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6.6 KiB
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Trustwave SpiderLabs Security Advisory TWSL2013-021:
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Multiple Vulnerabilities in Karotz Smart Rabbit
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Published: 08/01/13
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Version: 1.0
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Vendor: Electronic Arts (http://www.ea.com/), formerly Mindscape, formerly Violet
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Product: Karotz
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Version affected: 12.07.19.00
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Product description:
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Karotz is the successor to the "Nabaztag". Nabaztag is a Wi-Fi enabled
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ambient electronic device in the shape of a rabbit, invented by Rafi
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Haladjian and Olivier Mével, and manufactured by the company Violet.[1]
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Nabaztag was designed to be a "smart object" comparable to those
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manufactured by Ambient Devices; it can connect to the Internet (to
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download weather forecasts, read its owner's email, etc.). It is also
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customizable and programmable to an extent.
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Finding 1: Python Module Hijacking
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*****Credit: Daniel Crowley of Trustwave SpiderLabs
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CVE: CVE-2013-4867
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CWE: CWE-427
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During the setup process for a Karotz unit, if wifi is selected as the
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method used to connect to the Internet, a python script named "autorunwifi"
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is run as root to set up the wifi connectivity. This file, along with
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several others, is placed in the root of a USB flash drive or hard drive.
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Another file, named "autorunwifi.sig", contains a signature of autorunwifi
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signed with the private key for Violet, to prevent modifications to the
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"autorunwifi" script.
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Since Python first attempts to load modules not built into Python from the
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same directory as the invoked script, it is possible to override the
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functionality of imported modules by placing a file with the same basename
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as the module being imported and an extension of ".py". In this case, it is
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possible to write a Python script named "simplejson.py" and place it in the
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same directory as the other setup files, which will cause the contents of
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simplejson.py to be executed at the beginning of the "autorunwifi" script
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execution.
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This attack requires a USB flash drive to be plugged into the Karotz unit,
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and requires the Karotz to be turned off and on.
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The following is a proof of concept "simplejson.py" file that will copy the
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pubring.gpg file from the Karotz onto the inserted USB key, which is
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processed with MD5 to produce the key used to decrypt the root filesystem
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for the Karotz:
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## simplejson.py
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import os
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os.system("cp /karotz/etc/gpg/pubring.gpg /mnt/usbkey")
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## end simplejson.py
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Finding 2: API Session Token Passed in Cleartext
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*****Credit: Daniel Crowley of Trustwave SpiderLabs
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CVE: CVE-2013-4868
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There are two kinds of applications for the Karotz: hosted and external.
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Hosted applications are stored and run on the Karotz itself. External
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applications run outside the Karotz unit and control the Karotz through an
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api at api.karotz.com. Both types of applications must specifically request
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to use parts of the karotz in the manifest file of their application
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package. For instance, if your application uses the webcam and ears, you
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must specify in your application manifest that these will be used by your
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application before they will be available to your application.
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The control is performed over plaintext HTTP. As such, the session token
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authenticating API calls used to control the Karotz is available to an
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eavesdropping attacker. The session token can be used to perform any remote
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API call available to the application. For instance, if the application
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uses the webcam, a video could be captured using the webcam and sent to an
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arbitrary server.
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Vendor Response:
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No response received.
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Remediation Steps:
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No official patch is available. To limit exposure,
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network access to these devices should be limited to authorized
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personnel through the use of Access Control Lists and proper
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network segmentation.
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Revision History:
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06/19/13 - Attempt to contact vendor
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07/10/13 - Attempt to contact vendor
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07/12/13 - Attempt to contact vendor
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08/01/13 - Advisory published
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Additional Credits:
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Discussion of Python module loading behavior and initial suggestion of
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application to Karotz by Jennifer Savage
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References
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1. http://www.karotz.com
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2. http://savagejen.github.io/blog/2013/04/28/python-module-hijacking/
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About Trustwave:
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Trustwave is the leading provider of on-demand and subscription-based
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information security and payment card industry compliance management
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solutions to businesses and government entities throughout the world. For
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organizations faced with today's challenging data security and compliance
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environment, Trustwave provides a unique approach with comprehensive
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solutions that include its flagship TrustKeeper compliance management
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software and other proprietary security solutions. Trustwave has helped
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thousands of organizations--ranging from Fortune 500 businesses and large
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financial institutions to small and medium-sized retailers--manage
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compliance and secure their network infrastructure, data communications and
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critical information assets. Trustwave is headquartered in Chicago with
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offices throughout North America, South America, Europe, Africa, China and
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Australia. For more information, visit https://www.trustwave.com
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About Trustwave SpiderLabs:
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SpiderLabs(R) is the advanced security team at Trustwave focused on
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application security, incident response, penetration testing, physical
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security and security research. The team has performed over a thousand
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incident investigations, thousands of penetration tests and hundreds of
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application security tests globally. In addition, the SpiderLabs Research
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team provides intelligence through bleeding-edge research and proof of
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concept tool development to enhance Trustwave's products and services.
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https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs
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Disclaimer:
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The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without
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warranty of any kind. Trustwave disclaims all warranties, either express or
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implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
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particular purpose. In no event shall Trustwave or its suppliers be liable
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for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental,
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consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if
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Trustwave or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such
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damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability
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for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not
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apply.
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________________________________
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This transmission may contain information that is privileged, confidential, and/or exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the information contained herein (including any reliance thereon) is STRICTLY PROHIBITED. If you received this transmission in error, please immediately contact the sender and destroy the material in its entirety, whether in electronic or hard copy format. |